

A Theory on the Rise and Fall of Resistance in Civil Wars

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation develops a theory on the strategic interaction between civilians and combatants in war zones. It builds on the emerging field of research on noncombatant self-protection mechanisms in civil wars and addresses two questions: first, once civilians have decided to organize a resistance campaign, why do they choose armed or unarmed methods of struggle? Second, how do armed groups respond to this challenge? Regarding resistance strategies, I argue norms against the use of violence determine the content of a campaign when a community depends on an external ally to organize the mobilization and such an actor has strong preferences for peaceful activism. Strategic factors (e.g., rebels' reputation) are determinant when norm entrepreneurs are absent or fail to influence the community. Concerning groups' reaction to a resistance campaign, the dissertation conducts one of the first comparisons of the effectiveness of these strategies. To do so, it advances a typology that distinguishes between moderate (i.e., protests) and radical strategies (either unarmed or armed self-protection) and proposes two game-theoretic models of the civilian-combatant interaction in war zones. These models predict that rebels are more likely to repress radical rather than moderate strategies.

The dissertation tests this theory with statistical methods and a novel dataset on resistance campaigns in Colombia (1985-2005). It explores the Catholic Church's promotion of peaceful activism against the war in this country and tests the theory on the civilian choice of strategy with multilevel multinomial models. This empirical method yields robust evidence to the theory: when encountering a rebel group with a negative reputation, civilians are more likely to organize violent self-protection rather than peaceful

activism. In contrast, when there is a powerful third party with the leverage and resolution to promote nonviolent action, civilians are more willing to undertake a peaceful mobilization rather than create a militia. The empirical expectations concerning the warring parties' reaction to civilian dissent are examined with methods for causal inference with panel data. The dissertation corroborates that protests can compel insurgents to make concessions to the population. In contrast, rebels tend to harshly retaliate against communities that escalate a campaign with violent tactics.

DEDICATION

To *Abba*.

My strength, victory, and inspiration.

To my wife, Ana; and my kids, Joshua, and Luciana.

You have made the greatest sacrifice. Without your love and support, I could not have started and finished this project.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation aims to deepen our understanding of the strategic behavior of civilians in irregular wars. Challenging the view of civilians as passive agents amid the hostilities that dominated this literature, conflict scholars have recently explained the conditions under which noncombatants stay put in a disputed territory, withdraw their support to warring parties, and impose costs on these armies to bargain with them concessions for the population. This emergent field of research on the noncombatants' strategic behavior in civil wars has produced a wealth of knowledge on the *origins* of resistance mobilizations, such as protests campaigns against the war or local militias. However, few studies have investigated the civilian choice of resistance strategy, the effectiveness of these campaigns to reduce violence, and other critical aspects of this phenomenon. To move forward with this research program, this study explores two intertwined dimensions of the *trajectories* of civilian resistance movements. First, once noncombatants have decided to organize overt dissent against the conflict, how do they determine the methods of struggle against the warring parties? Second, and on the flip side of the coin, how do armed groups respond to this challenge? Under what conditions do they repress or cede to civilians' demand of restraint in the use of violence?

To address these questions, the dissertation proffers and examines a new two-part theory of the contentious interaction between dissident civilians and combatants in warzones. Regarding resistance strategies, I argue that while both strategic and normative factors shape the civilian decision-making process of tactics and demands raised to armed

groups, norms against the use of violence trump cost-benefit calculations when a community depends on an external ally to organize the mobilization and such an actor has strong preferences for the use of nonviolence in political conflict. Strategic factors are determinant when these external organizers are absent or fail to influence the community. Concerning the armed groups' reaction to this challenge, the dissertation conducts one of the first comparisons of the effectiveness of violent and nonviolent resistance strategies in the literature. To do so, I advanced a typology that distinguishes between moderate (i.e., protests) and radical resistance strategies (either nonviolent self-protection or armed self-defense) and propose two game-theoretic models of the interaction between civilian activists and rebels in the context of a resistance campaign. These formal models predict that armed groups are more (less) likely to repress (accommodate) radical rather than moderate strategies. The two sides of the theory are rigorously tested with statistical methods and a novel dataset collected for the dissertation on civilian resistance campaigns in the Colombian civil war (1985-2005).

The rest of this introduction contains three segments. The next section provides a background to the research project and describes its research objectives and significance. The second part defines the object of study, the scope of the argument, and the empirical strategy of the dissertation. Finally, the third segment outlines the contents of the following chapters.

1.1 An Emergent Field of Research in Conflict Studies

Civilian collective strategies to navigate and influence contexts of large-scale political violence have been at the forefront of the current research in conflict studies. Propelled by

the research agenda on the micro-dynamics of civil war, scholars, such as Weinstein (2006), Mampilly (2011), Arjona (2015), and Arjona et al (2014), explored the critical role of civilian (non)cooperation in the advancement of the organizational goals of the warring parties, especially those who aim to govern the population in their areas under control. Notably, Arjona (2014; 2015) introduced a theory of rebel governance that promoted civilian resistance as a pivotal explanatory factor: when civilians have the capacity and willingness to reject armed groups' attempt to rule a territory, the latter has either to bargain a better arrangement with the population, back down, or try to crush the dissident mobilization. By so doing, this study also proposed a seminal account of the conditions explaining the onset of civilian dissent against war and fostered new research on the effect of civilian resistance on rebels' territorial control, the building of government institutions, and responsiveness to local constituencies (see, e.g., Rubin 2020; Van Baalen 2021).

Another piece that decisively promoted the emergence of this new research program is Kaplan's (2017) study of nonviolent mobilizations against the war in Colombia. The author proposed a three-part theory that explained not only the origins of these campaigns, but also civilians' capacity to shape the violent behavior of the armed organizations. This piece built upon the work of scholars of peace communities in conflict driven areas (Hernández 2004; Hancock and Mitchell 2007; Anderson and Wallace 2012; García 2005; Bouvier 2006, among others), but provided a rigorous explanation and test of the mechanisms linking nonviolent action with armed groups' use of anti-civilian violence that was unprecedented in this literature. Thus, this work established civilian resistance as a proper object of study in the mainstream discipline -that is, as a phenomenon that requires

an explanation in its own right-. Other scholars have also elucidated key dimensions of this phenomenon, treated either as the outcome variable or explanatory factors of other conflict dynamics (e.g., Jentsch 2014; 2021; Shubiger 2021; Fumerton 2002; Moreno 2017; 2021; Masullo 2020; 2021).

Overall, the academic community has thoroughly investigated the conditions governing the emergence of civilian resistance. Most studies agree that a stalemate in a locality under military competition facilitates the onset of civilian noncooperative campaigns, specifically when a former dominant rebel group is unable to protect the civilian population from high levels of indiscriminate violence by a challenging pro-government force (Jentsch 2014; Shubiger 2014; Blocq 2014; Stoll 1993; Fumerton 2001; Hernández 2004; Masullo 2017; Kaplan 2017). In this context, residents have strong incentives to withdraw allegiance to both warring parties and face the dilemma of whether to flee or launch a mobilization to push back the operators of violence in a territory. Civilians can solve the collective action problem related to coordinating a resistance campaign via social capital and strong pre-existing organizations in the community, the presence of legitimate institutions, or by the action of resourceful local elites (Arjona 2014; Kaplan 2017; Jentsch 2014).

Yet, little research has been conducted on the trajectories of these mobilizations (see, as an exception Jentsch 2021; Kaplan 2017; Moreno 2017). This dissertation contributes to this literature by exploring the interaction between combatants and civilians after a resistance mobilization has been put in place. I argue inquiring about the kinds of strategies employed in a campaign and the reaction of the targeted groups to this challenge

is relevant not only for its normative implications (i.e., the capacity of a community to self-provide order and security amid a confrontation), but also because the decisions of both actors at this stage of the mobilization critically shape its development, including its decline and institutional legacies.

Another major limitation of this literature is that most studies have treated peaceful mobilizations and self-defense militias as different phenomena rather than alternative courses of action. Knowledge of the object of study of the dissertation has progressed mostly in two parallel agendas. Thus, while scholars of this area have evidenced that each type of strategy can compel warring parties to make concessions to the population (Kaplan 2017; Moreno 2017; Clayton and Thomson 2014; Peic 2014); our knowledge in this field is still limited by the lack of a unified framework to compare the effectiveness of each strategy vis-à-vis its counterparts. Some scholars have advanced typologies of resistance strategies that integrate both violent and nonviolent strategies (Petersen 2001; Arjona 2017; Barter 2014; Masullo 2021b), and few others have even addressed the question of the factors shaping the civilian choice of methods of struggle (Masullo 2021a; Zech 2016; Kaplan 2017). Yet almost no study has tested theories on civilian resistance with large-N data on the whole spectrum of resistance strategies. Even the canonical explanation of the onset of resistance described above has not been examined with a representative sample of violent and nonviolent campaigns.

The dissertation aims to fill these gaps theoretically and empirically. First, in the theoretical realm, I build upon the typologies of resistance strategies advanced by conflict scholars and propose three prototypes of mobilizations that cover a full range of demands

and tactics. This typology allows me to explore the bargaining range of civilians and rebels in the context of a resistance campaign and derive implications in terms of accommodative and repressive tactics employed by armed groups to prevent or crush the escalation of methods by dissident civilians. In the empirical realm, I collected one of the first datasets on the whole spectrum of resistance strategies. To date, the best data on the phenomenon of study contains information exclusively on one type of strategy, either nonviolent action (Chenoweth et al 2019; Salehyan et al 2012; García 2006) or militia activity (Carey et al 2013). I exploited a large amount of data on subnational campaigns of peaceful activism against the war in Colombia and complemented this information with a pioneering effort of data collection on community-initiated militias, a phenomenon traditionally neglected in the conflict literature on this country (except for Peñaranda 2016; 2015).

1.2 Overview of the Dissertation

1.2.1 The Theoretical Approach

Object of Study

This dissertation defines civilian resistance as a self-protection mobilization aimed to curb the levels of violence against the inhabitants of a territory through the imposition of costs on warring parties of a civil conflict by an organization or an ad hoc collectivity of noncombatants. This collective and noncooperative dissident behavior excludes other strategic behavior such as allegiance, neutrality, and migration (Arjona 2017; Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2021b)¹.

¹ Based on this definition, I distinguish civilian resistance from other contentious phenomena occurring during a civil war. Despite some conflict scholars have explored the role of what Scott (1985) calls ‘weapons of the weak’ or everyday resistance against armed groups (e.g., see Barter 2014; Masullo 2021b), the dissertation does not study individual, private, and low-risk actions of dissent against the war. Neither civilian

While further chapters will define in more detail three different resistance strategies, it is possible to aggregate these types in the traditional division between violent and nonviolent methods. Violent resistance is related to the activities of a grassroots self-defense mobilization engaged in clashes, patrolling, or unilateral actions against combatants and alleged local supporters of the armed groups. This definition has two salient features. First, it emphasizes the bottom-up dimension of the movement. I focus on community-initiated militias with a local membership (i.e., members are recruited, stationed, and active within their communities), an agenda of self-protection and security, and no subordination to another military organization (Jentzsch 2014: 22-4; Clayton and Thomson 2014: 921; Carey and Mitchell 2018: 5). Thus, state-initiated paramilitaries, militias created by non-state armed actors to delegate territorial control to local supporters, and private security guards of drug lords, e.g., are out of the scope of this study. Second, this definition implies no support for the state. Unlike Jentzsch et al (754) and Jentzsch (2014: 21), I do not restrict the object of study to pro-government militias. Civilians can also organize violent resistance against the state and other non-state armed groups (Pizarro 1991; Osorio et al 2020).

Per this study, nonviolent resistance is observed when civilians resort to collective disobedience and/or nonviolent collective actions (Sharp 1973). Collective disobedience corresponds to Sharp's tactics of noncooperation or intervention in the social, political, or economic realms of the community, despite an armed group's rule or in opposition to the

resistance is national campaigns of nonviolent or violent struggle against the regime by dissident movements (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Whereas the latter campaigns focus on maximalist goals (e.g., defeating the regime), this study focuses on campaigns with a minimalist agenda in which the crucial goal is assuring the survival of the inhabitants of contested territories.

presence of this army in the territory. In addition, the creation and management by civilians of sanctuaries amid warzones are other tactics of disobedience and self-government (Hancock and Mitchell 2007). Nonviolent collective actions are protests, demonstrations, and direct actions undertaken by noncombatants to denounce the actions or the presence of warring parties. Collective negotiations between groups and civilians are also considered an expression of this nonviolent tactic (Kaplan 2017).

Assumptions

The dissertation's theoretical approach relies on three assumptions. First, it assumes that noncombatants and militants are self-interested actors with bounded rationality. That is, when they encounter a choice between an individual and a collective goal, they will prefer the first one over the latter (Hechter 1987: 6). Foremost, they are primarily concerned with maximizing their odds of survival and personal security (Mason 1996; Kalyvas 2006; Kaplan 2017). Yet, while civilians are rational actors, they also consider normative and social motivations in their strategic decisions (Taylor 1988: 68; Ostrom 2007: 202; Opp 2009). In fact, civilians may lack complete information about actor actors' preferences and strategies, hence they use heuristics, common knowledge, and other contextual clues like reputation and past behavior to assess their actions' consequences and contenders' reactions (Ostrom 2007: 195-196)². This assumption is helpful, e.g., to disregard the

² In situations of extreme uncertainty about the reaction of their counterparts, civilians and combatants can even be modeled as agents in evolutionary game theories; "Their behavior is driven by rules of thumb, social norms, conventions, analogies with similar situations, or by other, possibly more complex, systems for converting stimuli into actions" (Samuelson 1997: 15). In interactions that are important and repeated frequently, players are expected to pay more attention, "adjust their behavior, rejecting choices that appear to give low payoffs in favor of choices that give high payoffs. The result is a process of experimenting and groping about for something that seems to work" (15).

expressive dimension of resistance and to examine the conditions under which civilians expect to mitigate the risks of the conflict with a given strategy (Kaplan 2017).

While rationality is the point of departure, norms and uncertainty play a major role in the theory advanced in this dissertation. To begin, I argue that norms may critically influence the civilian decision for a given type of method of struggle. I explain how influential and resourceful local actors or powerful external allies can work as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and promote, impose, or enforce the use of nonviolent methods of struggle in resistance campaigns. Empirically, I explore the role of one of the most important champions of peaceful activism in Colombia since the 1990s, the Catholic Church, and describe how hierarchs and rank-and-file of this religious sector were pivotal for the creation of an ‘infrastructure of nonviolent resistance’ in this country. I further provide quantitative evidence of how the variation in the Catholic Church’s promotion of nonviolence strongly correlates with the choice of this strategy.

On the other hand, uncertainty permeates localities heavily affected by the conflict and has a determinant part in the explanation of both research questions. Notably, in the game-theoretic models advanced in this study, I theorize lack of information on the contenders’ resolution to fight for changing (defending) the status quo is a pivotal variable explaining the success or failure of moderate and radical resistance campaigns. Returning to the first question, uncertainty about the type of rebel group that a community in resistance may encounter is also relevant to explaining the choice of strategy. I argue an armed group’s reputation can influence civilians’ assessment of the expected utility of each strategy. In the test of this theory, I found support for the idea that rebels with worse

reputations are more likely to encounter violent resistance, especially in the early stages of the Colombian civil conflict (1985-1992).

The theory's second cornerstone is the notion that the relationship between militants and noncombatants in irregular wars resembles that of ruler and ruled (Arjona 2017: 756; Weinstein 2006: 167). This idea has implications for both actors in the territory. For the ruler, civilian obedience is pivotal for the administration of territory and combatants will try to earn this support through multiple mechanisms including violence and governance (Arjona 2017: 764-9). Regarding the subordinates, it is always reasonable to expect some degree of civilian dissent against armed groups' rule (763). Peaceful resistance can be modeled as a reformist tactic raised to demand the re-establishment of the status quo (Uribe de Hincapié 2006: 74; Moreno 2017: 4) or to bargain new limits to the groups' influence over the local affairs (Uribe de Hincapié 2006: 75; Arjona 2014). In contrast, violent resistance is theorized as a burn-the-ships tactic oriented to subvert or seriously limit the group's territorial control. As mentioned before, I further develop these categories in a typology and theorize how their level of disruptiveness influences armed groups' response to civilian dissent.

Finally, the theory omits the research question about the conditions that compelled civilians to launch a resistance mobilization. The dissertation only assumes that civilians are willing and capable to launch a resistance campaign and are at the stage of deciding its content. However, two aspects of the origin of a civilian dissident mobilization against the war are critical for the dissertation. First, the theory has a path-dependency approach and contends that the history of the civilian-combatant interaction before the escalation of the

conflict is relevant to explaining the decisions and actions of dissident civilians. Especially, I focus on two wartime institutions created by rebel organizations that aim to govern the population in areas under their control: the provision of public order (Wickham-Crowley 2014) and the co-administration of local affairs with representatives of the population (Weinstein 2006). I argue these institutions mold rebels' reputations and provide a point of reference for dissident civilians on the expected degree to which the targeted group will respond to the demands of the campaign or defy the mobilization.

The second variable related to the origins of the campaign that the dissertation employs is the internal structure of the resistance community. In contrast to other accounts of this phenomenon, I do not treat the civilian population as a homogeneous mass of individuals. First, I claim that every campaign -even the most spontaneous and contingent one- is initiated by a resistance proto-organization³, that is, a group of civilian activists who have decided to organize collective action against the warring parties of a civil war. These first movers undertake the most basic tasks at this stage of the mobilization, such as blaming armed groups for the grievances related to the armed conflict, deliberating about the best methods of struggle, and coordinating the undertaking of the collective action. Moreover, a paramount goal of the proto-organization is to mobilize a minimum threshold of support from the rest of the members of the community to curtail the risk of repression by the warring parties (Petersen 2001: 24). To do so, civilian activists will try either to

³ Case studies of resistance campaigns in Colombia are crowded with descriptions about the activities and role of these 'first movers' in the early stages of a campaign. To mention only two emblematic cases, consider the group led by Josué Vargas that later created the peaceful *Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare* (ATCC) in Cimitarra (Santander) (GMH 2011) or the shotgunners led by Ramón Isaza in Magdalena Medio (CNMH 2020).

recruit the greater number of inhabitants as active participants of the mobilization or at least to persuade them to consider the campaign as a ‘public good’⁴. In addition, I also disaggregate the civilian community into two additional categories, local elites (e.g., ranchers, landowners, merchants, etc.) and subordinate groups (i.e., ethnic minorities, peasants, urban settlers). I argue that campaigns led by local elites are more likely to organize violent resistance even in the presence of external allies with strong preferences to promote nonviolent activism in the community.

Scope Conditions

The two parts of the theory advanced in the dissertation are bounded to civilian-combatant interactions in contexts of irregular civil wars. While certain aspects of the behavior of these actors can apply to the behavior of residents in disputed areas between the state and other kinds of nonstate armed actors (such as drug cartels), critical assumptions of the study are grounded on theories of civil wars (Kalyvas 2006; Mason 1996; Arjona 2014; 2015; 2016; Weinstein 2006; among others). Furthermore, this theory applies to internal conflicts in which rebels aim to govern the population rather than cleansing the territory from stubborn, noncooperative inhabitants. Thus, the theory’s explanatory capacity is severely limited when dissident civilians encounter ‘genocidal’ warring parties in a civil conflict – these are armies that have made an ideological decision to annihilate an antagonistic social group- (Kaplan 2017: 58). In contrast, the theory is more likely to account for cases in

⁴ A proto-organization composed of members of a relatively homogeneous community or a coalition between local elites and subordinate classes will be more likely to succeed at this attempt, than a proto-organization led exclusively by one of these classes in a community with an unequal distribution of power. Following Coleman (1990), I call a ‘conjoint structure’ when resistance activists can mobilize the support of most of the community and a ‘disjoint structure’ when there is an intra-community cleavage between those who consider themselves as beneficiaries of the mobilization and those who perceive it as a ‘public bad’.

which rebels operated as *de facto* rulers in liberated areas and later engaged in a dispute for the territory with pro-government forces.

On the other hand, this theory is specially designed to explain the interaction between civilians and rebels in warzones. While the strategic context of localities in civil wars involves at least three parties (including pro-government forces), the theory prioritizes the interaction with the insurgencies. This theoretical decision is oriented to maximize the comparability between violent and nonviolent campaigns given that most community-initiated militias are organized to fight rebel groups rather than the state, at least in the contemporary Colombian civil war⁵. However, pro-government forces play a role in the theory (although not as the main ‘players’) and violence related to the state forces and paramilitaries is included in the statistical analysis.

1.2.2 The Empirical Approach

Methodology

The dissertation examines these two sides of the theory with a single-country subnational comparison based on the Colombian civil war. I use disaggregated data on violence, institutions, and resistance campaigns to test the empirical implications of the dissertation with quantitative methods for causal inference and multilevel modeling. The information on the object of study of the dissertation comes from the Organized Dissent Against War (ODAW), a novel dataset on civilian resistance campaigns in Colombia, in the 1985-2005 period, based on academic sources and national newspapers. Few scholars have collected

⁵ This situation has not been always the norm in Colombia. In the previous civil war, known as *La Violencia* (1948-1958), peasants created self-defense organizations to protect themselves from the two warring parties, but especially from the violence led by the military and the police under the Conservative regime (Pizarro 1991; Medina 1986).

large samples of civilian collective actions against armed groups and the datasets available are usually limited to nonviolent protests. In contrast, ODAW includes information on both types of strategies and the whole cycle of mobilization (onset, trajectory, and decline).

Colombia as Case Study

The contemporary conflict in Colombia has its roots in the period of *La Violencia* -a civil war fought through party lines between 1948 and 1958- but began in 1964 with the creation of the rebel group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC in Spanish) (CNMH 2013: 121). A decade later, by 1974, the country had in total four national-scale Marxist insurgent groups apart from FARC: two of rural basis, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL); and the urban-based, 19th of April Movement (M-19)(130). The period of marginalization that featured this early stage of the conflict dramatically changed in the mid-1980s with the first national project of paramilitarism led by a coalition of the military, drug cartels, and cattle ranchers that directed the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Puerto Boyacá (ACPB) and the private army, Death to Kidnappers (MAS). These groups undertook a campaign of ‘dirty war’ and political violence against leftist militants, social leaders, and human rights advocates (139-143). Parallely, the rebel groups expanded throughout the national territory, boosted by the control of illegal rents related to drug trafficking, extortion of the oil industry, and kidnapping (135).

The country had a short period of improvement in the security conditions with the demise of ACPB and MAS, and chiefly with the peace accord with the two minor guerrillas, M19 and EPL (148-50). Since 1996, however, the country experienced the worse years of degradation of the conflict. Whereas FARC tried to launch a ‘war of

position' against the state with devastating consequences for the population in towns under attack, a new federation of paramilitaries consolidated its national presence with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) (158-62). After the failure of the negotiations with FARC, the state launched a new military offensive that escalated the warfare with severe death tolls until the demobilization of AUC in 2005 (175-7).


While the data collected for this dissertation do not systematically cover the period before 1985, anecdotal evidence suggests that a common technology of resistance during the early stages of the conflict and especially in the countryside was the creation of self-defense groups. In fact, two of the main nonstate armed actors of the civil war, FARC and several paramilitary groups such as ACPB, emerged out of regional self-defense groups created to protect peasant communities from campaigns of state repression (Pizarro 1991; Medina 1986), or to defend the property and integrity of landed elites from rebel predatory practices (CNMH 2020a; 2020b), respectively.

Moreover, during the first period of the conflict, both warring parties -but especially the state- promoted self-defense organizations among communities in warzones. Since the late 1960s, the Colombian government developed an institutional framework (the Decree 3398 of 1965 and the Law 48 of 1968) to promote local militias against the insurgency (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2016: 148). The military used entities created for different institutional goals, such as civic safety committees or civil defense groups (the latter created to cope with the impact of natural disasters), to provide weapons and military training to ranchers, merchants, or local leaders (148-51). Several emblematic self-defense groups were facilitated by the military, but led by landed elites (e.g., the ACPB);

charismatic local leaders such as the police inspector of the village of San Juan del Bosco in San Vicente del Chucurí (CNMH 2019); or even members of subordinate classes, such as the indigenous-led groups in the villages of Ortega in Cajibío (Cauca) (CNMH 2018) and Gaitania in Planadas (Tolima) (Barros and Padilla 2017). On the other hand, rebels like M-19 provided weapons, training, and support to left-wing indigenous militias that protected the authorities of the Nasa people in Cauca from vigilantes' violence in a period of intense activism in land reclamation, by the late 1970s (Peñaranda 2006; 2015).

Yet, in contrast to other Latin American civil wars such as Perú or Guatemala, where case studies suggest that local militias prevailed as the most frequent method of civilian self-protection (Fumerton 2001; Starn 1999; Stoll 1993), rural and urban communities in Colombia innovated with forms of nonviolent action that ranged from massive protests campaigns, human rights organizations, and sanctuaries. In fact, since the early 1990s unarmed self-protection has been the most widespread type of resistance in Colombia (**Figure 1.1**).

Figure 1.1 Resistance Strategies in Colombia (1985-2005)




Notes: Temporal variation of the presence of resistance strategies in Colombia. See Chapter 3 for a detailed definition of protest, sanctuary, and self-defense organization (or militia).
Source: Campaigns of civilian resistance from ODAW V1.0 (09/15/2021).

To begin, in response to the wave of repression against the Left in the 1980s, the population responded with large rural mobilizations to capital cities called ‘peasant exodus’, the organization of human rights committees, and the forging of rural-urban alliances between activists of the resistance. An emblematic example of these kinds of campaigns is the Popular Coordinator in Barrancabermeja that from 1987 to 1996 agglutinated 23 organizations, including the country's largest oil industry union, to sustain a tenacious resistance against the expansion of the paramilitaries in Magdalena Medio (van Isschot 2015: 143-6). Another illustrative case of this period is the nonviolent mobilization against FARC and the indigenous-led insurgency, the Quintin Lame Armed Movement

(MAQL in Spanish), led by the Misak people from Cauca. From 1984 and until 1990, the Indigenous Authorities of Southwest -led by this community- was one of the first ethnic organizations that openly rejected the interference of the insurgency in the indigenous councils, demanded neutrality to all the warring parties, and exposed rebel assassinations of leaders in massive mobilizations (CNMH 2012: 197-8).

Other three paradigmatic campaigns were the Association of Peasant Workers of Carare (ATCC in Spanish) created in 1987 in Santander; the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó (CPSJA) in Urabá antioqueño created in 1997; and the Mogotes Constituent Assembly of 1998 (Nieto 2010), which will be further discussed in the dissertation. These mobilizations innovated nonviolent, but still radical tactics and demands against paramilitaries, rebels, and state forces. The new repertoire of actions, resources, and rhetorical weapons employed in these campaigns was imitated and adapted by communities in warzones across the country (**Map 1**).

Map 1.1 Resistance Strategies in Colombia (1985-2005)



Notes: Municipalities that reported a civilian resistance campaign with one of the three types of strategy at least one year during the 1985-2005 period.

Source: Campaigns of civilian resistance from ODAW V1.0 (09/15/2021).

All in all, Colombia provides enough spatial and temporal variation in resistance strategies that facilitates the test of the dissertation's empirical expectations.

Limitations

While the empirical strategy yields robust and mostly positive support to the two sides of the dissertation's argument, further research needs to strengthen the results of this study on two fronts. First, case study methods can be employed to confirm and refine the theory and further explore the causal mechanisms in place in the civilian choice of strategy or the armed groups' reaction to civilian dissent. Colombia offers a wide variety of subnational case studies that can fill this vacuum in the dissertation. For instance, a deep examination

of the role of the Catholic Church to influence the civilian decision for nonviolence in the region of Urabá antioqueño can provide what Gerring and Cojocarú (2016: 405) name a *pathway case study*. As another example, the dissertation project had designed a qualitative component that included the comparison of the trajectory of three indigenous communities that organized militias in the early stage of the conflict but two of them changed their strategies in the late 1990s and early 2000⁶.

Second, it is necessary to further explore the degree to which the theory explains other irregular civil conflicts. This limitation can be coped with without losing the subnational scale of analysis, e.g., by comparing Colombia with similar countries such as the Philippines, in what Sellers (2019: 93) calls *replicatory multiple country subnational comparison*. This design is used to test the external validity of a subnational analysis between countries with key similarities (93).

1.3 Roadmap

The rest of the dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part comprises the theoretical argument. Chapter 2 explains the choice of resistance strategy by dissident civilians in internal conflicts. It challenges the two dominant explanations of this phenomenon in the literature: the theory that the content of a resistance campaign is explained exclusively by the prevailing norms about the use of violence in a community (Masullo 2021a), and the opposite idea that civilians rely mostly on utilitarian considerations about the effectiveness of a given strategy (Kaplan 2017). It proposes a socialization theory of the choice of strategy that aims to bridge these two camps. It argues that normative factors prevail over

⁶ This fieldwork was scheduled for the summer of 2020, but was cancelled due to the global pandemic of Covid-19.

strategic considerations when a community depends on an external ally or local political entrepreneurs to organize the mobilization and this actor has the capacity and willingness to promote a certain type of strategy. Based on a vast literature on ‘norm cycles’ and ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Coleman 1990; Hechter and Opp 2001; Bicchieri 2005; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, etc.), the chapter explains how and the conditions under which internal or external actors can promote nonviolent resistance in a civil war. In the absence of such norm activists (or when they fail to promote a certain type of political activism against the war), I claim that civilians will resort to strategic factors, such as the reputation of the former dominant group in the territory. Rebels with worse reputation are more likely to encounter violent resistance than their counterparts (Degregori et al 1996; Starn 1999).

Chapter 3 builds on the current literature of dissident-repression nexus to explore the willingness of a challenged rebel group to repress or accommodate a civilian resistance campaign. First, based on DeNardo’s (1985) definition of strategy and the description of actions and demands raised by civilians against armed organizations -especially Arjona’s work (2011; 2014; 2015; 2017), the chapter proposes a typology of resistance that distinguishes between one moderate, nonviolent strategy (protest), and two radical methods of struggle: nonviolent self-protection or sanctuary and violent self-protection or a community-initiated militia. I use these categories to build two formal models of unilateral deterrence in the context of civilian resistance: one of violent escalation (from protest to militia), and another of nonviolent escalation (from protest to sanctuary). Overall, these models predict that rebels are more likely to repress either type of radical strategy instead of the moderate.

The second part tests the theory. Chapter 4 describes the concept construction, operationalization of key dimensions of analysis, coding process, and the summary statistics of the dataset on civilian resistance campaigns collected for the dissertation. Chapter 5 examines the socialization theory of the civilian choice of resistance strategy with multilevel and multinomial models. The chapter studies the role of the Catholic Church as a key champion of nonviolent civilian resistance in Colombia (Ramírez 2015; García 2008). It exploits the temporal variation of the Catholic activism in nonviolence and conduct two tests for the theory. In the early stages of the conflict (1964-late 1980s), the religious organization played a minor role in the mobilization for peace in Colombia and I use this period as a proxy for the ‘absence’ of a third party at the national level with the determination and capacity to promote nonviolent action against the war. During the escalation of the conflict (1990s-2005), the ecclesiastic actor developed a coherent institutional policy to promote peace in this country and I employ this period to test the opposite situation. In both cases, I use disaggregated data on the Catholic Church activism for peace and find strong evidence to the two expectations of the theory. Chapter 6 employs a panel matching approach and a difference-in-difference method to compare towns with the presence of one of the three strategies proposed in Chapter 3 versus control units. I found strong support to the expectations of the unilateral deterrence game of violent resistance, but less support to the predictions about sanctuary.

Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the main findings of the dissertation and potential new research avenues in the program of civilian strategic behavior in civil wars.

CHAPTER 2

A CHOICE OF WEAPONS. EXPLAINING THE CIVILIAN CHOICE OF DISSIDENT STRATEGY AGAINST WAR

Consider these civilian resistance campaigns in the town of Apartadó (Antioquia), Colombia:

Case 1. As part of the peace agreement with the Colombian government in March 1991, the former rebel group EPL created the political party, Hope, Peace, and Liberty (aka, *Esperanzados*, in Spanish), to capitalize its popular support in regions such as Urabá Antioqueño. Yet, an EPL-splinter group and FARC launched a violent campaign against *Esperanzados* and their social basis in this region (Carroll 2011: 94). While inhabitants from Apartadó and the rest of Urabá massively protested these crimes and leaders of the new party held meetings with rebel commanders to reach an agreement of no aggression, one year after its demobilization, 40 EPL ex-militants were killed in Colombia, and several were kidnapped by the splinter group in Urabá (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2013: 230). In reaction, in March 1992, EPL former rebels created in Apartadó the first of five self-defense groups known as *Comandos Populares* (CP) that would operate in the region (230). After the FARC's 1994 massacre of La Chinita in Apartadó, the CP finally joined the paramilitaries (230).

Case 2. In March 1997, inhabitants from the corregimiento of San José de Apartadó created a peace zone to protect themselves from the decline in security conditions after the arrival to Urabá in 1995 of the paramilitary, Field Workers Self-Defenders of Córdoba and

Urabá (ACCU in Spanish) (Hernández 2004: 385). In response to the decision of the community, the military and ACCU clashed with FARC in the village, bombed the territory, and forcibly and massively displaced inhabitants to the urban area of Apartadó (386). This attack provoked a crisis in the civilian mobilization and put members of the peace zone in a dilemma whether to stay and resist or flee the territory (386). They chose the former option and continued active until today, but at a very high cost; violence against the peace zone remained high during the study period and even by 2004, the community denounced 114 members killed by pro-government forces (389).

Facing similar degrees of risks against their life, why did *Esperanzados* opted for violent self-protection while peasants in the second case created the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó (CPSJA in Spanish)? More broadly, once civilians have decided to organize open dissent against warring parties in a civil war, how do they determine the level of contention of their resistance strategies? Why do they choose violent or nonviolent methods of struggle? This chapter addresses these questions and builds a theory on the choice of civilian resistance strategy in civil wars.

While research on civilian strategic behavior in civil wars has boomed in the last decade (Arjona 2014; 2016; Kaplan 2017; Jentzsch et al 2015; Jentzsch 2022; Masullo 2021; Schubiger 2021; Steele 2017; 2011), few studies have modeled peaceful mobilizations and self-defense groups as alternative courses of action and have explained the conditions under which one method of struggle prevails over the other. The existent scholarship, however, contends that the civilian decision of resistance strategy is primarily shaped by either organizational factors (Jentzsh and Masullo 2018), normative and

ideational frameworks related to the use of violence (Masullo 2021; Zech 2016), or strategic interactions between militants and noncombatants (Kaplan 2017).

Based on DeNardo's (1985) implications of the theory of the power in numbers, the *organizational camp* predicts the occurrence of nonviolent resistance in communities with high organizational capabilities and violent resistance, otherwise. Yet, conflict scholars point out that self-defense organizations also need the support of the community to find 'safety in numbers' and prevent defection (Petersen 2001: 24), as well as access to costly organizational resources (coordination, cohesion, and manpower) to succeed (Kaplan 2017: 51). The *normative camp*, on the other hand, builds on Gurr's (1970) idea that political violence is backed up by normative and cultural frameworks that promote/justify it. While ideas and norms are critical to explaining individuals' resort to violence, prior research has also demonstrated that civilians make strategic considerations related to the perceived risk of their actions to navigate a conflict as illustrated in Case 1. Finally, the core of the *strategic* theories of resistance is the notion that civilians choose strategies based on the expectation that they can be effective to attain concessions from their rivals (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Shock 2005; Moreno 2017; Kaplan 2017; Zhukov 2013). Yet, this variable alone is not sufficient to elucidate unexpected cases where activists persist in the use of peaceful methods despite a high risk of death like the CPSJA in Case 2.

Alternatively, this chapter features a socialization theory of the choice of civilian resistance that combines strategic and normative factors. Socialization theories bridge rational choice and constructivism to argue that the degree of interiorization of norms,

ideas, and roles by members of an organization plays a critical role in shaping these individuals' behavior (Gates 2017; Checkel 2017). Those individuals lacking socialization in an organization's culture rely primarily on strategic motivations (Gates 2017: 679). In contrast, those who have internalized organization's norms and ideas via indoctrination or alteration of beliefs are willing to comply with the organization's goals even in the absence of enforcing mechanisms (679). Thus, e.g., armed groups that have successfully invested in socialization mechanisms are more likely to achieve allegiance despite military defeats (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2008), restrain combatants' use of violence against civilians (Green 2018), or even prevent desertion within forced conscripts (Gates 2017).

In this line, the chapter's main argument is that civilians' decision for a method of struggle is shaped by the expected effectiveness of a given strategy *vis-à-vis* its alternative, as well as the distribution of norms on the use of violence in the community. A community's normative structure is not the outcome of a random process. It depends on the leverage of organizations and/or political entrepreneurs with strong preferences about the use of one of these strategies. In the absence of these actors, civilians rely on strategic motivations. When these actors succeed at promoting and enforcing certain norms on the use of violence via a socialization mechanism, civilians are more willing to comply with the prescribed strategy by their patron.

In the first scenario, civilians use groups' reputation as a point of reference to weigh the consequences of their tactics. They will be more likely to choose nonviolent resistance when they expect to encounter an adversary to whom they can raise their 'voice' about its use of violence. Violent resistance is more likely when civilians encounter groups that carry

a negative reputation due to their previous use of indiscriminate violence, harsh enforcement of public order in liberated territories, and allowance of no civilian participation in local affairs (Manrique 1998; Degregori 1998). In the second scenario, norms can restrain the choice for a violent strategy even in the presence of authoritarian rivals (Gurr 1970; Voss 1995). Peaceful resistance is more likely, then, when external ally's commitment to nonviolence is strong and civilian dependence to this patron is high. This theory can explain Case 1 and Case 2 better than the three rival explanations.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section surveys the literature on the choice of strategy by dissident civilians in civil wars and by other activists in political conflicts against powerful rivals. The second section builds a three-part theory. First, while this chapter is not about the onset of civilian resistance campaigns in internal conflicts, the theory starts with critical assumptions about the origins of these mobilizations. Second, the theory explains how resistance activists devise their strategy in a context featured by the lack of norms against the use of violence. Finally, it expounds how norm entrepreneurs can alter the decision-making process of these civilian activists by promoting norms against the use of violence and details the conditions under which these norm makers are more likely to succeed in their initiative. The last section briefly describes how the dissertation tests the main two empirical implications of this theory.

2.1 Literature Review

Research on violent and nonviolent forms of civilian self-protection against large-scale political violence grew apart in two parallel agendas until recently⁷. A key step toward the

⁷ On the one hand, scholars from different disciplines have investigated the role of self-defense organizations in the struggle against totalitarian regimes -e.g., the Nazi rule in Europe- (Petersen 2001; Einwohner and

integration of the study of self-defense groups and peaceful resistance in internal conflicts in a unified research program was taken when conflict scholars developed comprehensive typologies of civilian strategic behavior in civil wars that transcended the dichotomy allegiance/defection (Petersen 2001; Arjona 2017; Barter 2014; Masullo 2021b). Even one step further, a few studies have directly addressed the question of the factors shaping the civilian choice of methods of struggle (Jentsch and Masullo 2018; Masullo 2021a; Zech 2016; Kaplan 2017). This section reviews these explanations and draws implications for the chapter's research question from studies on the choice of strategy by dissident activists in maximalist campaigns and other political conflicts. Overall, these theories can be classified into three camps depending on the weight attributed to the explanatory variables: organizational resources; norms and ideas; and strategic factors.

2.1.1 Theoretical Camps on the Study of Resistance Strategies

Scholars from the organizational camp raise two theories on the choice of strategy. The first one highlights the availability of resources -especially manpower- for the organizers of a resistance campaign. White et al (2015) propose, for instance, a two-steps model of the selection of tactics by dissident groups in maximalist campaigns in which grievances and organizational capacity are critical. In the first step, high degrees of grievances are critical because both rebels and nonviolent movements need to articulate maximalist

Maher 2011; Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), in civil wars such as Guatemala, Perú, Mozambique, and Russia (Stoll 1993; Starn 1998; Stern 1999; Jentsch 2013; Schubiger 2021; Fumerton 2001; Lyall 2010, among others), or cartel-state conflicts like in México (Osorio et al 2020; Dorf and Maves 2018; Lay et al 2019). On the other, inspired by the research on strategic nonviolent action in political conflicts (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2004; Sharp 1973), other scholars focused on the trajectory of peaceful campaigns in internal conflicts like Colombia or the Philippines (Hernández 2004; Arjona 2014; 2016; Kaplan 2017; Moreno 2017; Avruch and José 2007; Hancock and Mitchell 2007).

political claims to launch a large-scale mobilization (473). Yet, these groups differ in the degree of mobilization of resources needed to be effective with each type of strategy (474). Because nonviolence relies on coercion through noncooperation with the regime, it requires mass participation to succeed (474). In contrast, violent coercion exacts technical skills rather than manpower, that is, to impose military costs to the government, rebel groups can rely on “much smaller, better organized, and more effective fighting forces (...) even if the numbers mobilized are relatively low” (474). Similarly, Jetzsch and Masullo (2018), argue that organizational capacity, together with moral commitments and perceived threat, explains the type of strategy used in campaigns of civilian resistance against armed groups in a civil war.

These studies build upon DeNardo’s (1985) notion that the power of peaceful mobilization relies on the number of participants, whereas violent groups need no massive participation. Thus, these theories predict the presence of nonviolent resistance in communities with high organizational capacity and violent resistance, otherwise. However, it is not clear the validity of this idea in the context of a warzone where armed groups may have surveillance mechanisms in place in the territory. While a group employing terrorist tactics can operate as a clandestine organization with little popular support at the national level, a community-initiated militia exacts the collaboration of a critical threshold of community members to prevent repression (Petersen 2001: 24).

Pearlman’s (2011) organizational mediation theory stresses another dimension of the internal structure of dissident groups that determines their selection of tactics. For this author, all dissident movements benefit from the presence of effective leadership, strong

command-and-control, and unity of purpose between their members and constituencies, but only nonviolent ones require these three features of cohesive organizations for their functioning (10). Violent groups can operate without these organizational assets and usually, their lack thereof, is the reason for the spiral of violence and fratricidal conflict between armed organizations with similar goals that characterizes these groups (14). In contrast, cohesion is a necessary condition for achieving a large mobilization, discipline, and coherence in the use of tactics; skills required in nonviolent movements (11).

The empirical record in Colombia⁸ questions, however, the implications of this theory for the study of the choice of resistance strategy in civil wars. While some peaceful tactics against armed groups indeed require high levels of cohesion (e.g., the defense of sanctuaries amid warzones), other forms of contention like protests can emerge spontaneously and even linger despite low levels of organization⁹. Besides, Kaplan (2017: 51) claims that violent resistance also requires access to costly organizational resources (coordination, cohesion, and manpower) to succeed. Overall, authors such as Zech (2016: 41), claim that organizational capacity is critical for the onset of resistance, but what critically distinguishes campaign types are other factors such as ideas/norms.

⁸ Counter to the organizational theories' expectation, the dataset prepared for the dissertation found that, while there were spontaneous forms of both types of resistance strategies in Colombia, the proportion of peaceful cases exceeded their violent counterparts significantly. Moreover, the cases documented in the dataset suggest that while civilians can unintentionally clash with rebels in sporadic encounters, they need a cohesive organization for sustaining a long-lived violent mobilization. See **Chapter 4** for more details on the campaigns observed in the 1985-2005 period in Colombia.

⁹ For instance, since 2004, inhabitants from San Vicente del Caguán (Caquetá) organized dozens of protests, forums, and other forms of demonstrations to condemn the rise in violence after the end of the peace process with FARC in 2002 (Carroll 2011: 167). Yet, only by 2008, they created the Corporación Caguán Vive to lead this mobilization.

Within the second camp, it is possible to identify at least two main theories. From a constructivist approach, Zech (2016) explores the role of community narratives in shaping civilians' identity and preferences to use violent action against rebels, based on the Peasant Rounds case in Perú. Zech explains how these ideational frameworks forge a new collective identity in which violence is an appropriate behavior to deal with an armed contender (56). The author found robust qualitative evidence indicating that the presence of narratives that interpret *Senderistas*' violence as the action of 'human devils' vindicated the creation and operation of *Rondas*. Yet, this theory fails to explain what the source of these narratives is and neglects the potential role of intra-community conflicts related to opposite ideational frameworks about the use of violence. Narratives operate as agents in this theory, but it is not clear who activates, mobilizes, or challenges these cultural structures.

In contrast to this structural account, Costalli and Ruggeri (2015), as well as Masullo (2021), recover the role of agency in the explanation of how ideas and norms inform the selection of resistance strategy in civil wars. They claim that political entrepreneurs activate and mobilize cultural assets to achieve their goals. Costalli and Ruggeri (2015: 120), for instance, argue that radical networks translate private grievances and pro-social emotions (e.g., indignation) into public claims, forge group identities, and supply the know-how to organize partisan violent groups. Masullo (2021: 5), on the other hand, contends that "political entrepreneurs need to activate and mobilize ideational content that resonates within the community at large" to succeed. Resourceful leaders prioritize ideas and norms that already exist in the resistance constituency to avoid losing

the support of the population (5). In the presence of conflict between two different frameworks about the use of violent tactics, e.g., Masullo foresees that “those who promote content that resonates with the general population will likely succeed, others will likely exit or conform” (5).

While these scholars significantly improve the explanatory capacity of normative theories, they disregard the role of strategic factors in this stage of the mobilization. Both studies claim that although threat compels civilians to launch a mobilization, ideas and norms determine the form of that contention (Masullo 2021: 4; Costalli and Ruggeri 2015: 125). These authors argue that threat alone cannot determine the decision about strategies, based on the consensus in this field of study that the conjunction of indiscriminate violence and the armed group’s incapacity to protect the local population triggers both types of civilian resistance (Jentsch 2014; Shubiger 2014; Blocq 2014; Stoll 1993; Fumerton 2001; Hernández 2004; Masullo 2017; Kaplan 2017). However, the *threat of inaction* in a context of stalemate in a civil war is not necessarily the same as the *threat of repression* that civilians may face when selecting the form of resistance campaign (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Enwöhner and Maher 2011). In effect, a cornerstone assumption not only in collective action theories of political conflict¹⁰ but also in theories of civil war¹¹ is the idea that civilians are survival maximizers. Therefore, the conditions under which rational individuals are willing to bypass or even embrace the risks and costs of their actions in a

¹⁰ This idea is shared across the most influential theories on nonviolent action in maximalist campaigns (Sharp 1973; Schock 2004; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), state-dissidents nexus (Lichbach 1987; Davenport 2007; Mason 1996; Crenshaw 1990; Tilly 1978; Bakker et al 2016, among others), and even authors that attributed an important role to norms and ideas to the selection of dissident tactics (Gurr 1970; Voss 1995).

¹¹ See, e.g., Scott (1985); Popkin (1979); Migdal (1974); Paige (1975); Leites and Wolf (1970); Mason (1996); Kalyvas (2006); Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), to name a few.

struggle with powerful armed rivals should be investigated rather than assumed. Such a stage seems to be the outcome of a process of transformation of beliefs and preferences, rather than the baseline of a mobilization.

Finally, Kaplan (2017: 52) argues that civilian activists decide the contentious level of resistance tactics based on the “assessment of expected utility -the probability of success and the expected benefit if they are successful relative to alternative outcomes”. The point of reference for this assessment is the armed group’s sensitivity to civilian demands, which, in turn, is a factor of the group’s ideology, resource endowments, and time horizons (55). The author outlines an armed groups typology that ranges from low to high levels of sensitivity to civilian challenging behavior, namely: genocidal, opportunistic, hybrid opportunistic, and ideological groups (58-59). In consequence, Kaplan anticipates that ideological groups, for instance, will likely proactively respond to civilian demands, which makes contentious civilian resistance unnecessary (59). In contrast, given that genocidal groups are willing to use a ‘final solution’ to suppress dissent in their dominion, (exit or violent action is the most reasonable option for civilians (58)¹².

Kaplan’s argument points out that to anticipate the potential costs and risks of collective action, civilian activists look backward to the behavior of their armed contenders. This chapter builds upon this notion but stresses a different dimension of the previous combatants-civilians interaction. Information about the factors determining the

¹² Shubiger (2021) posits another strategic theory of the emergence of violent resistance. This author claims that civilians have incentives to create militia groups as a costly signal mechanism of anti-rebel stance to prevent state collective and face-to-face violence when the insurgency cannot protect them. This argument substantiates other theories of civilian behavior in civil wars arguing that indiscriminate violence often works as a mechanism to bandwagon with the stronger side (Stoll 1993; Downes 2006; Lyal 2009; 2010; Zhukov 2013).

typology proposed by Kaplan may be not available for civilians. Inhabitants from a warzone may ignore or misunderstand a rebel group's plans for the territory, its sources of organizational resources, or even its ideology. Rather, what civilians may have more vivid in their memories is an idea of the *reputation* of the group. I argue that two wartime institutions created by those groups which aim to govern a liberated territory can shape their reputation in a community: the provision of public order and the creation of government institutions to control the local affairs (Wickham-Crowley 2015; Weinstein 2006). The chapter explains later how these two institutions can inform civilian expectations on the degree of responsiveness and repression of their challenge.

2.1.2 Revisiting Gurr

The contrast between the normative camp and its strategic counterpart reflects a major division in theories of human action between those explanations that emphasize the role of instrumental rationality and those that prioritize culture/norms/ideas, in what Elster (1989) called the *homo economicus versus homo sociologicus* debate. However, as the same Elster and other influential scholars (e.g., Laitin 1986; Finnemore and Sikkink 1999; Ostrom 2000, to name a few) have previously noted, this division is artificial and hence both rational and normative factors may influence the decision-making process of activists in high-risk mobilizations.

Gurr's (1979) political violence model makes an early attempt to integrate both explanatory factors. In his seminal piece on relative deprivation theory, Gurr argues that high degrees of grievances against a regime is not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of political violence. The choice for this method of struggle is mediated by individuals'

“norms about the extent to which and the conditions under which violence generally, and political violence, specifically is proper”, and “expectations about the relative utility of violence as means of value attainment” (156). Based on this simple model, the author predicts that “Men who believe that (violence) is both proper and useful are more likely to resort to it than men who think is neither” (156). The model has two main limitations, however. First, it is not clear which factor prevails when individuals hold a doctrinal position against violence, and a utilitarian justification in favor of it, or vice versa. Gurr claims that people will resort to violence if they consider either useful or proper this method of struggle (156). But this corollary is not sustained by the author’s argument. Case 2 in the introduction and the experience of maximalist contenders that use strategic nonviolence (Shock 2005; Sharp 1973) demonstrate that activists can reject the use of violence, even facing authoritarian counterparts, when they have been indoctrinated or trained in nonviolent resistance. Second, while Gurr investigates the role of cultural traditions, family socialization patterns, and revolutionary ideologies as sources of individuals beliefs about violence (155, 193), the author provides no explanation on how individuals’ beliefs about the property and utility of violence are aggregated into collective behavior.

Other theories that incorporate both set of factors in the explanation of the behavior of agents involved in the armed conflict are socializations theories advanced in conflict studies (e.g., Checkel 2017; Gates 2017; Gutiérrez-Sanín 2008; Green 2018). Unlike Gurr’s theory, these studies explain when and how norms and utilitarian considerations overcome each other and provide a purposive account on how individual preferences are translated into collective action. An exemplar of this approach is Gates (2017) study on compliance

in rebel organizations that employ forced recruitment. Gates argues rebels that socialize their forced conscripts in the goals, collective identity, and norms of the organization are more effective in preventing defection than groups that rely exclusively on punishment. He distinguishes among three levels of socialization. The lower degree involves learning to play a role in the organization and is imparted through mechanisms such as initiation rituals (681). The highest degree of socialization involves the internalization of norms and changes in the agent's identity and preferences (681). Rebels use political indoctrination (Hoover 2016) or transmission of a culture of violence (e.g. by participating in collective rapes) (Cohen 2017) to attain this degree of socialization. Those individuals that have received no training in the roles of the organization or have not internalized group norms tend to behave in a traditional rational choice perspective and try to escape at the first opportunity (681).

Applied to the object of study of this chapter, socialization theory questions the normative camp's notion that strategic factors are not relevant for the selection of the campaign's content. Cost-benefit deliberations can be theorized as the baseline behavior of high-risk activists unless a norm against one of the methods of struggle has been enforced or interiorized by most of the community. When norm entrepreneurs succeed at doing so, the theory predicts that doctrinal justifications against the use of violence, e.g., overcome strategic factors that promote it. Finally, instead of an invisible aggregation mechanism that translates individual preferences into collective action, this theory emphasizes the agency of political entrepreneurs who attempt to influence agents' decision-making

process with a set of socialization mechanisms. This chapter builds upon socialization theory to explain the civilian choice of a resistance strategy.

2.2 Theory

2.2.1 The Baseline Scenario

The theory's point of departure is the idea that strategic and normative factors influence civilians' choice of resistance strategy (Voss 1995; Gurr 1970). Nonetheless, norms shape decision-making processes *mainly* when they are interiorized or enforced by social agents (Coleman 1990; Hechter and Opp 2001; Hechter 2008; Bicchieri 2005). In the absence of organizations or individuals with the capacity and willingness to impose norms against a method of struggle or when these actors fail to do so, survival-maximizing civilians will rely primarily on strategic factors.

The next subsection will explain the conditions under which norm entrepreneurs promote such norms, but for now it is sufficient to say that the 'baseline scenario' is characterized by the absence of obligatory norms against the use of violence. This kind of norms "oblige us to act in ways that are contrary, or at least orthogonal, to our immediate self-interest" (Hechter 2008: 665). Therefore, while civilians may hold normative beliefs about the use of violence in social conflicts, these beliefs distance from normative and empirical expectations against that method of struggle, which not only forbid this behavior but are either interiorized or enforced in such a way that "an important number of individuals consider legitimate the others' expectation and feel an obligation to fulfill them" or aim to avoid sanctions related to the proscribed behavior (Bicchieri 2005: 15).

Like other activists in high-risk mobilizations (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), in the baseline scenario, civilians ready to launch a resistance campaign weigh which kind of strategy is more likely to attain armed groups' concessions in the use of violence and to minimize the risks of violent retaliation (Kaplan 2017). This deliberation is not comparable to any standard of perfect rationality (Bicchieri 2005: 4). Instead, the behavior of the members of a resistance proto-organization is more accurately described as a "conscious deliberation and balancing of what one perceives (or misperceives) as the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action" (4). Moreover, warzones in a military stalemate are featured by a high degree of uncertainty about armed groups' expected behavior which further hampers civilians' cost-benefit assessments (Jentzsch 2014: 41; Arjona 2016: 10).

During the mobilization, civilians can adjust the level of contention of their tactics in response to warring parties' reaction to the campaign (Lichbach 1987). Case 1 of the *Esperanzados* illustrates the escalation of tactics by dissident civilians. The experience of the Association of Peasant Workers of the Carare (ATCC in Spanish) that emerged in Cimitarra (Santander) in Colombia, on the other hand, exemplifies the opposite process. In its first years, ATCC denounced the participation of militias and the army in human rights violations in Magdalena Medio and the paramilitary's links with politicians and landed elites. In retaliation, militias massacred the first leaders of the ATCC in 1990 (GMH 2011: 381). The new directive adopted a less confrontational tactic of covert negotiations with armed groups' commanders, including the militias (382-383).

In the short term, civilians can resort to uncertainty reduction mechanisms (Jentzsch 2014: 41). I will focus on reputation, a pivotal source of information and precedent about

the strategic behavior of competing actors in contexts of incomplete information and repeated interactions, such as markets and the international system (Mailath and Samuelson 2013; Crescenzi 2018). The utility of reputation increases as the access to direct information in strategic situations declines (Crescenzi 2018: 71). I argue that armed groups' reputations can decisively inform civilians' choice of strategy by providing a point of reference that connects past behavior with the expectation of future behavior of combatants (Mailath and Samuelson 2013: 1). In the emergence of a resistance campaign, activists may ignore whether armed groups will accommodate their demand of restraint in the use of violence and whether militants will punish them for their rebellion. Reputations may reduce the uncertainty about the *type* of counterpart they encounter (2).

Wartime institutions created by a dominant group to govern a territory convey information about these two dimensions. These institutions are the formal and informal rules shaping the combatant-civilian interactions in a context of territorial control (Mampilly 2011: 4; Arjona 2016: 3). When they work properly, civilians tend to have clear expectations of combatants' behavior and for the sake of future benefits, both parties (ruler and ruled) have incentives to restrain current gains (Arjona 2016: 10; Weinstein 2006: 168). Moreover, per Weinstein (2006: 168-170), depending on the degree that the ruler abides by the rules of the locality, it will be able to solve its commitment problem and build a reputation before its subjects. Scholars on rebel governance have explored the wide array of institutional arrangements created by the bargaining process between civilians and a dominant actor in a territory (Mampilly and Stewart 2021; Arjona 2016; Arjona et al 2014). I will focus on two institutions that can shape the group's reputation and legitimacy in the

population: the provision of public order and the creation of structures of joint government to manage local affairs.

To some authors, such as Wickham-Crowley (2015: 49), would-be rulers not only deal with defending the populace from external enemies, but also with maintaining internal peace and public order. A critical institution for accomplishing this task is the administration of punitive justice in the locality (64). The group is more effective in this regard if its sanctions are “public, prompt, necessary, minimal under the given circumstances, proportionate to the crimes, and established by law” (Kalyvas 2006: 141). Selective punishment not only has a deterrence effect (prevents future violations of a norm by civilians) (141), but also increases the legitimacy of the group within the population (Wickham-Crowley 2015: 64). Effective control of the territory also facilitates civilian obedience to the group (Kalyvas 2006: 141). On the contrary, arbitrary punishment severely damages the ruler’s reputation and provides a source of civilian resentment (Manrique 1998; Degregori 1998). In either case, the group’s prior management of crime in the territory can inform civilians’ beliefs about the group’s willingness to repress the campaign. Scholars of the Peruvian civil war, for example, argue that the brutal sanctions imposed by the Shining Path were not only a cause of early ruptures between the group and peasant communities but also a trigger of the organization of self-defense against the insurgency (Manrique 1998; Degregori 1998).

A dominant group can also create sharing power institutions to include representatives of the population in the decisions about the local affairs (Weinstein 2006: 169). Structures of joint government put in place a check-and-balance system that “make(s)

more difficult for the (ruler) to change course in a direction contrary to the interest of the civilian population” (170). While these institutions vary in the degree of civilian participation’s inclusiveness and influence (163), the key information contained in these arrangements is the degree to which a group is likely to respond to residents’ demands when launching the resistance campaign. Civilians that, in the past, successfully raised concerns about a group’s unpopular policy may expect that the group will accommodate their current demand for tranquility and security. For instance, before the ATCC’s creation, peasants questioned FARC’s authoritarian attempt at land parceling (GMH 2011: 310-313). The group convoked a meeting to trial a leader who opposed the redistribution of its property, and the participants were successful at protecting the leader’s integrity and persuading the group to withdraw its policy (311). This victory was a milestone for the community and a reference point for the future onset of the campaign (313). Fruitless negotiations may have the opposite precedent. In the same town, cattle ranchers bargained with FARC for the reduction of taxes (CNMH 2019a: 59). Yet, by the late 1970s, this group was engaged in a process of expansion that required a higher financial capacity and not only ignored the requests of their previous tacit allies in the territory but also increased their burden by using kidnappings (57-61). This behavior fostered the ranchers’ creation of militias in Cimitarra and other neighboring towns (CNMH 2019a: 61; 2020: 32-5).

Overall, civilians are likely to adjust their expectations about a challenged group’s response to the resistance campaign based on the reputation that this group forged during its period of rule in the territory. Hypothesis 1 summarizes this section and the empirical expectations of the chapter:

H1. Civilians are more likely to organize violent rather than nonviolent resistance when they confront a group with a negative reputation (low responsiveness and high arbitrariness).

2.2.2 The Promotion of Norms Against Violent Activism

Civilians' decision-making process concerning the primary method of struggle can be decisively influenced by resourceful local organizers or external allies with strong preferences about the use of a given type of strategy in political conflicts¹³. Theories of the life cycle of social norms suggest that norm entrepreneurs can achieve this outcome by three mechanisms: enforcement; creation of group identity and group norms; and/or the interiorization of norms by massive compliance, routinization, or indoctrination (e.g., Bicchieri et al 2011; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

In the first case, and lacking other mechanisms to assure compliance, entrepreneurs enforce a norm by imposing sanctions (Axelrod 1986: 1097; Coleman 1990: 266; Hechter 2008: 666). These sanctions are administered to transform the utility function of target individuals either by punishing proscribed actions or by rewarding compliance to the norm, in what Sunstein (1996) calls 'taxes' and 'subsidies' of individual choice. Civilian activists can also employ a 'group-identity mechanism' (Bicchieri et al 2011: 6), by fostering a strong sense of self-identification with the group that leads the campaign among target individuals and by raising the salience of the norms shared by the members of the group. They do so with the expectation that group norms will be obeyed by individuals that aim to maximize group membership (6). When this mechanism is in place, "Any perceived lack

¹³ Hereafter, I will focus on norms against the use of violence -although these actors might promote the opposite.

of conformity to group norms is seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the group” that can be punished with ostracism and other sanctions (6). Finally, entrepreneurs attain the highest level of conformity to a norm, when target agents “have an internal sanctioning system which provides punishment when he carries out an action proscribed by the norm or fails to carry out an action prescribed by the norm” (Coleman 1990: 293). Entrepreneurs do so by investing in mechanisms (e.g., indoctrination) that foster individuals’ appropriation of roles (295). Agents also interiorized norms by imitation and routinization when there is a ‘norm cascade’ and most peers abide with the norm (or are perceived to do so) (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902).

The norms that these entrepreneurs promote seek to govern three sets of actions. First, they proscribe the use of violent tactics in a mobilization against the warring parties of a civil war (hereafter, ‘norms against violent activism’). Second, they proscribe the provision of material support to any side of the armed conflict (‘norms of neutrality’). Third, they prescribe the peaceful resolution of intra-community conflicts (‘norms of internal peace’). These norms are oriented to solve what Kaplan (2017: 36) denominates *the other* collective action problem of nonviolent civilian resistance: “how do civilian organizations keep their residents from giving in to the temptations to participate in conflict and fracture the community?”. Related to the first norm, Kaplan contends that some communities promote a ‘culture of peace’ to “making civilians less easily seducible by armed actors” (48). Resistance leaders do so by promoting (and enforcing) norms “among residents to influence their preferences and persuade them against participating in conflict and against seeking selective benefits from aiding armed actors” (48). The second norm is

related to what Kaplan calls the ‘autonomy-seeking’ strategy of some civilian campaigns. “When multiple armed groups signal and stigmatize civilians as collaborators, communities may seek to credibly commit to not having allegiance to enemy groups and incentivize armies to desist from violence” (46). Finally, the third norm can be promoted, e.g., when resistance leaders put in place local conflict resolution mechanisms to “minimize the degree to which civilians go to outside actors to police problems of local order” (49). By so doing, leaders prevent armed groups capitalize on internal divisions to purge alleged supporters of their enemies in the territory (49).

Internal Norm Entrepreneurs

Norm entrepreneurs can come from inside or outside the community. In the first case, they usually coincide with the members of the resistance proto-organization. In communities with a conjoint structure, the set of beneficiaries of the norm (i.e., resistance activists) tend to overlap with most of the targets of the norm (i.e., the rest of the community), and the former can appeal to social sanctions, such as reputational costs or ostracism, to enforce these norms among the latter. In a disjoint social structure, there is a gap between beneficiaries and the target group that exacts another kind of resources and means from enforcers to punish local defectors¹⁴. Local political entrepreneurs are motivated to promote these norms, either because they hold a strong moral commitment

¹⁴ Self-defense groups face a similar dilemma: They need the participation of most of the population or at least their solidarity in terms of no cooperation with the armed groups (Petersen 2001: 24). To enforce this ‘solidarity norm’, local elites-initiated militias in Colombia resorted to coercive mechanisms such as forced recruitment, total adscription to the self-defense project, or expulsion from the territory (see, e.g., the cases of the *ACPB* and the *Autodefensas Campesinas de San Juan Bosco La Verde y Chucurí* -CNMH 2019a; 2019b).

In the case of nonviolent resistance, local political entrepreneurs can even fail to promote nonviolent activism when powerful actors in the community (e.g., local elites) not only refuse to comply norms against violent activism, but also view the campaign as a ‘public bad’ that jeopardizes their interests (Coleman 1990: 262).

against violence or because they try to discourage negative externalities¹⁵ related to violent activism, allegiance to armed groups, and/or violent local conflicts.

It is possible to track evidence of the presence of both types of motivations in the organizers of the ATCC -an ‘index’ case study¹⁶ of civilian resistance in Colombia. Several scholars have highlighted the role of members of the Adventist Church in the resistance proto-organization that created the ATCC as a key factor determining the option for nonviolence in this campaign (Masullo 2021; GMH 2011). The testimony of the surviving leaders of the campaign points out that when the community faced the dilemma imposed in 1987 by the military and the *Autodefensas Campesinas de Puerto Boyacá* (ACPB) of either leaving the territory, creating an independent self-defense organization or joining one of the armies, one of the most charismatic leaders of the community, Josué Vargas, proposed the creation of an autonomous self-defense group; “[...] we need to organize ourselves, let’s do as in Puerto Boyacá, here these people are going to kill us here, let’s arm ourselves” (GMH 2011: 322). This proposal had support among other members of the community; “[...] other peasants [...] agreed on this call: “One day I was to collect the plantain, collect a plantain that I had above and the driver also ‘we will need to organize ourselves and arm ourselves because that people will kill us’” (322). However, the members of the Adventist Church rejected this proposal harshly for their religious

¹⁵ Coleman argues that the conditions for the ‘demand’ of a social norm come from a situation where several individuals are affected by the actions of another agent (negative externality) and no single actor can persuade alone this agent to change its behavior (1990: 251).

¹⁶ Gerring and Cojocarú (2016: 398-99) use this term to refer to pioneer cases -similar to the *patient zero* in epidemiology- that for their importance established a precedent that was emulated (or avoid) by other units.

commitment to nonviolence; “We are willing to collaborate with prayer, with any resource that we can, but not with weapons” (324).

Josué Vargas likely withdrew the initiative of creating a self-defense organization to prevent a fracture in the community and the isolation of the segment of the population that adhered to the Adventist Church, as Masullo (2021) claims. Nevertheless, the organizers of the ATCC discussed another more pragmatic and nonnormative argument (GMH 2011: 306). First, the idea of creating an autonomous militia was perceived as untenable in a context of extreme violent competition among three armed groups already present in the territory. As the leaders concluded, “[...] And Josué at some point tried to encourage us to arm ourselves. But then, and after all, looking for one reason after another to be able to survive, one comes to the very easy conclusion, we arm ourselves against one and the others remain” (323). The leaders foresaw an increase in violence against the population if they opted for a self-defense mobilization:

[...] We are going to organize ourselves but in what way. I think that everyone here knows that they also thought of aspiring to arms, that is, to form a fourth armed group, but through those dialogues they say no man, we cannot arm ourselves, we have to find another strategy because if we arm ourselves what we are going to creating is more violence (315).

The leaders also considered the creation of an adjunct militia to one of the groups as a negative solution for the interests of the community (GMH 2011: 323-4). Per the Historical Memory Group (GMH in Spanish) (GMH 2011: 224), this assessment was largely based on the previous experience of victimization of the population and the

attribution of blame for these actions to ‘all’ the warring parties. “[...] trust in all the armed groups is lost, and it is precisely when meetings are held inviting the peasants to ‘join certain groups to leave or die’” (223). It is noteworthy that the leader Josué Vargas mentioned the ACPB as a model for the creation of their self-defense group. Yet, the reputation of this group was repudiated by inhabitants from areas of Cimitarra stigmatized as pro-rebel, where the militia committed brutal actions against residents. Between 1982 and 1983, e.g., this group committed 12 massacres (around 70 deaths) in Cimitarra, five of them in two villages, La Corcovada and Vuelta Acuña, that later became part of the zone of influence of the ATCC (CNMH 2019a: 101-4)¹⁷.

Regarding rebels, the population from one of the villages under the radar of the ATCC had a frustrating attempt to provide direct militant support to FARC. In 1983, the ACPB threatened the inhabitants of the village, Santa Rosa del Carare, with the commission of a massacre of alleged sympathizers of FARC (CNMH 2019a: 110). The guerrilla exerted a strong control of the territory and had the presence of insurgents disguised among the population, therefore, the inhabitants demanded FARC the provision of weapons to contain the paramilitary incursion (110). However, the rebel group refused to provide weapons to the population and failed to protect the population from the attack in which two civilians were killed by 20 paramilitaries (111). Peasants used their pistols and shotguns to repel the paramilitary attack, but the reputation of the rebels was severely

¹⁷ In response to another massacre in Vuelta Acuña in 1984, 700 people from Cimitarra marched to the city of Barrancabermeja and protested the actions of the ACPB and demanded the investigation of the role of the military in these crimes (GMH 2011: 317) in what was one of the most immediate precedents to the creation of the ATCC.

damaged in the zone: “The FARC did not support the peasant. From that day on, a distance was marked between the peasant and the FARC. [...] but because they did not respond, the peasant took it as a form of retaliation not to help them” (111). A similar negative outcome was experienced in Vuelta Acuña. After FARC and residents repelled a militia’s attack on the population in 1983, the ACPB kept the village under constant siege, killed inhabitants in sporadic incursions, and committed a massacre in 1984 that caused a mass displacement (108-9).

External Norm Entrepreneurs

Norm entrepreneurs can also be external actors to the communities, such as religious organizations, national NGOs, political parties, unions, etc., that operate as allies of the resistance- proto organization. These agents can be defined as third parties because they are neither the direct beneficiaries nor the target of these norms (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004a: 186; Gintis et al 2003: 154). While there is a debate about what motivates third parties to promote norms (Young 2015: 361), there is an amass of experimental evidence that they can reward compliance to prescribed behavior, punish transgressors of norms, and even are willing to compensate victims of deviant actions -even when they cannot expect a material reward for their behavior and incur at a personal cost (Chavez and Bicchieri 2013; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004b; Ostrom 2000). Likewise, other scholars have studied the role of third parties -e.g., transnational moral entrepreneurs, transnational advocacy networks, or epistemic communities- engaged in fostering the emergence of normative regimes in the international system (Nadelmann 1990; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Haas 1992). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 898) claim that this kind of norm entrepreneurs are motivated by

empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment. Alternatively, they can be categorized as strategic actors, according to these authors, because they make “detailed means-ends calculations to maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitment of the norm entrepreneurs” (910).

In either case, third parties can engage in three actions that are critical for the promotion of norms in favor of peaceful activism in civil wars. First, “they ‘frame’ issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention, and encourage action, and to fit with favorable institutional venues” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). To be successful, these activists are not limited to the role of activating and mobilizing normative content that resonates with the frames of the community, as Masullo claims (2020: 5). Bridging consistent frames is only one of the primary tasks of political entrepreneurs (Snow et al 1986: 467). They can “[...] bring new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy debates, and serve as sources of information and testimony” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 3). They can amplify issues, promote new beliefs and values not previously held by the constituency, or even transform pre-existing ideas of what was considered tolerable as inexcusable, unjust, or immoral -all of them critical mobilization tasks (Snow et al 1986: 467-474). Furthermore, social movement scholars claim that organizers can impose their political agendas and mobilize a constituency despite the opposition of local leaders to the goals and principles of the social movement organization. Fireman and Gamson (1979: 27-8), for instance, suggest that organizers can weaken the position of those leaders that block collective action by moving the locus of a new solidarity network or by appealing to other

actors in the community isolated or in conflict with these leaders. Likewise, Snow et al (1986: 474) claim that political leaders can transform the frame of members of their constituency to accept those of the movement.

Second, external allies can mobilize knowledge, information, and resources that are critical for the onset and persistence of a resistance campaign (McCarthy and Zald 1977). According to Kaplan, “technical assistance for cooperation provided by external actors” is a critical source of social capital that can be available for some civilian communities to solve the collective action problem of resistance (2017: 38; see, also Moreno 2021). External actors can provide financial support to community-led programs and initiatives oriented to peacebuilding, such as the European Union’s (EU) Peace Laboratories implemented in several regions of Colombia (Barreto 2012). These programs can be strategically exploited by resourceful local activists to mobilize the community in a resistance campaign.

For instance, when a rebel group killed three people in the Colombian town of Tiquisio (Bolívar) in 2003, local leaders asked the priest to find external support to a resistance initiative (Saiz 2016: 16). The priest amassed support for the community from peace and human rights NGOs, as well as the Second Peace Laboratory of the EU (27-28). The external support facilitated the community's participation in the campaign and the onset of the *Proceso Ciudadano de Tiquisio* (28). Foreign aid agencies and other allies created the ‘Peasant School’ to train local leaders in human rights, International Humanitarian Law, tactics for dealing with armed groups, etc., with the goal that these leaders would disseminate this information in the community (17). In addition, the

Programa de Paz del Magdalena Medio (PPMM) -a key partner of the EU in Colombia- channeled funds for economic projects oriented to providing residents with alternatives to the growth of illegal crops (17). The mobilization declined in 2008 when paramilitary groups threatened the external organizations that supported the campaign, and these allies, including the PDMM, had to leave the territory and the international cooperation funds were finished (30).

Finally, and foremost, third parties “promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance [...]” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 3). These actors can directly sanction residents to make “compliance with new norms seem or be more beneficial” (Sunstein 1996: 920). To do so, they can use the flow of resources as an implicit sanctioning mechanism: members of a resistance proto-organization that relies on an external actor can expect a continuous flow of resources from their patron, as long as they maintain their commitment to peaceful activism. As McAdam claims, social movement organizations that heavily depend on external actors’ support are pressured to “[...] modify its operation in such a way as to make itself ‘acceptable’ to elite sponsors, or after receipt of support, as a condition of continued backing” (1982: 28). The external actor can also aid to install native organizational capacity that enables members of a resistance proto-organization to monitor by themselves the compliance to the norm by the target group. Thus, after the creation of the CPSJA -Case 2-, the Dioceses of Apartadó and the Jesuit-based, CINEP and Justice and Peace, promoted the creation of a community’s body to govern interpersonal relations in the peace zone (CEC 2021: 247).

Case 2 is, in fact, largely explained by the role of a key third-party norm entrepreneur in Colombia: The Catholic religious sector. To begin, the Diocese of Apartadó, Justice and Peace, and Cinep were pivotal for the onset and survival of the CPSJA despite the persistent repression of the campaign by militias (Hernández 2004). When residents were considering resistance against ACCU in 1996, these religious organizations consulted with them on different self-protection mechanisms for the community, including active neutrality and the creation of peace zones (382). Once civilians opted for the second option, the external allies trained activists in the principles of peace zones and served as mediators between the campaign and the armed groups (383). Over the mobilization, the Church provided legitimacy to the campaign to shield it against the government's accusations of connivance between the *Comunidad* and FARC, as well as transmitted denunciations of violence by militias against its members (Masullo 2015).

Power-Based Relations and the Leverage of External Norm Entrepreneurs

The activation of norms occurs in no social vacuum and peaceful activists from inside and outside the community may face the opposition of powerful residents whose interests and preferences may be threatened by the content -and even the mere existence- of the resistance campaign (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897; Vaital et al 2017: 9). Some authors, such as Masullo, foresee the failure of political entrepreneurs that promote conflicting normative frames to those of most of the community. Yet, because “[...] the possibility of a norm conflict is in principle inherent to a structure of social arrangements”, as Popitz claims (2017: 8), such a hypothesis would fail to explain normative change. A more plausible expectation is that the degree of success of external allies to determine the

content of the campaign depends largely on the social structure of the community and the source of opposition to peaceful activism. In addition, the effectiveness of the entrepreneur also depends on its internal characteristics, specifically its willingness to promote norms against violent resistance even at personal or institutional costs. Overall, even in the presence of conflictive frames, I argue that norm entrepreneurs' favored method of struggle can prevail in a resistance campaign when two conditions are met: first, local resistance activists depend on this external actor to organize and sustain the campaign; and second, the external ally has strong preferences, unity, and resolve for promoting these norms in the mobilization.

Regarding the first factor, I claim that external allies are less likely to be successful at promoting a nonviolent mobilization when the resistance campaign is initiated by local elites. Landowners, ranchers, merchants, and other affluent groups are more likely to develop strong preferences for violent self-protection against rebels (especially Marxist groups) and to own independent resources to mobilize the community without the support of external actors than their subordinate counterparts (i.e., peasants, indigenous, Afro-descendants, urban settlers, etc.).

In terms of anti-rebel preferences, Kalyvas (2008) noticed that the elites who staffed the officer-level of collaborationist militias in the Greek Civil War had a clear political agenda to prevent the rise of a Communist regime in the postwar period, unlike the nonmilitant troops of these units. Remijnsen (2001), on the other hand, studied the variation in local support for civil defense patrols in Guatemala across towns dominated either by white elites (*ladinos*) or by indigenous. While militia participation was mandatory, ladino-

led patrols were more hierarchical, heavily armed, and in constant contact with the military than their counterparts (459). Previous rebel attacks against ladinos strongly motivated the participation of members of this group in the counterinsurgency (458). Ties between ladinos and the military were already close before the escalation of the conflict, and when the military organized patrols in the territory, wealthy families with political influence were the first candidates to fill the position of commanders of these militias (460).

A similar contentious relationship between landed elites and rebel groups marked the onset of most self-defense groups in Colombia (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2019; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Vargas 2017; CNMH 2019)¹⁸. While unsurprisingly rural elites are one of the ‘natural’ antagonists of Marxist rebel groups such as the Shining Path or the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FLMN in Spanish) (Degregori 1998; Wood 2003), rebels in Colombia had an ambivalent and more pragmatic relationship with cattle ranchers and landowners, especially in the beginning of the conflict. Until the early 1980s, FARC was able to nurture a positive relationship with cattle ranchers in regions such as the Magdalena Medio, based on an equilibrium of low levels of exaction in exchange for protection to these elites from cattle theft and other crimes against their property (Reyes 2009: 27-31; Gutiérrez-Sanín 2017: 302). This rebel policy fostered support or, at least, passive neutrality among landowners and ranchers (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2017: 302). Yet, the 1982 VIII Conference’s decision of transforming the group into an army-like organization urged the

¹⁸ Jentzsch (2014) explores anti-rebel sentiments among other kinds of local elites in regions heavily affected by guerrilla warfare. She claims that administrative elites have strong incentives to hold the territory under its control and when the military cannot provide sufficient protection to the civilian population, these actors are “forced to tolerate or even actively support the formation of armed forces outside the regular state security apparatus” (33).

regional units to increase their predatory practices against the civilian population and rural elites became one of the main targets of this new policy, including the use of extorsive kidnapping (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2017: 302; Reyes 2009: 30). Such a threat to their physical integrity and property rights incubated a strong counterinsurgent and anti-communist sentiment among landowners and ranchers (CNMH 2019: 58-9). Consequently, rural elites -especially ranchers- “were involved not only in funding, but also in leading, managing on a day to day basis, organizing, and lobbying on behalf of the paramilitaries” (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2019: 121).

Concerning mobilization capacity, several scholars have explained how access to administrative resources, clientelist networks, and patron-subordinate relations give local elites a crucial advantage to mobilize segments of the population to resistance against rebel groups (van Baalen 2021; Gutiérrez-Sanín 2019). Van Baalen (2021) argues that when local elites have access to strong clientelist networks, they control critical “resources and are embedded in local authority structures in a way that allows them to mobilize local citizens”. Elites can use this mobilization capacity to support or resist rebels, which gives them leverage before would-be rebel rulers (931).

Whereas van Baalen (2021) studies local elites’ nonviolent capacity in Ivory Coast, Gutiérrez-Sanín (2019) employs a similar clientelist argument to explain pro-government militias’ trajectory in Colombia. He claims that both bottom-up self-defense groups and large paramilitary armies were “a new form of (coercive) brokerage, which appeared in the midst of the counterinsurgent war” (16). Community-initiated militias that operated at the local level were mostly “created and/or invited into the municipality by large landowners,

merchants, and politicians - precisely those who had the better contacts to process their security demands vis-a-vis the army or the police” (17). Like ladinos in Guatemala, Colombian rural elites had better access to state resources to organize autonomously violent action compared to other actors with similar preferences: “have links with the army (not just anybody could simply go and visit the brigade or speak with high ranking officers), be a 'documented cattle rancher' or respectable and known regional notable and demonstrate the will and capacity of fighting subversion” (72). In other regions with less intense agrarian conflicts, local elites mobilized patron-subordinate networks against the insurgency in what López calls ‘traditionalist militia’ (2016: 110-1). An example of this model was the group created in Titiribí (Antioquia) by Efraín Ochoa, a landowner, coffee producer, council member, and head of a wealthy family from the region. Ochoa used the hierarchical networks of this town to amass institutional and social support to his militia (111).

Local elites’ advantageous position differs from the situation of many subordinate groups in civil wars. While indigenous, Afro-descendants, peasants, or poor urban settlers may also develop resentment against the insurgency during the conflict, they may lack similar organizational capacity to initiate a campaign -not to mention a self-defense organization- against a rebel group. In this context, external patrons can be more successful at promoting norms against the use of violence. The degree of dependency of some communities on the support of strategic partners like the Catholic Church is illustrated in the case of the *Asamblea Constituyente Municipal de Mogotes* (ACMM) (Santander). After a 1997 ELN attack on the town in which the rebels took hostage the town’s mayor, 50 local

leaders asked for the support of the Catholic Church to organize resistance (Nieto 2010: 5). Buttressed by the Diocese of Socorro-San Gil, a group of civilians and priests led pilgrimages to the rebel camps and started a 'pastoral council' with the ELN (6). This commission attained the liberation of the mayor, and -together with 240 elected representatives of the town- created the ACMM in 1998 (7-8). Finally, the campaign demised in 2001 when a new ecclesiastical leadership withdrew its support to the ACMM and transferred the clergy who supported it (14-16).

Even in the absence of powerful local actors against peaceful activism, a third party can fail to shape the content of a campaign in the presence of internal division and hesitance. Notice the contrast in the experience of the Catholic Church in Perú and the Philippines in this regard. The Peruvian Catholic hierarchy sustained a position against war violence, aided conflict-affected communities, and even coordinated peaceful mass mobilizations against the war (CVR 2001: 400). However, key regional religious authorities, such as the archbishop of Ayacucho -the province with the highest intensity of violence in the civil war-, "thwarted national efforts to denounce and prevent human rights abuses and remained ambivalent about or facilitated violent responses to Sendero Luminoso" (Zech 2016: 92). Other leaders of the lower hierarchy were also hesitant about the appropriateness of nonviolent action as a self-protection mechanism in communities under the siege of the insurgency (CVR 2001: 405-6). Ultimately, preeminent national Catholic and Evangelical leaders even acknowledged publicly that the religious sector could have done more direct action on the ground against rebel violence and state human rights abuses (Zech 2016: 93).

In the Philippines, on the contrary, the Catholic religious sector “has been among the most active and influential participants in the peace-building process, with involvement of leaders down to grassroots workers” (Palm-Dalupan 2004: 226). The Catholic Bishop Conference of the Philippines led peace advocacy and constituency building activities, promoted human rights and justice for victims, and mobilized their networks down to the grassroots on nonviolent action (238). The smallest unit of Catholic activism, the Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs), was determinant to empower communities and promote peaceful norms which facilitated the declaration of peace zones in war-driven regions in the late 1980s (Palm-Dalupan 2004: 245; Avruch and José 2007: 64-5).

All in all, this section can be summarized in the following hypothesis:

H2. Civilians are more likely to organize nonviolent rather than violent resistance when they rely on external allies with strong preferences and the capacity to enforce peaceful activism.

2.3 Overview of Research Design

The empirical expectations of the chapter’s theory will be tested with quantitative methods, based on disaggregated data drawn from the Colombian civil war. I use a single-country subnational comparison for the 1985-2005 period and employ multilevel-multinomial regression analysis (Snyder 2001; Sellers 2019; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012; Koster and McElreath 2017).

To examine the mechanisms posited in the theory, the empirical strategy needs to identify the presence/absence of key norm entrepreneurs at the territorial level and any relevant variation of their capacity and willingness to promote/enforce norms against

violent resistance activism. One way to do so would be to collect fine-grained data on a multiplicity of local norm entrepreneurs in a representative sample of communities in Colombia during the period of study. Another option would be to compile information on at least one external actor involved in peaceful activism against the war with a presence in most of the national territory during the observation period.

The dissertation follows the latter logic and studies the role of the Catholic Church as a key champion of nonviolent civilian resistance in Colombia (Ramírez 2015; García 2008; Hernández 2004). In **Chapter 4**, I exploit the temporal variation of the content, scope, and frequency of Catholic activism in nonviolence and conduct two tests for the theory. In the early stages of the conflict (1964-late 1980s), the religious organization played a minor role in the mobilization for peace in Colombia and I use this period as a proxy for the ‘absence’ of a third party at the national level with the capacity and willingness to promote norms against the use of violence to test H1. During the escalation of the conflict (1990s-2005), the ecclesiastic actor developed a coherent institutional policy to promote peace in this country and I employ this period to test H2. In both cases, I use disaggregated data on peace initiatives supported by the Catholic Church and rates of priests at the local level as approximate measures of the *willingness* and *capacity* of this actor.

Finally, the data on the strategies employed by civilian resistance activists is based on the *Organized Dissent Against War* (ODAW) dataset project, collected for the dissertation, and based on a vast array of academic sources and grey-literature, as well as the systematic revision of two national newspapers, *El Tiempo* and *Voz Proletaria*.

Chapter 3 describes the concept construction and operationalization of key dimensions of analysis, coding process, and summary statistics. The **Appendix** provides further detailed documentation of the coding rules and cases included.

CHAPTER 3

RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION. HOW DO REBELS RESPOND TO CIVILIAN SELF-PROTECTION STRATEGIES IN WAR ZONES?

How do armed groups respond to campaigns of civilian resistance in conflict-driven zones? Under what conditions do they use repression to deter civilians from escalating or even organizing dissent? When are rebels more prone to accommodate civilians' demand of restraint in the use of violence? While the study of the emergence of different forms of civilian noncooperation in civil wars has been prominent in the last decade, the trajectory and decline of these campaigns is still understudied phenomena and only few scholars of nonviolent mobilizations and grassroots self-defense groups have investigated the conditions under which each resistance strategy is effective against armed organizations. Prior research on peaceful resistance agrees that neutral mobilizations in contested areas seems to reduce anti-civilian violence (Moreno 2017; Kaplan 2017). On the other hand, qualitative studies of civil wars (Manrique 1998; Degregori 1998; Starn 1998; Clayton & Thomson 2014) and statistical analysis (Peic 2014) substantiate the idea that militias can be effective at defeating nonstate armed actors, apparently at a high humanitarian cost in the short-term (Del Río 2020; Herrera 2022). Yet, to date, the literature on civilian agency in civil wars still lacks a unified framework to assess the effectiveness of these types of mobilizations.

This chapter aims to fill this gap and builds a set of signaling games of two-sided asymmetric information to explore the strategic interaction between dissident civilians and rebel groups in war zones. These models are informed by a long literature on

dissident/repression nexus and deterrence and escalation in interstate conflicts, civil wars, and terrorism. I use this theoretical foundation to explain the conditions under which protests, violent self-protection, and nonviolent protection of territories (aka, ‘sanctuaries’) are more likely to either compel rebels to confer concessions to civilians or to foster repression and the decay of the security conditions in the territory.

The next section surveys the literature on civilian-combatants interaction in irregular civil wars, as well as the most recent advancement in the research on dissident-repression nexus and deterrence theory in conflict studies and international relations, respectively. Later, the chapter describes the underpinnings of the theory and, third, develops two unilateral deterrence games of resistance in civil wars. The fourth section draws implications of the solution of these models in terms of the rebels’ use of repression and concessions to deter/appease civilian resistance. The final part of the chapter outlines the research design employed to test the hypotheses derived from this theory.

3.1 Literature Review

3.1.1 Is Civilian Resistance Effective?

Scholars on nonviolent resistance has produced some of the most conclusive empirical results on the effects of civilian dissent in the behavior of armed organizations in civil wars. Kaplan (2017) and Moreno (2017), e.g., provide a rigorous examination of the conditions under which peaceful mobilizations curtail the degree of violence against civilians by armed groups in Colombia. The former author employs municipal data on community action boards as a proxy of social capital and community organizational capacity and finds significant evidence that “organized civilian communities on average tend to suffer fewer

effects of violence than unorganized communities” (Kaplan 2017: 112). The author corroborates that organized communities are better suited to implement autonomy-seeking mechanisms (e.g., a peace culture) that can reduce armed groups’ incentives to repress the civilian population (48-51). Also, he found that, “(...) the violent-reducing effect of juntas weakens as conflict intensity increases” (125), which confirms his theory that military competition affects armed groups’ sensitivity to civilian demands (56).

On the other hand, Moreno (2017) studies armed groups’ capacity and willingness to repress peaceful protests in civil conflicts (9). The author claims that the target of these collective actions determines the willingness of armed actors to sanction the mobilized civilian population. In the context of military control, the most powerful group has no incentives to repress collective actions organized by civilians from its constituency or when these protests target the rival military organization (8-9). In contrast, while the challenger group may have incentives to punish civilians, it lacks the capacity to undertake violent actions in the territory (9). Surprisingly, counter Kaplan’s results, Moreno posits (and finds evidence) that neutral protests are less likely to be repressed in towns under dispute because both sides lack screening mechanisms (capacity) to selectively punish civilian protesters and aim to prevent a massive shift of support in the territory (10-13).

In contrast, scholars on community-based militias have an open debate regarding the humanitarian consequences of violent mobilizations in internal armed conflicts. Because of their access to high-quality information on rebel supporters within the population, ability to restrict insurgent access to the territory, and capacity to foster infighting, fragmentation and paranoia among rebel lines, civilian defense militias (CDF)

have been theorized as powerful military assets in counterinsurgent operations (Clayton and Thomson 2014; Peic 2014). In fact, in a cross-national study of guerrilla warfare, Peic (2014) evidenced that the presence of CDFs increases incumbents' likelihood to defeat rebels. Case studies corroborate these results in Perú, Iraq, the Philippines, and other civil wars (Clayton and Thomson 2014; Fumerton 2001; Degregori 1998; Starn 1999).

Nevertheless, despite the militias capacity to inflict military costs on insurgent organizations, scholars disagree on the humanitarian effects of these militias' operation. From the perspective of militias as perpetrators of violence, some authors contend that these groups are less likely to incur in coercive and predatory methods against civilians because, as they draw from the local population, they might be subject to accountability mechanisms (Carey and Mitchell 2017; Peic 2014). "In case of wrongdoing, the agents cannot exit easily" (Carey and Mitchell 2017: 136). Besides, these groups can provide intelligence that assist incumbents to shift from indiscriminate to selective targeting of local defectors (Jentzsch et al 2015: 761). All in all, in their typology of pro-government militias, Carey and Mitchell (2017: 137) conceive these groups as "the least violent towards civilians".

In contrast, other authors point out how these agents can quickly 'turn bad' and become an unchecked source of violence, extortion, and coercion of the population (Romero 2003; Schuberth 2015; Carey and Mitchell 2017: 135-6). In this line, the Colombian National Commission of Historical Memory (CNMH in Spanish) documented the use of brutal tactics against civilians by ranchers-led militias in the early stages of the Colombian conflict in the 1980s. Militias with the participation of local population in

Antioquia, Boyacá, and Santander used terror tactics against alleged rebel sympathizers (mostly peasants, leftist leaders, union members, etc.), such as disappearances, scorched-earth operations, forced recruitment, displacement, and massacres (CNMH 2019; 2020a; 2020b). Moreover, Peic (2019) argues that tribal groups can form CDFs to defeat rival local factions and advance their predatory private agendas in conflicts fought through ethnic lines, such as in the Philippines and Turkey.

From rebels' perspective, increasing evidence point out that the emergence of a local militia tends to have a short-term spike effect on the use of insurgent violence against civilians. In this line, Clayton and Thomson (2014: 923) contend that one of the mechanisms that explain the effectiveness of counterinsurgent campaigns that employ CDFs is to force rebels to become the agents of repression of the population, which reverses the logic of guerrilla warfare (923). The authors predict that rebels will increase their use of violence against the population until and if territorial control shifts to the hands of the militia and the security forces (924). Studies of cartel-related violence corroborate the occurrence of this pattern of spike of violence against civilians in the Mexican conflict between the state forces, cartels, and vigilante groups (local militias). Thus, Del Río (2020) and Herrera (2022), e.g., found that the rates of homicides increased significantly in municipalities that registered the presence of vigilante groups in the Mexican state of Michoacán, both during the operation of the groups (2013-2014) and the first years after their demobilization.

Put together, while scholars on each resistance strategy have made important contributions on the study of the consequences of dissident civilian behavior, our

knowledge on this field is limited by the lack of a unified framework that allow researchers to compare the effectiveness of each strategy vis-à-vis their counterparts. Furthermore, several empirical studies still lack a proper description of key actors' goals, abilities, and the strategic context of the civilian-combatant interaction. Therefore, we still ignore the conditions under which armed groups have the incentives and the capacity to deter the escalation of civilian tactics via repression or when they prefer to make concessions to civilians to avoid an open conflict against resolved local dissident actors.

3.1.2 Lessons from the Dissident-Repression Nexus

Due to the category of ruled and ruler can apply to the relationship between civilians and those combatants who aim to govern a population in an irregular civil war (Arjona 2017: 756; Weinstein 2006: 167), current progress in the research agenda on the dissident-repression nexus can inform this chapter's research question. In the last decade, the study of the factors that determine the state's reaction to citizens' contentious action has shifted from the discussion of the role of regime type (*Domestic Democratic Peace vs. More Murder in the Middle*) (Gupta et al 1993; Henderson 1991; Fein 1995; Davenport and Armstrong 2004) and the degree of contentiousness of the dissent (*the Law of Coercive Responsiveness*) (Davenport 2007; Earl et al 2003), to a more sophisticated understanding of three critical assumptions that are ubiquitous to most types of political conflicts (Pierskalla 2010; Ritter 2014; Shellman 2006; Ritter and Conrad 2016): (1) dissent and repression are causally interrelated, (2) both sides compete over the redefinition of a policy or the allocation of a good, and (3) state leaders repress (or accommodate) to remain in power (Ritter 2014: 143).

These three assumptions have important implications for the study of armed groups' reaction to resistance strategies. First, interdependence between dissent and repression implies not only that both actors are "strategic in their decision making" (Ritter 2014: 144), but especially that each one "makes a decision based on what she expects her opponent to do with the understanding her decision may affect her opponent's choice" (147). To date, nevertheless, the literature on civilian agency in civil wars lacks a theoretical framework that incorporates both sides of this strategic interaction. For instance, four prominent game-theoretic models in conflict studies include rebels and civilians as key players (Kalyvas 2006; Zhukov 2014; Rueda 2017; Krakowski 2020). However, they place emphasis on the role of noncombatants as key sources of inputs for the armed organization, as agents with the capacity to affect an armed group indirectly through the support to its military rival, or as reactionary players that manage to navigate warring parties' violence by siding with one group or fleeing the territory. Put differently, none of these models build upon the current central claim in conflict studies that, under certain circumstances, organized civilians can impose direct costs to armed contenders and compel these groups to make concessions to the local population (Kaplan 2017; Arjona 2017).

Second, like most other political conflicts, civilian resistance entails a dispute over the redefinition of a set of nonstate armed actors' policies on the administration of local affairs in the territory, including the use of violence against the population (Arjona 2017). This assumption connects the chapter's object of study with a deep-rooted tradition in political science that frames political conflict as a bargaining problem (e.g., Schelling 1956; Fearon 1995; Wagner 2007; Reiter 2003; Powell 2006; Ritter 2014; DeNardo 1985).

Current typologies of civilian strategic action in civil wars (e.g., Kalyvas 2006; Petersen 2001; Barter 2014; Arjona 2015; Masullo 2021) provide key insights to explore the kinds of policies and demands that noncombatants make to their armed contenders. Prominently, Arjona (2008; 2015; 2017) describes different levels of (non)cooperation and dimension of local affairs that can be put into question by dissident civilians in a resistance campaign. In the next section, I build upon Arjona's work and DeNardo's notion of strategy (1985: 41) to postulate a typology of resistance strategies determined by policy demands and the contentiousness of tactics.

The third assumption implies that repressive agents need to carefully weigh whether the use of coercion or concessions maximizes their chances of political survival in the territory (Ritter 2014: 147; Shellman 2015: 75). Dissident activity can undermine rulers' authority by imposing direct costs to its organization (Ritter and Conrad 2016: 86) or by imposing audience costs on the leaders, who may be perceived as weak in front of their ruling coalition (Shellman 2015: 75-6). External threats to their authority can also critically alter agents' incentives to use repression against internal dissidents (Ritter 2014: 147; Davis and Ward 1990: 453). In contrast, "As state authority become increasingly secure in power, they will be less likely to engage in repression" (Ritter 2014: 144). In the context of civil war, the degree of territorial control offers a key factor determining armed groups' expectation to maintain their dominion over a territory and their incentives to tolerate civilian disobedience (Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2015; Kaplan 2017). Yet, as the results of the works of Moreno and Kaplan show, this effect is not necessarily straightforward and several factors may mediate the relationship between military

competition and repression, including armed groups' screening mechanisms, inhabitants' disposition to balance against or bandwagon with the most powerful side, civilians' resolve and capacity to escalate tactics, etc. In either case, because "strategic actors should be able to predict when a leader will be more accommodating to dissent versus free to repress" (Ritter 2014: 148), civilians also adjust their strategies based on the perceived weakness or strength of the armed groups in the territory.

Finally, it is noteworthy to discuss what lessons can be learned from the discussion on regime type and the level of threat to the study of resistance and repression in civil wars. While the categories of democracy/autocracy hardly apply to nonstate armed actors -no matter how much combatants aim to govern a territory-, theories on the role of regime type invite us to explore which organizational characteristics of a group constraints its use of coercive methods against the population. Conflict scholars theorize that legitimacy-seeking groups are less prone to use repressive and predatory methods against civilians in their areas of control. These groups tend to restrain their behavior to boost their reputation in front of key national and foreign constituencies (Jo 2015; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014; Akcinaroglu and Tokdemir 2016; Moreno 2017; Kaplan 2017). In contrast, two types of groups are more prone to crush any kind of popular dissent in the territory: genocidal groups (which have made an ideological commitment to use mass political violence to exterminate a particular population from a territory), and opportunistic groups (which lack command and control structures and reward the abusive behavior by their troops as a mechanism of recruitment) (Kaplan 2017; Valentino 2004; Weinstein 2006; Arjona 2016). Even peaceful protests are likely to be ineffective in the presence of these organizations.

Regarding the ‘law of coercive responsiveness’ (Davenport 2007), the survey of the current literature on resistance and repression suggests that the typical finding in the research on dissident-repression nexus also apply to this phenomenon of study, that is, rulers “are more likely to engage in repressive practices or enact repressive policies as dissent becomes more violent, more multidimensional, more organized, or more directly threatening” (Ritter and Conrad 2016: 86). Yet, since severe coercion can yield institutional costs and trigger backlash effects (Carey 2006; DeNardo 1985), under certain conditions, armed groups may have incentives to accommodate resolved dissident civilians. This outcome can be theorized when it is relaxed the assumption that a ruler *always* has a credible threat to engage in an open conflict against a radical group of civilians who are committed to escalate their tactics rather than to back down in favor of the status quo.

Current research on deterrence in international crisis provide analytical tools to explore these kinds of strategic interactions, marked by lack of complete information about the preferences, capacity, and payoffs of one or multiple players involved in a conflict (Quackenbush and Zagare 2016). The critical assumption of perfect deterrence theory -the most prominent current approach on this field- is that players’ preference for conflict rather than capitulation is a variable (typically determined by the actor’s type) rather than a fixed parameter (7). This theory has fostered important progress in the research agenda on international conflict (Quackenbush 2010; 2011; Slantchev 2011; Sartori 2007; Werner 2000; Langlois and Langlois 2006), as well as domestic conflict (e.g., Marchain et al 2011). Scholars on terrorism have used similar models to explain the conditions under which governments decide either to concede or to defy radical groups after a terrorist attack, when

there is uncertainty about the group's preferences for nonviolent political action or radical militancy (Lapan and Sandler 1993; Overgaard 1994; Arce and Sandler 2007). Often, these models predict governments' regret when, because of a failure in intelligence, incumbents 'wrongly' accommodate/repress the group they would have preferred to fight/appease.

Zagare and Kilgour (2000) develop a set of games of incomplete information that can be adapted to different kinds of political conflicts and capture the logic of unilateral deterrence in which one actor challenges the status quo that another one defends. This approach can accurately describe the strategic interaction entailed in the context of civilian resistance in irregular wars.

3.2 Theoretical Underpinnings

3.2.1 Resistance as a Bargaining Problem

I model civilian resistance as a bargaining failure. Especially in contexts of segmented sovereignty in irregular wars, resistance is costly, risky, and, even, unnecessary for both civilians and combatants who aim to govern the population. Both sides would prefer to reach an ex-ante agreement to avoid the onset of a dissident mobilization against the dominant group. In fact, the literature on rebel governance predicts that civilians and would-be rulers are better off by reaching a 'social contract' to foster predictability and reap positive byproducts of their interaction (Arjona 2016; Mason 1998; Kalyvas 2006; Whickham-Crowley 1991; Weinstein 2006).

One of these byproducts is an expected decline in the use of violence by the dominant actor. In this context, the armed group has no incentives to indiscriminately targeting civilians (Kalyvas 2006). The stronger its control, the higher its capacity to collect

quality information about possible defectors and punish such behavior (128). Effective use of sanctions by the dominant group, in turn, increases civilian collaboration or at least prevents defection and other dissident behaviors (141). Contrariwise, indiscriminate violence would be a detrimental strategy for the incumbent group in this setting; it reduces the opportunity costs of defection with the rival side (143). Thus, civilians have incentives to provide goods and services (manpower, food, intelligence, etc.) to the dominant party, if this group protects them from the rival actor (Kalyvas 2006: 124; Mason 1996: 74). When the rival group's capacity to punish collaboration increases, civilians tend to provide this support covertly (Mason 1998: 74). Otherwise, they provide overt material support to the dominant side (75). In either case, here, the challenger group has no screening mechanisms and will likely use collective targeting (Kalyvas 2006). This type of violence reinforces civilians' dependency on the dominant group (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007: 109). In this scenario, even neutral passivity is acceptable for both civilians and the ruling party (Mason 1998; Kalyvas 2006).

Arjona (2015; 2016) claims, however, that there is a chance of civilian resistance when a dominant group with long-time horizons and interest in controlling a territory encounters a community which holds legitimate pre-existing local institutions. Given that these institutions are recognized by locals as valid and effective, the inhabitants of this territory hold strong preferences for the current governance structure and have the capacity to solve collective action problems related to pushing back an intrusive actor (Arjona 2016: 12). Yet, since resistance is a risky and costly strategy, civilians are prone to refrain this mobilization when the armed group is willing to make concessions to the community and

control only civilian defection and public order (11). On the other side, the group has incentives to establish this social order to maintain control of the territory and obtain the positive byproducts of this policy (11). When the community lacks these institutions, the dominant group can exert a strong control of civilian local affairs (11). In this situation, civilian resistance is not a likely option for civilians (Arjona 2015: 184). In either case, ultimately, Arjona corroborates the idea that even when civilians might have strong preferences against the dominant actor and the capacity to revolt, scenarios of segmented sovereignty tend to be in equilibrium. Modeled as a repeated game of complete information, both actors would agree to establish a limited governance system in the first round and avoid the costs of a local dispute.

This equilibrium breaks apart when rival forces thrive to erode rebels' dominant position in the territory and there is a fragmentation of the local sovereignty with overlap authorities from both sides. In this scenario, the main goal of both warring parties is to defeat their enemy and, thus, they have no incentives "to restrain their behavior and abstain from conduct that they expect will increase the odds of winning that territory" (Arjona 2016: 10). Here, the challenger will try to reduce civilian support to the incumbent by using indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2006). When the incumbent loses its control over the territory, its capacity to protect collaborators decreases; it is focused on its own defense (Arjona 2016: 10). Likewise, the odds that the incumbent faces military strikes by its enemy rises, which, in turn, reduces civilians' incentives to support the group (Mason 1996: 78). Yet, while effective in weakening civilian loyalty to the incumbent, collective targeting is not necessarily an effective means to change the balance of popular support,

especially if civilians are prone to balancing against rather than bandwagon with the stronger side (Zhukov 2013). Unless the challenger offers a credible promise of protection, defection may be too risky for civilians because the declining ruler can still punish betrayal (Kalyvas 2006: 112). Under military competition, allegiance to any party is not a dominant strategy for civilians.

Often, it is neither an option for noncombatants to hide and adopt passive neutrality (Uribe de Hincapie 2006). In this context, the declining ruler has incentives to use anti-civilian violence and neglect the social contract to its local constituency (Arjona 2016: 10). The result of this policy is the emergence of a situation in which norms of behavior (a social contract) are no longer clear for civilians and are often violated by the armed groups (Arjona 2016: 54). Besides, in the context of fragmented sovereignty, both armed competitors tend to demand absolute and overt allegiance to their cause (Uribe de Hincapie 2006: 72); which jeopardizes civilian personal safety. Warring parties tend to make this demand implicitly. Yet, oftentimes, this request is explicit and involves an existential dilemma for civilians (Hernández 2004; Masullo 2015). All in all, the status quo becomes unbearable for most civilians who face a dilemma between fleeing the territory or organizing a collective action to demand a restriction in the use of violence to the armed groups.

3.2.2 A New Typology of Resistance Strategies

Once civilians have decided to stay put in the territory and refuse to cooperate with armed groups, they can organize a vast array of kinds of collective actions and several scholars have proposed alternative typologies to describe this strategic behavior. For instance,

Masullo (2021: 902) describes three unarmed tactics used in sustained campaigns, differentiated by the kind of civilian-combatant interactions. Oblique tactics neither address war dynamics, nor directly target armed groups (903). In contrast, unilateral actions involve a radical break with the warring parties that can lead to a direct confrontation between the two sides (905). Pacted tactics directly challenge armed organizations, but do so “via consultation and dialogue” (904). This form of noncooperation can lead to the onset of norms that regulate the behavior of civilians and combatants (904). Barter (2014: 21-3) advances a similar classification of actions used by civilians to raise their ‘voice’ in the conflict: defiance or direct actions of confrontation such as protests; everyday resistance; and engagement, which involves civilian feedback and negotiation with the warring parties.

While these typologies unearth the possibility that both sides can reach a bargaining agreement even when the resistance campaign has been put in place, they only encompass a restricted segment of the ample repertoire of collective actions employed in civilian resistance mobilizations. Notably, armed self-protection (and protests in Masullo’s work) is excluded from the analysis. Besides, the typologies are agnostic about the policy at stake in the dispute between the two parties. Yet even the least confrontational tactics can become very threatening when they imply the withdrawing of the supply of a key civilian input for the rebels’ rule. More critical, these theories fail to determine the level of disruptiveness implied in these actions, which impedes predicting the kind and degree of responsiveness of the targeted actors by the campaign (DeNardo 1985: 35).

In contrast, Arjona (2015; 2008; 2017) proposes a typology that hinges on the dimension neglected in these works: the issue at stake in the campaign. The author

distinguishes between two types of campaigns of civilian dissent (2015: 183): partial resistance, “where opposition is against specific conducts or decisions of the armed ruler but not against its rule”, and full resistance, “where opposition is against the group’s rule altogether”. Arjona contends that the most important policy at dispute in a resistance campaign is the scope of an armed group’s intervention in the local affairs. Partial resistance is ubiquitous to all forms of rebel governance (2017: 757) and hardly posits an existential threat to the organization. Full resistance, on the other hand, can be very threatening for the group, especially when it jeopardizes its military control over the territory (2015: 187).

I build upon Arjona’s work but include an additional dimension of analysis. An important limitation of Arjona’s typology is that it makes no distinction between collective, individual, armed, or unarmed forms of resistance (2017: 762). However, authors such as DeNardo consider that two of the most important factors determining the level of disruptiveness of a dissident’s strategy are, first, the set of policies that are target of disruption and, second, the kind of tactic (violent or nonviolent) employed in the collective actions (1985: 41, see, also McAdam 1982). Based on these two dimensions, I consider three prototypes of resistance strategies that encompass a full spectrum of tactics and demands to the armed groups: *protest*, *sanctuary*, and *violent self-protection*. These types can be classified into four categories: violent versus nonviolent tactics, and moderate versus radical demands. **Table 3.1** summarizes this classification.

Table 3.1 Typology of Civilian Resistance Strategies

		Demand	
		Moderate	Radical
Tactic	Nonviolent	Protest	Sanctuary
	Violent	N.A.	Violent Self-Protection

The categories in the first dimension are relatively straightforward, but still deserve clarification. Some scholars conceptualize tactics as a continuous variable (DeNardo 1985; Schock 2013), with a certain level as the cutting point. For instance, in a numeric scale from 0 to 1, DeNardo (1985: 41) defines a peaceful method as a tactic that equals 0 (total absence of violence), while a violent method corresponds to every tactic higher than 0. I rather follow scholars on strategic nonviolent action such as Schock (2005) and Masullo (2021) and treat violent tactics as a discrete choice based on the use of armed self-protection methods. Notice that the use of unarmed actions does not preclude the possibility that a demonstration result in riots, arson, deaths, and other violent events related to the confrontation between civilians and combatants (Shock 2004: xvi). Yet, these violent events are the unintentional result of the frictions between the two sides rather than a dissidents' deliberate plan to use (or threat to use) violent weapons to infringe harm in their opponents.

Regarding the second dimension, like Arjona's (2015: 183) notion of partial resistance, I define a demand as moderate when it challenges a single policy of the warring parties operating in a territory. Nevertheless, unlike Arjona, the policy of interest is not undetermined, but corresponds to the core and most basic demand raised in all civilian

resistance campaigns¹⁹: restraint in (ideally relinquish to) the use of violence against the local population. Every demand that contains this basic request to the warring parties but challenge other aspects or dimensions of the administration of local affairs by these armed organizations can be considered a more comprehensive or radical demand. For instance, one year after the creation of the Association of Peasant Workers of Carare (ATCC) in 1987 in Santander (Colombia), the organization's leaders formulated a development plan to demand warring parties respect not only of the peasants' right to life, but also of their 'right to work', threatened by violent constraining and taxation (GMH, 2011: 325). In the extreme case, following Arjona (2015: 187), it is possible to theorize a civilian challenge to an armed group's rule over the territory as the most radical kind of demand raised by a campaign.

With these categories in mind, it is possible to define *protest* as a moderate, nonviolent strategy of civilian resistance. This strategy encompasses all forms of unarmed collective actions to publicly convey inhabitants' dissatisfaction with the security situation in the territory, especially regarding the indiscriminate or abusive targeting of civilians by the warring parties (Kaplan 2017: 50; Moreno 2021: 319; Barter 2014: 21). Protests can be neutral and target both conflict sides either directly (Moreno 2017: 9) or indirectly to avoid risks of reprisal (García 2005: 49; Uribe de Hincapié 2006: 74). Alternatively, protest can address only one side of the conflict, which armed actors can interpret "as costly signals of loyalty, since civilians undertake them despite the likely negative consequences of violent

¹⁹ This assumption corresponds to the dissertation's definition of the object of study proposed in **Chapter 1**: "Civilian resistance is a self-protection mobilization aimed to curb the levels of violence against the inhabitants of a territory through the imposition of costs on warring parties by an organization or an ad hoc collectivity of noncombatants".

retaliation” (Moreno 2017: 7). By threatening to impose reputational costs on armed contenders, “protesting may provide increased leverage in quieter forms of bargaining over protecting civilians with would-be aggressors” (Kaplan 2017: 50). This strategy is moderate because it mainly implies a demand for protection against violence and a recovery in the security conditions of the locality, comparable to what the previously dominant group offered under territorial control (Uribe de Hincapié 2006: 74).

A more radical strategy is the creation of an unarmed organization to protect the community from the armed groups’ violence. In its most radical form, this strategy includes the “declarations of neutrality that set a community’s territory off limits to armed groups (a ‘peace zone’)” (Kaplan 2017: 50-1) and hence the name *sanctuary* that peace scholars have coined to refer to these campaigns (e.g., Avruch and José 2007; Hancock and Mitchell 2007). With this strategy dissident civilians escalate the level of demands and the costs imposed to the warring parties. Neutrality, for example, implies the withdrawal of obedience and voluntary support in key realms of the local affairs and even the creation of parallel institutions that challenge armed groups’ control of the economic, social, or political spheres in the territory (Sharp 1973). The instauration of a sanctuary threatens the presence (and rule) of the warring parties in the territory and seeks to create an alternative local order administered by the civilian population (Uribe de Hincapié 2006: 76). Very cohesive communities often even dare to use massive, unarmed manpower to protect or patrol these territories from military operations by the armed groups (Kaplan 2017: 51; Masullo 2021: 905). In practice, this strategy does not necessarily preclude bargaining arrangements with the armed actors (Uribe de Hincapié 2006: 76). In fact, civilians often

create these organizations to improve their leverage vis-à-vis their armed contenders and “convince them to moderate their behavior toward civilians” (Moreno 2021: 319). Even the most radical campaigns of unarmed resistance against rebel groups in Colombia, such as the mobilization led by the indigenous Nasa in Cauca, often resort to what Masullo calls pacted tactics to reach agreements of no confrontation and respect of autonomy with irregular combatants (Hernández 2004; Peñaranda 2006).

In this chapter, I will also treat as expressions of sanctuary other less radical and less comprehensive campaigns of unarmed resistance that demand armed groups to restraint their use of violence and, in addition, invest in noncooperative tactics or the creation of parallel institutions in the political, social, or economic spheres of the locality. The cases of the ATCC (Kaplan 2013), the Mogotes Constituent Assembly (Nieto 2010), or the civilian-rebels local peace pact in Samaniego (Masullo et al 2019) are exemplars of these forms of civilian resistance strategy.

The last type of strategy, *violent self-protection*, is the most radical form of dissident collective action in terms of both tactics and demands. This is an armed, local-based mobilization that “employs a logic of deterrence to directly impose (or threaten to impose) military costs on armed groups for abuses that they may commit” (Kaplan 2017: 51). While this strategy may imply noncooperation and the creation of parallel institutions in key spheres of the local affairs (Fumerton 2001; 2018; Shubiger 2021), its core demand involves the withdrawal of the rebel organization from the territory. The disruptiveness of tactics and demands, combined with the possibility that the mobilization can be viewed as an asset for pro-government forces in the military confrontation (Peic 2014; Clayton &

Thomson 2014; Shubiger 2021), makes very difficult the possibility that a group will accommodate to this strategy in a bargaining arrangement. Thus, violent self-protection can be theorized as a burning-the-bridges strategy used to signal rebels and the state civilians' strong commitment to change the status quo (Shubiger 2021; Stoll 1993).

3.2.3 To Repress or to Accommodate?

As other political actors invested with authority or who arrogate the right to govern a population (DeNardo 1985; Pierskalla 2010; Ritter 2014), I argue an armed group's decision to repress civilian dissent is a function of its organizational characteristics, the perceived threat to its dominion in the territory, and the level of disruptiveness of the resistance strategy advanced by the challengers.

Two organizational characteristics can strongly predispose a rebel group to repress or accommodate civilian dissent. First, whether the group seeks legitimacy in front of key constituencies or not (Jo 2015; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014; Akcinaroglu and Tokdemir 2016; Moreno 2017; Kaplan 2017). Because legitimacy-seeking groups make a commitment to protect their constituencies, it is more likely that they accommodate to nonthreatening forms of dissent to their rule in the territory if these actions are perceived as legitimate demands to change its behavior from representatives of their constituency (Moreno 2017). In the first place, this kind of groups “measure their use of violence to a greater degree, making (civilian resistance) less necessary” (Kaplan 2017: 58). These groups can also be proactive in responding to the population if civilians organize resistance (58). In contrast, groups that neglect the importance of their reputation (e.g., genocidal

groups or predatory organizations) are less likely to tolerate any kind of popular dissent in the territory (Kaplan 2017; Valentino 2004; Weinstein 2006; Arjona 2016).

The second variable is the resource endowments of the warring party (Weinstein 2006; Kaplan 2017; Wood 2014). Resource-poor groups tend to be highly dependent on the local population for their survival and therefore are more likely to be responsive to civilian demands (Kaplan 2017: 56). After all, these groups often create inclusive institutions to administer local affairs during periods of segmented sovereignty and thus have more experience in dealing with criticism and feedback from the population (Weinstein 2006: 172-3; Barter 2014: 22-3). Resource-wealthy groups depend less on the population and tend to recruit opportunistic agents with scarce or no restraint in their use of violence against noncombatants (Weinstein 2006: 7; 171-2). Dissident civilians will probably meet repression when they challenge these rulers, especially when the source of economic endowments is threatened by a deliberate action of from the community (e.g., when peasants decide to stop growing coca in their fields in defiance of a rebel order) (Estancona 2021).

Regarding the second factor, an armed group's time horizon heavily influences its incentives to tolerate or not civilian dissent (Kaplan 2017: 56). Groups with long time horizons "care about future outcomes more than they do about present ones" (Arjona 2016: 48). I claim that these actors might be willing to restraint their use of violence in exchange of higher degrees of civilian cooperation, the recovery of levels of obedience and material support withdrawn by the local population, or to prevent radical noncombatants from opting for higher levels of noncooperation. Groups operating under short-term horizons -

those that prioritize immediate goals- have fewer incentives or less capacity to self-restraint in the treatment of the civilian population (51). As Arjona (2016: 51) argues, “When an armed group has problems of internal discipline -that is, of enforcing its rules and orders within its organization- the rank and file can act upon their own short-term interest rather than those of the organization”. Thus, the troops can renege any contingent agreement to respect civilian demands of self-control in the use of violence even if the rebel leaders might have incentives to appease the local population.

On the other hand, a fierce territorial dispute can reduce the time horizon of the group and its incentives to respect agreements with civilians (Weinstein 2006; Arjona 2016). In this scenario, a group prioritizes defeating its rival over any other goal (Arjona 2016: 53). The competition also creates uncertainty about long-term outcomes and creates an expectation in the group that civilians will also break any agreements reached with them (53-4). In this context, as Arjona (2016: 54) observes, “Civilians face disorder because none of the armed actors are able to fully enforce its rules and uncertainty (about the use of violence) is high”. The scenario described by Arjona resembles a situation of parity in the Kalyvas (2006) typology of warzones. Such a kind of local stalemate is strongly correlated to the onset of the civilian resistance campaign (Jentzsch 2014; Stoll 1993; Fumerton 2001; Hernández 2004; Masullo 2017; Kaplan 2017).

Nevertheless, zones of fragmented sovereignty are more fluid and diverse than the situation of parity. Armed groups’ incentives to restraint their use of violence covary with the balance of power in the territory (Kalyvas 2006). Assuming civilians balance against the most abusive actor, a dominant group prefers to use selective violence against defectors

(203). The weakest side will have incentives to collectively targeting the civilian population (204). All things equal, I argue that a dominant group that expect to capture territorial control soon, might aim to govern the population²⁰. Such expectation can lead it to make concessions to inhabitants to improve its chances of obtaining civilian cooperation. The weakest side might maintain negative prospects of controlling the territory, which can decrease its willingness to make arrangement with the population. To sum up, I argue that prospects of winning or losing can augment or reduce groups' time-horizon and, consequently, their disposition to cede or crush civilian collective demands.

Finally, the responsiveness of an armed group can be shaped by the level of disruptiveness of the resistance mobilization. There is almost no debate that any ruler is more willing to repress violent tactics rather than nonviolent tactics as the literature review highlighted, therefore, it is more relevant to explore the role of demands. Strategies challenge rebels' expectation on the levels of civilian cooperation in the territory. To explore their response to these demands it is useful to use Arjona's disaggregation of civilian cooperation into obedience (acts that follow an explicit order by a ruler) and voluntary support (actions that favor a rebel organization that were neither explicitly nor implicitly given by the group) (2017: 762), as well as her typology of levels of civilian cooperation in warzones (2008: 120-1): high cooperation (obedience and support in

²⁰ This insight is based on fragmentary evidence that predatory and abusive groups in civil wars can restrain the use of violence once they obtain the upper hand in the competition. For instance, Gutiérrez-Sanín (2008: 15-6) observes that the behavior of the paramilitary in Colombia is "sharply divided into two periods. In the first one, the "hot" period, they carried out a wave of indiscriminate violence that includes massacres, mutilations (often on those still living), torture, and the destruction and theft of property. In the second "cold" period, the paramilitary switch to selective violence. They prowl in the towns where they are strong, often settling permanently there (...) The paramilitaries gradually became more selective in their use of violence in response to the demands of governance".

multiple spheres of the local affairs), medium/low cooperation (restricted obedience and support to a single or few dimensions), minimum cooperation (no support but obedience under the threat of coercion); and zero cooperation (neither support nor obedience). Seminal pieces in conflict studies have theorized a similar rebels' ranking of preferences on the behavior of the population that they aim to rule (Kalyvas 2006: 104-5; Mason 1996: 72-5): high cooperation > medium/low cooperation > minimum cooperation > zero cooperation > defection (cooperation to the rival side).

Given this order of preferences and the fact that armed dissent invites support from the rival side, it is very unlikely that rebels will give in to a campaign of violent self-protection (Shubiger 2021: 86; Clayton and Thomson 2014: 923; Peic 2019: 2). Rebels will only accommodate to such a strategy under two joint conditions: they lack a credible commitment to fight for the territory and they expect to encounter a resolute community. This might be the case of a very weak actor that faces an unbalance of military power and/or resolve vis-à-vis the dissident armed organization. While sanctuary can also be threatening as it restricts civilian obedience to a minimum level -or in the case of its most radical version to a zero level-, rebels that depend heavily on the community or that care about their reputation and legitimacy have incentives to accommodate to these kinds of civilian demands (Kaplan 2017: 60; Masullo 2021: 904; Moreno 2021: 319). In contrast, actors that rely on external sources of financing or face a shortage of horizon might be less willing to tolerate nonviolent escalatory strategies.

On the other hand, protest is the strategy that has the best option to yield concessions from armed contenders, especially with legitimacy-seeking rebels that depend

on the community for their survival or when combatants expect to face a community with the capacity and willingness to escalate their tactics and demands. In effect, armed groups that claim to be the ‘defenders of the community’ can be more easily persuaded to accommodate or at least tolerate these actions (Moreno 2017: 8; Kaplan 2017: 50). Moreover, some authors claim that armed groups that aim to govern a territory “learn that they need at least some voluntary cooperation from locals and that giving them voice to express their discontent is a useful strategy” (Arjona 2015: 185). Similarly, Barter (2014: 22) observes that leftist guerrillas often solicit criticism for civilians, especially through channels that they control. While protests express demands outside the channels controlled by rebels and in that way can be contentious (Kaplan 2017: 50), the demand for a modest change in the behavior of the armed groups can be more easily accommodated by a would-be ruler than a radical threat to its rule (Arjona 2015: 185). Moreno (2017: 9) claims that when the dominant group and the population share the same ideology, “Protesting then prepares the stage for these negotiations that are set to take place between the armed actor and its loyal constituency”.

3.2.4 The Bargaining Range of Civilian Resistance


To end, it is important to revisit the bargaining range available for noncombatants and militants despite the onset of a civilian resistance campaign. **Figure 2.1** depicts in a horizontal line from 0 to 1 ideal types of status quo in a warzone. The status quo describes two interrelated dimensions: from the civilians’ perspective, the line represents the scope of an armed group’s intervention in the locality; and, from the rebels’ viewpoint, the axis measures levels of civilian cooperation.

Consider point E -the rebels' preferred outcome-. This is a situation in which an insurgent organization has established an interventionist order (i.e., *Rebelocracy* in Arjona's terms) in which it expects high levels of civilian cooperation (Arjona 2016). Yet, this is an unacceptable deal for dissident noncombatants because overt and active support is only provided by rational civilians when the group has the capacity to provide protection from the rival side and rebels' have lost the monopoly of violence in the territory (Mason 1996: 75). Point D represents a situation in which civilians decide to raise a moderate demand against the dominant group, which not necessarily involves the withdrawal of cooperation in any realm of the local affairs. The would-be ruler can still seek to intervene in several dimensions of the locality, but it needs to yield concessions to civilians in terms of restraint in its use of violence. Point C corresponds to a situation in which civilians have refused to obey and to voluntarily support the group in one or several spheres to force it to make concessions about the use of violence. The scope of intervention of the insurgency in local affairs has been curtailed and the group only receives middle/low cooperation. In C and D, the group can expect active but covert support from a part of the population (Mason 1996: 74).

Point B illustrates the situation in which civilians have put in place the radical version of sanctuary and refuse to cooperate with the group. If rebels defy civilians, they can still force inhabitants to obey orders related to public order and taxes (Arjona 2008: 146). A group may have incentives to cede until this point; after all, minimum cooperation is better than zero cooperation and the group can relinquish its goal of implementing an interventionist order if it can still control fragments of the territory under its influence

(Arjona 2016: 64; Kalyvas 2006: 104). Point A is radical civilians’ favorite outcome: no intervention of the rebels in the community or, even further, the withdrawal of the group from the area. Combatants have no incentives to give in to this challenge given that “they would risk losing their territorial control altogether -a situation they are not likely to accept because controlling territory is often their primary goal” (Arjona 2015: 187). If rebels fail to defeat the resistance organization, civilians can expel the group from the territory (Arjona 2016: 64). In a more benign scenario for the rebels, the community succeeds at disobeying the group, but cannot force it to leave the area. In this context, while civilians even refuse to engage in market transactions with the group, they cannot restrict it to operate in their vicinity (Mason 1996: 72).

Figure 3.1 Bargaining Range in Civilian Resistance Campaigns



Overall, rational civilians and rebels have incentives to concede to their counterparts in the bargaining range from point B to point D, to avoid incurring in unacceptable outcomes.

3.3 A Set of Games of Civilian Resistance


3.3.1 Introduction: The Generalized Game of Civilian Resistance

The strategic interaction between dissident civilians and rebels described in the previous section of the chapter can be modeled as a unilateral deterrence game of incomplete information (Zagare and Kilgour 2000: 134). In this game -depicted in **Figure 3.2** in its simplest extensive form- there are two main players: a community, the ‘Challenger’ (Ch), that aims to change the status quo of a warzone in stalemate between state forces and the insurgent side, and a rebel organization, the ‘Defender’ (Df), that operated as *de facto* ruler of the territory in the previous period and aims to retake its control. A third actor, pro-government forces (i.e., either the military, paramilitaries, or both), is important for civilians and rebels, but is not part of the game’s strategic players. To maximize comparability between violent and nonviolent resistance strategies the model focuses on rebels as the ‘defender’ of the status quo because most armed self-protection movements target this side rather than the state. Nevertheless, the game is flexible enough to incorporate pro-government forces as a third actor.

In the first period, the challenger has the choice of protesting against the insecurity in the locality, P, or not protesting, $\sim P$, and allowing the status quo (SQ) to remain stable, in which case the game ends. If the community protests, the defender decides whether to repress the mobilization, R, or accommodate to the demand of the civilian population, $\sim R$, in which case the outcome is ‘moderate civilians win’ (McW). The third node is reached when the community protests and the rebel organization represses the mobilization. The challenger then weighs whether to escalate the campaign or to back down and let the rebels

win (RW). This general form of the game is agnostic regarding the type of strategy civilians use to escalate the campaign. **Chapter 2** elaborates a theory of the choice of resistance strategy by dissident civilians, this section treats the proclivity to use violence or nonviolence as an exogenous variable to the model. The unilateral deterrence game of violent resistance (UDG-VR) only assumes that the core of the resistance proto-organization prefers armed rather than unarmed resistance if rebels repress a moderate demand. The opposite situation is assumed in the unilateral deterrence game of nonviolent resistance (UDG-NR). Finally, in Node 4, the defender makes the last choice whether to concede and allow the radical civilians win (RcW), or to defy and engage in an open conflict (DD) with the community.

Figure 3.2 Generalized Unilateral Deterrence Game of Civilian Resistance



Next two sections will describe in detail the players' payoffs in each outcome of the game. Here, it is sufficient to say that the game assumes the following order of preferences of the players:

$$\text{Challenger: } McW > SQ > RcW > [RW, DD] \quad (3.1)$$

$$\text{Defender: } SQ > RW > McW > [RcW, DD] \quad (3.2)$$

Following Zagare and Kilgour (2000: 107), the relative preferences of the outcomes enclosed in brackets are intentionally unspecified at this moment because they correspond to the parameters of interest in the following models. They represent the degree to which

each contender has a credible threat, that is, the resolve to fight rather than to capitulate against a stubborn rival (67-8).

Largely, the order of these preferences depends on the players' types. I assume that both challengers and defenders can be of two types, strong or weak. Specifically, "a Hard player prefers to retaliate (i.e., prefers Conflict to losing the advantage) while a Soft player prefers to capitulate" (Zagare and Kilgour 2000: 108). However, as conflict scholars point out, warzones of fragmented sovereignty are marked by uncertainty about future events; the costs and benefits of high-risk activism; the capacity, preferences, and payoffs of warring parties; and the allegiance and endurance of the population (Jentzsch 2014: 42; Arjona 2016: 54; Ginkel and Smith 1999: 294). Therefore, the model further assumes that both players ignore each other's types. The final assumption about the nature of the players is that the challengers update their beliefs about the rebel group according to the latter's respond to the moderate demand. Like Pierskalla's game of repression and dissent with incomplete information (2010), civilians believe that a group reveals its type as strong when it represses a protest campaign and as weak, otherwise. These assumptions about the actors' preferences for conflict or capitulation are captured in the first two nodes, in which the players make the strategic moves of the game (i.e., the probabilities x and y in **Figure 3.2**). The last two nodes are completely determined by each player's type. In sum, this is a signaling game of two-sided asymmetric information (Muñoz and Toro 2016).

Challengers' type is determined by the composition of the community in terms of what DeNardo (1985: 157) calls pragmatists, P_g , and purists, P_t . Both types of individuals are followers (or would-be joiners) of a social movement that drastically differ in their

commitment to the dissident organization's demands and their willingness to incur in risks and costs related to the escalation of the political conflict. Concerning demands, "The purist is more tenacious in opposing policies that diverge only slightly from -his ideal policy-" (163). In contrast, the pragmatist "may retire from the battlefield as soon as the regime moderates its position even slightly" (175). In terms of their endurance to absorb the risks and costs of escalation, "the purist is largely unaffected by costlier participation, while the pragmatist's political activities are fairly drastically curtailed" (164). Moreover, in the context of repression, unlike pragmatists, purists "willingly join demonstrations even though repression is a certainty (that is, regardless of the safety in numbers or lack of it)" (194). This distinction is critical for the leaders of proto-resistance organizations that need to form a critical mass to escalate the tactics and the demands against the rebel group. As DeNardo explains (1985: 222), "Having a large purist following makes it easier to escalate tactics without suffering debilitating defections". A large bloc of pragmatists in the community, on the contrary, "favors moderate tactics" (223). Put differently, communities where the size of $P_t > P_g$ are strong and dissident leaders will be able to escalate the campaign against a stubborn rebel group. When $P_g > P_t$, the community is weak and will probably back down after experiencing repression.

Rebels' type is operationalized by the prospects of the group to retake the control of the territory or not. As Lichbach (1995: 66) claims, "past successes and failures are key indicators of the probability of future victories and losses", therefore, previous victories may boost rebels' confidence that soon it will have the upper hand over pro-government forces. A positive change in the balance of power in the territory can increase the incentives

of the group to prepare the setting for ruling (again) the population. Thus, I argue, while this group may be stronger in the military contest, it is weak vis-à-vis the civilians that it aims to govern. That is, under certain conditions the group has incentives to accommodate to civilian demands if it considers that such a strategy will foster civilian obedience and voluntary support. On the contrary, the weakest side in the warfare will be less likely to make concessions to the community because it sees no options in the short term to rule the population. The next sections will specify the implications of being a strong or weak defender in terms of concessions or defiance to escalatory civilians' strategies.

3.3.2 Unilateral Deterrence Game of Violent Resistance

The UDG-VR starts with the premise that most members of the community prefer to resort to violent tactics rather than nonviolent tactics when the rebels repress peaceful demonstrations against the insecurity in the locality. In DeNardo's terms (1985: 191-2), in this case, the disutility of the use of violence, $L(T)$, is less than the disutility of rebel's repression, $L(R)$, and thus the leaders of the resistance face no moral backlash when they escalate the campaign by organizing a violent self-protection, V . This is the typical model of escalatory strategies used in conflict studies (see, e.g., DeNardo 1985; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Pierskalla 2010; Petersen 2001).

The game has the same structure and sequence than the generalized form. However, observe that nature, N , makes two initial movements. First, the community is strong with probability p and weak with probability $1-p$. The second move of N determines whether the rebels are strong with probability θ and weak with probability $1-\theta$. Each player knows


its type but ignore the other's one and therefore the dotted lines connecting nodes in **Figure 3.3** are the players' information sets.

In Node 1, the community decides whether to protest, P , or not to protest, $\sim P$. If it opts for $\sim P$, the game ends with the outcome, SQ , and the challenger obtains a negated utility of $-u$ and the defender, a positive utility G . These payoffs reflect the status quo described in the previous section: civilians carry an unbearable burden and rebels still obtain a utility for intervening in the local affairs. If the community protests, the rebel organization must weigh in Node 2 whether it represses or accommodates the challenger's demand of restraint in the use of violence. If it accommodates, the game ends with the outcome, McW . The defender restricts its use of violence against the civilian population at the cost, $-c_t$, of investing in internal discipline via enforcing mechanisms, punishment of abusive rank and file, and/or political education (Hoover 2018). It retains a positive utility, G , for maintaining its influence over the community. Civilians obtain a positive utility, g_p , related to an improvement in their security conditions, diminished by the costs of organizing a protest campaign, $-c_p$. When the defender represses the protest mobilization, civilians decide whether to escalate with V or acquiesce. The model assumes that the challenger updates its belief about the rebel group's type according to the latter's response in Node 2. When it represses, the challenger's a posteriori belief is that the defender is strong. If the community backs down, the game ends with the victory of the rebels, RW , who retain G but incur in a reputational cost, $-l_r$, that affects its legitimacy. The community receives a payoff composed of three negative terms, $-u$, $-c_p$, and $-c_r$ (of being

repressed), but receives a diminished positive reward for protesting an abusive actor, g_p' .

Notice that $g_p > g_p' > 0$ and u , l_r , and c_t are, respectively, greater than zero.

Figure 3.3 Unilateral Deterrence Game of Violent Resistance



When the challenger escalates the mobilization, the rebels have the final choice in Node 4 of conceding to the radical campaign, RcW, or defying the self-defense organization and engaging in an open conflict with the community, DD. I assume that

rebels concede to civilians by withdrawing its presence from the territory where the community resides, but in exchange, the group retains the ‘right’ to operate in the vicinity of the community. This is one of the two scenarios described in the previous section, that Mason (1996: 72) denominates ‘passive neutrality’²¹. Thus, in RcW, the rebels receive a negative utility of $-t$ for yielding part of the territory under its influence, together with the costs of repressing the protest campaign, but retains a reduced positive utility, G' , for staying in the area. On the other hand, the challenger obtains a positive utility, g_v , that represents a situation in which the community succeeds at disobeying the insurgency and pushing it to the margins of its territory of residence (Arjona 2016: 64). This reward is diminished by the cost of escalating the mobilization, $-c_{ev}$, together with the costs of organizing a protest campaign (previously repressed by the group). In DD, the rebels incur the costs of a military conflict with the local militia, $-m$, in addition to $-l_r$, compensated by G' -the model is agnostic about which side wins the conflict. The community incurs the same costs of escalation and those costs related to the previous protest campaign, described in RcW. In addition, while the negative utility of $-u$ is not present in this payoff, the challenger must assume additional repression costs. As a compensation, nonetheless, the community receives a positive reward, g_v' , for resisting a repressive group.

²¹ There is anecdotal evidence of this ‘cold war’ scenario between rebels and communities organized in self-defense groups in Colombia. For instance, the *Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega*, an indigenous militia from an isolated area of Cajibío, Cauca, coexisted in the same town with FARC for decades after an initial period of intense confrontation between the two sides in the early 1980s (CNMH 2018: 355). The rebels opted for a policy of lockdown and isolation of the community, short of clashes, incursions, or skirmishes (355). This situation changed with the incursion of paramilitaries to Cauca in 2000, when FARC launched an operation to control the militias’ territory at the cost of employing a scorched-earth tactics and displacing the population (356-7). Similar cases include the indigenous-led militia, ‘Territorial Defense’, in Planadas, Tolima (Barros and Padilla 2017; Maldonado 2015).

Notice that $g_v > g_v' > g_p > g_p' > 0$ represents the fact that higher degrees of *de facto* autonomy yield a higher utility for the challenger, and $G > G' > 0$ measures the degree to which rebels' intervention in the locality is curtailed by the escalation of civilian dissent. Finally, the model further assumes that the costs for escalating the campaign are higher than those of organizing a protest, $c_{ev} > c_p > 0$. **Table 3.2** presents the payoff structure of the UDG-VR.

Table 3.2 Payoff Structure of the UDG-VR

Outcome	Challenger	Defender
Status Quo (SQ)	$-u$	G
Moderate Civilians Win (McW)	$g_p - c_p$	$G - c_t$
Rebels Win (RW)	$g_p' - u - c_p - c_r$	$G - l_r$
Radical Civilians Win (RcW)	$g_v - c_p - c_r - c_{ev}$	$G' - l_r - t$
Conflict (DD)	$g_v' - c_p - 2c_r - c_{ev}$	$G' - l_r - m$

Before analyzing the solution of this game, it is critical to specify the payoff structure for each type of player. Regarding civilians, given that $P_t > P_g$ in a strong community, the challenger can absorb the costs and risks of the escalation, so $g_v > g_v' > c_r + c_{ev}$. For a weak challenger $c_r + c_{ev} > g_v > g_v'$. Concerning the defender, a strong rebel group prefers both to incur the reputational costs of repressing rather than investing in internal discipline mechanisms (so $c_t > l_r$), and to embrace the military costs of fighting the community rather than yielding territory under its influence (thus, $t > m$). For a weak defender $l_r > c_t$ and $m > t$. In summary:

$$\text{Strong Challenger: } McW > RcW > SQ > DD > RW \quad (3.3)$$

$$\text{Weak Challenger: } McW > SQ > RcW > RW > DD \quad (3.4)$$

$$\text{Strong Defender: } SQ > RW > McW > DD > RcW \quad (3.5)$$

$$\text{Weak Challenger: } SQ > McW > RW > RcW > DD \quad (3.6)$$

To solve this game, **Appendix I** presents all the necessary proofs to show that there are only two pure strategies that fulfill the properties of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE):

Proposition 1: The first PBE of the game is a separating equilibrium, with the strategy profile (Strong Challenger: P/V, V; Weak Challenger: P/BD, V; Strong Defender: R/D, D; Weak Defender: \sim R/A, A), and a posterior belief $q=1$ after observing repression and $q=0$ after observing accommodation.

Given the assumption of the game that the status quo carries a negative utility for the civilian population in a context of fragmented sovereignty, leaders of a proto-resistance organization will risk protest as a mechanism for ‘testing the waters’ even when they suspect (but are not completely certain) that the rebels are likely to be strong²². The defender will reveal its type and a strong rebel group will repress, while a weak one will accommodate to moderate dissidents.

Here, it is useful to separate the analysis of the results for each type of defender. Let’s start with a strong rebel group. Hard defenders will not accommodate to the moderate demand of restricting the use of violence against civilians -regardless of the community’s capacity to escalate its strategy- because the group views an investment in internal discipline as a higher cost than the reputational damage of repressing a nonviolent mobilization. After all, the group is concentrated in the military dispute and must direct its organizational resources in obtaining a military victory. Moreover, if the community has the capacity to escalate the conflict, this hard defender also prefers the lottery of a conflict

²² For instance, when the prior belief is high ($\theta \leq .83$ or $5/6$) but not certain. See the **Appendix 3.1** for a detailed explanation of this approximated values.

with the local community than yielding part of control of the territory to a local self-defense organization. Observing that the rebel group is strong after repressing, a community will escalate the confrontation when the group of purists is large enough to form the ‘critical mass’ of a self-defense organization. A weak community has no capacity of absorbing the costs and risks of creating a local militia and will acquiesce to the repressive group.

A weak defender accommodates to moderate civilians because it prefers to discipline the behavior of its rank and file rather than compromising its reputation in front of key audiences, as well as the community that it aims to govern soon. Even relaxing this assumption, given that the group is strong in the military terrain in the locality, it will prefer to stay in the municipality and isolate any community’s attempt to organize a self-defense organization. Using backward induction, it is possible to predict that a weak community only will dare to organize a militia if it faces a soft insurgency. A strong community would resort to violence -regardless the rebels’ type-, but the victory of a moderate mobilization brings a greater net utility to the local population than the victory of the radical organization $(g_p - c_p > g_v - c_p - c_r - c_{ev})$.

There is another solution to this game:

Proposition 2: The second PBE of the game is a separating equilibrium, with the strategy profile (Strong Challenger: $\sim P/V, V$; Weak Challenger: $\sim P/BD, V$; Strong Defender: $R/D, D$; Weak Defender: $\sim R/A, A$), and a posterior belief $q=1$ after observing repress and $q=0$ after observing accommodation.

In this case, civilians are so convinced that the rebels are strong that they refrain from challenging the status quo²³. This can be the case in which a community lacks enough organizational resources to undertake a protest campaign and the high probability of experiencing repression discourages its leaders from resisting war. This is also a token of perfect deterrence in the context of civil war.

To sum up, together with the status quo, the model explains three strategic outcomes: (1) conflict, when a strong challenger and a hard defender collide; (2) rebels win, when a weak community cannot fight back a repressive rebel group; and (3) moderate civilians win, when a weak insurgent group prefers conceding to protests rather than risking a costly conflict with the community.

3.3.3 Unilateral Deterrence Game of Nonviolent Resistance

The point of departure of the UDG-NR is a situation in which the leaders of the resistance proto-organization consider that most potential activists in the community will reject armed self-protection²⁴ or they themselves reject the use of violence in political conflict altogether. In either case, in DeNardo's terms (1985: 191-2), the campaign can face a backlash effect if the disutility of using violent tactics, $L(T)$, is greater than the disutility of experiencing rebels' repression, $L(R)$. Thus, the leaders of the campaign prefer to organize a sanctuary, S , if they are willing and able to escalate the mobilization against a stubborn group. This model of escalation of dissident tactics is less common in conflict

²³ For instance, when the prior belief is extremely high ($\theta > .83$ or $5/6$).

²⁴ The case of the ATCC is illustrative of this matter, as **Chapter 2** described. In this case, the first leaders of the mobilization considered both armed and unarmed methods to escalate the mobilization against rebels and militias but precluded the first option due to the opposition of a segment of the population and their own deliberation that forming a militia would yield more conflict rather than security to the community (GMH 2011: 306; 322-4).


studies but correspond to the idea of scholars and practitioners of strategic nonviolent action that unarmed methods can be as contentious (and effective) as political violence (Sharp 1973; Shock 2004; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Some studies of civilian agency in civil war have also proposed this escalatory model (e.g., see Uribe de Hincapié 2007).

This game follows the same structure of the generalized form, and the payoff structure is equivalent to the one of the UDG-VR until Node 3 (see, **Figure 3.4**)²⁵. When civilians have organized sanctuary -in response to the repression of a protest campaign by the rebels-, the defender has the option of accommodating the campaign, RcW, or defying the mobilization, DD. In the first case, I assume that rebels concede to the challenger by yielding the claim of interfering in one or several dimensions of the local affairs, in addition to restricting its use of violence against the population. I will operationalize this decline in rebels' influence in the community with the cost, $-ms$, of losing inhabitants' material support (although the community could have withdrawn cooperation in the political or social dimension as well). The most radical forms of sanctuary can seriously limit the military operation of rebels in their territory with the creation of unarmed patrols (Kaplan 2017: 51; Masullo 2021: 905). Yet, the most likely scenario is that radical nonviolent communities have to (forcefully) coexist with the insurgency near or inside their territory of residence. In compensation, the group obtains the benefit of retaining certain influence in the community, G' , diminished by the reputational cost of repressing the protest campaign, $-l_r$. The challenger obtains the reward of the defender's concessions, g_s ,

²⁵ Remember that this game assumes that the challenger updates its belief about the rebel group's type according to the defender's response in Node 2. When it represses, the challenger's a posteriori belief is that the defender is strong.

attenuated by the costs of escalating the campaign, $-c_{es}$, organizing protest, $-c_p$, and repression by the defender in the previous period, $-c_r$.

Figure 3.4 Unilateral Deterrence Game of Nonviolent Resistance



If rebels defy, they incur an additional reputational cost²⁶, $-2l_r$, for repressing the two stages of the unarmed mobilization -protests and the sanctuary-. The group may try to take by force what civilians deny giving it. For example, rebels can pillage the community to take food, gas, shelter, and any other good that the inhabitants refuse to exchange in a market transaction. Pillaging yields a cost, $-pi$, for the group. Civilians obtain a diminished reward for resisting a predatory and repressive group, g_s' , but incur in the costs related to protests ($-c_p-c_r$), and the sanctuary ($-c_{es}-c_r$).

Like the UDG-VR, in this model, $g_s > g_s' > g_p > g_p' > 0$ represents greater benefits related to higher degrees of *de facto* autonomy when civilians escalate the campaign, and $G > G' > 0$ indicates a decline in rebels' influence in the locality when civilians invest in more disruptive strategies. Finally, the model also assumes that the costs for escalating the campaign are higher than those of organizing a protest, $c_{es} > c_p > 0$. **Table 2.3** presents the payoff structure of the UDG-NR.

Table 3.3 Payoff Structure of the UDG-NR

Outcome	Challenger	Defender
Status Quo (SQ)	$-u$	G
Moderate Civilians Win (McW)	$g_p - c_p$	$G - c_t$
Rebels Win (RW)	$g_p' - u - c_p - c_r$	$G - l_r$
Radical Civilians Win (RcW)	$g_s - c_p - c_r - c_{es}$	$G' - l_r - ms$
Conflict (DD)	$g_s' - c_p - 2c_r - c_{es}$	$G' - 2l_r - pi$

²⁶ Additional to other sources of peaceful coercion, some nonviolent campaigns raise moral pressure on their contenders by renouncing to the advantage of anonymity. Consider the case of the peace zones in Colombia, for instance. Unlike protests in which participants cope with the risks of being targeted by mobilizing a large crowd, leaders of peace communities directly communicate their intention to both parties and make clear who are the members of the campaign and where they reside. By so doing, they intentionally become an 'easy' target for retaliation. Yet, they do so to "attract broader attention from outside the community" (Kaplan 2017: 51) and mobilize a campaign of shame if the actors attack them. This method has been relatively successful at obtaining the support of the international community and powerful civil society actors in Colombia (CEC 1999), but at a high cost in human lives for the campaign. Therefore, this double reputational cost aims to capture in the game the effect of this mobilization of shame in rebels' legitimacy.

Finally, it is important to determine how each type of player interprets this payoff structure. For civilians, a strong community can absorb the costs and risks of organizing a sanctuary (so $g_s > g_s' > c_r + c_{es}$), whereas a weak one cannot do so (thus, $c_r + c_{es} > g_s > g_s'$). On the side of the defender, a strong rebel group prefers to incur the reputational costs of repressing rather than investing in internal discipline mechanisms (so $c_t > l_r$) and pillaging rather than accommodating civilians refuse to provide material support (thus, $ms > pi$). For a weak defender $l_r > c_t$ and $pi > ms$. Consequently, equations (3.3) - (3.6) may also apply.

It is noteworthy that the structure of the payoff is relatively different than in the case of the UDG-VR, though. In the previous game, a strong rebel group always preferred conflict rather than capitulation since $t > m$ and the group only faced a reputational cost for repressing protest and not for defying a violent campaign. As conflict scholars argue, “Armed resistance can certainly be an important strategy for maintaining autonomy, though by directly participating in hostilities and forgoing the status of “noncombatant,” civilians can become legitimate targets of armed” (Kaplan 2017: 17). This situation differs from repressing a campaign that, although more disruptive in tactics and demands, is still nonviolent such as sanctuary. In this case, rebels face a double reputational cost if they defy in Node 4. Compared to conflict, the cost of yielding to moderate civilians can be less than the costs of pillaging and repressing peaceful activists, even for strong insurgencies. Thus, the solution of this game depends on whether civilians face a very ‘tyrannical’ strong group (case 1 in which $ms > lr + pi$) or a ‘flexible’ strong group (case 2 in which $ms < lr + pi$). The following equations (3.7) – (3.10) determine the order of preferences of the players in case 1, and the equations (3.11) – (3.14), those of the players in case 2.

$$\text{Strong Challenger: } McW > RcW > SQ > DD > RW \quad (3.7)$$

$$\text{Weak Challenger: } McW > SQ > RcW > RW > DD \quad (3.8)$$

$$\text{Strong Defender: } SQ > RW > McW > DD > RcW \quad (3.9)$$

$$\text{Weak Challenger: } SQ > McW > RW > RcW > DD \quad (3.10)$$

$$\text{Strong Challenger: } McW > RcW > SQ > DD > RW \quad (3.11)$$

$$\text{Weak Challenger: } McW > SQ > RcW > RW > DD \quad (3.12)$$

$$\text{Strong Defender: } SQ > RW > McW > RcW > DD \quad (3.13)$$

$$\text{Weak Challenger: } SQ > McW > RW > RcW > DD \quad (3.14)$$

In case 1, the payoff structure resembles exactly the UDG-VR and therefore the same solutions apply to this case (see **Appendix I** for proofs of these propositions), namely:

Proposition 3: When $ms > lr + pi$, the first PBE is a separating equilibrium, with the strategy profile (Strong Challenger: P/S, S; Weak Challenger: P/BD, S; Strong Defender: R/D, D; Weak Defender: \sim R/A, A), and a posterior belief $q=1$ after observing repress and $q=0$ after observing accommodation.

Proposition 4: When $ms > lr + pi$, the second PBE is a separating equilibrium, with the strategy profile (Strong Challenger: \sim P/S, S; Weak Challenger: \sim P/BD, S; Strong Defender: R/D, D; Weak Defender: \sim R/A, A), and a posterior belief $q=1$ after observing repress and $q=0$ after observing accommodation.

Propositions 3 and 4 explain the same four outcomes than the UDG-VR: status quo, conflict, rebels win, and moderate civilians win. Therefore, this section will not discuss these results.

In case 2, this is the only PBE:

Proposition 5: When $m < lr + pi$, the only PBE of the game is a pooling equilibrium, with the strategy profile (Strong Challenger: P/S, S; Weak Challenger: P/S, S; Strong Defender: $\sim R/A$, A; Weak Defender: $\sim R/A$, A), and a posterior belief $q=1$ after observing repress and $q=0$ after observing accommodation.

When the costs of repressing and pillaging a community that has organized a sanctuary are too high for a strong rebel group, this type of defender will mimic its weaker counterpart and not repress in Node 2. Backward induction can help to explain this outcome. Given that both kinds of rebel groups prefer accommodating rather than defying a sanctuary in Node 4, even weak communities will risk escalating the strategy in Node 3. Therefore, the expected utility of not repressing for the strong (but flexible) rebel group is greater than the expected utility of repressing. The weak defender has no incentives to deviate from this outcome because its net utility for capitulation is greater than its net utility for conflict (i.e., $G' - l_r - ms > G' - 2l_r - pi$). Put differently, this solution explains that when both types of rebels lack a credible threat to defend the status quo, they prefer to give in to moderate civilians and prevent the escalation of the conflict in the territory.

3.4 Implication of the Game-Theoretic Models and Hypotheses

Put together, the two game-theoretic models have critical implications for the study of resistance and repression in civil wars. Propositions 1-5 explain four outcomes: perfect deterrence (status quo), successful protest (moderate civilians win), repression of protest (rebels win), and repression of sanctuary/violent self-protection (conflict). This section will discuss how these four outcomes can help to elucidate the object of study of the chapter and can be translated into testable empirical expectations in Chapter 6.

Table 3.4 summarizes the main results of the two game-theoretic models, according to Propositions 1-5. Per each pair, it lists the outcome predicted by the models and sustained by the Propositions. The most frequent expected outcome of the games is *status quo*, predicted in 8 out of 20 potential scenarios described by the models. The status quo corresponds to a situation in which civilians are almost certain to encounter a strong rebel group and prefer not to launch a resistance campaign; not even protest the war. For this reason, it is also a token of ‘perfect deterrence’ in civil wars. This is arguably the most common event on empirical grounds; the organization of resistance is, in fact, a rare event according to the available data on the behavior of civilians in internal conflicts. For instance, in the 1985-2005 period in Colombia, the ODAW reports 2,445 units (municipality-year) with active civilian resistance activities out of 22,494 units of observation. More importantly, the model captures the notion -advanced by conflict scholars such as Kaplan (2017: 57-8) and Moreno (2021: 324)- that there is a threshold in the degree of violence used by the warring parties after which the organization of civilian resistance becomes increasingly less likely.

Table 3.4 Predictions of Formal Models

	Strong Defender	Weak Defender
Strong Challenger	DD, SQ, DD, SQ, McW	McW, SQ, McW, SQ, McW
Weak Challenger	RW, SQ, RW, SQ, McW	McW, SQ, McW, SQ, McW

The second most frequent scenario (8 out of 20) is *moderate civilians win*. This outcome describes a ‘successful’ protest campaign in which rebel groups prefer to make limited concessions to a peaceful and moderate resistance mobilization, rather than to fight a stubborn community willing to escalate the conflict to a sanctuary or an armed self-

defense group. According to Propositions 1 and 3, this is the most likely result when civilians (hard and soft alike) struggle against weak defenders in the territory. Furthermore, under special circumstances, when the community encounters a ‘flexible’ rebel group that cannot afford the costs of repressing both a peaceful protest campaign and sanctuary, Proposition 5 demonstrates that not only the weak but also the strong defender will prefer to yield to the protest campaign and prevent the nonviolent escalation of the mobilization.

Two additional, but less frequent outcomes predicted by the models are *conflict* and *rebels win* (with 2 out 20, respectively). Conflict occurs when both the challenger and the defender are strong and, therefore, prefer fighting rather than capitulating to their counterparts. Based on a large pool of radical followers, leaders of a resistance campaign dare to radicalize the mobilization when a strong rebel group represses peaceful protests that demand restraint in the use of violence. On the contrary, lacking a critical mass to escalate the campaign with a radical strategy, a weak community backs down the resistance after a rebel group has repressed a protest campaign against the war.

All in all, the models suggest that the most likely scenarios are no resistance and successful protest. When civilians dare to escalate the mobilization with a radical strategy, the most likely scenario is that strong rebels will counter escalate the conflict. Hard defenders will also repress a protest campaign led by a weak community that will prefer to acquiesce rather than fight an escalated conflict with a stubborn insurgency. In summary, this is the main empirical expectation of the theory:

H1. Overall, rebels are less likely to repress moderate strategies (protests) than radical ones (either sanctuary or violent self-protection).

3.5 Overview of Research Design

I test this theory in Chapter 6 with a novel approach to causal inference with time-series cross-sectional data (Imai et al 2021). First, I disaggregate H1 into three specific expectations on the effectiveness of these resistance strategies: While protest is expected to decline the degree of rebel lethal violence against civilians, both radical strategies are theorized to increase those levels. Next, I employ a panel matching approach and a difference-in-difference method to compare towns with the presence of one of the three strategies proposed here versus control units. Conditional on treatment history, year-effects, and relevant covariates, I found strong support to the expectations of the unilateral deterrence game of violent resistance: protest tends to decline levels of lethal violence and local militia has the opposite effect in the short term. The results are less conclusive regarding the effect of sanctuary on rebel violence.

CHAPTER 4

ODAW AND THE TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL VARIATION OF RESISTANCE IN COLOMBIA

The study of civilian strategic behavior in violent conflicts has been prominent in the last decade. Building upon the research agenda of the micro-dynamics of civil wars, current scholars have turned their attention to the full spectrum of options that civilians have available not only to survive periods of mass political violence, but also to shape armed groups' behavior strategically.

An increasing wealth of knowledge has been produced recently on different forms of noncooperative civilian actions to contain, resist, bargain, or even repel armed actors' violence and authority. These studies have focused on the conditions explaining the onset of nonviolent civilian mobilizations to resist the conflict (Arjona 2016b; 2017; Kaplan 2017), the effectiveness of these efforts to reduce violence against noncombatants (Kaplan 2017; Moreno 2017), the role of resistance in the groups' administration of local orders (Arjona 2016; 2014), and even the conditions shaping civilian choice of violent or nonviolent means of struggle (Masullo 2021; Zech 2016; Jentzsch 2022). Other scholars have explored similar research questions in internal conflicts involving organized crime groups and the state (Ley et al 2019).

The progress in this field of research has been hampered, nonetheless, by the lack of disaggregated and comprehensive data on the phenomenon of study. There are few collection projects on civilian collective action in civil wars and most of them restrict their samples to nonviolent forms of resistance (Chenoweth et al 2019; Salehyan et al 2012;

García 2006). Thus, for example, the pioneer theories on the onset of nonviolent resistance remain untested with large-N research designs. Moreover, the absence of data on violent resistance impedes a further comparison on the conditions determining the emergence, trajectory, and effectiveness of these campaigns vis-à-vis their counterparts. Other areas of research -such as the decline of these campaigns- remain underexplored, in part for the lack of data on other stages of the civilian mobilization against war.

In this chapter, I introduce the *Organized Dissent Against War* (ODAW) dataset. This project aims to fill these gaps and provide an empirical bedrock for exploring the dissertation's research questions. While it is limited to Colombia, it contributes to conflict studies by collecting data at the subnational level and during the 1985-2005 period on civilian resistance campaigns that employed either violent or nonviolent tactics. ODAW also documents features of campaign composition, intergroup competition and coordination, onset, and demise of these mobilizations.

To proceed, the first section surveys the mainstream datasets both in the cross-national setting and the case study of Colombia. The next section discusses ODAW's structure and its main operational definitions and methodological decisions. The third summarizes key descriptive statistics of the spatial and temporal variation of resistance campaigns in the Colombian civil war. The final concludes and discusses potential extensions to this data collection project.

4.1 The Need for a New Dataset

Colombian scholars have pioneered in collecting large-N data on civilian strategies against war. García (2006), for example, used 10 national newspapers to build the Database of

Collective Actions for Peace (Datapaz). Datapaz collects data on protests, demonstrations, and other public events oriented to express support to peacemaking and peacebuilding in Colombia since 1978. This project has been a critical source of information for the study of civilian dissent against the internal conflict, the emergence and trajectory of the social movement for peace in Colombia, and the armed groups' reaction to protests in their areas of influence (García 2006; Moreno 2017).

However, protest-event data have a major shortcoming. As scholars on small-N comparisons and monographies in Colombia have demonstrated, some vigorous resistance organizations and movements rarely use protests and rely most heavily on noncooperative behavior, rhetorical weapons, or other collective actions (not easily captured in an event) to protect their territories (see, e.g., the *Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare -ATCC-* or the *Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó*) (Hernández 2004; Hernández and Salazar 1999; Masullo 2015). Thus, the use of this data alone could overlook or even misrepresent the strength of critical cases.

Other researchers have collected data on peace initiatives, defined as peacebuilding projects and actions with continuity over time and certain level of organization (Rettberg 2006: 17; Rettberg and Quishpe 2017: 5). Rettberg and Quishpe (2017), for example, documents 1,900 initiatives reported in the 1980-2017 period. Although this project provides relevant information on resistance tactics that not necessarily overlap with event-data, its organizational approach comes at a cost: a sample based exclusively on organized campaigns can ignore robust cases where civilians either sustained high levels of

mobilization against warring parties without a visible organization or created such entities late to coordinate an already existent collective effort²⁷.

Moreover, both kinds of datasets neglect more radical forms of civilian resistance, such as armed self-protection. To the best of my knowledge, there are no data collection efforts in Colombia to capture the emergence, trajectories, and decline of violent resistance campaigns.

The cross-national study of civil conflicts experiences a similar situation to this case study. For almost two decades, data collection projects on organizational capabilities, behavior, success, among other factors concerning maximalist campaigns to overthrow a regime by violent or nonviolent methods dominated the field of conflict studies and contentious politics (Cunningham et al 2009; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015; Carey et al 2013; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; to name a few). Only few scholars aimed to measure civilian-based collective actions that might affect the goals and dynamics of warring parties in war-driven countries. Raleigh et al (2013) -with the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)- and Salehyan et al (2012) -with the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD)- were the two leading projects within this innovative trend. Among other variables, ACLED and SCAD provide information on protests, demonstrations, riots, violent actions in favor or against the government, and other contentious actions by

²⁷ Thus, CNMH (2016: 281) reported dozens of cases of communities that spontaneously undertook daring collective actions to block and repel ongoing rebel incursions in their territories. As an example of the second case, since 2004, inhabitants from El Caguán (Caquetá) organized at least 21 protests to condemn the rise in violence after the end of the peace process with FARC in 2002, but only by 2008 created the *Corporación Caguán Vive* to lead the mobilization.

civilians against nonstate armed actors and the state in conflict-driven regions such as Africa and Central America.

Few years later, Chenoweth et al (2019) followed this line and introduced the Nonviolent Action in Violent Context (NVAVC) dataset. NVAVC builds upon SCAD but improves its methodology by restricting the sample to African countries at civil war and by including not only protests and demonstrations, but also noncooperative behaviors and covered organizational tactics. This project provides one of the most complete datasets on civilian strategies in internal conflicts. Yet, it still has two of the previous limitations noted in the Colombian case-study. First, some nonviolent tactics of dissent against war, such as the constitution and administration of peace zones, humanitarian areas, and other sanctuaries amidst the conflict -such as those studied by Hancock and Mitchell (2007)- are not necessarily captured by event-action data. More critically, this dataset restricts the sample to primarily nonviolent actions and -while some violent actions such as riots are included- other violent tactics such as armed self-protection are still neglected.

Like Colombia, few cross-national datasets document forms of civilian self-defense mobilizations against war. The Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD), collected by Carey et al (2013), is an exception. This project documents essential features of organized armed groups that are not part of the security forces but that publicly express a pro-government support on the conflict (Carey and Mitchell 2018: 5) and it might provide useful information on violent resistance²⁸. Nevertheless, it has two critical limitations.

²⁸ For instance, it is possible to filter the dataset by “membership” and “purpose of PGM”, e.g., to focus on those cases that are both primarily local -when “the defining feature of the PGM members is that they are civilians that are recruited, stationed, and active within their communities” (15)- and oriented to self-protection and security (18).

First, methodologically, the dataset is aggregated at the national level. Second, the dataset restricts the sample to anti-rebel groups, yet civilians can also organize violent campaigns against state forces, militias, and other pro-government forces.

To fill these gaps, this project collects fine-grained data on violent and nonviolent resistance tactics, spontaneous and organized mobilizations, and the whole cycle of the campaigns.

4.2 Introducing ODAW

ODAW identifies, documents, and codifies campaigns of collective civilian resistance against war in Colombia. Based on the definition advanced in the introduction, these campaigns can be conceptualized as self-protection mobilizations aimed to curb the levels of armed violence against the inhabitants of a territory through the imposition of costs on warring parties by a group (either an organization or an ad hoc collectivity) of dissident civilians.

Based on this definition, ODAW has four critical features. First, it focuses exclusively on *dissident behavior* against military organizations and excludes allegiance, passive neutrality, and migration. Thus, in line with mainstream typologies of civilian strategies in armed conflicts (Kalyvas 2006; Petersen 2001; Wood 2003; Wickham-Crowley 1991; Barter 2014; Arjona 2017), the dataset models resistance as an expression of civilian noncooperation (Arjona 2014; 2016; 2017; Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2017). However, because the essential characteristic of irregular warfare is the presence of overlapping and competing projects of sovereignty in the local territory (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2016), open dissent against one warring party can be perceived as veiled support to

another organization. Some scholars exclude mobilizations that fail to overtly reject all the sides of the conflict (e.g., Hernández 2004). Yet, neutrality can be treated as another component of civilians' resistance strategy rather than a requirement of the object of study. By restricting the sample to cases that struggle to be neutral, scholars may overlook the complexity in civilian-armed groups' interactions and the attempt by violent organizations to influence civilian collective action. Therefore, together with neutral cases, ODAW also includes campaigns that target only one side of the conflict if there is evidence that these mobilizations are not subordinated to an armed group.

Defining resistance in terms of civilian dissent has other two relevant implications for the dataset. First, it builds on the idea put forward by conflict scholars, such as Arjona (2017: 756), that the *locus* of the civilian choice of strategy in irregular conflicts is one in which the relationship between an armed group and the civilian population in a locality resembles that of ruler and ruled. Thus, like many other challenging groups involved in a contentious interaction with a more powerful actor, civilians band together to challenge their adversary's policies by employing extra-systemic means of struggle (Gurr 1970; Tilly 1978; Lichbach 1987; Shock 2005; Sharp 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), but the *target* of that mobilization can be any armed group that aim to be the ruler of a locality (including the state forces) and the *policies* of interest of the dataset are those related to the control of the local civilian population and territory. This idea implies a strong bias towards local politics in the dataset and the exclusion of maximalist campaigns of secession, revolution, change of regime, etc. (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

The emphasis on capturing the process of dissent against war at the local scale also informs the dataset's decision to prioritize grassroots mobilizations in detriment of top-down interventions implemented by external actors, such as INGOs, the national government, or warring parties. To be clear, the European Union's Peace Laboratory is not considered as a civilian resistance campaign in this dataset, for example, but the 'Asamblea Constituyente Popular de Micoahumado' in Morales (Bolívar) that was recipient of funding by this program is included due to its actions to oppose rebels and paramilitaries operating in this municipality (Barreto 2012).

Regarding the policies of interest, the second key characteristic of ODAW is its emphasis on actions oriented to reduce the degrees of anti-civilian violence (or, altogether, to eliminate the presence of armed groups) in a territory. Other scholars (Hernández 2004; Rettberg 2006; Rettberg and Quishpe 2017; Hallward et al 2017) focus on a broader set of collective actions oriented to address forms of structural and cultural violence -together with direct physical violence-, following the peace positive tradition (Galtung 1969). However, ODAW restricts the sample to cases that *at least* aim to reduce the degrees of direct violence in a locality -in a negative peace approach-, regardless the use of additional peacebuilding initiatives such as the strengthening of democratic institutions, the implementation of development projects, etc. This methodological decision is based on the idea that the minimum area of agreement between nonviolent and violent campaigns of resistance is the common objective of reducing the armed violence in a territory -although paradoxically self-defense organizations decide arm themselves to do so-.

A third ODAW's essential feature is the inclusion of collective, public, and contentious mobilizations and, thus, the exclusion of lone wolf strategies, isolated resistance events, non-contentious actions like oblique noncooperation (Masullo et al 2019), or private forms of 'everyday' resistance (Scott 1985). While recent scholarship has made an important effort to unearth some of these incipient forms of noncooperative behavior, there are critical challenges for the systematic collection of this information based on the public sources used by ODAW. Moreover, from a theoretic perspective, the dataset prioritizes collective actions that have a better chance to shape armed groups' behavior regarding the treatment of the civilian population.

ODAW's final hallmark is the decision of using campaign as the unit of analysis. A campaign-level data has several advantages over its counterparts, such as the event. Often dissident civilians employ resistance tactics that cannot be easily described in an event-municipality-day cell²⁹. Besides, while resistance organizations also resort to tactics that fit the category of event, frequently they thrive to conceal this information³⁰. In other cases, violent events are reported by members of these campaigns but are not easily corroborated by other sources³¹. ODAW's unit of analysis can capture the information left out by events, whenever the tactics reported are observable, overt, and documented.

²⁹ For example, the 'Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó' (Antioquia) declared its territory and inhabitants as neutral and since 1997 its members have undertaken civil disobedience methods short of protests, demonstrations, or direct nonviolent actions (Masullo 2015). Members of this campaign only engaged in a few protests in these 18 years of mobilization and, if ODAW were based exclusively on events, this case would have been underrepresented.

³⁰ Thus, the self-defense group of Gaitania in Planadas (Tolima) engaged in clashes with FARC that left casualties in both sides, but former members of this organization avoid providing information on these deaths (Maldonado 2015).

³¹ This is the case of the clash in Las Mercedes (Antioquia) between the shotgunners led by Ramón Isaza and FARC that was referred as the foundational myth of the *Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio* (CNMH 2020).

Campaign-based datasets have proved useful to provide robust empirical ground in other areas of conflict studies (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).

However, campaign-level data has also limitations. ODAW is better at describing the presence and absence of these campaigns and their tactics and strategies, rather than the frequency or intensity of these variables. Further versions of this dataset may transform these nominal-scale variables into ordinal or continuous scales with the incorporation of more disaggregated data (if available).

4.2.1 Operational Definitions

I argue that a campaign of civilian resistance against war can be captured by the presence of at least one of the following methods of struggle against the armies of a civil conflict: (1) collective disobedience, (2) nonviolent collective actions, and/or (3) an armed self-defense mobilization.

Each type of resistance method is a non-cooperative civilian behavior that has an observable *cost* on their targets. For instance, Arjona (2017: 763) explains that obedience (more than voluntary support) is quintessential for an operator of violence in a territory to reap out the potential benefits related to the administration of a local order. Thus, coordinated forms of disobedience by most or a key segment of the local population impose a direct organizational cost to the targeted group that can even menace its territorial control. Protests and demonstrations, on the other hand, usually impose a reputational cost to the warring parties by naming-and-shaming their behavior in front of key audiences (Kaplan 2017: 50). Direct nonviolent actions against a group can not only affect the latter's reputation but also hinder the achievement of their goals. Finally, a local self-defense

organization can impinge an armed group's manpower and military resources with violent actions.

Following Goertz (2006: 41), I model the relationship between these methods of struggle and civilian resistance as ontological and based on a family-resembles structure. Thus, none of these variables is a necessary condition for the presence of resistance (41). In turn, these methods are gauged in ODAW by the presence of 15 indicators, adapted from Sharp's (1973) classical list of resistance tactics, whenever they fit typical civilian resistance actions reported in armed conflicts.

Thus, the dataset codes social noncooperation, political noncooperation, economic noncooperation, social intervention, political intervention, and economic intervention as indicators of collective disobedience. Explanations and examples of these categories are in order:

- Social noncooperation is coded when there is evidence that civilians tried to stop obeying armed groups' norms oriented to control the private and public behavior of the population. An example of this behavior is the disobedience of curfews and territorial checkpoints imposed by FARC -to limit the freedom of movement of inhabitants in Montes de María (Bolívar)- by the 'Mujeres Unidas de El Salado' in 2003 (Conte 2010: 82).
- Political noncooperation is defined as the civilian attempt to disobey armed groups' norms aimed to control the political behavior, preferences, or identities of local inhabitants. Arjona (2016b), for example, documents how residents of Viotá (Cundinamarca) voted in the elections of 2001, despite FARC's prohibition of electoral

participation in the municipality under the threat of capital punishment. Other examples of political noncooperation are communities that publicly withdraw their allegiance to a group or reject any label as sympathizers of a conflict side as the inhabitants of El Dorado and El Castillo (Meta) who in 1999 -led by their mayors- rejected their alleged support to paramilitaries and rebels, respectively, and signed a 'peace agreement' that included the no collaboration to any side of the conflict (Duplat 2019).

- Economic noncooperation is coded when there is evidence of a civilian effort not to participate in economic activities promoted or imposed by a group, such as the production of illegal crops. To be clear, a case of substitution of an illegal crop is only included when the source explicitly states or implies civilians were challenging a previously imposed rule by a group. For instance, the 'Comunidad de Paz de Batata' in Tierralta (Córdoba) was harshly punished by FARC, after some of its leaders decided to stop growing coca crops in the territory since 2001 (Econometría 2008: 4). However, often rebels perceive no challenge in the implementation of legal economic projects by the inhabitants under their control, as Barreto (2012: 600-1) documented in some initiatives funded by the European Peace Laboratory in the Macizo Colombiano (Cauca and Nariño) to substitute coca with coffee or cocoa.
- Social intervention is coded when civilians promote new, alternative, or dissident social norms that challenge an armed group's rule in a territory. Kaplan (2017: 48-9), for example, documents how members of the ATCC promoted a culture of peace and created conflict resolution mechanisms to keep combatants off from the business of the local population.

- Political intervention is coded when there is evidence of the civilian creation of self-government institutions aimed to control the public order in a territory. An illustration of this tactic is the trial carried out by the Nasa people of northern of Cauca to prosecute rebels responsible of the killing of a local leader in Toribío in 2001 (Peñaranda 2006: 558).
- Economic intervention is coded when civilians promote new, alternative, or dissident economic practices or institutions in the territory that challenge the financial interest of an armed group. For instance, a few years after the ATCC's creation, its leaders launched a development plan with a set of economic projects oriented to defend the peasantry's right to work in the territory (GMH 2011: 326-9).

In addition to these tactics, the declaration and implementation of zones of peace and sanctuaries amid an ongoing conflict is a method documented by scholars of resistance in civil wars (Hancock and Mitchell 2007). In this vein, the dataset codes 'territory off the conflict' when a community has declared the locality as neutral and demand no intervention of the armed groups in the local affairs, regardless of the degree of consolidation of the sanctuary; and 'active territorial control' when these civilians invested in nonviolent mechanisms to protect the territory and its inhabitants and not only employed the declaration of this figure as a rhetorical weapon. As an example of the first category, by 2004, the returning communities of Batata, El Diamante, and La Ossa in Tierralta (Córdoba) declared themselves as peace communities, but apart from the defiance to grow illegal crops mentioned before, it was not possible to ascertain the degree of constitution of these sanctuaries in the available sources (Econometría 2008: 6). Other peace zones, on

the contrary, organize a disarmed body of guards to control the entrance to the area, monitor the local inhabitants' behavior, and even repel armed troops that aim to use the locality for military operations. The Indigenous Guard of the Nasa people in Cauca is a prototype of this second tactic.

Nonviolent collective actions are measured by the presence of protests, demonstrations, and nonviolent direct actions that directly or implicitly target the warring parties. For instance, ODAW includes campaigns that explicitly protest warring parties' actions in a municipality, as well as those that use an abstract rhetoric that avoids naming a group directly in a protest but implicitly target them by either condemning the horrors of war or by promoting a peace process or by denouncing a violent action that is typically associated with one of the warring parties (e.g. kidnapping with the insurgency) (García 2006: 100-1; Uribe de Hincapié 2006: 73). The dataset also includes protests that reject policies that may benefit one of the armed groups, such as the civilian mobilization in 2001 against the initiative to demilitarize an area in southern Bolívar to begin a dialogue between Pastrana's administration (1998-2002) and the ELN (Prada 2006).

Following Sharp (1973), demonstrations are those forms of 'processions', 'honoring the dead', and 'public assemblies' that are different from protests, but address the same topics than the previous indicators. Examples of this tactic are marches, funerals of conflict-related victims and magnicides, forums for peace and human rights, pilgrimages to war-affected areas, etc.

Finally, nonviolent direct actions are physical interventions that directly affect the operation of groups, such as nonviolent invasions, occupations, obstructions, etc. An

emblematic illustration of this tactic in Colombia was the civilian organizing of meetings and peaceful occupations of the main square of towns under attack by rebel troops in municipalities of Cauca, Nariño, Tolima, and other departments (CNMH 2016). Another form of direct action included in the dataset is the dialogues between armed groups and civilian commissions. For instance, leaders of the Indigenous Organization of Antioquia held in 1987 a negotiation with FARC in which rebels agreed to respect the authorities of the native people, not to kill indigenous who allegedly violated norms imposed by the group, and not to impose the Patriotic Union in the local elections (Salazar 1999: 163).

An armed self-defense mobilization is coded when civilians resort to the following actions that have been reported in emblematic cases of violent civilian resistance such as the ‘peasant rounds’ in Perú (Starn 1999) or the Nasa self-defense groups of Cauca (Colombia) in the 1970s and 1980s (CNMH 2015): clashes with armed groups, violent territorial control (patrolling), unilateral actions against combatants, and unilateral actions against civilians. These actions can be implemented spontaneously or coordinately through the work of a grassroots organization.

As an example of the first type of mobilization, GMH (2011b: 190-3) documents the case of the inhabitants of the corregimiento La Libertad in San Onofre (Sucre) that exhausted by the arbitrary treatment of the civilian population by AUC in the municipality, lynched and killed the militia’s commander and his guards with rudimentary arms (pistols, machetes, stones, sticks) and expelled the group from the territory in 2004 after the commander arbitrarily killed a youth. During the following month, men of the community organized turns to control the entrance to the territory and to prevent a violent retaliation


by the militias (192-193). They later captured automatic weapons and grenades from a militia's supporter and used them in their patrolling (192).

There are multiple examples of organized violent resistance in Colombia, especially in the early stages of the armed conflict. Like peasant rounds in Perú, farmers in Colombia also transformed collective forms of self-protection against robberies, cattle thief, and other crimes in the rural areas into anti-insurgent organizations (CNMH 2019: 40-46). Other self-defense organizations were early promoted by state forces in peripheric areas -during the transition from La Violencia to the contemporary armed conflict- in the 1960s and 1970s and were appropriated by subordinate rural classes such as the *Autodefensa Indígena Nasa Wes'X* in Planadas (Tolima) or the *Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega* in Cajibío (Cauca) (Maldonado 2015; CNMH 2018). On the contrary, other self-defense organizations received an early support in terms of training and weapons by rebel organizations, such as the *Autodefensas Indígena del Pueblo Nasa* in Cauca (CNMH 2015). The next section discusses the criteria for the inclusion of violent mobilizations.

Based on these definitions, ODAW distinguishes between two kinds of resistance strategies: primarily violent when categories associated to armed self-defense mobilization are coded and primarily nonviolent when a particular type of collective disobedience or nonviolent collective action is coded. Like NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 418), it is likely to observe cases where civilians resort to both violent and nonviolent methods of struggle in the same mobilization, thus, ODAW codes the resistance strategy that is more frequently used in the campaign.

The figure below summarizes the concept construction of the object of study of the dataset.

Figure 4.1 Collective Civilian Resistance in Civil Wars



Note: Build by the author, based on Goertz (2006). Dotted lines represent an ontological relationship between the levels and the plus sign (+) means the Boolean operator OR. S:E means Social, Political, and Economic.

4.2.2 The Campaign-Municipality-Year Data

ODAW’s basic structure is a time-series cross sectional data that covers the 1985-2005 period and has campaign-municipality-year as the unit of analysis.

The onset of a campaign is coded the first year during the study period that at least one of the 15 resistance tactics is reported in a municipality³² or the year that the mobilization resumed after a minimum of two years of hiatus. Each year within the period that a campaign remained functioning is coded with the category active, including those of its onset and decline.

³² ODAW codes the geographical scale of the campaign as sub-municipal, municipal, regional (two or more contiguous towns), departmental, or macro-regional (two or more contiguous regions or departments). The dataset codes the presence of a campaign in a municipality when there is explicit information about the participation of local inhabitants in the mobilization. When this information is vague and the source claims that the campaign has incidence in a whole department or region, the campaign is attributed to the capital(s) of that geographic area(s).

Decline is coded when one of these four options occurs during the study period. First, civilians voluntarily suspend the mobilization, which is coded as suspension. Second, the mobilization is repressed by one or both warring parties and civilians had to stop it to appease their armed adversaries; coded as suppression. Third, the mobilization is coopted by an armed group and local inhabitants no longer control it. This case is coded as cooptation and is usually attributed to campaigns that primarily employ violent methods. Finally, a self-defense organization is transformed into a warring party (either an insurgent group or a pro-government militia). This case is coded as transformation. ODAW also attributes decline and suspension when there is no more information about the use of resistance tactics in the municipality for two consecutive years.

4.2.3 The Municipality-Year Data

To address the fact that a town can simultaneously have multiple campaigns in the same year, ODAW's alternative version collapses the information into a municipality-year unit of analysis. The key operational definition here is independence, referred to a situation in which the operation of a resistance mobilization is not subordinated to a third party, especially to another campaign. Independence is not a synonym of isolation, and the dataset captures different types of cooperative (and conflictive) relationships between overlapping campaigns.

ODAW counts the number of independent mobilizations in a unit of analysis. Based on the concept of 'social movement industries' (SMI), defined as clusters of organizations competing for resources, support, and legitimacy, and concerned with similar areas of social change (McCarthy and Zald 1977), the dataset distinguishes between violent and

nonviolent resistance industries. If there are two or more campaigns in the same industry, ODAW counts them and codes the main features of the foremost mobilization³³. The type of relationship between campaigns of the same industry is coded from cooperation to rivalry³⁴. Finally, the dataset codes the industry's onset and decline when it is reported the first campaign in this industry in the study period and when the following year is not reported any active campaign in this industry, respectively.

Following McCarthy and Zald (1977) anew, the dataset codes information at a higher level of aggregation by using the notion of 'social movement sector' as the union of SMIs. At the sector-level, ODAW codes the degree of conflict intensity between violent and nonviolent industries with the same scale at the industry-level (from cooperation to rivalry). The dataset reports whether the primary method of struggle used in the unit is violence, nonviolence, or both methods. Finally, ODAW codes the 15 indicators of resistance tactics explained in the previous section, but in this form of the dataset an indicator measures whether such a tactic was used at least by one campaign. The scale of these indicators is still nominal. Finally, ODAW codes the onset and decline of overall resistance when the first campaign is reported (regardless of its strategy type) and when the following year is no longer reported any active campaign in the municipality, respectively.

For a detailed description of coding rules, see the **Codebook** in the **Appendix III**.

³³ When the information about leadership is unclear, ODAW codes the longest-lived campaign by a given year.

³⁴ The whole set of options is unity (reserved to one campaign), cooperation, noncooperation, competition, and rivalry.

4.2.4. Sources, and Data Collection and Codification Workflow

ODAW is based on three complementary sources of information: academic works, grey literature, and national newspapers. The data collection process and codification had four stages: identification of potential campaigns and creation of two lists of cases based on their resistance strategy type; documentation of these candidates; depuration of the lists according to the use of the inclusion criteria explained above; and codification of the aggregated dataset.

The original list of nonviolent campaigns was primarily based on an extensive literature on peaceful mobilizations in Colombia, documented in case studies (e.g., Van Isschot 2015; Ayala 2019), small-N comparisons (e.g., Hernández 2004; 2012; Hernández and Salazar 1999), and national and regional lists of initiatives collected by scholars, practitioners, and agencies such as Rettberg (2006); Sandoval (2004); Villareal and Ríos (2006); Barreto (2012); the *Banco Nacional de Buenas Prácticas para Superar el Conflicto* (UNDP 2003, among others. This list was further depurated, first, by eliminating duplicates and attributing multiple initiatives to the same case (if fitted), but, especially, by assessing the degree to which a case fulfilled the four characteristics of resistance established in the operational definition³⁵. The dates of onset and decline of some included cases were also modified from the creation of an organization to the moment in which it changed its activities and goals to resistance.

The creation of the preliminary list of violent campaigns was a more challenging task. While there is a vast scholarship on the main paramilitary groups in Colombia (i.e.,

³⁵ Thus, e.g., the Comunidad de Paz de Lerma in Bolívar (Cauca) was excluded because it aimed to reduce interpersonal conflicts and not to address war-related factors.

Autodefensas Campesinas de Puerto Boyacá -ACPB-, *Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá -ACCU-*, and *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia -AUC-*) (Medina 1990; Romero 2003; Reyes 2010; Gutiérrez-Sanín 2019), the study of more parochial, grassroots self-defense organizations such as the *Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega* has been traditionally eclipsed³⁶. There is a gap in the knowledge on the origins, distribution, persistence, and decline of these organizations. Yet, the recent shift to explain the state's role in promoting these groups during the transition from *La Violencia* to the current conflict (Ugarriza and Pabón 2017); the CNMH's effort to revisit the history of paramilitarism, including its regional origins; and the provision of raw material on the historical context, criminal behavior, structure and operation of the militias that demobilized under the umbrella of the Justice and Peace Law (2005); provides an opportunity to begin a process of documentation of these self-defense mobilizations.

I built upon these last sources of information to create the list of violent campaigns. First, I systematically reviewed judicial rulings against paramilitary commanders pronounced by the courts in Bogotá, Medellín, and Barranquilla, created by the Justice and Peace Law. Based on 46 rulings, I identified and listed groups that could potentially fill the requirements of the operational definition of resistance and that operated before or simultaneously to the consolidated pro-government militias such as ACPB, ACCU, AUC, among others. I completed (and later fully documented) this list with new entries from other transitional courts' rulings in Colombia, such as the *Tribunales de Restitución de*

³⁶ A remarkable exception is Peñaranda's study (2006; 2015) on the origins of self-defense groups led by the Nasa people in Cauca in the 1970s, that that became the rebel group, *Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame*, in the early 1980s.

Tierras; investigative reporting websites, such as the national press, *Verdad Abierta*; official records of the Attorney General's Office, the Colombian Agency of Reintegration, and the Victims Unit; national newspapers; and academic literature such as the CNMH's seven reports about the origin and behavior of the paramilitary groups in the regions. In total, I put together a preliminary list of 97 potential candidates for the object of study.

Because the dataset's object of study are grassroots, relatively independent dissident mobilizations, a critical step in the stage of depuration was the collection of data on residents' participation in the mobilization and their relationship with the warring parties (i.e. state, rebel groups, and pro-government militias), and other violent organizations such as organized crime groups (OCG).

To address the first dimension, I followed Paige (1975), Wood (2003), Gutiérrez-Sanín and Vargas (2017), van Baalen (2021), among other scholars who have brought *class* back in to explain the role of subordinate and elite groups as social constituencies of insurgencies and pro-government militias in irregular conflicts. I measured both nonelite (peasants, indigenous, Afro-Colombians, and other subordinate groups) and elite (landowners, ranchers, merchants, and other affluent and influential groups) direct participation in these violent organizations. To be clear, participation is defined in terms of quality rather than quantity. That is, the dataset assumes neither massive nor majoritarian participation of any of these social groups nor lack of division, dissent, and even conflict within the local population for the presence and participation in a self-defense organization. Even nonviolent campaigns can raise cleavages about their role in local politics -beyond self-protection- in their areas of influence (see, e.g., the case of Mogotes) (Nieto 2010).

Based on these variables, I coded community's participation in violent resistance as 'no participation' when the campaign is primarily constituted and led by external actors; 'elitist organization' when the organization is primarily elite-led, short of subordinate participation; 'popular organization' when the organization is primarily nonelite-led, short of elite participation; or 'organic mobilization' when both nonelite and elite groups are relevant members of the organization. While scarce, ODAW identified cases of organic violent resistance such as the one organized by members of the Wayúu people in Maicao and Arab-descendant merchants to protect their lives and businesses from the expansion of AUC's Bloque Norte to the peninsula (Ochoa 2011: 44-5). Several cases of popular violent resistance have been mentioned throughout this chapter, such as the *Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega*. An example of elitist mobilization was the infamous '*Doce Apóstoles*', a group of ranchers, landowners, and merchants from Yarumal (Antioquia) who created a vigilante group in the early 1990s to 'cleansing' the area from alleged rebel supporters (Torres 2018: 134). Finally, examples of external groups operating at the local level are private security guards that provide protection to oil companies in war-driven areas.

To address the second dimension, I collected data on how organizations' members acquired weapons and received military training, as well as on the degree of independence-subordination of the organizations vis-à-vis the state forces, nonstate armed actors, and OCGs. The categories used in the last three variables were: 'independence' (no evidence of external support by the respective armed group); 'critical alliances' (when the organization held this kind of links with the respective group or there was coordination to

conduct military operations against a common rival, but the organization was not a military appendix of its ally); and ‘subordination’ (when the organization was controlled and commanded by the respective group). Based on these variables, I coded community’s relative autonomy as ‘subjection’ when the group was subordinated to the state forces, a nonstate armed actor, or an OCG; ‘limited autonomy’ when the group had critical alliances with an armed group but maintained its own command and control; or ‘extended autonomy’ when the group had no strategic alliances with the warring parties, even if it had a public position in favor of one of the sides of the conflict. This factor was the main qualifier of the list and many candidates failed to pass the threshold of no subordination. In total, 39 out of the 97 initial candidates were included in the final sample of violent campaigns.

Brief descriptions of the cases are available in **Appendix III**.

4.2.5 Strategies to Cope with Potential Biases

ODAW implemented three mechanisms to address potential biases related to the data collection, depuration, and codification process. First, following best practices in the collection of data on violent and nonviolent conflicts (Day et al 2014; Weidman and Rod 2014; Kreutz 2015), ODAW codes ambiguity and the degree to which a particular case fits the operational definition of resistance. Scholars can further depurate the dataset either by reading the campaigns’ narratives case-by-case or by filtering altogether some of these categories.

Second, a potential major challenge for the dataset is the degree to which the sample is representative of the population of resistance campaigns. While the lurking possibility of no representativeness is always present in observational data and research designs not

based on survey data, I tried to increase the representativeness of the sample with three additional data collection tasks. First, I reviewed the whole series of books prepared by the CNMH on conflict and peace in Colombia (around 75 documents) to spot omitted cases of violent and nonviolent resistance and document already collected cases. While the CNMH's series is not based on a proportional sample of regions or municipalities, it does cover a multiplicity of regions and a great variety of scales (from corregimientos to macroregions) and temporal frameworks. Besides, this academic production is influenced by current studies on civilian agency in civil wars and almost every document had a section about civilian noncooperation and strategies to navigate the conflict.

Additionally, I prepared a dataset on civilian resistance events, based on the systematic revision of two national newspapers with different (and complementary) editorial positions, *El Tiempo*, of a center-right stand, and *Voz Proletaria*, the Colombian Communist Party's newspaper. This dataset includes those tactics that fit the category of event: protests, demonstrations, direct nonviolent actions, clashes, and unilateral actions by self-defense organizations. It also covers reports, columns, and chronicles about campaigns of civilian resistance and other relevant data for the project. This information was useful to document already existing cases and to identify potential spontaneous nonviolent and violent mobilizations with continuity over time. Because national press usually has an urban bias in the coverage of conflict, new versions of the dataset will include regional newspapers such as *El Colombiano* (Medellín), *El Heraldo* (Barranquilla), *Vanguardia Liberal* (Bucaramanga), *El País* (Cali), and *El Diario del Huila/La Nación* (Neiva).

The third task was a ‘fast search’ of campaigns in a randomly selected sample of the 25% (201 out of 805) of municipalities of Colombia where ODAW reports no campaigns during the study period. I used nine of the most common terms used to describe resistance mobilizations in the literature in Colombia (five related to peaceful cases and four to violent cases) in two academic sources. This search yielded no new campaigns to be included in the dataset.

Finally, ODAW addresses potential problems of source selection (Salehyan 2015: 106) by creating two additional variables to report the quantity and quality of the sources employed. Scholars can further depurate the dataset by including only the most reliable sources and the best documented cases. **Appendix II** provides the whole bibliography of resistance campaigns used in the dataset.

4.3 Descriptive Statistics


This project identified 178 civilian resistance campaigns in Colombia from 1977 to 2005. On average, these campaigns covered three municipalities and lasted seven years. Thus, based on a campaign-municipality-year unit of analysis, ODAW’s first version reports 2,977 observations.

Figure 4.2 and **Map 1** display the temporal and spatial variation of this resistance activity vis-à-vis war-related violence. Figure 2 shows a general trend of mutual escalation in these two variables. The first peak was reached in the late 1980s during a period of high levels of violence against the ‘Left’ by the alliance between paramilitaries, drug-cartels, and state forces, and the civilian response to this repression with large rural mobilizations to capital cities called ‘peasant exodus’, the organization of human rights committees, and

the forging of rural-urban alliances between activists of the resistance. After a short period of stagnation in the first part of the 1990s, the dissident mobilization against war accelerated rapidly since 1995 until the early 2000s in response to the intensification of violence related to FARC's attempt to make the transition to a 'war of position' and the creation of the national federation of militias, AUC.

Breaking down the variation over time of resistance by primary method of struggle reveals an intriguing pattern between the steady decline in the use of violent self-protection and the constant growth of peaceful campaigns -the prevalent resistance strategy since 1995-. What explains the divergent trajectory of these forms of resistance in Colombia? While there are no similar data collection projects for other Latin American civil wars, Colombia seems to contrast with the experience of other countries of the region, such as Perú, where self-defense organizations were the most common strategy against war employed by local inhabitants (Starn 1999; Zech 2016).

Figure 4.2 Resistance and Conflict in Colombia (1977-2005)*



Note: Figure A depicts the number of municipalities with active campaigns of resistance in grey and the count of conflict actions aggregated at the national level in a dotted black line. Figure B disaggregates the number of active campaigns by primary method of struggle: a red line for violent campaigns and a blue line for nonviolent ones.

* Before 1985, ODAW only includes campaigns reported by academic sources and grey literature. The systematic revision of newspapers covers the 1985-2005 period.


Sources: Campaigns from ODAW V1.0 (09/15/2021); time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data and municipality-year unit of analysis. Conflict actions from the *Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto* (OMC) of the *Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica* (CNMH) (2021) – last version by 01/31/2021. Data processed by the author.

Regarding the cross-sectional exploratory analysis, Map 1 suggests a strong regional concentration of conflict violence and resistance activity in the 1985-2005 period. This correlation seems to be particularly strong in the axis of northern Chocó, Antioquia, southern Córdoba, Magdalena Medio santandereano and bolivarense, southern Cesar and Magdalena, and Montes de María; and in the corridor Putumayo, Caquetá, Meta, and

Arauca. This behavior indicates that dynamics of clustering of the exposure to violence and diffusion of resistance might be in place in Colombia.

However, two divergent regional patterns are noteworthy. First, there is an over-representation of resistance campaigns in less violent regions during this period, specifically in some departments of the Andean region such as Huila, Tolima, and Bogotá. Contrariwise, regions that had higher rates of conflict such as Guaviare and parts of Caquetá, Meta, and Casanare are under-represented. This indicates that the regional distribution of campaigns is not merely an epiphenomenon of a diffusion dynamic and that internal factors may also shape this variable. The first pattern can be explained by the presence of large urban areas in the Andean region which might facilitate the undertaking of protests and other nonviolent collective actions. Cities and regional ‘capitals’ are also epicenter of resistance activity given activists’ aim to target larger audiences and national authorities. In contrast, the second group of regions are peripheric and sparsely populated which might have increased the costs of organizing a collective action. Moreover, resistance activity in these regions could have been under reported by the dataset sources employed by ODAW.

Map 4.1 Conflict and Resistance in Colombia (1985-2005)




Note: The map on the left side of the plot depicts the rates of conflict actions reported at the municipality level and accumulated during the 1985-2005 period. The map on the right reports the number of years with active campaigns at the local level during the same timeframe. Independent campaigns are counted separately. Thus, for example, if ODAW reports two campaigns in the same municipality and each of them lasts 10 years, the map depicts 20 observations.

Sources: Conflict actions from OMC (CNMH 2021) -processed by the author-. Campaigns from ODAW V1.0 (09/15/2021); cross-sectional data and municipality as the unit of analysis. N= 1,123.

Figure 4.3 summarizes the main characteristics of the campaigns identified in the dataset. Plot A corroborates the idea that organized resistance is the most common form of mobilization in this period both among nonviolent and violent campaigns. Yet, it is noteworthy the high percentage of spontaneous peaceful mobilizations - the second at the top among the four categories-. A second striking feature is the use of neutrality as a key element of most resistance campaigns: 68% of the campaigns targeted both warring parties. Anti-rebel mobilizations -primarily violent campaigns- and anti-government mobilizations -led mostly by peaceful dissidents- were almost equally represented, each one with 16%.

Finally, demonstrations and protests were by far the most frequently used resistance tactics by civilians, followed by noncooperative civil disobedience.

Figure 4.3 DS of Resistance Campaigns in Colombia (1985-2005)




Note: Figure A depicts the organizational level of the resistance campaigns versus their primary method of struggle. Figure B depicts the target of the campaigns. Figure C shows the mean use of resistance tactics in the study period. Dark blue dots represent nonviolent collective actions; light blue, collective disobedience; and red, violent self-protection.

Sources: ODAW V1.0 (09/15/2021); TSCS data and municipality-year unit of analysis. N= 2,863.

To end, **Figure 4.4** and **Figure 4.5** provide an exploratory descriptive analysis of the durability and decline of the campaigns. While the information related to the period before 1985 is exclusively based on academic sources and grey literature and should be treated cautiously, Figure 4.4 suggests that both organized and peaceful campaigns tend to be more long-lived and persistent than their unorganized and violent counterparts. Per Figure 4.5, an important percentage of campaigns were right censored and persisted after

2005 and among those which ended during the study period the majority had a ‘positive’ decline (i.e., a suspension). The 20% rest of the sample faced a ‘negative’ demise either by suppression (10%), cooptation (7%), or transformation into warring parties (5%).

Figure 4.4 Survival and Decline of Resistance in Colombia (1977-2005)*




Note: Kaplan-Meier plots of survival probability of resistance campaigns in Colombia. Figure A compares violent and nonviolent campaigns and Figure B, unorganized and organized campaigns. ODAW reports years; for preparing this analysis, onset dates were assigned to January first of the respective years and decline dates were December 31st.

* Before 1985, ODAW only includes campaigns reported by academic sources and grey literature. The systematic revision of newspapers covers the 1985-2005 period.

Sources: ODAW V1.0 (09/15/2021); TSCS data and campaign-municipality as unit of analysis. N= 538.

Figure 4.5 Decline Type of Resistance in Colombia (1977-2005)*



Note: The plot depicts the status of the campaigns by the end of the study period (12-31-2005).

* Before 1985, ODAW only includes campaigns reported by academic sources and grey literature. The systematic revision of newspapers covers the 1985-2005 period.

Sources: ODAW V1.0 (09/15/2021); TSCS data and campaign-municipality as unit of analysis. N= 538.

4.4 Conclusions

Overall, ODAW makes three contributions to the research program on civilian strategic behavior in civil wars. First, it collects data on the whole array of resistance tactics employed by dissident noncombatants, including the neglected violent self-protection. Second, it provides a framework to study the entire cycle of mobilization that can be useful to examine mainstream theories on the onset and effectiveness of these campaigns or to explore new questions concerning the survival of this kind of civilian collective action. Finally, by covering spontaneous mobilizations, it also provides richer information on the consolidation and effectiveness of less structured campaigns.

Furthermore, because ODAW is based on the documentation of standard resistance tactics, this project can cover additional case studies (e.g., the Latin American civil wars) or complement other cross-national data collection projects on civilian agency, such as the NVAVC or even PGM.

CHAPTER 5

CIVILIAN RESISTANCE STRATEGIES IN COLOMBIA (1985-2005)

The theory posited in Chapter 2 makes three claims about the civilian choice of dissident strategy in civil wars. First, both utilitarian and ideational variables can shape the content of a resistance mobilization. However, norms against the use of violence are more likely to override strategic considerations in favor of this strategy when these norms are interiorized or enforced by authorities or influential allies of the community. In the absence of these actors -or when they fail to impose their normative view on the campaign- survival maximizing civilians are more likely to base their decision on the expected effectiveness and risks of their actions according to strategic factors such as the reputation of the former dominant group in the territory (Hypothesis 1). In contrast, civilians are more likely to opt for peaceful activism when they depend on organizations with a strong preference and capacity to promote norms against the use of violence (Hypothesis 2).

This chapter examines the two main empirical expectations of this theory with disaggregated data on resistance and conflict dynamics in the case study of the Colombian civil war (1964-2005). To do so, I explore the role of the Catholic Church in the promotion of nonviolent activism against the war in Colombia. While other actors have also shaped the content of resistance campaigns in this conflict, this religious organization has features that make it unique in the context of the case study and facilitate a subnational quantitative analysis. For instance, except for the state, no other institution has such deep embeddedness and leverage in this country. The Catholic Church has had an extended presence along with the territory, even in remote and rural areas with no persistent presence of state institutions;

has delivered key public goods in areas with fragile state capacity; and has mostly enjoyed high degrees of legitimacy among a majoritarian Catholic population, especially in the countryside and small urban localities (González 1997; Ramírez 2015).

Second, there is another factor that makes the study of this institution propitious for the empirical analysis. The Catholic Church has shown a significant degree of temporal variation in the content, scope, and frequency of its participation in peaceful activism (Ramírez 2015; García 2008; González 1990). Thus, it is possible to distinguish two periods: first, the early stages of the conflict (1964-late 1980s), when the institution played a minor role in the mobilization for peace in Colombia with scattered participation of bishops, priests, and Catholic activists in some war-afflicted areas; and, second, the escalation of the conflict (1990s-2005), when the religious organization developed a coherent institutional policy to promote peace in this country through both its mediation in peace dialogues between the warring parties and its parish social ministry.

I exploit this temporal variation to examine the hypotheses with two tests. First, I use a cross-sectional analysis of the 1964-1992 period, in which the Catholic Church lacked a leadership role in the mobilization for peace in Colombia. This period is used as a proxy of the ‘absence’ of a third party at the national level with the capacity and willingness to promote norms against the use of violence. Therefore, this analysis is primarily oriented to test hypothesis 1. Second, I use a time-series cross-sectional analysis of the 1993-2005 period, when the Catholic Church put in place a consistent peace policy. This part seeks mainly to test hypothesis 2. I found robust evidence to support these hypotheses with the use of multilevel multinomial regression analysis.

The rest of the chapter follows this structure. The coming section provides a historical context of the role of the Catholic Church in the movement for peace in Colombia. The other two sections discuss the data, research design, and results of the two empirical tests. The final part concludes.

5.1 The Catholic Church and the Quest for Peace in Colombia

5.1.1 From Dormancy to Activism

Until the mid-1980s, the Catholic Church featured a conservative position about the civil war and social conflicts, lacked a clear approach about human rights, and supported the victims of political violence rhetorically but short of concrete actions (Ramírez 2015: 49; García 2008: 10). This situation changed dramatically in the late 1980s and, especially, in the early 1990s when this ecclesiastic organization developed an institutional ‘peace policy’ in Colombia (Ramírez 2015: 85) that not only contributed to the signing of peace and the dialogue between the warring parties, but also facilitated the creation and expansion of an infrastructure of nonviolent mobilization against the war that aided civilians to navigate the period of worst deterioration of the conflict.


In effect, in the early stages of the conflict, the diocesan hierarchy supported the state’s defense and national security policy and had a limited understanding of the causes of the insurgency and the conflict (Ramírez 2015: 49; CEC 1985: 3-4). During these years, the *Episcopal Conference of Colombia* (CEC in Spanish) –the collegiate body of Colombian bishops- not only lacked initiative in promoting social equity and condemning an increasing situation of human rights violations in the country (García 2008: 10), but also censured peaceful protests by peasants and urban settlers (CEC 1987: 2), and even

criticized Catholic organizations with a progressive agenda, such as the Jesuit-based *Centro de Investigaciones y Educación Popular* (CINEP), for supposedly promoting a secular ideology that threatened the homeland and the Catholic principles (CEC 1981: 11).

Moreover, while the Catholic Church decried the use of violence by rebels and pro-government forces in its public communiques (CEC 1981; 1984; 1985; 1987), both its hierarchy and its rank-and-file had a modest participation in programs or initiatives oriented to address the conditions of the victims of the conflict (Ramírez 2015: 50). For instance, in the 1978-1985 period, the count of protests for peace convoked by members of this sector was 7 out of 66 (11%), the fifth place at the national level, per García (2008: 11) (see **Figure 5.1**). Similarly, as **Figure 5.2** shows, the Catholic Church implemented only a few peace initiatives in this period of the conflict (CEC 2021).


This conservative stance towards the armed conflict and its timid involvement in peacebuilding activities began to change in the second part of the 1980s with three events. First, in 1987, the CEC created the ‘Episcopal Commission for Life, Justice, and Peace’ to define the guiding principles of the ecclesiastic organization on human rights, armed conflict, and peace (Ramírez 2015: 52). Per González (1990: 258-9), due to the work of this Commission, by 1989, the Catholic Church had a more robust diagnosis of the causes and complexity of the civil war and expressed an institutional commitment to the defense of human rights and the pursuit of peace. In turn, the Commission was influenced by the academic work of CINEP (Ramírez 2015: 52), as well as the experience of priests, bishops, and activists involved in the denunciation of human rights violations in regions affected by the conflict, such as Urabá, Magdalena Medio, and Ariari (CEC 2021: 480).

Figure 5.1 Collective Actions for Peace in Colombia (1978-2005)



Source: García (2008: 10). **Note:** Per García (2008: 10), the Catholic Church led the 96% of the protests for peace reported under the category, ‘Churches’.

Figure 5.2 Peace Initiatives - Catholic Church in Colombia (1970-2016)



Source: CEC (2021: 476-501). **Note:** The solid red line corresponds to all the peace initiatives supported by the Catholic Church, regardless of their category. The dotted blue line corresponds to initiatives against the war, which includes the categories of 1) attention to victims, (2) peace campaigns, (3) human rights and IHR, (4) dialogue with armed groups, and (5) peace zones. Both variables include all initiatives in these categories regardless of their scope.

In the rhetoric turn of these years, the Catholic Church was more critical about the state's responsibility in crimes against the civilian population and blamed the state failure to provide justice as a source of self-defense violence (González 1990: 258). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that, since 1987, the Catholic Church had a clear position against the activities of pro-government militias. In the Communique of the XLVIII Plenary Assembly of 1987, the CEC claimed that:

“The kidnapping, the extortion, the torture, and the so-called ‘self-defense’ movements are other expressions of that violent environment. All these phenomena

exact the reproof of the Christian conscience. In particular, it is necessary to reaffirm the ethical principle that no one has the right of making justice by their own hands” (CEC 1987: 2).

By 1989, several bishops from regions with the presence of self-defense militias, even offered mediation between these groups and the state (González 1990: 261). The bishops, however, expressed in the public opinion that, while militia activities might have been valid in their origins, these groups had lost their legitimacy and should not be accepted by any citizen (261). The Catholic Church’s strong position against violent self-protection in Colombia contrasts with the experience of this religious sector in other civil wars such as Perú. There, both the hierarchy and local priests from the province most affected by the war, Ayacucho, held a permissive stance towards the community militias that fought the Shining Path (Zech 2016: 92; CVR 2001: 405-6). The overt, and mostly unanimous, disallowance of the Colombian militias by the diocesan clergy was a key source of delegitimization of the option of violent civilian self-protection in this country.

A second major shift in the role of the Catholic Church in the promotion of peace in Colombia was triggered by the participation of this organization in the peace process held by Barco’s administration (1986-1990) and Gaviria’s government (1990-1994) with the ‘Simón Bolívar Coordinating Board’, that ended abruptly in December of 1990 with the military’s attack to FARC’s headquarters in Casa Verde in La Uribe (Meta) that marked the beginning of the ‘integral war’ against the insurgency (Ramírez 2015: 59). The diocesan hierarchy had been heavily involved in this process and developed experience in

the mediation with rebel groups, in what the CEC calls ‘pastoral dialogues’ (59). This kind of mediation became a critical component of the ecclesiastic peace policy and an asset for nonviolent campaigns with access to the Catholic Church’s support, such as the *Asamblea Constituyente Municipal* in Mogotes (ACMM), Santander (Nieto 2010: 5).

Finally, more progressive religious orders -influenced by the Second Vatican Council, the liberation theology, and the work of base ecclesiastical communities in the 1960s- played a critical role in modernizing the Catholic Church’s approach to peace and conflict (Ramírez 2015: 73). The ‘Society of Jesus’ was one of the most proactive and committed orders in the building of peace through the social ministry of the Catholic Church (Romero 2001: 410-11). In 1987, the Jesuits funded a Peace Program to support local initiatives of the civil society in regions affected by the conflict and poverty (411). In the late 1980s, this Program also funded peace initiatives in the main cities of Colombia that became the seed of some of the main national NGOs for peace in the mid-1990s, such as the ‘National Network of Citizen Initiatives for Peace and against War’ (Redepaz in Spanish) (412-14). The Jesuits also had created CINEP in the 1970s; a center that has been engaged in the collection of data on political violence and the denunciation of war-related atrocities against the civilian population, such as forced displacement. (CEC 2021: 478). Although previously criticized by the diocesan clergy in the 1970s, Jesuits’ programs and approach to peacebuilding was later assimilated by the Catholic Church in the 1990s and 2000s.

5.1.2 The Catholic ‘Peace Policy’

These changes were institutionalized in the document prepared by the diocesan clergy in the LIX Plenary Ordinary Assembly of 1994, ‘Towards a Parish Social Ministry for Peace’ (*“Hacia Una Pastoral Social para la Paz”*) (CEC 1994)³⁷. For Ramírez (2015: 76), this new ‘policy’ of the ecclesiastic organization was largely inspired by the Second Vatican Council and Galtung’s theory of positive peace (1998)³⁸. The document stipulated two principles that reinforced the Church’s institutional commitment with the pursuit of peace. First, it claimed that the ecclesiastic social ministry had the civic duty of promoting a culture of peace and the Catholic Church had the ‘co-responsibility’ of contributing to peace at every institutional level (Ramírez 2015: 92-3; CEC 1994: 9). In fact, this document became a material to instruct priests and non-diocesan clergy on the organization’s values, principles, and actions related to peacebuilding (Henaó 2014).

The Catholic Church’s policy on peacebuilding also defined three main areas of intervention: human rights promotion; ‘pastoral dialogues’; and programs, initiatives, and mobilization for peace (Ramírez 2015: 86). Regarding the first area, during the peak of the conflict, bishops, priests, and members of Catholic-based organizations became key agents denouncing violations of international humanitarian law by the warring parties, including the state (141; 190). In addition, the CEC was a key advocate of the 1995 Constitutional

³⁷ This document was later developed in several communiques of the CEC plenary assembly (1998; 2001; 2002).

³⁸ Per Ramírez (2015: 77), the CEC defined eight principles related to the search for peace in Colombia: (1) it is a right and a duty; (2) it involves integral human development; (3) it implies the promotion of human rights; (4) it is the outcome of justice and the result of a fair, fraternal, and participative social order; (5) it involves internal peace; (6) it is indivisible and must be either for everybody or for nobody; (7) it demands the use of dialogue and nonviolent methods to transform conflicts; and (8) it demands prayer and action in opposition to violence.

Court decision that ratified Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions in terms of protection to the victims of internal armed conflicts (CEC 1995). Finally, since 1994, the Catholic Church has been a champion of the cause of internally displaced people (IDP) in Colombia. The publications about this phenomenon by the institution (e.g., CEC 1994b; CEC & *Secretariado Nacional de Pastoral Social* -SNPS- 1994) were critical not only for denouncing the humanitarian crisis related to IDPs, but also for developing laws to typify this crime and stipulate the state's duty on this matter (CEC 2021: 212). Ecclesiastic authorities in departmental capitals such as Bogotá, Cali, Barranquilla, Ibagué, Cartagena, Sincelejo, and Medellín -the most common destinations of IDPs- provided services to ameliorate the situation of victims of this crime even before the state acted (213-7).

Pastoral dialogues have been another central part of the Catholic Church's promotion of peace in Colombia (Ramírez 2015: 79). In 1995, the CEC convoked civil society organizations, other religious denominations, academics, politicians, etc., and created the 'National Conciliation Commission' (CNC in Spanish) to facilitate the occurrence of peace dialogues and to design "a permanent national peace policy" - independent of any government's agenda (CEC 2021: 199). The CNC aided other civic society initiatives in favor of a negotiated solution to the armed conflict, such as the 1997 *Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz* (a symbolic referendum for peace in which participated 10 million adults) (Ramírez 2015: 132) and the 1998 *Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil para la Paz* (CEC 2021: 204). The diocesan hierarchy and the CNC facilitated Pastrana administration's (1998-2002) peace talks with the ELN in 1998 and the negotiation with FARC in El Caguán (CEC 2021: 205-9), as well as the demobilization of

the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC in Spanish) in Uribe's presidency (2002-2010) (Ramírez 2015).

Finally, the last area of work for peace of the Catholic Church was in charge primarily of the SNPS (Ramírez 2015: 96; 349), but also had the participation of bishops, priests, and religious orders at the regional and local levels. The Catholic Church's social ministry had an important component of political, social, and economic training, funding, and support of community-based initiatives to navigate the armed conflict (CEC 2021: 187). In fact, there was a rapid increase in peace initiatives promoted by the Catholic sector during the 1993-2005 period (CEC 2021) (see **Figure 5.2**). In 2005, the number of initiatives almost triple the value of 1987 (the highest level in the 1964-1992 period). The decade of the 1990s also coincided with the peak of the mobilization for peace in Colombia, a period of 'peace effervescence' when the ecclesiastic organization played a protagonist role as the second largest organizer of these protests at the national level (García 2008: 11; Ramírez 2015: 132) (**Figure 5.1**). Moreover, the Catholic Church contributed to the expansion of the repertoire of collective actions for peace with the use of vigils, pilgrimages, and masses (García 2008: 12), as well as with the institutionalization of protest events such as the 'Week for Peace' and 'Via Crucis for Peace' (pilgrimages to warzones), among others (Ramírez 2015: 132; CEC 2021: 266).

5.1.3 A Church-Promoted Infrastructure of Nonviolent Action

The implementation of this peace policy by the Catholic religious sector fostered and contributed to the expansion of an infrastructure -a set of practices, resources,

organizations, networks, and norms- that has been conducive to the use of nonviolent resistance methods by civilian activists.

Specifically, the work of Catholic-based actors often reduced the costs (and sometimes even the risks) of organizing a nonviolent mobilization (Kaplan 2017; Hernández 2004). First, in several cases members of the Catholic Church helped communities either to return or to stay put in the territory despite the deterioration of the conflict -one of the first conditions for launching a resistance campaign. For instance, members of the Missionaries of Mother Laura, the Sisters of the Presentation, the Conference of Religious from Colombia, and the Inter-Ecclesiastical Commission for Justice and Peace, persuaded inhabitants from the corregimiento of San José de Apartadó (Antioquia) to return to the municipality after a forced displacement caused by militias in 1997 (CEC 2021: 244). Besides, with the help of the Dioceses of Apartadó, these religion activists managed resources to improve the conditions for the return of the community by aiding to rebuild houses, improve food security, and receive healthcare attention (245). These actions paved the road for the creation of the *Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó* (CPSJA) (245).

Second, the Catholic Church frequently helped the community to coordinate the undertaking of a resistance campaign. In the promotion of peace communities in the regions of Urabá Antioqueño and Atrato (Chocó), e.g., the clergy aided resistance activists to identify the displaced families from each village, improved the conditions for their return, and advised them on nonviolent methods (CEC 2021: 247). Activists from regions heavily affected by violence and poverty recognize the centrality of this support for the

organizing of nonviolent action. For instance, an educator of the municipality of Bojayá (Chocó) told to the newspaper *El Tiempo* (2002) “They -the missionaries, priests, and laymen from the Augustinians or the Missionaries of Mother Laura- here are the state. Perhaps we would have not resisted all this time if they had not been with us”.

A third factor helping civilians to solve collective action problems related to nonviolent resistance is the perceived sense of protection associated with the actions of committed religious authorities in the territory. Per Ramírez (2015: 316-20), Catholic Church’s representatives are frequently perceived as ‘guarantees of security’ for the civilian population in warzones, especially in areas with fragile state presence, where ecclesiastic actors lead the reconstruction of towns attacked by nonstate groups, manage resources to alleviate the material conditions of victims of violence, and provide a sense of order amid the confrontation. Thus, a leader interviewed by *El Nuevo Siglo* (2003) concluded that “the priest's cassock protects more than a bulletproof vest” in these regions. Based on testimonies of inhabitants from warzones, Ramírez (2015: 316) concluded that:

(...) for many citizens the presence of the priest and the religious in the town was a sort of guarantee -and often hope- that it is still possible to live in this locality, hence some consider that in the moment that the Church has left the town there are no more possibilities to live there.

This idea is illustrated in the testimonies of laymen from the town of Bojayá (Chocó), where FARC massacred 119 civilians in an attack against the parish in 2002, who explain how the survivals of this event managed to remain in the town despite the confrontation between rebels and militias:

The communities claimed that, if the Church left, we all would leave behind (...), then, it was created diocesan teams that came to strengthen the missionary teams that stay in the zone and we always accompanied the communities, and that helped that the majority of people would not leave the communities, although there was displacements, in the same way there were also returns accompanied by the dioceses and always accompanied by the missionary teams of the Church, especially the diocesan teams created to accompany and strengthen the process and the hope of the people (...) (for) they to resist (CEC 2021: 187).

While the capacity of the Church to provide security in these areas can be overestimated by inhabitants from these territories³⁹, political entrepreneurs can use this shared perception in a community to attribute a lower risk for a nonviolent collective action that receives the support of the Catholic religious sector.

Often, however, these religious leaders do directly mitigate the risks of nonviolent activists by mediating with the warring parties to protect the civilian population. For example, the priest of Sabanalarga (Antioquia), Gustavo Palacio, affirmed to the newspaper *El Colombiano* (2000):

(...) when the armed groups come, I go to talk to them, I face them to tell them not to kill the people. And if there is someone in danger or under death sentence, I go and talk for him, clarify the situation, whatever the group is [...] both know that I am neutral, that everything I do is for the people.

³⁹ Violent organizations targeted several religious leaders, including members of the diocesan hierarchy, who participated in peaceful mobilizations and campaigns of human rights denunciation. In fact, using data from CEC, Ramírez (2015: 363) estimated around 187 religious leaders attacked by armed groups in the 1984-2007 period, including 77 assassinations, 33 kidnappings, 63 threats of murder, and 14 nonlethal attacks.

In some resistance mobilizations supported by religious actors, activists have employed ‘pastoral dialogues’ to reach agreements with combatants on restraining the use of violence. This is illustrated in the case of the ACMM, created after a 1997 ELN attack in Mogotes, in which rebels took hostage the town’s mayor. Buttressed by the Diocese of Socorro-San Gil, civilians and priests organized pilgrimages to the rebel camp, held a pastoral dialogue with the ELN, and ultimately attained the liberation of the mayor in 1998 (Nieto 2010: 6-8; Ramírez 2015: 156). In Oriente Antioqueño, merchants, businessmen, civil society activists, and community leaders, and clergy from the Diocese of Sonsón-Rionegro created the ‘Commission for Life, Justice, and Peace’ in the region in 1994 to resist the escalation of the conflict between ELN and pro-government militias (CNMH 2016: 302). The Commission adapted the tactic of ‘pastoral dialogues’ and reached humanitarian agreements with the armed groups (such as the liberation of kidnapped people and political figures) and started regional dialogues with leaders of ELN imprisoned in Itagüí (302). The Catholic Church has also mediated as a ‘neutral third party’ in negotiations between militias and rebel groups, such as the peace agreement between FARC and the indigenous-based self-defense group in Gaitania, Planadas (Tolima), facilitated by the Dioceses of Líbano-Honda, the local mayor, and civic society organizations (Jurado 2014: 9; Caviedes 2007: 46).

The second main way that Catholic-based activists advanced the option for nonviolent resistance in Colombia was by fostering norms against the use of violence in activism against the war. This is best illustrated in the promotion of the *norm of neutrality* in campaigns primarily based on principles of noncooperation with the armed groups and

the creation of ‘sanctuaries’ amid the conflict, such as the peace communities created in Urabá antioqueño and Chocó. The Vicar for the Afrocolombian Ministry of the Dioceses of Quibdó, Sterlin Londoño, explains how this norm was observed in the period of escalation of the war in the region of Atrato chocoano (CEC 2021: 191):

When an armed actor arrives to the town, nobody can stay quiet, but the spokesmen need to speak and make them know that they cannot stay here, that we do not want them and we are neutral, we are civilian population, we are in favor of no armed actor and, please, leave the territory. With the support of everybody, a few speak, but everybody needs to go out to the street and show with their presence that they are in their position. In this relied the resistance capacity of the communities [...]

In the pioneer experience of the CPSJA, created in 1997 in Apartadó (Antioquia), the use of this principle, e.g., was preceded by a Dioceses of Apartadó’s and CINEP’s research on instruments from the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Colombian Constitution that could help the community to remain in the territory and protect themselves through nonviolent methods (CEC 2021: 243). When the war deteriorated in Apartadó for the incursion of the paramilitary group, Field Workers Self-Defenders of Córdoba and Urabá’ (ACCU in Spanish) in 1996, residents asked the Catholic Church for support to organize a resistance campaign. Thus, these religious organizations trained civilians in the functioning and philosophy of peace zones (Hernández 2004: 383; CEC 1999). The presbyter Leonidas Moreno, director of the Jesuit-NGO ‘Justice and Peace’ by the time of the creation of the CPSJA, explained that the principle of neutrality

was materialized by a set of rules and an autonomous body to govern the interpersonal relations in the peace zone (CEC 2021: 247):

Not to carry arms, not to aid anybody who were related to the armed conflict; create rules of coexistent, of solidarity, and not to put in risk in anyway the members of the community; there also needed to there be an internal council that in some way put in place rules of coexistent and conflict resolution, to help people to recover trust.

The Catholic Church also promoted the principle of *self-determination* in campaigns engaged in the creation of parallel political institutions of government or participation, such as the ACCM (Nieto 2010). With the support of the Dioceses of Socorro-San Gil, in 1998, e.g., leaders from Mogotes convened a municipal constituent assembly with the participation of 240 delegates from all the sectors and areas from the town (7). The Assembly engaged in collective actions and a direct dialogue with the ELN to prevent the escalation of the conflict in the region (García et al 2009). Nonetheless, its influence surpassed security matters. The Assembly's first action was the celebration of a referendum to decide whether the liberated mayor needed to quit or not -in which the latter option won with 4,474 out of 4,880 votes (7). Later, the ACCM convoked a new election in which the candidate of the Assembly was elected (Ramírez 2015: 158). The bishop of the Dioceses of Socorro-San Gil by that time, Mgr Luís Gómez, explained that together with development and human rights, another campaign's pillar was the principle of popular sovereignty consecrated in the Constitution (158). Per the bishop, "the constituent assembly of Mogotes was a pioneer in Colombia of a whole movement of communities

that seek peace based on the recognition that the people are sovereign and the people are the ones who have the word” (159).

Neutrality and self-determination were not exclusively promoted by the Catholic Church. Indigenous communities, such as the Misak and Nasa in Cauca since the mid-1980s (CNMH 2015) and the ‘Indigenous Organization of Antioquia’ since 1994 (Salazar 1999) also based their nonviolent mobilizations on these two principles. In fact, apart from the training on IHL, members of the CPSJA considered that they learned from the experience of native communities in Antioquia who were able to resist and stay put in their territories (CEC 2021: 247-8). However, the Catholic Church was a key promoter of these norms in Tiquisio (Bolívar), San Luís (Antioquia), and Aguachica (Cesar), to name a few campaigns (Saiz 2016; CNMH 2016; CEC 2021: 265).

Furthermore, the Catholic-religious sector also contributed to the diffusion of these norms by sharing the experience of these pioneer campaigns with emerging mobilizations from other communities that aimed the clergy's support. For instance, the CEC (2021: 245) explains that with the support of the SNPS, the Dioceses of Apartadó, and Jesuit-based activists, the model of the CPSJA was replicated and adapted to the conditions of the communities from the Urabá antioqueño and Atrato chocoano, such as Pavarandó in Mutatá (Antioquia) or the *Comunidad de Paz de San Francisco de Asís* and the *Comunidades de Paz de Nuestra Señora del Carmen y Natividad de María* in Riosucio (Chocó). These agents trained and explained the recipient communities about the principles of peace zones and the lessons from the CPSJA (245).

In another example, the leaders from the corregimiento of Micoahumado in Morales (Bolívar) asked the support from the Dioceses of Magangué to organize a resistance campaign against the paramilitaries, *Bloque Central Bolívar*, and the ELN in 2002 (CNMH 2020). Counseled by the diocesan clergy, the local priest, the *Programa de Paz del Magdalena Medio*, Redepaz, and the NGO, Christian Peacemaking Teams, inhabitants from the territory considered different options to contain the escalation of the conflict related to the arrival of the paramilitaries and decided that the experience of the ACMM fit with the goals and features of the community (Hernández 2012: 266). After negotiations with the armed groups to assure their respect of the civilian population's right to life and to remain in the territory, the community installed the Popular Constituent Assembly in Micoahumado in 2003, which continued active by the end of the study period (267).

5.2 Test 1. The Early Stages of the Conflict

5.2.1 Data and Research Design

The historical context in the previous section describes a stark contrast in the role of the Catholic Church in the promotion of nonviolent activism against the war in Colombia between the early stages of the war (1964-late 1980s) and the period of degradation of the conflict (1993-2005).

This section uses the first period of the conflict as a proxy of the 'absence' of a third party at the national level with the capacity and the resolution to promote nonviolent resistance activism. It examines the first hypothesis with a cross-sectional analysis at the municipality unit of observation, with the dependent variable (type of resistance strategy)


for the 1985-1992 period, and explanatory and control variables for the 1964-1984 period. The choice for a cross-sectional analysis is justified for the lack of fine-grained data for this understudied period of the war in Colombia (Daly 2012: 478). Due to the administrative division of Colombia changed continuously throughout the study period, the dataset is based on the existing municipalities by 1984 (N = 996).

Data Management

The dependent variable is based on the *Organized Dissent Against War* (ODAW) Dataset Project, collected for this dissertation and described in **Chapter 4**. The outcome takes the value of 1 (Violent Resistance) if a municipality reported a violent resistance campaign during this period; 2 (Nonviolent Resistance) if the unit reported only nonviolent resistance in these years, and 3 (No Resistance) if there were no campaigns in this unit during the whole period. ODAW codes the primary method of strategy as violent when a community-initiated self-defense group (Jentzsch 2014; Clayton and Thomson 2014; Carey and Mitchell 2018) engages in clashes with warring parties, violent territorial control (patrolling), or unilateral actions against combatants or other civilians. The primary method is peaceful when civilians either (1) employ collective disobedience and noncooperation by creating peace zones, engaging in dialogues of no aggression, or investing in parallel political, economic, or social institutions that challenge warring parties' attempt to govern the territory (Sharp 1973; Hancock and Mitchell 2007); or (2) undertake nonviolent collective actions to protest war or to challenge the groups (Kaplan 2017; Sharp 1973); or both.

Map 1 displays the geographic distribution of resistance campaigns in the 1985-1992 period, according to ODAW, and the armed conflict intensity in the 1964-1984 period (OMC 2021).

Map 5.1 Conflict and Resistance in Colombia (1964-1992)



Note: Left: rates of mean conflict events per 100,000 people at the municipality level for the 1964-1984 period (OMC 2021). Right: Presence of resistance campaigns, disaggregated by strategy type in the 1985-1992 period (ODAW 1.0).

To test hypothesis 1, the main explanatory variable is the ‘Index of Negative Reputation’. This continuous variable (0-1) is an additive index of nine dichotomic variables aiming to capture four dimensions related to the reputation of a rebel group in the unit of study in the 1964-1984 period. 1 represents the worst reputation and 0, the best.

1. ‘Rebel Presence’. This variable takes the value of 1, if there is evidence of the presence of rebel structures (military fronts) in a municipality in any of these years and 0, otherwise. This variable is not dependent on the use of violence by rebels;

an insurgent unit can be present in a town without committing any military actions against military or civilian targets. This variable is based on Daly's data on 'rebel control' in the early period of the Colombian armed conflict (2012: 478). I completed missing values with academic sources, such as Vélez (2001), Medina (2011), and CNMH (2014).

2. *Arbitrariness*: 'Assassinations', 'Massacres', 'Raids', and 'Terrorist Attacks' committed by rebel groups. These variables individually take the value of 1 if the unit reported one or more of these actions in the period of study and 0, otherwise. These variables are based on the Memory and Conflict Observatory (OMC in Spanish) of the National Center for Historical Memory of Colombia (CNMH in Spanish) (2021).
3. *(Lack of) Responsiveness*: 'Predatory Behavior' and 'Kidnapping for Ransom' by rebel groups. The first variable takes the value of 1 if an insurgency committed one or more actions of sexual aggressions against civilians and/or forced child recruitment, and 0, otherwise. The second variable is coded 1, if the rebels kidnapped civilians for economic motives and 0, otherwise. Both are based on OMC (CNMH 2021).
4. *(Lack of) Protection*: 'Assassinations' and 'Massacres' by pro-government forces (either state agents, progovernment militias, or both). Both based on OMC (CNMH 2021).

The technical supplement to this chapter in **Appendix II** includes the descriptive statistics of these variables and the additive index. A Cronbach's Alpha test of the Index

of Negative Reputation yielded an acceptable level of .74 (in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest level of consistency of an index).

To test hypothesis 2, I use two variables. First, rates of priests at the diocesan level per 100,000 people as a proxy of the Catholic Church's 'Capacity' in a territory. The variable is based on the official Pontifical Yearbook Statistics for 1983 (Vatican 1984). Second, as a proxy of the Catholic sector's 'Willingness' to promote nonviolent mobilization against the war, I use the dichotomic variable, 'Church's Peace Initiatives Against the War', that takes the value of 1, if the Catholic Church supported one or more initiatives in a unit of analysis and 0, otherwise. This variable is based on the CEC (2021: 476-501) list of initiatives supported by the Catholic Church in the 1850-2016 period. Most of these initiatives (166 out of 187) were implemented during the Colombian civil war (1964-2016). The scope of these initiatives varied and included (nation, macroregion -two or more departments-, departments, region -two or more municipalities- and municipality). I only included initiatives that were reported at the departmental level or below. Furthermore, the initiatives are classified in nine categories: (1) attention to victims, (2) peace campaigns, (3) human rights and IHR, (4) dialogue with armed groups, (5) peace zones, (6) defense of the territory, (7) development, (8) marches and protests, and (9) reconciliation. I coded 1, for an initiative in the first five categories and 0, otherwise. The latter four categories are not directly related to the war but with a broader vision of peace. For instance, the Church reports the creation of the Missionary Anthropological Institute as a peace initiative in education. However, I used the full version of this variable (Church's Total Peace Initiatives) as a robustness check (see **Appendix II**).

In either case, it is noteworthy that the proxy of ‘willingness’ reports no initiatives in the 1964-1984 period. Therefore, this cross-sectional analysis only includes the proxy of ‘capacity’. The absence of this kind of initiatives in this period corroborates the marked contrast in the promotion of peaceful activism by the Catholic religious sector during this early stage of the armed conflict.

In addition, I use a set of control variables. First, to control for the rival explanatory factor of ‘Organizational Capacity’, I use rates of community action boards (JACs in Spanish) per 100,000 people at the municipality level by 1985, published by the Colombian Ministry of Government and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE in Spanish), and processed by Kaplan (2017: 118). Higher levels of this variable are expected to increase the probability of nonviolent resistance. Second, ‘Military Competition’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a municipality reported unilateral actions against military targets by rebel groups and/or clashes between the insurgency and pro-government forces in a territory, during the period 1964-1984 (OMC - CNMH 2021). Third, ‘State Capacity’, measured by the percentage of the population in a municipality with access to electricity, according to the National Census of 1985 (DANE 1986). Fourth, a logged variable of ‘Population Size’ in 1985, based on the same census (DANE 1986). Fifth, the ‘Mean Elevation’ in the municipality, based on the Municipality’s Panel Data of the Center for the Studies on Economic Development’s (CEDE in Spanish) (Acevedo and Bornaccely 2014). Sixth, ‘Distance to the Main Nearest Market’ (CEDE - Acevedo and Bornaccely 2014).

Table 5.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this analysis.

Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics (Cross-Sectional Analysis 1964-1992)

Variable	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max
Resistance Strategy				
1. Violent Resistance	0.0698	0.2549	0	1
2. Nonviolent Resistance	0.0529	0.2239	0	1
3. No Resistance	0.8774	0.3282	0	1
Index of Negative Reputation (z1)	0.0001	0.9919	-0.5853	4.9459
Rates of Priests (z1)	-0.0202	0.9949	-1.5727	3.0672
Rates of JACs (1987) (z1)	0.0060	1.0035	-1.2217	6.6173
Military Competition	0.2283	0.4200	0	1
Percentage Access to Electricity (1985) (z1)	-0.0002	0.9895	-2.1296	2.0035
Ln Population (1985) (z1)	0.0133	0.9663	-2.8480	4.8362
Mean Elevation (z1)	0.0240	1.0086	-1.0376	20.3852
Distance Main Market (z1)	-0.0165	0.9490	-1.1937	5.6551

Note: N = 996. Continuous variables are standardized (z1).

Empirical Strategy

To conduct the first test, the structure of the data necessitates the use of multinomial regression analysis. Moreover, like other scholars who have studied the effect of regional clustering in conflict dynamics in Colombia (e.g., Daly 2012), I use a multilevel specification to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the entity level with a random intercept at the province⁴⁰. Following applied researchers, such as Koster and McElreath (2017), the log-odds that municipality i exhibits one of the two resistance strategies rather than the reference category is notated as:

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_{1i}}{\pi_{3i}}\right) = \beta_{1i} + v_{1i}$$

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_{2it}}{\pi_{3it}}\right) = \beta_{2i} + v_{2i}$$

⁴⁰ The region or province in Colombia comprises several contiguous municipalities within a department (the second highest subnational level). The information of regions is based on CEDE (Acevedo and Bornaccely 2014).

$$\begin{bmatrix} v_{1i} \\ v_{2i} \end{bmatrix} \sim Normal(0, \Omega_v): \Omega_v = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{v_1}^2 & \\ & \sigma_{v_2}^2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\pi_1 + \pi_2 + \pi_3 = 1$$

where β_{1i} and β_{2i} are the intercepts that contrast ‘Violent Resistance’ and ‘Nonviolent Resistance’, respectively, against ‘No Resistance’, and v_{1i} and v_{2i} are the regional-level random effects, which are assumed to be multivariate normally distributed with zero means and a homogenous 2×2 variance-covariance matrix. For brevity, the equation only includes intercepts. Nonetheless, I specified four models with additional covariates. Model 1.1 includes the index of negative reputation and the set of control variables. Model 1.2 adds the proxy of the Church’s ‘capacity’ to promote nonviolent activism. Model 1.3 includes the community’s organizational capacity with rates of JACs. Finally, Model 1.4 includes all the variables. I replicated these models with multilevel conditional logistic regression with similar results (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012).

Regarding model comparison, while Model 1.4 is the second-best fit of the data after 1.3, the full specification includes the variables informed by the theory and will be used for the analysis. Model 1.4 passed several diagnostics checks, including a Likelihood-Ratio Test that yielded a statistically significant result $p < 0.001$ that allowed me to reject the use of the standard single-level version of this model. Moreover, it passed a quadrature check that evaluates its consistency with an increase in the number of integration points (7 -the fitted model- versus 11 and 15). I found no significant variation in the estimated results, which increases the confidence to use this model for the analysis. Finally, I used several robustness checks with alternative explanatory variables and the main results remained stable in most cases. See checks and diagnostics in the **Appendix II**.

5.2.2 Statistical Results

Table 5.2 summarizes the results of the statistical analysis. It supports the theory's empirical predictions: during the early stage of the conflict -a period marked by the 'absence' of a third party with the willingness and capability to impose nonviolent activism-, the negative reputation of rebel groups increased the odds of violent resistance. This effect is significant and consistent across the four specifications of the models (and other robustness checks reported in **Appendix II**). Notice that the same explanatory variable positively affects peaceful activism. However, the effect of the Index of Negative Reputation on the log-odds of violent resistance is substantially larger than on the log-odds of the nonviolent alternative. Specifically, interpreting the results in terms of odds ratios, a one-standard deviation increase in the Index augments the odds of violent resistance compared with no resistance by a 160% [$100\% \times (2.60 - 1)$]. This effect is by 79% [$100\% \times (1.78 - 1)$] in the case of the alternative method of struggle versus the reference category.

Hypothesis 2, as expected, finds no empirical support in the analysis. In fact, a one-standard deviation increase in the rates of priests per 100,000 people decreases the log-odds of both types of resistance activism. This negative effect is also persistent across the models.

Regarding the control variables, it is noteworthy that the proxy of native organizational capacity (measured by rates of JACs) has no significant effect on the log-odds of the resistance strategies. Two other relevant features can be learned from the models: the size of the population increases the log-odds of both types of mobilizations

and military competition positively shapes peaceful activism but not its counterpart. The other controls fail to pass the test of statistical significance.

To further explore these substantial effects, **Figure 5.3** presents the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the explanatory factors on the probability of each type of strategy. Chiefly, the Index of Negative Reputation has the foremost effect on violent resistance in comparison to all the other explanatory factors. Comparing the effect of this variable on resistance strategies, the positive effect of the Index on violent resistance almost triples its effect on nonviolent resistance (.032 vs. .012).

Table 5.2 Models with Random Intercept (1964-1992)

	Model 1.1		Model 1.2		Model 1.3		Model 1.4	
	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)
Violent Resistance								
Index of Neg. Reputation(z1)	0.919***	(0.192)	0.931***	(0.193)	0.950***	(0.199)	0.956***	(0.198)
Rates Priests (1983)(z1)			-0.624**	(0.259)			-0.570**	(0.261)
Rates JACs (1987)(z1)					0.157	(0.228)	0.171	(0.225)
Military Competition	-0.0834	(0.458)	-0.0660	(0.459)	0.0450	(0.476)	0.0466	(0.475)
Access to Electricity(z1)	-0.353	(0.237)	-0.350	(0.233)	-0.341	(0.249)	-0.335	(0.244)
Ln Population(z1)	0.762***	(0.258)	0.700***	(0.256)	0.768***	(0.275)	0.707***	(0.274)
Mean Elevation(z1)	-0.146	(0.280)	0.0192	(0.329)	-0.206	(0.311)	-0.105	(0.298)
Distance to Market(z1)	-0.467	(0.325)	-0.602*	(0.327)	-0.395	(0.332)	-0.535	(0.332)
Constant	-4.570***	(0.537)	-4.560***	(0.516)	-4.718***	(0.577)	-4.688***	(0.552)
Nonviolent Resistance								
Index of Neg. Reputation(z1)	0.616***	(0.192)	0.588***	(0.191)	0.612***	(0.195)	0.580***	(0.189)
Rates Priests (1983)(z1)			-0.871***	(0.318)			-0.920***	(0.310)
Rates JACs (1987)(z1)					0.265	(0.276)	0.307	(0.266)
Military Competition	1.063**	(0.481)	1.166**	(0.478)	1.357***	(0.508)	1.455***	(0.498)
Access to Electricity(z1)	-0.00316	(0.272)	-0.0414	(0.272)	0.175	(0.292)	0.144	(0.288)
Ln Population(z1)	1.287***	(0.291)	1.227***	(0.289)	1.217***	(0.306)	1.133***	(0.300)
Mean Elevation(z1)	0.135	(0.177)	0.299	(0.334)	0.101	(0.147)	0.184	(0.219)
Distance to Market(z1)	-0.250	(0.315)	-0.464	(0.327)	-0.0782	(0.293)	-0.319	(0.297)
Constant	-5.337***	(0.601)	-5.388***	(0.595)	-5.329***	(0.595)	-5.322***	(0.581)
var(M1[codprovincia])	4.971**	(1.948)	4.280**	(1.667)	5.213**	(2.096)	4.464**	(1.791)
var(M2[codprovincia])	4.298**	(1.778)	3.419**	(1.504)	3.500**	(1.569)	2.364*	(1.236)
cov(M1[cod.],M2[cod.])	2.776**	(1.412)	2.015*	(1.179)	2.446*	(1.392)	1.594	(1.128)
Observations	969		969		946		946	

Note: Estimated effects on the log-odds of resistance strategy. Standard errors in parentheses *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Independent variables cover the 1964-1984 period. The dependent variable covers the 1985-1992 period.

Figure 5.3 AMEs with 95% CIs (1964-1992)




Figure 5.4 APMs: Index of Negative Reputation with 95% CIs (1964-1992)




Figure 5.4 depicts the adjusted predictions at the means (APMs) of the Index of Negative Reputation on the outcome variable. It illustrates how the probability of violent

resistance increases markedly -and separates notably from peaceful resistance- as the reputation of a rebel group deteriorates. The predicted probability of the first strategy type accelerates rapidly from .04 to .24 as the Index increases from its average value to three-positive standard deviations. In contrast, even at the highest level of this predictor, nonviolent activism does not take off and remains at .05. Meanwhile, no resistance declines severely from .96 to .7, when it is observed the same change in the Index.

5.3 Test 2. The Escalation of the Conflict

5.3.1 Data and Research Design

This section examines the second hypothesis with a time-series cross-sectional analysis at the municipality-year unit of observation for the period 1993-2005 -considered a proxy of the ‘presence’ of a national actor with the capacity and resolution to promote nonviolent action. It also aims to evaluate the degree to which the results of the first hypothesis remain in this period.

Data Management

To assure comparability with the previous analysis, I use the same variables or proxies of the same dimensions of study than those of the first test. The outcome variable is still based on ODAW. Yet, due to the proliferation of pro-government militias in this period, I supplemented this data with the *Violent Presence of Armed Actors in Colombia* (ViPPA) (Osorio et al 2019) to include potential cases of violent resistance that were not captured by ODAW. Following ODAW coding rules, I coded 1 when a town reported two or more violent actions by a militia in a year and 0, otherwise. Besides, given the dissertation’s theory is circumscribed to bottom-up violent mobilizations rather than top-


down provision of security by national, paramilitary groups, such as the Self-Defense United Forces of Colombia (AUC in Spanish), I use another stringent inclusion criterion: I also coded 0 when ViPPA reported at least one violent action at the municipality-year level by one of these paramilitaries: AUC, ACCU, Casanare Peasant Self-Defense Forces, Popular Revolutionary Anti-Terrorist Army of Colombia, American Anti-Communist Alliance, and the United Gaitan Self-Defense Forces. **Map 2** shows the geographical presence of these campaigns.

For the main explanatory factors, I use the same three variables. Regarding H1, to cover the study period, I complemented the ‘Index of Negative Reputation’ with seminal works on guerrilla movements in Colombia, such as Echandía (1998), Vélez (2001), Medina (2011), and CNMH (2014). The Cronbach’s Alpha test of the Index for this period, however, declined to .66. While I keep this variable to increase comparability, I also use ‘rebel massacres’ -a factor correlated to rebels’ negative reputation- as a robustness check. Concerning H2, rates of priests per 100,000 inhabitants is used again as a proxy of the Catholic Church’s ‘capacity’ to promote nonviolent activism, and ‘Church’s Peace Initiatives Against the War’ measures its ‘willingness’ to do so. I use the same sources for these variables. In detail, ‘capacity’ is based on the Pontifical Yearbooks for 1977, 1983, 1995, and 2003 (Vatican 1978; 1984; 1996; 1999; 2004, respectively).

In terms of control variables, two changes are noted. First, there is no disaggregated information on community action boards for this period, apart from 1993. Therefore, I use rates of protests aggregated at the department-quinquennium, reported by CINEP (2021). I averaged this variable at the study’s unit of analysis. As a robustness check, I use the rates

of JACs by 1993. The main results remain stable. Second, ‘State Capacity’ is measured by the Index of Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI in Spanish) (CEDE - Acevedo and Bornaccely 2014). The other dimensions are captured with the same variables. **Table 5.3** presents the descriptive statistics of the analysis.

Map 5.2 Conflict and Resistance in Colombia (1993-2005)



Note: Left: rates of mean conflict events per 100,000 people at the municipality level for the 1993-2005 period (OMC 2021). Right: Presence of resistance campaigns, disaggregated by strategy type in the same period (ODAW 1.0; ViPPA – Osorio et al 2019).

Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics (Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis 1993-2005)

Variable	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max
Resistance Strategy				
1. Violent Resistance	0.0315	0.1746	0	1
2. Nonviolent Resistance	0.0861	0.2805	0	1
3. No Resistance	0.8825	0.3221	0	1
Index of Negative Reputation (z1)	0.0230	1.0049	-0.9317	4.0465
Church' Peace Initiatives Against the War (z1)	0.4885	0.4999	0	1
Rates of Priests (z1)	-0.0157	0.9803	-1.4756	5.0523
Rates of Protests (z1)	0.0026	1.0019	-0.7295	9.3404
Military Competition	0.3431	0.4748	0	1
NBI (z1)	-0.0395	0.9674	-2.0264	2.5911
Ln Population (z1)	0.0404	0.9638	-2.6883	5.6854
Mean Elevation (z1)	0.0362	1.0060	-0.9974	20.7681
Distance Main Market (z1)	-0.0095	0.9802	-1.1992	5.1364

Note: N = 13,477. Continuous variables are standardized (z1). Independent variables are lagged.

Empirical Strategy

The second test follows the empirical strategy of the previous analysis: multilevel modeling, multinomial regression, and the same four model specifications used to examine the hypotheses.

Noteworthy, however, the multilevel modeling of panel data implies three key decisions (Zhu 2013). First, to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the entity level, I used both random intercepts and fixed effects at the municipality level. To adjudicate between these two strategies, I used a Hausman test and failed to reject the null hypothesis that the unobservable variation at the municipal level is uncorrelated with the covariates in the model, thus the random model is a good option for the analysis (401). Second, following Zhu (2013: 415), I used time-specific effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across time. I used a Testparm to evaluate the appropriateness of this

specification and rejected the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all the years used in the analysis are jointly equal to zero, so I can confidently use time fixed effects.

A third key decision related to panel data is whether to control for time dependence (Zhu 2013: 402). Despite the canonical recommendation of using a lagged dependent variable (LDV) (Beck and Katz 1996), some methodologists claim that these controls tend to wash out the effect of more substantial predictors (Achen 2000; Keele and Kelly 2006). Even Beck and Katz (2011: 332) contend that the recommendations to model dynamic TSCS data apply to large panels (those in which, as a rule of thumb, $T > 14$). Thus, while I prepared an alternative version of Model 2.4 with a one-year lagged outcome variable, I use this model as a robustness check rather than the main specification because the second test uses a small panel dataset ($N=1045$, $T=13$). In either case, the main results remain stable with this stringent LDV model specification.

Finally, in terms of model comparison, Model 2.4 is the second-best fit of the data, after Model 2.2. Nonetheless, guided by the theory, I use the full model to interpret the statistical and substantive results. Model 2.4 passes the Likelihood-Ratio Test versus its single-level specification and the quadrature check test that compares the fitted model with replications with 11 and 15 integration points. All these diagnostics and robustness checks are available in the **Appendix II**.

5.3.2 Statistical Results

Table 5.4 summarizes the estimated effects of the regression models on the choice of resistance strategy in the period of escalation of the conflict. The results strongly support hypothesis 2. The proxies of ‘capacity’ and ‘willingness’ have a statistically confident and

substantially meaningful effect on the log-odds of nonviolent resistance. These results remain stable across the fitted models and most robustness checks (see **Appendix II**). Of the two, ‘willingness’ has the largest effect. The discrete change from 0 to 1 in the presence of a peace initiative against the war led by the Catholic Church increases the odds of nonviolent resistance in comparison to no resistance by 226% [$100*(3.26-1)$]. While this explanatory variable also increases the log-odds of violent resistance, this effect is not comparable in substantive terms to the impact on peaceful activism -it is seven times smaller; 32% [$100*(1.33-1)$]- and is less certain across robustness checks. For example, this relationship is not statistically significant in the full fixed effects models reported in **Appendix II**. On the other hand, ‘capacity’ increases the odds of nonviolence in comparison to the baseline category by a 93% [$100*(1.93-1)$]. The correlation between this factor and violent resistance has the expected sign in the theory (negative), but the effect is not statistically significant.

Regarding the first hypothesis, the Index of Negative Reputation still has a positive and significant effect on both methods of struggle and this impact is larger on the first type of strategy. However, the difference between these two effects is reduced substantially in this test. Specifically, a one-standard deviation increase in the Index raises the odds of violent resistance in comparison to no resistance by a 94% [$100*(1.94-1)$], meanwhile the same effect on peaceful activism is 80% [$100*(1.80-1)$]. The difference in the previous period was of 160% versus 79%. This difference is even less clear in the analysis of the predicted probabilities -that I will discuss below.

Concerning control factors, three results are relevant. First, the native organizational capacity of the communities -measured by lagged rates of protests- has the expected effect on the choice of resistance strategy predicted by rival organizational theories. It increases the log-odds of nonviolence and has no effect on violent mobilizations. Yet, this result can be related to the fact that this is an aggregated measure of collective action that includes protests for peace -one of the methods of nonviolent resistance activism. In a robustness check of this model with rates of members of JACs by 1993, e.g., this relationship has no significant effect. Second, likewise the previous test, military competition positively shapes nonviolence, but not the alternative strategy. Finally, given the effect of NBI on the outcome variable, it seems that nonviolent resistance is more likely to occur in impoverished communities lacking the provision of basic services and goods by the state. This result is congruent with the historical description in **Section 5.1** of the Catholic Church's attention of the material needs of communities affected by violence and poverty.

Table 5.4 Models with Random Intercept and Year Fixed Effects (1993-2005)


	Model 2.1		Model 2.2		Model 2.3		Model 2.4	
Violent Resistance								
Index of Neg. Reputation(t-1)(z1)	0.658***	(0.0803)	0.665***	(0.0799)	0.658***	(0.0803)	0.665***	(0.0799)
Church Peace Init. Against War(t-1)(z1)			0.291*	(0.163)			0.284*	(0.163)
Rates Priests(t-1)(z1)			-0.0207	(0.114)			-0.0128	(0.115)
Rates Protests(t-1)(z1)					0.180	(0.136)	0.180	(0.135)
Military Competition(t-1)	0.182	(0.145)	0.184	(0.145)	0.184	(0.145)	0.186	(0.145)
NBI(z1)	0.517***	(0.122)	0.499***	(0.122)	0.542***	(0.124)	0.525***	(0.123)
Ln Population(z1)	0.852***	(0.123)	0.835***	(0.124)	0.936***	(0.138)	0.920***	(0.138)
Mean Elevation(z1)	-0.736***	(0.162)	-0.663***	(0.170)	-0.730***	(0.163)	-0.659***	(0.171)
Distance to Market(z1)	-0.642***	(0.132)	-0.635***	(0.133)	-0.652***	(0.133)	-0.640***	(0.134)
Constant	-5.995***	(0.330)	-6.962***	(0.356)	-6.020***	(0.330)	-7.003***	(0.360)
Nonviolent Resistance								
Index of Neg. Reputation(t-1)(z1)	0.584***	(0.0756)	0.591***	(0.0756)	0.584***	(0.0757)	0.589***	(0.0757)
Church Peace Init. Against War(t-1)(z1)			1.202***	(0.180)			1.182***	(0.180)
Rates Priests(t-1)(z1)			0.622***	(0.134)			0.659***	(0.139)
Rates Protests(t-1)(z1)					0.588***	(0.160)	0.517***	(0.157)
Military Competition(t-1)	0.603***	(0.134)	0.612***	(0.135)	0.599***	(0.134)	0.609***	(0.135)
NBI(z1)	1.003***	(0.149)	1.018***	(0.146)	1.069***	(0.151)	1.082***	(0.148)
Ln Population(z1)	1.807***	(0.177)	1.853***	(0.176)	2.060***	(0.194)	2.087***	(0.194)
Mean Elevation(z1)	0.0126	(0.144)	-0.0509	(0.138)	0.0193	(0.143)	-0.0492	(0.139)
Distance to Market(z1)	-0.771***	(0.195)	-0.602***	(0.191)	-0.782***	(0.196)	-0.574***	(0.194)

Constant	-5.432***	(0.291)	-5.611***	(0.314)	-5.444***	(0.291)	-5.621***	(0.315)
var(u1)	3.419***	(0.455)	3.288***	(0.437)	3.418***	(0.455)	3.287***	(0.438)
var(u2)	13.56***	(1.593)	12.08***	(1.424)	13.31***	(1.567)	12.04***	(1.424)
cov(u1,u2)	3.786***	(0.624)	3.537***	(0.581)	3.758***	(0.618)	3.524***	(0.580)
Observations	13,514		13,513		13,478		13,477	
Number of Municipalities	1,045		1,045		1,045		1,045	

Note: Estimated effects on the log-odds of resistance strategy. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year fixed effects were not presented in the table. Variables with t-1 were lagged one year and variables with z1 were standardized.

To further explore the statistical results, I prepared marginal effects and predicted probabilities, based on Model 2.4. **Figure 5.5** displays AMEs on the probability of the outcomes of study. Regarding H2, the Catholic religious sector's resolve to promote peaceful activism has the second largest effect on the probability of nonviolent resistance after population size. Capacity has another important influence, surpassed by NBI and the two previous factors. Chiefly, neither of these variables has a significant effect on the probability of violent mobilization. Regarding H1, the effect of the Index on the probability of violent resistance is almost undistinguishable from its effect on nonviolence. Nevertheless, compared to the other factors, the Index has the most powerful positive effect on the probability of violent resistance during this period.

Figure 5.5 AMEs with 95% CIs (1993-2005)



Concerning predicted probabilities related to ‘willingness’, **Figure 5.6** contrasts the probability of each type of strategy by a discrete change in the presence of Church’s peace

initiative against war in a municipality. This variable significantly reduces the probability of no resistance by 4%. **Figure 5.7** explores the APMs related to ‘capacity’. As the rates of priests reaches its highest levels (i.e., at two and three positive standard deviations), not only the probability of nonviolence increases at almost .2, but also the probability of violence (already low) almost falls to zero.

In terms of the Index of Negative Reputation, **Figures 5.8** portrays adjusted predictions at representative values (APRVs) based on the Index when a town reports no presence of peace initiatives against the war led by the Church and the other variables are at their mean. Even in this scenario, the effect of the Index on violent resistance only surpasses the effect on peaceful activism at the highest level of this independent variable (three positive standard deviations).

Figure 5.6 Contrast: ‘Willingness’ with 95% CIs (1993-2005)




Figure 5.7 APMs: Rates of Priests with 95% CIs (1993-2005)





Figure 5.8 APRVs: Index, when 'Willingness' = 0, with 95% CIs (1993-2005)



5.4 Conclusions

These statistical tests provide robust evidence to the dissertation's theory on the choice of strategy in civil wars. Consistent with the first empirical expectation, test 1 substantiates the idea that, in the absence of an actor with the willingness and capacity to enforce norms against the use of violence, civilians employ strategic considerations to weigh the consequences of their actions and determine the content of a resistance campaign. Particularly, facing a rebel group with a negative reputation (for its lack of responsiveness, high level of arbitrary use of violence, and failure to provide protection to the population), civilians are more likely to organize violent forms of self-protection rather than peaceful activism. In contrast, according to Test 2, when there is an influential third party with the leverage and resolution to promote nonviolent action, civilians are very likely to undertake a peaceful mobilization rather than create a self-defense group.

These tests were critically informed by the role of a prominent champion of nonviolent action against war in Colombia: The Catholic Church. Until the mid-1980s, this religious organization featured a conservative position about the armed conflict, lacked a clear approach about human rights, and was not engaged in concrete actions to support civilians to resist violence. However, this situation changed dramatically in the early 1990s, when this ecclesiastic organization developed an institutional 'peace policy' in Colombia, implemented by both its hierarchy and rank-and-file. The byproduct of this institutional investment in peaceful activism was the development of a set of norms, practices, networks, and resources that facilitated the choice for nonviolent action against the war in several communities across the country. Test 1 examined hypothesis 1 using the period of

1964-1992 as a context in which the country lacked the presence of a national actor with the motivation and resources to promote nonviolent activism against the war. Test 2 examined primarily hypothesis 2 in the period of escalation of the conflict that coincided with the committed activism of the Catholic Church on the movement for peace in Colombia.

Further research needs to expand the results of this analysis in two fronts. Quantitatively, it is necessary to further explore the degree to which the theory explains other irregular conflicts. Case studies point out that the prominent role of religious actors in the pursuit for peace and the promotion of civilian nonviolent action against warring parties is not idiosyncratic of Colombia. For instance, the Catholic Church played a similar role to its counterpart in Colombia in the Philippine Civil War (Palm-Dalupan 2004) and the inclusion of this country would provide what Sellers (2019: 93) calls a *replicatory multiple country subnational comparison* to test the external validity of a subnational analysis between countries with key similarities. Qualitatively, the empirical results would be tremendously enriched by the investigation of subnational case studies to confirm/refine the theory and further explore the causal mechanisms in place in the Catholic Church's actions to influence civilian decision for nonviolence rather than violence, in what Gerring and Cojocarú (2016: 405) name as *pathway case study*. For instance, the peace zones of Urabá Antioqueño -briefly described in Section 4.1- are a good fit for this kind of deeper analysis.

CHAPTER 6

REPRESSION OF CIVILIAN RESISTANCE IN COLOMBIA

Chapter 2 advanced two game-theoretic models of the interaction between dissident civilians and combatants in warzones and postulated a central claim about the response of warring parties to the challenge organized by a community in resistance: rebels are more likely (less likely) to repress (accommodate) radical resistance strategies rather than moderate ones. Based on the resistance strategies typology proposed in Chapter 2, this claim can be further specified into three hypotheses:

H1. Municipalities where dissidents launched anti-war protests are more likely to experience a decline in rebel violence against civilians in the following year(s) than municipalities with no presence of such a resistance strategy.

H2. Municipalities where dissidents created a violent self-protection group are more likely to experience an increase in rebel violence against civilians in the following year(s) than municipalities with no presence of such a resistance strategy.

H3. Municipalities where dissidents launched a nonviolent self-protection organization (i.e., sanctuary) are more likely to experience an increase in rebel violence against civilians in the following year(s) than municipalities with no presence of such a resistance strategy.

This chapter examines these hypotheses with methods for causal inference and disaggregated data on civilian resistance campaigns and rebel lethal violence in the Colombian civil war (1985-2005). I use ‘panel matching’ (Imai et al 2021) to control for treatment history, time, and a set of covariates, and estimate the average effect that the use

of a given resistance strategy has on the rate of rebel lethal violence against civilians in treated municipalities in comparison to control observations with the absence of such a resistance strategy. The document finds strong support to the first two hypotheses: protests tend to decrease the levels of anti-civilian violence in a territory in the short- and mid-term after the onset of the campaign and a local self-defense organization increases rebels' use of violence against the population in the first year after its creation (but later violence declines). The statistical analysis provides less conclusive evidence for hypothesis 3.

6.1 Data and Research Design

Data Management

I use a time-series cross-sectional data (TSCS) on the Colombian civil war with the municipality-year as unit of analysis and the 1985-2005 period. The outcome variable is the rate of civilians killed by rebel groups per 100,000 inhabitants⁴¹, based on the Memory and Conflict Observatory (OMC in Spanish) of the National Center for Historical Memory of Colombia (CNMH in Spanish) (2021). This variable only includes victims in assassinations and massacres; civilian casualties in events with military targets (e.g., incursions or terrorist attacks) are excluded from the analysis.

The explanatory variables are based on the *Organized Dissent Against War* (ODAW) Dataset Project collected for the dissertation (see **Chapter 4** for more information on the data). ODAW collects fine-grained data on 15 civilian resistance tactics that are used as proxy of the three types of resistance strategies mentioned above. 'Protest' is coded 1 when at least one of the following categories is reported, and 0 otherwise:

⁴¹ I only include civilian deaths in assassinations and massacres. Casualties in events with military targets are excluded.

protests, demonstrations, or direct actions. ‘Sanctuary’ is coded 1 if at least one of the following categories is reported in the unit of analysis, and 0 otherwise: declaration of territory as off the limits to the warring parties; nonviolent control of territory; social, economic, or political noncooperation; and social, economic, or political intervention. ‘Violent Self-Protection’ is coded when at least one of these categories is reported, and 0 otherwise: unilateral actions against civilians, unilateral actions against combatants, clashes, and violent territorial control, all of them by members of a local self-defense organization. I treat each strategy as an independent treatment variable and run three distinct statistical analyses.

Finally, I use a set of time-varying control factors that can affect the dependent variable. First, ‘logged population’, according to the Colombian national census of 1985, 1993, and 2005 (Dane 1986; Acevedo and Bornaccely 2014). Second, two proxies of state capacity: ‘percentage of rurality’ and the Index of Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI in Spanish), based on the same sources of information. Third, ‘electoral support for the left’ in the presidential elections of 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002. This information is provided by the Colombian National Civil Registry (*Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil* in Spanish) and processed by the Electoral Database of the Center for the Studies on Economic Development (CEDE in Spanish) (Pachón and Sánchez 2014), as well as Pachenkina and Gamboa (2019). Fourth, ‘military dispute’, gauged by the Balance of Dispute Indicator (IBD in Spanish) (Granada and Sánchez 2009). The IBD is a continuous variable that yields values between 0 and 1 when two groups have a military competition over territory. When the IBD approximates 1, the military effort of an incumbent group

(A) is greater than the initiative of a challenger group (B) (246). Values close to 0 indicate the opposite situation (246)⁴². Fifth, ‘conflict intensity’ in the territory, measured by the rates of conflict events (OMC - CNMH 2021). Sixth, rates of civilians killed by pro-government forces (OMC – CNMH 2021). Finally, I include a binary indicator of whether a municipality reports in the same period another resistance strategy apart from the treatment variable.

Table 6.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.

Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Rates of Civilians Killed by Rebels	29,885	5.438	17.033	0.000	418.911
Protest	25,404	0.071	0.256	0.000	1.000
Sanctuary	25,404	0.042	0.201	0.000	1.000
Violent Self-Protection	25,404	0.027	0.163	0.000	1.000
Log Population	25,404	9.464	1.079	4.682	15.719
Percentage Rurality	25,404	0.630	0.240	0.002	1.000
Percentage Votes for the Left	21,946	2.894	6.403	0.000	93.829
UBN	25,340	48.993	20.564	5.360	105.290
Military Dispute	6,546	0.659	0.396	0.000	1.000
Rates of Conflict Events	25,404	48.270	108.671	0.000	3368.894
Rates of Civilians Killed by PGF	25,404	10.042	28.561	0.000	906.157
Other Resistance Strategy (No P)	29,885	0.024	0.153	0.000	1.000
Other Resistance Strategy (No S)	29,885	0.048	0.214	0.000	1.000
Other Resistance Strategy (No V)	29,885	0.061	0.239	0.000	1.000

Empirical Strategy

To conduct the statistical analysis, I use Imai et al (2021) matching methods for panel data.

These authors propose a methodology that consists of three steps (2021: 2): first, it is

⁴² The IBD is estimated with this formula (Granada and Sánchez 2009: 246): $IBD = \frac{UA_A + CL_{AB}}{UA_A + CL_{AB} + UA_B}$. UA = unilateral actions, and CL = clashes.

necessary to find a set of control observations per each treatment unit that share the same treatment history up to the same period of study, what the authors called *matched sets*. Next, these sets are refined with the use of a set of covariates that might impact the outcome variable by using one or several standard matching methods. Finally, a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator is applied to gauge a causal quantity of interest (i.e., ATT, ART, or ATC) (Imai et al 2021: 2)..


The first step requires to determine the value of three ‘matching estimators’ (Imai et al 2021: 6-7): (1) the number of lags (L) to control for; (2) the number of leads (F) or time periods after the treatment is assigned; and (3) the causal quantity of interest. Regarding the latter estimator, the proposed methodology can be used to estimate three kinds of causal effects (7): the average treatment effect of policy change among the treated (ATT), the average treatment effect of policy reversal among the reversed (ART), and even the ATT of stable policy ‘change’ among the treated. Imai et al (2021) illustrate these quantities with a replication of Acemoglu et al (2019) study of the relationship between regime change (and stability) and development. Thus, the authors use the ATT of policy change to estimate the causal effect of democratization on economic growth; the ART to study the effect of democratic backsliding; and the ATT of stable policy change to examine the effect of the persistence of a given regime type on the outcome variable. This step of the proposed methodology tackles two serious threats to causal inference neglected in the current literature on matching methods: first, it controls for treatment history, which “in many cases (...) are among the most important confounders as they are likely to affect both the current treatment and outcome” (8). Second, “the matched sets only include


observations from the same time period, implying exact matching on time period” (8), which is equivalent to the use of temporal fixed effects methods.

The other two steps apply the conventional matching and DiD methods. To observe the ‘parallel trend assumption’ in DiD, the second step involves the selection of “a subset of control units within the original matched set that are most similar to the treated unit in terms of the observed confounders”, including lagged values of the outcome, with the use of standard matching methods, such as Mahalanobis, propensity score weighting, CBPS matching, etc. (Imai et al 2021: 8-10).

Based on this methodology, the chapter’s empirical strategy is to estimate the average treatment effect of the change in the use of a given resistance strategy (e.g., from ‘no protest’ in t-1 to ‘protest’ in t0) on the rates of civilians killed by rebels in the following four periods after this treatment assignment, conditional on treatment history and lagged values of the eight covariates and the dependent variable (before treatment assignment, that is, in t-2, t-3, and t-4).

Figure 6.1 Treatment Variation Plot by Resistance Strategy






Note: Top: Protest, middle: Sanctuary, and bottom: Violent Self-Protection.

Specifically, in the first step I used the following estimators: $Y = ATT$ of the policy change, $L = 3$, and $F = 5$. **Figure 6.1** displays the treatment variation plot of each resistance strategy. While the three strategies tend to be concentrated in regional ‘hot spots’, there is enough temporal and spatial variation to find a large group of matched sets per treated unit. For instance, the matched set for protest had a mean of 724 control observations per each 358 treatment units and only 2 treated units with empty sets. For violent self-protection, there were 306 treated units, a mean size of 892 control units per matched set, and no empty sets. Sanctuary reported 172 treated units, a mean of 959 controls for a matched set, and one empty set. In the second step, I primarily used propensity score weighting with two different sizes of matching sets (5 and 10 matches), as well as CBPS matching and CBPS weighting with 5 matches as robustness checks. The technical supplement to this chapter in **Appendix II** provides diagnostics of improvement of covariate balance before and after treatment assignment related to the refinement of the matched sets with these four methods.

6.2 Statistical Results

Figure 6.2 shows the results of the matching analysis using protests as the treatment variable. As the theory in Chapter 2 predicted, the onset of a protest campaign against war has a statistically significant negative effect on the rates of rebel lethal violence against civilians both in the short and mid-terms. These effects are similar across the four specifications of the models and approximate a reduction by 4 and 9 civilian deaths per 100,000 people the first and fourth year after the emergence of the campaign, respectively, in comparison to a municipality where civilians did not protest war. Overall, the results suggest a clear declining trend in rates of civilian casualties in the five-year period.

Figure 6.2 Estimated Average Effects of Protest



Note: The estimates are based on matching methods that adjust for treatment and covariate histories during the three-year period before the treatment ($L = 3$). The estimates are shown for the five-year period after the change of strategy (from no resistance to protests); $F = 0, 1 \dots 4$, with 95% asymptotic confidence intervals as vertical bars.


Table 6.2 ATEs on Rates of Civilian Deaths by Rebels

Method	ATT of Protests on Y				ATT of Violent SP on Y				ATT of Sanctuary on Y			
	t+1	t+2	t+3	t+4	t+1	t+2	t+3	t+4	t+1	t+2	t+3	t+4
PS												
Weighting												
(Up to 5	-3.859	-7.485	-2.844	-8.552	10.811	-4.544	-16.545	-18.257	5.466	-1.587	-6.633	-3.738
Matches)	(1.398)*	(1.610)*	(2.475)	(2.233)*	(2.229)*	(2.158)*	(2.180)*	(2.814)*	(2.709)*	(3.164)	(3.691)	(4.129)
PS												
Weighting												
(Up to 10	-3.859	-7.485	-2.844	-8.552	10.811	-4.544	-16.545	-18.257	5.466	-1.587	-6.633	-3.738
Matches)	(1.398)*	(1.610)*	(2.475)	(2.233)*	(2.229)*	(2.158)*	(2.180)*	(2.814)*	(2.709)*	(3.164)	(3.691)	(4.129)
CBPS												
Matching												
(Up to 5	-6.183	-12.816	-7.783	-13.623	11.821	-2.907	-18.299	-19.824	-6.903	-12.213	-16.905	-13.228
Matches)	(1.283)*	(1.574)*	(2.280)*	(2.069)*	(2.001)*	(1.939)	(2.149)*	(2.760)*	(1.530)*	(1.732)*	(2.230)*	(2.912)*
CBPS												
Weighting												
(Up to 5	-6.004	-14.173	-6.693	-9.751	10.678	-5.472	-16.995	-20.372	-0.633	-5.937	-12.928	-11.192
Matches)	(1.443)*	(2.052)*	(2.531)*	(2.207)*	(2.254)*	(2.291)*	(2.297)*	(3.314)*	(2.214)	(2.584)*	(3.225)*	(3.890)*

Note: The estimates are based on matching methods that adjust for treatment and covariate histories during the three-year period before the treatment (L = 3). The estimates are shown for the five-year period after the change of strategy (e.g., from no protests to protests); F = 0, 1... 4, with 95% asymptotic confidence intervals. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05.

Similarly, in line with the theory's predictions, rebels tend to punish the escalation of a resistance campaign, especially when civilians resort to violent tactics. **Figure 6.3** displays the average treatment effect of violent self-protection on the use of lethal violence against civilians by rebel groups. In the first year after the creation of a local militia, rebel groups severely retaliate against the civilian population and the rates of victims of assassinations and massacres increases by almost 11 deaths in comparison to a municipality that lacked the capacity or the resolve to organize these mobilizations. However, this effect is reversed in the mid-term and the four models highlight a rapid decline in the rates of lethal violence in the treated municipality in the following three years. At the end of the time frame, civilian deaths decline by 18 cases in contrast to a control unit.

Figure 6.3 Estimated Average Effects of Violent Self-Protection



Note: The estimates are based on matching methods that adjust for treatment and covariate histories during the three-year period before the treatment ($L = 3$). The estimates are shown for the five-year period after the change of strategy (from no resistance to violent self-protection); $F = 0, 1 \dots 4$, with 95% asymptotic confidence intervals as vertical bars.


This pattern relates nicely to the literature on local militias discussed in **Chapter 3**. As Clayton and Thomson (2014), Del Río (2020), and Herrera (2022) evidenced, the emergence of a community-initiated self-defense organization triggers a short-term spike effect on the use of insurgent violence against civilians, but these levels decline if the balance of power changes in favor of pro-government forces in the territory. Historical evidence in the Colombian civil war substantiates this argument. For instance, in the region of Magdalena Medio, the consolidation of pro-government militias since the mid-1980s

severely weakened historical rebel fronts, such as FARC's Front XI that operated in Cimitarra and Puerto Boyacá (CNMH 2019a: 90-7) or the Front XII that influenced El Carmen del Chucurí in Santander (CNMH 2019b: 111-6). However, the matching methods employed in this chapter are not designed to confirm whether the mid-term positive effect in the decline of civilian deaths in rebel events is, on average, a factor of the retreat of the rebel groups or the suppression of the local militias. As a token of the latter explanation, rebels heavily repressed a group of armed civilians who during the mid-1980s coordinated defensive actions with police officers to protect the village of Saiza in Tierralta (Córdoba) from rebel incursions. In retaliation, the insurgency crushed the *Grupo de Defensa Civil* in a 1988 attack in which 12 civilians and 14 police officers were killed (UARIV 2020; CNMH 2016b: 290).

Finally, **Figure 6.4** reports the causal effect of sanctuary. Compared to the other two resistance strategies, it is less clear the average effect on rebel lethal violence against civilians when dissidents organize a nonviolent self-protection campaign. Both specifications of propensity score weighting estimate a statistically significant positive effect on the rates of casualties in the year after the creation of an organization, likewise the short-term effect of violent self-protection. Yet, this effect is not significant with the CBPS weighting method and has the reversed sign of the relationship with the CBPS matching method. The four specifications report a mid-term decline in the rates -again like the previous treatment variable-, but this effect is not significant with the two specifications of the main matching method. In summary, in this study, it is not possible to conclude whether sanctuary reduces or increases the use of anti-civilian violence by rebel groups in

comparison with control units. Moreover, the four specifications agree on delineating an oscillating effect of the independent variable on the outcome during the period of study.

Figure 6.4 Estimated Average Effects of Sanctuary




Note: The estimates are based on matching methods that adjust for treatment and covariate histories during the three-year period before the treatment ($L = 3$). The estimates are shown for the five-year period after the change of strategy (from no resistance to sanctuary); $F = 0, 1 \dots 4$, with 95% asymptotic confidence intervals as vertical bars.

This ambiguity about the causal effect of sanctuary may be related to the alternative scenarios described in the unilateral deterrence game of nonviolent resistance. Even some ‘hard’ rebel groups have incentives to accommodate to radical dissidents who escalate nonviolent methods of struggle when the reputational costs associated with repressing unarmed civilians are perceived as damaging for the organization. In contrast, stubborn

groups -who relegate building legitimacy to other organizational goals- are less willing to concede to defiant civilians. The Colombian case provides preliminary evidence of a different reaction towards sanctuary that may be determined by the degree to which nonstate armed actors seek to build legitimacy in front of the civilian population. **Figure 6.5** displays the mean rates of civilian deaths by rebels and paramilitary groups during the four years after a municipality reports the presence of a sanctuary in the territory (based on data from the OMC - CNMH 2021). While the two groups incurred in atrocities against the population, paramilitaries usually carried a worse reputation for mistreating civilians than rebels. On average, this group killed almost 20 more civilians per 100,000 people than their counterparts in towns with campaigns of nonviolent self-protection. This difference is statistically significant with a p-value < 0.001 ⁴³.

⁴³ Two sample t-test of mean of rates of civilian deaths per 100,000 people: 14 and 32 cases for rebels and paramilitaries, respectively. Results: $t = 9.7669$, $df = 2152$, $p\text{-value} < 2.2e-16$. $N = 2,154$. A difference in means of 18 cases with a 95% CIs of 14-21.

Figure 6.5 Average Rates of Civilian Deaths in Municipalities with Sanctuary



Note: Average rates of civilian deaths per 100,000 people in the next four years after a municipality reported an active campaign of civilian resistance with a ‘sanctuary’. N = 1,077. Unit of analysis: municipality-year. Period: 1985-2005.

Source: OMC – CNMH (2021).

6.3 Conclusions

This chapter provides a rigorous set of tests to the empirical expectations derived from the theory proposed in Chapter 2. Conditional on the history of presence of resistance strategies, time, and other critical covariates that may influence the rebel decision to use violence against civilians, the statistical analyses of this chapter yielded robust evidence to two out of the three main hypotheses derived from the game-theoretic models of the dissertation. On average and according to the unilateral deterrence game of violent resistance, rebels seem to moderate their violent behavior after civilians raise demands of restraint in the use of violence. Put differently, the chapter substantiates the empirical

finding in the literature on civilian resistance that, under certain circumstances, protests effectively compel insurgents to make concessions to the population.

In contrast, and following the expectations of the dissertation's theory, rebels tend to harshly retaliate a community that escalates a resistance campaign with violent tactics. Like other scholars on community-initiated militias, the statistical analysis of this chapter confirms an empirical pattern after the creation of these organizations: a strong short-term peak in the use of anti-civilian violence by the challenged rebel organization, followed by a marked decline in this variable in the locality in the next couple of years. Further research needs to investigate whether the mid-term decreasing effect of violent self-protection in rebel violence against civilians is explained by the military defeat of the insurgent organization or the suppression of the campaign.

On the other hand, the statistical test of the implication of nonviolent escalation provided inconclusive results. The methodology used in this chapter suggests that there is an oscillating effect of the creation of a sanctuary on the behavior of nonstate armed groups in comparison to control units. Based on the unilateral deterrence game of nonviolent resistance, I argued that this ambiguous effect can be related to the difficulty to further disaggregate in the model the willingness to incurring in reputational costs across rebel units. Given that the creation of sanctuary is a strategy that civilians employ against rebels and paramilitaries alike, I advanced preliminary evidence that more tyrannical groups such as the progovernment militias were more willing to kill civilians in municipalities with radical nonviolent campaigns than their rebel counterparts.

All in all, the empirical chapter mostly provides positive evidence to the formal models advanced in Chapter 3. Yet, the partial results related to sanctuary also unearth a limitation of the unilateral deterrence game of nonviolent resistance (UDG-NR). The on-the-equilibrium-path behavior described in this model suggests that rebels without a credible threat prefer to capitulate to protests and prevent a strong community from escalating the confrontation with sanctuary. However, the model makes no predictions about the rebels' reaction to a resistance mobilization once civilians have put in place a sanctuary. The off-the-equilibrium-path behavior of the model suggests, nonetheless, that weak groups would accommodate this strategy. Further research needs to collect disaggregated data on intra-rebel units and examine whether variations in the degree to which a rebel unit is willing to incur reputational costs for repressing civilians are related to higher or lower degrees of violence against civilians in towns with a sanctuary. This idea was partially examined and supported with the means test that compared the rebels' and paramilitaries' rates of lethal violence against civilians in municipalities that reported sanctuary in Colombia, as described in the previous section.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has advanced and tested a new theory on the strategic interaction between dissident civilians and combatants in irregular civil wars. This theory addresses two sides of this interaction. On the one hand, it investigates the micro-foundations of the civilian decision of the methods of struggle against warring parties that operate in a territory. On the other, it explores the mechanisms that explain the armed groups' decision to accommodate or repress this challenge. This section summarizes the theoretical argument and the main empirical findings of this dissertation. In the second part, the chapter explores the implications of this study for the research program on the civilian strategic behavior in civil wars and the literature on conflict studies.

7.1 The Civilian Choice of Dissident Strategy

From the dissident viewpoint, the dissertation proposes a new account that bridges the utilitarian and the normative traditions that explain the civilian choice of resistance in civil wars. The study's socialization theory argues that norms determine the content of a resistance campaign when they are interiorized or enforced by key social agents operating in the territory. I focus on three kinds of norms promoting nonviolent activism against the war: general norms against the use of violence in political conflicts; norms of neutrality towards all the warring parties; and norms of nonviolent conflict resolution. Based on a colossal knowledge on the role of social entrepreneurs on the cycle of a norm, I theorize how local leaders or external allies to the community in dissent can promote and/or enforce these norms against violent resistance. The theory predicts that nonviolent resistance will

be more likely to occur when a community depends on an external ally with strong preferences and the capacity to enforce peaceful activism.

When norm entrepreneurs are absent or fail to influence the community, civilians employ primarily on deliberations about the expected effectiveness of the available strategies for the campaign. Given the context of uncertainty that pervades warzones, local activists use the reputation of target armies as a point of reference. I argue that the history of the interaction between civilians and rebels -extensively described in the literature of rebel governance- can be critical for resistance organizers at this stage of the mobilization. Two wartime institutions created by would-be ruler rebels before the escalation of the conflict in the territory can mold their reputation before the community: the provision of public order and the co-administration of local affairs. The first institution provides information about the level of arbitrariness of the group to cope with dissent. The second, the degree of responsiveness of the ruler to demands made by the population. The chapter claims that civilians are more likely to organize violent resistance when they target a group with a negative reputation (low responsiveness and high arbitrariness).

The dissertation examines this theory extensively with fine-grained data from Colombia. I explore the role of the Catholic Church as a key champion of nonviolent civilian resistance in Colombia (Ramírez 2015; García 2008; Hernández 2004). First, I delineate the evolution of the institutional approach of this religious sector towards the protection of the civilian population in the contemporary civil war in this country and explained how since the 1990s' the Catholic Church nurtured a national infrastructure for nonviolent activism in this country. Next, I use the temporal variation in the content, scope,

and frequency of Catholic activism in nonviolence and conduct two tests for the theory. In the early stages of the conflict (1964-late 1980s), the religious organization played a minor role in the mobilization for peace in Colombia and I use this period as a proxy for the ‘absence’ of a third party at the national level with the capacity and willingness to promote norms against the use of violence. On the other hand, since the early 1990s, the ecclesiastic organization developed an institutional policy to promote peace and I employ this period to test the theory’s expectation about the role of normative factors in the choice of strategy. Both statistical tests provide robust evidence to the theory: when encounter a rebel group with a negative reputation (for its lack of responsiveness, arbitrary use of violence, and failure to provide protection to the population), civilians are more likely to organize violent forms of self-protection rather than peaceful activism -especially in the early stages of the conflict-. In contrast, when there is a powerful third party with the leverage and resolution to promote nonviolent action, civilians are more willing to undertake a peaceful mobilization rather than to create a self-defense group.

7.2 The Armed Groups’ Reaction to Civilian Dissent

From the combatants’ perspective, the dissertation argues that the rebels’ decision to repress civilian dissent is a function of the organizational characteristics of the group, the perceived threat to its dominion in the territory, and the level of disruptiveness of the resistance strategy. Based on DeNardo’s work, the study proposes a novel typology that distinguishes between one moderate, nonviolent strategy (protest), and two radical methods of struggle: nonviolent self-protection or sanctuary and violent self-protection or a community-initiated militia. First, I use this typology to explore informally the bargaining

range between dissident civilians and a targeted rebel group in the context of a resistance campaign: rational rebels which aim to govern the population have incentives to concede to civilians, especially when the latter peacefully demand restraint in the use of violence. Next, I formalize these expectations with two unilateral deterrence games of civilian resistance: one that captures a violent escalation of civilian strategies (from protest to the organization of a local militia) and that resembles most models of dissident-state conflict, and another less frequent model of nonviolent escalation (from protest to sanctuary). Put together, these models explain four outcomes in the context of civilian resistance: no resistance, successful protest, repression of protest, and repression of a local militia. The second model also predicts that under certain circumstances (when the targeted group is negligent about its reputation) sanctuary is expected to be repressed, otherwise (when the group is more ‘flexible’), rebel groups will prefer to concede to moderate civilians and avoid the escalation of the nonviolent conflict.

The dissertation tests this theory with methods for causal inference with panel data. Controlling for the ‘treatment’ history, time, and relevant covariates, I conduct three statistical analyses to compare the causal effect of each type of strategy on the rebels’ use of lethal violence in a ‘treated’ municipality in comparison with a control observation. The analysis corroborates the empirical finding in the literature on civilian resistance that, under certain circumstances, protests effectively compel insurgents to make concessions to the population. In contrast, and following the expectations of the theory, rebels tend to harshly retaliate a community that escalates a resistance campaign with violent tactics -but only in the short term. Here, the study confirms an empirical pattern found in the literature on local

militias: a strong short-term peak in the use of anti-civilian violence by the challenged rebel organization, followed by a marked decline in this variable in the next years. Further research needs to disentangle whether the increase in security in the mid-term is a factor of the retreat of the targeted group or the suppression of the campaign. Finally, the results were less conclusive in the case of sanctuary. I argued that these findings may relate to the difficulty of disaggregate rebel units by their proclivity to incur in reputational costs. I advanced preliminary evidence of how more stubborn groups such as paramilitaries were more willing than rebels to kill civilians in towns with radical nonviolent campaigns.

7.3 New Avenues of Research in Conflict Studies

Finally, the dissertation has two additional implications for the research program on the strategic behavior of noncombatants in civil wars. First, the study introduces a unified approach that includes both types of strategies that can foster new insights about the dominant questions in this literature. For instance, the ODAW can be used to test whether the canonical explanation of the onset of dissident mobilizations against the war applies to both kinds of campaigns. Moreover, the unilateral deterrence games of civilian resistance can be applied to further explore the conditions governing the persistence of the status quo (no resistance) or a situation of perfect deterrence. The dissertation also advocates for a better understanding of how the history of the interaction between rebels and noncombatants before the escalation of the conflict determine the decisions and actions of resistance activists. This avenue of research would foster a more robust dialogue between the scholars on civilian agency in civil wars and researchers in rebel governance.

Looking forward, the study proffers a link to connect the origins of resistance campaigns with their decline and legacies. In effect, I argue that the two sides of the strategic interaction between dissident civilians and combatants critically determine the endurance of self-protection movements. Further research can explore the degree to which internal factors, such as the decision regarding the means of struggle and the creation of a formal resistance organization, as well as external factors, such as the targeted groups' violent and nonviolent counterstrategies to control the campaign, determine the demise or the survival of the dissident mobilization. Furthermore, success or failure of these campaigns may have long-lasting impacts in a community. Scholars on this research program have ushered in to investigate the institutional legacies of resistance mobilizations. For instance, Fumerton (2018) explores how the peasant rounds in Perú strengthened local authorities in regions where the civilians had the upper hand over the Shining Path. In line with this research, I seek to explore the degree to which successful resistance communities experience a boost in their social capital, organizational capacity, and self-provision of public goods and services. In contrast, a campaign's suppression may weaken the social cohesion and resilience of the community.

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APPENDIX I
FORMAL PROOFS

8.1 Introduction

To proof propositions 1-5, I follow Muñoz-García's (2012) systematic procedure for finding Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in games of incomplete information. This procedure consists of five steps aimed to guarantee that the strategy profile and system of beliefs hold the two conditions of PBE (3): sequential rationality (i.e., "Each player's strategies specify optional actions, given the strategies of the other players, and given his beliefs") and consistency of beliefs with Bayes' rule (i.e., when possible, a player's beliefs are updated after observing his opponent actions). These are the lists of steps (Muñoz-García 2012: 7):

1. "Specify a strategy profile for the privately informed player".
2. "Update the uninformed player's beliefs using Bayes' rule at all information sets, whenever possible".
3. "Given the uninformed player's updated beliefs, find his optimal response".
4. "Given the optimal response of the uninformed player, find the optimal action (message) for the uninformed player".
5. "Then check if this strategy for the informed player coincides with the profile you suggested in step 1".

In other words, this procedure extends the logic of sequential rationality used in games of complete information through backwards induction to games of incomplete information (Muñoz-García 2012: 3). Applied to the generalized unilateral deterrence game of civilian resistance, after Step 1, the next task would be to identify the optimal strategy of the defender (Df) in Node 4. This decision is fully determined by the rebel's

type, regardless of the path that brought these players to such a stage. The procedure's Step 2 consists of updating the beliefs of the challenger (Ch) in Node 3, after the community observes repression or not repression in Node 2. In Step 3, it is necessary to find out the best strategy for the community given the defender's message. Step 4 is used to determine whether the rebel group has incentives to deviate from the prescribed strategy profile. Noteworthy, a key assumption of the dissertation's game-theoretic models is that protests are a 'cheap talk' strategy of dissident civilians and, therefore, rebel groups learn nothing from the type of community that they encounter after observing this strategy. Thus, the rebel group needs to weigh the expected utility of repressing and not repressing. Finally, if the strategy profile holds in Step 1, a final task corresponds to find out whether the community has incentives to protest or not in Node 1. Like the Df in Node 2, the Ch compare the expected probabilities of these strategies.

To end, to solve the games, I assigned values to the variables of the games that correspond to the games' assumptions, including the order of preferences of the players, described in equations (3.7) – (3.14). The final section of the Appendix includes the R code used to define these values and verify these equivalences. **Tables 8.1 – 8.3** presents the assigned values to the payoff structure of the games, discriminated by type of actor.

Table 8.1 Payoff Structure (UDG-VR)

Outcome	Payoff	S Ch, S Df	W Ch, S Df	S Ch, W Df	W Ch, W Df
SQ	-u, G	-0.2, 1	-0.2, 1	-0.2, 1	-0.2, 1
McW	gp - cp, G - ct	0.2, 0.6	0.2, 0.6	0.2, 0.8	0.2, 0.8
RW	gp -u - cp, G - lr	-0.3, 0.8	-0.3, 0.8	-0.3, 0.6	-0.3, 0.6
RcW	gv - cp - cr - c_ev -, G - lr - t	0.05, 0.3	-0.28, 0.3	0.05, 0.35	-0.28, 0.35
DD	gv - cp - 2cr - c_ev -, G - lr - m	-0.25, 0.55	-0.58, 0.55	-0.25, 0.1	-0.58, 0.1

Table 8.2 Payoff Structure (UDG-NR, Case 1)

Outcome	Payoff	S Ch, S Df	W Ch, S Df	S Ch, W Df	W Ch, W Df
SQ	-u, G	-0.2, 1	-0.2, 1	-0.2, 1	-0.2, 1
McW	gp - cp, G - ct	0.2, 0.6	0.2, 0.6	0.2, 0.8	0.2, 0.8
RW	gp -u - cp, G - lr	-0.3, 0.8	-0.3, 0.8	-0.3, 0.6	-0.3, 0.6
ReW	gs - cp - cr - c_es, G - lr - ms	0.05, 0.3	-0.28, 0.3	0.05, 0.35	-0.28, 0.35
DD	gs - cp - 2cr - c_es, G - 2lr - pi	-0.25, 0.35	-0.58, 0.35	-0.25, -0.3	-0.58, -0.3

Table 8.3 Payoff Structure (UDG-NR, Case 2)

Outcome	Payoff	S Ch, S Df	W Ch, S Df	S Ch, W Df	W Ch, W Df
SQ	-u, G	-0.2, 1	-0.2, 1	-0.2, 1	-0.2, 1
McW	gp - cp, G - ct	0.2, 0.6	0.2, 0.6	0.2, 0.8	0.2, 0.8
RW	gp -u - cp, G - lr	-0.3, 0.7	-0.3, 0.7	-0.3, 0.6	-0.3, 0.6
ReW	gs - cp - cr - c_es, G - lr - ms	0.05, 0.2	-0.28, 0.2	0.05, 0.35	-0.28, 0.35
DD	gs - cp - 2cr - c_es, G - 2lr - pi	-0.25, 0.15	-0.58, 0.15	-0.25, -0.3	-0.58, -0.3

8.2 UDG-VR

The unilateral deterrence game of violent resistance (UDG-VR) has four available strategy profiles: a separating equilibrium in which the strongest rebel group represses, and the weakest does not repress (hereafter, $R^{Sch}, \sim R^{WCh}$); an opposite separating equilibrium in which the weakest represses, and the strongest concedes (i.e., $\sim R^{Sch}, R^{WCh}$); a pooling equilibrium in which both types repress (R^{Sch}, R^{WCh}); and, finally, another pooling equilibrium in which both types concede ($\sim R^{Sch}, \sim R^{WCh}$). Propositions 1 and 2 describe the first strategy profile and are the most likely PBE of this game. Another equilibrium is discussed here but not included in the main text of the dissertation because it only occurs under a very limited set of conditions.

Separating Equilibrium 1

First step: $R^{Sch}, \sim R^{WCh}$.

In the fourth node, the strong rebel group will always choose to defy (rather than to accommodate) an armed self-defense organization in a community. In contrast, a weak group will accommodate because its payoff for defying is less than the one for ceding to the community. These decisions will be the same in the next three strategy profiles.

Second step: the challenger's beliefs about the type of defender it encounters is updated after observing repression or not repression in Node 2. Let q denotes the community's belief about the rebel group's type being strong upon observing repression, i.e., $q \equiv q(\text{S Df}|\text{R})$. Similarly, γ represents the challenger's belief that the defender is strong upon observing repression, i.e., $\gamma \equiv \gamma(\text{S Df}|\sim \text{R})$. According to this strategy, only a strong rebel group represses, thus the community updates q with the following signal: $\alpha^{S Df} = 1$ while $\alpha^{W Df} = 0$. Formally,

$$q = \frac{\theta \alpha^{S Df}}{\theta \alpha^{S Df} + (1 - \theta)(\alpha^{W Df})} = \frac{\theta(1)}{\theta(1) + (0)} = 1$$

Intuitively, if the community observes repression, it assigns full probability that such signal comes from a strong group. In contrast, after observing this strategy, the challenger assigns zero probability that this action was committed by a weak group, $1 - q = 0$. Likewise, after not observing repression, the community updates the belief γ . In this case, the strategy prescribes that $\alpha^{S Df} = 0$ and $\alpha^{W Df} = 1$.

$$\gamma = \frac{\theta \alpha^{S Df}}{\theta \alpha^{S Df} + (1 - \theta)(\alpha^{W Df})} = \frac{\theta(0)}{\theta(0) + (1 - \theta)(1)} = 0$$

After not observing repression, the community assigns full probability to encounter a weak group, $1-\gamma = 1$.

Third step: with this in mind, after observing R in Node 3, the strong challenger prefers to escalate rather than to capitulate against a strong group (see quadrant I in **Figure 8.1**), while the weak challenger chooses the opposite strategy (in II). If the weak defender does not repress in Node 2, the game ends with ‘moderate civilians win’ (McW). However, if the challenger had observed repression by a weak group in Node 2 (an off-the-equilibrium-path behavior), the strong community would have chosen to escalate rather than to back down (because $-.15 > -.3$ in III), whereas the weak would have opted for capitulating rather than organizing a local militia (due to $-.3 > -.58$ in IV).

Fourth step: given the optimal strategies of the challenger, each type of defender weighs whether the prescribed strategy is more profitable than cheating. Ignoring whether it wrestles with a strong or a weak community, the strong defender compares the expected utility of repressing versus not repressing. The weak defender does the opposite.

$$EU(R)^{S\,Df} = p(.55) + (1 - p)(.8) \geq EU(\sim R)^{S\,Df} = p(.6) + (1 - p)(.6)$$

$$EU(\sim R)^{W\,Df} = p(.8) + (1 - p)(.8) \geq EU(R)^{W\,Df} = p(.35) + (1 - p)(.6)$$

Step 5: the strong defender has no incentives to deviate from repressing even when the probability that it encounters a strong challenger (p) is high but not certain (i.e., $p \leq .8$). Neither the weak rebel group sees deviating as a profitable option. Therefore, this strategy profile, updated beliefs, and optimal responses can be supported as a PBE.


Finally, in Node 1, each type of challenger must weigh whether the expected utility of protesting is greater than the payoff of accommodating the status quo.

$$EU(P)^{S Ch} = \theta(-.25) + (1 - \theta)(.2) \geq EU(\sim P)^{S Ch} = \theta(-.2) + (1 - \theta)(-.2)$$

$$EU(P)^{W Df} = \theta(-.3) + (1 - \theta)(.2) \geq EU(\sim P)^{W Df} = \theta(-.2) + (1 - \theta)(-.2)$$

Both types of challengers see more profitable to organize a protest campaign against the war instead of left unchallenged the status quo. The strong chooses to protest even when the probability of targeting a strong rebel group is very high but not certain ($\theta \leq .88$). The weak challenger faces a similar situation ($\theta \leq .8$). This demonstration sustains Proposition 1. When the probability that the defender is strong is almost certain, both types of communities prefer not to protest, as claimed in Proposition 2.

Figure 8.1 UDG-VR With Assigned Values



Separating Equilibrium 2

First step: $\sim R^{Sch}, R^{Wch}$.

Second step: the challenger's beliefs about the type of defender it encounters is updated after observing repression or not repression in Node 2. Per this strategy, only a

strong rebel group abstain to repress the community, thus the challenger updates q with the following signal: $\alpha^{S Df} = 0$ while $\alpha^{W Df} = 1$. Formally,

$$q = \frac{\theta \alpha^{S Df}}{\theta \alpha^{S Df} + (1 - \theta)(\alpha^{W Df})} = \frac{\theta(0)}{\theta(0) + (1 - \theta)(1)} = 0$$

Intuitively, the community assigns zero probability that repression comes from a strong group. In contrast, after observing this strategy, the challenger assigns full probability that this action comes from a weak group, $1 - q = 1$. Likewise, after not observing repression, the community updates the belief γ . In this case, the strategy prescribes that $\alpha^{S Df} = 1$ and $\alpha^{W Df} = 0$.

$$\gamma = \frac{\theta \alpha^{S Df}}{\theta \alpha^{S Df} + (1 - \theta)(\alpha^{W Df})} = \frac{\theta(1)}{\theta(1) + (1 - \theta)(0)} = 1$$

After not observing repression, the community assigns full probability to encounter a strong group, $\gamma = 1$.

Third step: after observing R in Node 3, both types of challengers prefer to escalate rather than to back down because they expect to fight a weak group (that will accommodate rather than defy their escalated challenge) (see quadrants III and IV in **Figure 8.1**). If the strong group capitulate to the protest campaign in Node 2, the end games with McW (in I and II). Yet, both types of communities would have escalated the campaign if the strong rebel had repressed them (the off-the-equilibrium-path behavior). In effect, hypothetically after observing repression, they would have assumed that the group is weak and expect it to accommodate to a local militia in Node 4.

Fourth step: given the optimal strategies of the challenger, each type of defender weighs whether the prescribed strategy is more profitable than cheating.

$$EU(\sim R)^{S Df} = p(.6) + (1 - p)(.6) \geq EU(R)^{S Df} = p(.55) + (1 - p)(.55)$$

$$EU(R)^{W Df} = p(.35) + (1 - p)(.35) \geq EU(\sim R)^{W Df} = p(.8) + (1 - p)(.8)$$

Fifth step: the strong defender views the prescribed strategy as more profitable than repressing. However, the weak group has incentives to deviate and not to repress. Therefore, this strategy profile is not sustained as a PBE.

Pooling Equilibrium 1

First step: $R^{S Ch}, R^{W Ch}$.

Second step: because in this pooling strategy profile $\alpha^{S Df} = 1$ while $\alpha^{W Df} = 1$, the community learns nothing about the type of defender it is fighting after a group represses a campaign in Node 2. Consequently, challengers' posterior beliefs coincide with the prior probability distribution of strong = θ and weak = $1 - \theta$. When the community does not observe repression, the game ends with McW.

Third step: to find its optimal response given the uninformative action of its opponent, each type of community weighs the expected utility of escalating the campaign versus backing down.

$$EU(V|R)^{S Ch} = p(-.25) + (1 - p)(.05)$$

$$EU(BD|R)^{S Ch} = p(-.3) + (1 - p)(-.3)$$

$$EU(V|R)^{W Ch} = p(-.58) + (1 - p)(-.28)$$

$$EU(BD|R)^{W Ch} = p(-.3) + (1 - p)(-.3)$$

In this case, the challengers have opposite strategies: the strong escalates, while the weak backs down.

Fourth step: given the optimal strategies of the challenger, each type of defender weighs whether the prescribed strategy is more profitable than cheating.

$$EU(R)^{S^{Df}} = p(.55) + (1 - p)(.8) \geq EU(\sim R)^{S^{Df}} = p(.6) + (1 - p)(.6)$$

$$EU(R)^{W^{Df}} = p(.35) + (1 - p)(.6) \geq EU(\sim R)^{W^{Df}} = p(.8) + (1 - p)(.8)$$

Fifth step: in this case, the weak defender has incentives not to repress and the strategy profile cannot be sustained as a PBE.

Pooling Equilibrium 2

First step: $\sim R^{Sch}, \sim R^{Wch}$.

Second step: because in this pooling strategy profile $\alpha^{S^{Df}} = 0$ while $\alpha^{W^{Df}} = 0$, a community cannot update its belief about the defender. If a group does not repress in Node 2, the game ends with no further action by the community. Hypothetically, upon observing repression, since off-the-equilibrium-path behavior satisfy $\gamma \in [0,1]$, a community cannot focus on a single node and must compute the expected utility of the strategies available in Node 3.

Third step: the expected utilities are equivalent to those of the previous strategy profile. That is, the strong community prefers to escalate, and the weak, to back down.

Fourth step: given the optimal strategies of the challenger, defenders weigh whether to cheat or follow the prescribed strategy of this profile.

Fifth step: due to these comparisons are equivalent of those from the previous strategy profile, it is showed that the strong group prefers repressing rather than conceding to a protest campaign. The group only prefers not to repress when the probability that it

fights a strong community is extremely high ($p \geq .8$). Thus, this strategy profile can be sustained as a PBE, but it is a very unlikely equilibrium.

8.3 UDG-NR

As explained in **Chapter 3**, in the first case of the unilateral deterrence game of nonviolent resistance (UDG-VR), the community encounters a strong rebel group that prefers to defy a sanctuary rather than ceding to it regardless of the compounded reputational costs of repressing and pillaging a nonviolent mobilization (i.e., $ms > lr + pi$). In this case, the demonstrations discussed in the previous section and the first separating equilibrium of $R^{Sch}, \sim R^{Wch}$ proofs Propositions 3 and 4.

The second case emerges when the community encounters a ‘flexible’ strong rebel group that aim not to incur in the compounded reputational cost described above (i.e., $ms < lr + pi$) and, therefore, has no actual credible threat in Node 4. In the second case, there exists four strategy profiles as well, but only a pooling equilibrium $\sim R^{Sch}, \sim R^{Wch}$ is a PBE.

Separating Equilibrium 1

First step: $R^{Sch}, \sim R^{Wch}$.

In the fourth node, both types of rebel groups choose to accommodate rather than to defy a sanctuary. This decision is the same in the next three strategy profiles.

Second step: the challenger’s beliefs about the type of defender it encounters is updated after observing repression or not repression in Node 2. Like in the UDG-VR, upon observing repression, the community assigns full probability to encounter a strong rebel group ($q = 1$) instead of a weak one ($1 - q = 0$). Correspondingly, upon not observing

repression, the community updates and assigns zero probability to the belief γ , of fighting a strong group that does not repress. Likewise, it provides full probability ($1-\gamma = 1$) to the belief of fighting a weak group that does not repress.

Third step: with this in mind, after observing R in Node 3, both types of challengers prefer to organize a sanctuary rather than capitulate to the defender because they expect that both types of rebel groups will accommodate to a nonviolent radical strategy (see quadrants I and II in **Figure 8.2**). If the weak defender does not repress in Node 2, the game ends with ‘moderate civilians win’ (McW). However, in the off-the-equilibrium-path situation of observing repression by a weak group in Node 2 (III and IV), both types of communities would also escalate the campaign given the expectation that even the strong rebel group prefers not to repress a sanctuary.

Fourth step: considering the optimal strategies of the challengers in Node 3, the defenders weigh the expected utility of deviating from the prescribed strategy versus complying with them.

$$EU(R)^{S^{Df}} = p(.2) + (1 - p)(.2) \geq EU(\sim R)^{S^{Df}} = p(.6) + (1 - p)(.6)$$

$$EU(\sim R)^{W^{Df}} = p(.8) + (1 - p)(.8) \geq EU(R)^{W^{Df}} = p(.35) + (1 - p)(.35)$$

Step 5: while the weak defender has incentives to comply with the strategy profile, the strong has not such incentives and would prefer not to repress a sanctuary. Thus, this strategy profile cannot be sustained as a PBE.

Separating Equilibrium 2

First step: $\sim R^{S^{Ch}}, R^{W^{Ch}}$.

Second step: Like in the UDG-VR, upon observing repression, the community assigns zero probability to encounter a strong rebel group ($q = 0$) and full probability to the opposite type (weak group with $1-q = 1$). Likewise, upon not observing repression, the community updates $\gamma = 1$ of fighting a strong group that does not repress, and $1-\gamma = 0$ of fighting a weak group that does not repress.

Third step: after observing R in Node 3, both types of challengers prefer to escalate rather than to back down because they expect to fight a weak group (that will accommodate rather than defy their escalated challenge) (see quadrants III and IV in **Figure 8.2**). If the strong group capitulate to the protest campaign in Node 2, the end games with McW (in I and II). However, even in off-the-equilibrium-path situation of observing repression by a strong group, both communities would escalate the campaign.


Fourth step: given the optimal strategies of the challenger, each type of defender weighs the expected utilities of the alternatives in Node 2.

$$EU(\sim R)^{S^{Df}} = p(.6) + (1 - p)(.6) \geq EU(R)^{S^{Df}} = p(.2) + (1 - p)(.2)$$

$$EU(R)^{W^{Df}} = p(.35) + (1 - p)(.35) \geq EU(\sim R)^{W^{Df}} = p(.8) + (1 - p)(.8)$$

Fifth step: the weak defender prefers to deviate from the strategy profile and, consequently, this is not a PBE.

Figure 8.2 UDG-NR (Case 2) With Assigned Values



Pooling Equilibrium 1

First step: R^{Sch}, R^{WCh} .

Second step: because in this pooling strategy profile $\alpha^{SDf} = 1$ while $\alpha^{WDf} = 1$, the community cannot update its belief about the type of defender it is fighting after a group represses a campaign in Node 2. Consequently, challengers' posterior beliefs coincide with

the prior probability distribution of strong = θ and weak = $1 - \theta$. When the community does not observe repression, the game ends with McW.

Third step: each type of community weighs the expected utility of escalating the campaign versus backing down.

$$EU(S|R)^{S Ch} = p(.05) + (1 - p)(.05)$$

$$EU(BD|R)^{S Ch} = p(-.3) + (1 - p)(-.3)$$

$$EU(S|R)^{W Ch} = p(-.28) + (1 - p)(-.28)$$

$$EU(BD|R)^{W Ch} = p(-.3) + (1 - p)(-.3)$$

Both types of communities have incentives to escalate the campaign.

Fourth step: based on these challengers' optimal strategies, each type of defender weighs the expected utilities of repressing and not repressing in Node 2.

$$EU(R)^{S Df} = p(.2) + (1 - p)(.2) \geq EU(\sim R)^{S Df} = p(.6) + (1 - p)(.6)$$

$$EU(R)^{W Df} = p(.35) + (1 - p)(.35) \geq EU(\sim R)^{W Df} = p(.8) + (1 - p)(.8)$$

Fifth step: both types of defenders have incentives to deviate from this strategy profile and, therefore, this is not a PBE.

Pooling Equilibrium 2

First step: $\sim R^{S Ch}, \sim R^{W Ch}$.

Second step: because in this pooling strategy profile $\alpha^{S Df} = 0$ and $\alpha^{W Df} = 0$, a community cannot update its belief about the defender. Like the UDG-VR, if a group does not repress in Node 2, the game ends with no further action by the community. Hypothetically, upon observing repression, since off-the-equilibrium-path behavior satisfy $\gamma \in [0,1]$, a community must compute the expected utility of S and BD in Node 3.

Third step: these expected utilities are the same of those described in the previous strategy profile. Both types of challengers escalate the mobilization.

Fourth step: given these challengers' optimal strategies, the defenders weigh R and $\sim R$ in Node 2.

Fifth step: due to this comparison is the opposite of the description in the previous strategy profile, it is showed that both types of defenders prefer to capitulate rather than to defy a nonviolent radical mobilization. Put differently, this strategy profile, updated beliefs, and optimal responses can be supported as a PBE.

Finally, it is necessary to examine whether the challenger prefers P instead of $\sim P$ in the first node.

$$EU(P)^{S Ch} = \theta(.2) + (1 - \theta)(.2) \geq EU(\sim P)^{S Ch} = \theta(-.2) + (1 - \theta)(-.2)$$

$$EU(P)^{W Df} = \theta(.2) + (1 - \theta)(.2) \geq EU(\sim P)^{W Df} = \theta(-.2) + (1 - \theta)(-.2)$$

Both types of challengers prefer organizing a protest campaign against the war rather than accepting the status quo. This demonstration substantiates Proposition 5.

8.4 Technical Supplement to Formal Proofs

```
#####
# UDG-VR
#####
```

```
# Variables for Defender
```

```
ct_s = .4
ct_w = .2
lr_s = .2
lr_w = .4
t_s = .4
t_w = .2
m_s = .2
m_w = .4
G = 1
G.d = .8
```

```
# Variables for Challenger
```

```

c_p = .2
c_r = .3
c_ev = .4
c_es = .4
gv_s = 1
gv_w = .65
gs_s = 1
gs_w = .65
gp = .5
gp.d = .3
gv.d_s = .9
gv.d_w = .6
gs.d_s = .9
gs.d_w = .6
ut = .2

```

```

c_p2 = .25
gp3 = .45
gv_w2 = .67

```

```

m_s2 = .25
t_s2 = .5
m_w2 = .5
t_w2 = .25

```

Payoff structure

Ch

```

SQ_ch_s4 = -ut
McW_ch_s4 = gp3 - c_p2
RW_ch_s4 = gp3 - ut - c_p2 - c_r
RcW_ch_s4 = gv_s - c_p2 - c_r - c_ev
DD_ch_s4 = gv_s - c_p2 - 2*c_r - c_ev
SQ_ch_w4b = -ut
McW_ch_w4b = gp3 - c_p2
RW_ch_w4b = gp3 - ut - c_p2 - c_r
RcW_ch_w4b = gv_w2 - c_p2 - c_r - c_ev
DD_ch_w4b = gv_w2 - c_p2 - 2*c_r - c_ev

```

McW_ch_s4 > RcW_ch_s4 > SQ_ch_s4 > DD_ch_s4 > RW_ch_s4 # Strong Challenger

McW_ch_w4b > SQ_ch_w4b > RcW_ch_w4b > RW_ch_w4b > DD_ch_w4b # Weak Challenger

Df

```

SQ_df_s3 = G
SQ_df_w3 = G
McW_df_s3 = G - ct_s
McW_df_w3 = G - ct_w
RW_df_s3 = G - lr_s
RW_df_w3 = G - lr_w
RcW_df_s3 = G - lr_s - t_s2
RcW_df_w3 = G - lr_w - t_w2

```

```

DD_df_s3 = G - lr_s - m_s2
DD_df_w3 = G - lr_w - m_w2

SQ_df_s3 > RW_df_s3 > McW_df_s3 > DD_df_s3 > RcW_df_s3 # Strong Defender
SQ_df_w3 > McW_df_w3 > RW_df_w3 > RcW_df_w3 > DD_df_w3 # Weak Defender

# First check inequalities

gv_s > gp3 > 0 # Strong Challenger
gv_w2 > gp3 > 0 # Weak Challenger

gv_s > (c_r + c_ev)

(c_r + c_ev) > gv_w2

G > 0 # Defender

# Node 4

DD_df_s3 > RcW_df_s3 # Strong Defender. Prefer to D?
DD_df_w3 > RcW_df_w3 # Weak Defender. Prefer to D?

# Node 3

DD_ch_s4 > RW_ch_s4 # Strong Defender, Strong Challenger. Given Df D, prefer to BD?
DD_ch_w4b > RW_ch_w4b # Strong Defender, Weak Challenger. Given Df D, prefer to BD?

RcW_ch_s4 > RW_ch_s4 # Weak Defender, Strong Challenger. Given Df A, prefer to BD?
RcW_ch_w4b > RW_ch_w4b # Weak Defender, Weak Challenger. Given Df A, prefer to BD?

#####
# Nonviolent Resistance
#####

# Variables for Defender
ct_s = .4
ct_w = .2
lr_s = .2
lr_w = .4
t_s = .4
t_w = .2
m_s = .2
m_w = .4
G = 1
G.d = .8
lr_s2 = .3

# Variables for Challenger
c_p = .2
c_r = .3
c_ev = .4
c_es = .4
gv_s = 1

```

gv_w = .65
gs_s = 1
gs_w = .65
gp = .5
gp.d = .3
gv.d_s = .9
gv.d_w = .6
gs.d_s = .9
gs.d_w = .6
ut = .2

c_p2 = .25
gp3 = .45
gs_w2 = .67

m_s2 = .25
t_s2 = .5
m_w2 = .5
t_w2 = .25

ms_s2 = .5
pi_s2 = .25
ms_w2 = .25
pi_w2 = .5

SQ_ch_s4_nv = -ut
McW_ch_s4_nv = gp3 - c_p2
RW_ch_s4_nv = gp3 - ut - c_p2 - c_r
RcW_ch_s4_nv = gs_s - c_p2 - c_r - c_ev
DD_ch_s4_nv = gs_s - c_p2 - 2*c_r - c_ev
SQ_ch_w4b_nv = -ut
McW_ch_w4b_nv = gp3 - c_p2
RW_ch_w4b_nv = gp3 - ut - c_p2 - c_r
RcW_ch_w4b_nv = gs_w2 - c_p2 - c_r - c_ev
DD_ch_w4b_nv = gs_w2 - c_p2 - 2*c_r - c_ev

McW_ch_s4_nv > RcW_ch_s4_nv > SQ_ch_s4_nv > DD_ch_s4_nv > RW_ch_s4_nv # Strong Challenger
McW_ch_w4b_nv > SQ_ch_w4b_nv > RcW_ch_w4b_nv > RW_ch_w4b_nv > DD_ch_w4b_nv # Weak Challenger

Df
Df 'tyrannical': ms (.5) > lr + pi (.45)

SQ_df_s3_nv = G
SQ_df_w3_nv = G
McW_df_s3_nv = G - ct_s
McW_df_w3_nv = G - ct_w
RW_df_s3_nv = G - lr_s
RW_df_w3_nv = G - lr_w
RcW_df_s3_nv = G - lr_s - ms_s2
RcW_df_w3_nv = G - lr_w - ms_w2
DD_df_s3_nv = G - 2*lr_s - pi_s2
DD_df_w3_nv = G - 2*lr_w - pi_w2

$SQ_{df_s3_nv} > RW_{df_s3_nv} > McW_{df_s3_nv} > DD_{df_s3_nv} > RcW_{df_s3_nv}$ # Strong Defender
 $SQ_{df_w3_nv} > McW_{df_w3_nv} > RW_{df_w3_nv} > RcW_{df_w3_nv} > DD_{df_w3_nv}$ # Weak Defender

Df 'flexible': $ms > lr + pi$

$SQ_{df_s4_nv} = G$
 $McW_{df_s4_nv} = G - ct_s$
 $RW_{df_s4_nv} = G - lr_s2$
 $RcW_{df_s4_nv} = G - lr_s2 - ms_s2$
 $DD_{df_s4_nv} = G - 2*lr_s2 - pi_s2$

$lr_s2 + pi_s2$

$SQ_{df_s4_nv} > RW_{df_s4_nv} > McW_{df_s4_nv} > RcW_{df_s4_nv} > DD_{df_s4_nv}$ # Strong Defender

First check inequalities

$gv_s > gp3 > 0$ # Strong Challenger
 $gv_w2 > gp3 > 0$ # Weak Challenger

$gv_s > (c_r + c_ev)$

$(c_r + c_ev) > gv_w2$

$G > 0$ # Defender

Node 4 with Tyrannical

$DD_{df_s3} > RcW_{df_s3}$ # Strong Defender. Prefer to D?
 $DD_{df_w3} > RcW_{df_w3}$ # Weak Defender. Prefer to D?

Node 3

$DD_{ch_s4} > RW_{ch_s4}$ # Strong Defender, Strong Challenger. Given Df D, prefer to BD?
 $DD_{ch_w4b} > RW_{ch_w4b}$ # Strong Defender, Weak Challenger. Given Df D, prefer to BD?

$RcW_{ch_s4} > RW_{ch_s4}$ # Weak Defender, Strong Challenger. Given Df A, prefer to BD?
 $RcW_{ch_w4b} > RW_{ch_w4b}$ # Weak Defender, Weak Challenger. Given Df A, prefer to BD?

Node 4 with Flexible

$DD_{df_s4_nv} > RcW_{df_s4_nv}$ # Strong Defender. Prefer to D?
 $DD_{df_w3} > RcW_{df_w3}$ # Weak Defender. Prefer to D?

Node 3

$RcW_{ch_s4} > RW_{ch_s4}$ # Strong Defender, Strong Challenger. Given Df A, prefer to BD?
 $RcW_{ch_s4} > RW_{ch_w4b}$ # Strong Defender, Weak Challenger. Given Df A, prefer to BD?

$RcW_{ch_s4} > RW_{ch_s4}$ # Weak Defender, Strong Challenger. Given Df A, prefer to BD?
 $RcW_{ch_w4b} > RW_{ch_w4b}$ # Weak Defender, Weak Challenger. Given Df A, prefer to BD?

APPENDIX II
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODELS

9.1 Technical Supplement to Chapter 4

9.1.1 Test 1: Robustness Checks

Table 9.1 shows the results of the robustness checks at the single level, based on Model 1.4. I conducted nine robustness checks. Alternative cluster standard errors: (1) ecclesiastic jurisdiction rather than province; and (2) municipality rather than province. Alternative dependent variable: (3) resistance against all the warring parties of the conflict, rather than against rebel groups. Alternative independent variables: (4) a dichotomic version of kidnapping for ransom rather than the INR; and (5) a dichotomic version of massacres rather than the INR. Alternative control variables: (6) a dichotomic version of land invasions (1971-1978) rather than rates of community action boards in 1987; (7) rates of protests (1975-1985) rather than rates of community action boards in 1987; (8) percentage of the population with access to aqueduct rather than access to electricity; and (9) presence of an international border. Across these models -and likewise the main analysis in Chapter 4-, the effect of negative reputation on violent resistance remains stable, statistically significant, and substantially relevant and larger than the effect of nonviolent resistance.

Table 9.1. Robustness Checks (Based on Model 1.4)

VARIABLES	Model 1.4	RCh1	RCh2	RCh3	RCh4	RCh5	RCh6	RCh7	RCh8	RCh9
VR-Index of Neg. Reputation(z1)	0.700*** (0.155)	0.700*** (0.160)	0.700*** (0.144)	0.781*** (0.165)			0.699*** (0.149)	0.620*** (0.145)	0.732*** (0.161)	0.722*** (0.154)
NVR-Index of Neg. Reputation(z1)	0.601*** (0.140)	0.601*** (0.131)	0.601*** (0.159)	0.786*** (0.138)			0.617*** (0.131)	0.571*** (0.139)	0.624*** (0.141)	0.615*** (0.123)
VR-Rates Priests (1983)(z1)	-0.486 (0.361)	-0.486 (0.296)	-0.486** (0.205)	-0.429 (0.344)	-0.398 (0.356)	-0.469 (0.366)	-0.477 (0.372)	-0.476 (0.379)	-0.494 (0.356)	-0.456 (0.362)
NVR-Rates Priests (1983)(z1)	-0.886*** (0.266)	0.886*** (0.236)	0.886*** (0.236)	-0.268 (0.218)	0.879*** (0.252)	0.880*** (0.253)	-0.734*** (0.239)	0.747*** (0.237)	0.912*** (0.274)	-0.919*** (0.270)
VR-Kidnapping for Ransom					0.862** (0.435)					
NVR-Kidnapping for Ransom					0.332 (0.427)					
VR-Massacres						2.035*** (0.403)				
NVR-Massacres						1.111** (0.559)				
VR-Land Invasions (1971-78)							0.165 (0.342)			
NVR-Land Invasions (1971-78)							0.0761 (0.487)			
VR-Rates Protests (1975-85)(z1)								0.376** (0.178)		

NVR-Rates Protests (1975-85)(z1)								0.277 (0.206)		
VR-Access Aqueduct(z1)									-0.477** (0.210)	
NVR-Access Aqueduct(z1)									0.168 (0.245)	
VR-Int. Border										-21.03*** (1.442)
NVR-Int. Border										0.375 (0.362)
Observations	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,907	2,907	2,838	2,805

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

9.1.2 Test 1: Diagnostics

Table 9.3 presents the model comparison of the four main specifications of the data.

Table 9.2 Model Comparison

Model	N	Log-Likelihood	df	AIC	BIC
Model 1.1	969	-313.298	17	660.5961	743.4926
Model 1.2	969	-307.7347	19	653.4695	746.1185
Model 1.3	946	-297.3049	19	632.6098	724.8024
Model 1.4	946	-291.4359	21	624.8719	726.769

Results of the Likelihood Ratio Test, based on the assumption that the single-level model is nested within the multilevel model: LR $\chi^2(3) = 58.60$, with a Prob > $\chi^2 = 0.0000$.

Table 9.3 reports the Quadrature Check, based on the main specification of the data, Model 1.4:

Table 9.3 Quadrature Check Model 1.4

	Fitted Quadrature 7 points	Comparison Quadrature 11 points	Comparison Quadrature 15 points
Log Likelihood	-291.43593	-291.42764	-291.42929
Violent Resistance			
Index of Neg. Reputation(z1)	0.95647175	0.95845431	0.95807674
Rates Priests(z1)	0.19807849	0.19845816	0.19836659
Rates JACs(z1)	-0.5698014	-0.5710475	-0.5709064
Military Competition	0.26148941	0.26080807	0.26094127
Percentage with Access to Elect.(z1)	0.17067125	0.16880774	0.16912586
Ln Population(z1)	0.22483629	0.22463597	0.22475556
Mean Elevation(z1)	0.04656235	0.04734722	0.04704408
Distance to Market(z1)	0.47530457	0.47500828	0.47503023
Constant	-0.3354354	-0.3378114	-0.3375495
	0.24446023	0.2425086	0.24289248
	0.70732821	0.70459511	0.70499936
	0.27371719	0.27323225	0.27331217
	-0.1050975	-0.1063312	-0.1060044
	0.29772076	0.29720573	0.29734033
	-0.5345505	-0.5305083	-0.5312708
	0.33159128	0.32820726	0.3290802
	-4.6876256	-4.6921865	-4.6909463
	0.55150479	0.55364097	0.55287666
Nonviolent Resistance			
Index of Neg. Reputation(z1)	0.58025505	0.58008383	0.58011292
Rates Priests(z1)	0.18936016	0.18918562	0.18920056
Rates JACs(z1)	-0.9199953	-0.9204421	-0.920402
Military Competition	0.3103434	0.31017554	0.31019742
Percentage with Access to Elect.(z1)	0.30744996	0.30630559	0.30648221
Ln Population(z1)	0.26556748	0.2655432	0.26554899
Mean Elevation(z1)	1.4550479	1.455245	1.4552078
Distance to Market(z1)	0.49779226	0.49759176	0.49761218
Constant	0.14421989	0.1421883	0.14246189
	0.28755632	0.28716075	0.28722522
	1.1325404	1.1314119	1.1315346
	0.29961168	0.29909881	0.29914191
	0.18424155	0.18433011	0.18436496

	0.21852565	0.21772792	0.21789605
Distance to Market(z1)	-0.3192114	-0.3185409	-0.3186467
	0.29690342	0.29645939	0.29653547
Constant	-5.3215193	-5.3212667	-5.3211319
	0.58113818	0.580412	0.58041568
var(u1)	4.4638873	4.405435	4.4135023
	1.7908807	1.7012581	1.7207908
var(u2)	2.3638778	2.3445625	2.3468828
	1.2357608	1.2188727	1.2206932
cov(u1,u2)	1.5940461	1.5520094	1.55789
	1.128458	1.0950597	1.1010768

9.1.3 Test 1: Descriptive Statistics INR (1964-1984)

Table 9.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the Index of Negative Reputation for the 1964-1984 period.

Table 9.4 Descriptive Statistics INR (1964-1984)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max
Rebel Presence	997	0.125	0.331	0	1
Rebel Assassinations	997	0.217	0.412	0	1
Rebel Massacres	997	0.050	0.218	0	1
Rebel Raids	997	0.043	0.203	0	1
Rebel Terrorist Attacks	997	0.030	0.171	0	1
Rebel Predatory Behavior	997	0.022	0.147	0	1
Rebel Kidnapping for Ransom	997	0.063	0.243	0	1
Pro-Gov. Assassinations	997	0.255	0.436	0	1
Pro-Gov. Massacres	997	0.041	0.199	0	1
Index of Negative Reputation	997	0.094	0.161	0	0.889

9.1.4 Test 2: Robustness Checks

Table 9.5 reports the results of the statistical models with fixed effects at the year and municipality levels. Time-invariant variables are excluded from the analysis. Notice that this specification of the models yields a stronger effect of the index of negative reputation

(INR) on the presence of violent resistance in comparison with the main models. In these models, the effect on violent resistance is almost twice the effect on nonviolent action.

Table 9.5 Fixed Effects at Year and Municipality

	Model 2.1f	Model 2.2f	Model 2.3f	Model 2.4f
Violent Resistance				
Index of Neg. Reputation(t-1)(z1)	0.433*** (0.0954)	0.437*** (0.0954)	0.432*** (0.0954)	0.436*** (0.0955)
Ch. Peace Init. Against War(t-1)(z1)		-0.0453 (0.204)		-0.0410 (0.205)
Rates Priests(t-1)(z1)		0.00697 (0.216)		0.0306 (0.220)
Rates Protests(t-1)(z1)			0.531 (0.364)	0.482 (0.366)
Military Competition(t-1)	0.152 (0.153)	0.154 (0.153)	0.153 (0.153)	0.154 (0.153)
NBI(z1)	0.532* (0.319)	0.529* (0.319)	0.535* (0.317)	0.534* (0.317)
Ln Population(z1)	3.922*** (0.814)	3.859*** (0.814)	4.148*** (0.823)	4.073*** (0.823)
Nonviolent Resistance				
Index of Neg. Reputation(t-1)(z1)	0.267*** (0.0790)	0.270*** (0.0794)	0.265*** (0.0791)	0.270*** (0.0796)
Ch. Peace Init. Against War(t-1)(z1)		0.692*** (0.196)		0.707*** (0.196)
Rates Priests(t-1)(z1)		0.935*** (0.230)		0.989*** (0.233)
Rates Protests(t-1)(z1)			0.831*** (0.315)	0.884*** (0.305)
Military Competition(t-1)	0.342** (0.137)	0.351** (0.138)	0.321** (0.137)	0.327** (0.139)
NBI(z1)	-0.0112 (0.208)	0.0253 (0.207)	0.0267 (0.209)	0.0709 (0.207)
Ln Population(z1)	0.610 (0.642)	0.736 (0.641)	0.987 (0.661)	1.159* (0.662)
Observations	4,382	4,382	4,382	4,382
Number of divipola	338	338	338	338

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9.6 reports additional robustness checks, based on Model 2.4. The first model (with an ‘l’ at the end) includes a lagged dependent variable. The second model (with an ‘r’ at the end) includes random effects at the regional level in addition to the random effects at the municipality level used in the main specification. Notice that both more stringent specifications of the main model retain similar results for the theory’s explanatory variables.

Table 9.6 Additional Robustness Checks

	Model 2.4l	Model 2.4r
Violent Resistance		
Index of Neg. Reputation(t-1)(z1)	0.510*** (0.0720)	0.665*** (0.0775)
Church Peace Init. Against War(t-1)(z1)	0.270* (0.145)	0.284 (0.334)
Rates Priests(t-1)(z1)	-0.0583 (0.0844)	-0.0128 (0.194)
VR (t-1)	3.499*** (0.199)	
NVR (t-1)	3.083*** (0.212)	
Rates Protests(t-1)(z1)	0.0276 (0.101)	0.180 (0.196)
Military Competition(t-1)	-0.00280 (0.140)	0.186 (0.152)
NBI(z1)	0.301*** (0.0870)	0.525*** (0.170)
Ln Population(z1)	0.336*** (0.0945)	0.920*** (0.182)
Mean Elevation(z1)	-0.388*** (0.118)	-0.659*** (0.197)

Distance to Market(z1)	-0.351***	-0.640***
	(0.0881)	(0.164)
Constant	-4.996***	-5.221***
	(0.288)	(0.376)
<hr/>		
Nonviolent Resistance		
Index of Neg. Reputation(t-1)(z1)	0.504***	0.589***
	(0.0737)	(0.102)
Church Peace Init. Against War(t-1)(z1)	1.168***	1.182**
	(0.164)	(0.516)
Rates Priests(t-1)(z1)	0.322***	0.659*
	(0.0817)	(0.373)
VR (t-1)	2.484***	
	(0.219)	
NVR (t-1)	5.340***	
	(0.184)	
Rates Protests(t-1)(z1)	0.138	0.517
	(0.103)	(0.372)
Military Competition(t-1)	0.512***	0.609***
	(0.142)	(0.141)
NBI(z1)	0.690***	1.082***
	(0.0940)	(0.268)
Ln Population(z1)	0.708***	2.087***
	(0.109)	(0.291)
Mean Elevation(z1)	0.0249	-0.0492
	(0.0625)	(0.197)
Distance to Market(z1)	-0.353***	-0.574**
	(0.0993)	(0.249)
Constant	-5.935***	-8.832***
	(0.289)	(0.852)
<hr/>		
var(u1)	0.272*	3.287***
	(0.156)	(0.638)
var(u2)	0.868***	12.04***
	(0.275)	(1.969)
cov(u1,u2)	0.195	3.524***
	(0.188)	(0.910)
Observations	13,477	13,477
Number of divipola	1,045	1,045

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

9.1.5 Test 2: Diagnostics

Table 9.7 presents the model comparison of the four main specifications of the data.

Table 9.7 Model Comparison

Model	N	Log-Likelihood	df	AIC	BIC
Model 2.1	13,514	-3272.286	41	6626.572	6934.543
Model 2.2	13,513	-3238.57	45	6567.14	6905.154
Model 2.3	13,478	-3265.778	43	6617.555	6940.434
Model 2.4	13,477	-3232.357	47	6558.713	6911.624

Results of the Likelihood Ratio Test, based on the assumption that the single-level model is nested within the multilevel model: LR $\chi^2(3) = 58.60$, with a Prob > $\chi^2 = 0.0000$.

Table 9.8 reports the Quadrature Check, based on the main specification of the data, Model 2.4:

Table 9.8 Quadrature Check Model 2.4

	Fitted Quadrature 7 points	Comparison Quadrature 11 points	Comparison Quadrature 15 points
Log likelihood	-3232.3566	-3233.4707 -1.1140789 .00034466	-3233.4327 -1.0760848 0.00033291
Violent Resistance			
Index of Neg. Reputation(t-1)(z1)	.66540745	.66061529 -0.00479217 -0.00720185	0.66103713 -0.00437032 -0.00656788
Church Peace Init. Against War(t-1)(z1)	.28421577	.28060379 -0.00361198 -.01270858	0.28083835 -0.00337742 -0.0118833
Rates Priests(t-1)(z1)	-0.01278135	-0.00904771 .00373364 -0.29211612	-0.00962841 0.00315293 -0.24668251

Rates Protests(t-1)(z1)	0.1795159	.1824086 .0028927	0.18187576 0.00235986
		.01611387	0.01314568
Military Competition(t-1)	.18634006	0.17865078 -0.00768928	0.1792337 -0.00710637
		-0.04126477	-0.03813654
NBI(z1)	.52507105	.52095779 -0.00411326	0.52121514 -0.00385591
		-0.00783372	-0.0073436
Ln Population(z1)	0.92038832	.9274207 0.00703238	0.92609822 0.0057099
		.00764066	0.00620379
Mean Elevation(z1)	-0.65915413	-0.65247893 .0066752	-0.65331419 0.00583994
		-0.01012692	-0.00885975
Distance to Market(z1)	-0.64031756	-.63270293 .00761463	-0.6333986 0.00691896
		-0.01189195	-0.01080551
Constant	-5.6207395	-5.5951386 .02560086	-5.5967084 0.02403107
		-0.00455471	-0.00427543
<hr/>			
Nonviolent Resistance			
Index of Neg. Reputation(t-1)(z1)	.5886018	.59294834 .00434654	0.59276724 0.00416544
		.00738452	0.00707684
Church Peace Init. Against War(t-1)(z1)	1.1818538	1.183079 .00122519	1.183573 0.00171918
		.00103667	0.00145465
Rates Priests(t-1)(z1)	.65863421	.66126377 .00262956	0.66157902 0.00294481
		.00399244	0.00447109
Rates Protests(t-1)(z1)	.51695506	.51768078 .00072572	0.51806472 0.00110965
		.00140383	0.00214651
Military Competition(t-1)	.60857529	.61317645 .00460116	0.61320552 0.00463023
		.00756054	0.00760831
NBI(z1)	1.0823675	1.0975104 .0151429	1.0965455 0.01417798
		.01399053	0.01309905
Ln Population(z1)	2.0869491	2.098143 .01119386	2.0955834 0.00863426
		.00536375	0.00413727
Mean Elevation(z1)	-0.04919505	-0.04961827 -0.00042322	-0.04816832 0.00102673
		0.00860283	-0.02087062
Distance to Market(z1)	-.57430122	-0.5834933	-0.58179721

			-0.00919208	-0.00749598
			0.01305236	
Constant	-7.0025138		-6.9499675	-6.9559171
			.05254628	0.04659665
			-0.00750392	-0.00665427
var(u1)	3.2872593	3.2709417	3.2687245	
		-0.01631764	-0.01853481	
		-0.0049639	-0.00563838	
var(u2)	12.042076	11.740554	11.726658	
		-0.30152171	-0.31541761	
		-0.02503901	-0.02619296	
cov(u1,u2)	3.5242102	3.768474	3.7352031	
		.24426384	0.21099297	
		.06931024	0.05986958	

9.1.6 Test 2: Descriptive Statistics INR (1993-2005)

Table 9.9 presents the descriptive statistics of the Index of Negative Reputation for the 1993-2005 period.

Table 9.9 Descriptive Statistics INR (1993-2005)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max
Rebel Presence	23,525	0.187	0.390	0	1
Rebel Assassinations	23,525	0.286	0.452	0	1
Rebel Massacres	23,525	0.022	0.147	0	1
Rebel Raids	23,525	0.016	0.127	0	1
Rebel Terrorist Attacks	23,525	0.021	0.143	0	1
Rebel Predatory Behavior	23,525	0.081	0.273	0	1
Rebel Kidnapping for Ransom	23,525	0.115	0.319	0	1
Pro-Gov. Assassinations	23,525	0.362	0.481	0	1
Pro-Gov. Massacres	23,525	0.058	0.234	0	1
Index of Negative Reputation	23,525	0.120	0.149	0	0.8

9.2 Technical Supplement to Chapter 5

9.2.1 Diagnostics

The following figures show the improved covariate balance related to the process of matching over the pre-treatment period, per each resistance strategy. The plot on the top

left displays the covariates balance after matching but before refinement; the top right, the propensity score weighting; the bottom left, the CBPS matching; and the bottom right, the CBPS weighting.

Figure 9.1 Improved Covariate Balance (Protest)




Figure 9.2 Improved Covariate Balance (Violence)





Figure 9.3 Improved Covariate Balance (Sanctuary)



APPENDIX III
ORGANIZED DISSENT AGAINST WAR

10.1 Codebook and Coding Rules

1. `divipola`: DANE's municipality code.
2. `mun`: Name of the municipality (second level subnational division).
3. `dep`: Name of the department (first level subnational division).
4. `uid_crc`: Code of the campaign.
5. `cr_case`: Name of the campaign. If there is one leading organization the year of the onset of the campaign, the coder will attribute the organization's name to the campaign. On the contrary, the campaign will be named after the municipality or region of its location. For nonviolent campaigns, it will be used the generic term: 'Civilian resistance campaign in...', e.g., Civilian resistance campaign in San Vicente del Caguán. For violent campaigns, the term will be 'Armed resistance in...'.
6. `ID_case`: Code of the campaign in the original table related to resistance types. For nonviolent campaigns the code starts with 'nvcr_00001', and for violent, 'vcr_00001'.
7. `year`: Year of codification.
8. `scale`: Geographic presence of the campaign. It takes the following values:
 - '1. Submunicipal' when the campaign is concentrated in a village, corregimiento, etc.
 - '2. Municipal' when the source implies that the campaign operates in the whole town.
 - '3. Regional' when the campaign is present in two or more neighboring municipalities, regardless of whether they are from different departments.
 - '4. Departamental' when the campaign is present in most municipalities of the department.
 - '5. Macroregional' when the campaign is present in two or more contiguous regions or departments.

Note: The presence of a campaign is coded when there is explicit information about the participation of local inhabitants in the mobilization. When this information is vague and the source claims that the campaign has incidence in a whole department or region, the campaign is attributed to the capital(s) of that geographic area(s).

9. `strategy_type`: Primary method of struggle used in the campaign in that year. Violent resistance can be seen as the default category. While a violent campaign (e.g., a self-defense group) can include elements of a peaceful mobilization (protests, demonstrations, etc.), it is more difficult to categorize a campaign as nonviolent when it incorporates armed actions against warring parties. By definition, a nonviolent campaign is one in which its

participants relinquish the use of violent methods based on their normative or strategic motivations (Sharp 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2005). In practice, resisters can unintentionally get engaged in violent episodes with state agents or armed groups' members. Thus, a campaign which relies mostly on nonviolent methods but occasionally reports skirmishes with armed groups can still be considered '2. Mostly nonviolent'. A campaign in which civilians patrol the territory with arms, regularly engage in violent clashes with armed groups, and/or commit unilateral armed actions against combatants or noncombatants in the territory is '1. Mostly violent', regardless of whether its participants also use peaceful methods.

10. *org_level*: Level of organization of the campaign. Coded as '2. Organized' when at least one local and already-existent organization formally decides to lead the campaign or when civilians create a new organization or self-defense group to do so. Otherwise, the variable takes the value of '1. Unorganized' to describe a spontaneous mobilization. Sometimes external organizations from the civil society (e.g. the Catholic Church), NGOs, IGOs, or political parties play a critical role in the campaign. However, they should be coded as external allies not as civil resistance organizations if they have presence at the national level. The emphasis is placed on local organizations.

11. *com_part_vcr*: Type of the participation of the community in a violent resistance campaign. It can take the following values:

'0. No participation' when the campaign is primarily constituted and led by external actors. More precisely, when local elites only engaged in the funding of the organization and/or subordinate classes only are hired as killers or mercenaries or no participation of local inhabitants at all.

'1. Elitist organization' when the organization is primarily elite-led, short of subordinate participation.

'2. Popular organization' when the organization is primarily nonelite-led, short of elite participation.

'3. Organic mobilization' when both nonelite and elite groups are relevant members of the organization.

Note: The deputed version of the dataset excludes the value 0 in this variable.

12. *com_rel_aut_vcr*: The type of relationship between the campaign and other armed actors, including the warring parties and organized crime groups. The key operational concept is 'relative independence' of the self-defense organization vis-à-vis potential allies. It can take the following values:

'0. Subordination' when the organization is controlled and commanded by another armed organization (either a warring party or an organized crime group).

'1. Limited autonomy' when the group has critical alliances with an armed group but maintained its own command and control.

'2. Extended autonomy' when the group has no strategic alliances with the warring parties, even if it had a public position in favor of one of the sides of the conflict.

Note: The deputed version of the dataset excludes the value 0 in this variable.

13. `com_part_nvcr`: Type of the participation of the community in a nonviolent resistance campaign. It takes the value of '1. Sectorial' when mostly members of a specific group (e.g., economic interest group, social class, ethnic minority, etc.) participate in the campaign; and '2. Civic' when the inhabitants from different social groups and sectors participate in the campaign.

14. `lead_nvcr`: Type of leadership of the campaign. It takes the following values:
'0. External actors' when the campaign is led by members of national or foreign NGOs, INGOs, or other civil society organizations.
'1. Elitist' when the campaign is led by economic interest groups, public officials at the local or regional level, and other economic or political elites that have their residence in the geographic area of influence of the campaign.
'2. Popular' when the campaign is led by members or organizations of subordinate classes: peasants, workers, indigenous, or ordinary citizens.
'3. Organic' when the campaign is coordinated by both local elites and nonelites.

Note: The dataset only includes nonviolent campaigns with participation of inhabitants from the geographic area of influence of the mobilization. See the section, **4.2 Introducing ODAW**, for clarification on how the dataset deals with the influence of external actors on a nonviolent mobilization.

15. `territory_off`: Declaration of a territory as off the limits of warring parties. Coded as 1 when a community has declared the locality as neutral and demand no intervention of the armed groups in the local affairs, regardless of the degree of consolidation of the sanctuary, and 0 otherwise.

16. `active_terrc`: Active nonviolent territorial control. Coded as 1 when civilians invested in nonviolent mechanisms to protect the territory and its inhabitants and not only employed the declaration of this figure as a rhetorical weapon. Coded as 0, otherwise.

17. `soc_nc`: Social noncooperation. Coded as 1 when there is evidence that civilians tried to stop obeying armed groups' norms oriented to control the private and public behavior of the population, and 0 otherwise.

18. `pol_nc`: Political noncooperation. Coded as 1 when there is evidence of civilians' attempt to disobey armed groups' norms aimed to control the political behavior, preferences, or identities of local inhabitants, and 0 otherwise.

19. `eco_nc`: Economic noncooperation. Coded as 1 when there is evidence of a civilian effort not to participate in economic activities promoted or imposed by a group, such as the production of illegal crops, and 0 otherwise.

20. `soc_int`: Social intervention. Coded as 1 when civilians promote new, alternative, or dissident social norms that challenge an armed group's rule in a territory, and 0 otherwise.
21. `pol_int`: Political intervention. Coded as 1 when there is evidence of the civilian creation of self-government institutions aimed to control the public order in a territory, and 0 otherwise.
22. `eco_int`: Economic intervention. Coded as 1 when civilians promote new, alternative, or dissident economic practices or institutions in the territory that challenge the financial interest of an armed group, and 0 otherwise.
23. `protests`: Protests. Coded as 1 when a municipality reported at least two protests in a twelve-month period rejecting warring parties' actions in a municipality, condemning the horrors of war in general, denouncing a violent action that is typically associated with one of the warring parties (e.g., kidnapping with the insurgency), promoting a peace process, or rejecting policies that may benefit one of the armed groups.
24. `demonstrations`: Demonstrations. Coded as 1 when a municipality reported at least two demonstrations against the war, such as marches, funerals of conflict-related victims and magnicides, forums for peace and human rights, pilgrimages to war-affected areas, etc.
25. `direct_actions`: Direct nonviolent actions. Coded as 1 when a municipality reported at least two direct actions of nonviolent physical interventions that directly affect the operation of groups, such as nonviolent invasions, occupations, obstructions, etc.
26. `ua_groups`: Unilateral actions against combatants of armed groups. Coded as 1 when a self-defense organization of the municipality is engaged in violent actions against alleged members of a warring party operating in the territory, and 0 otherwise.
27. `ua_civilians`: Unilateral actions against civilians. Coded as 1 when a self-defense organization of the municipality is engaged in violent actions against alleged civilian supporters of a warring party operating in the territory, and 0 otherwise.
28. `terr_control`: Violent territorial control. Coded as 1 when a self-defense organization of the municipality is engaged in violent territorial control of the territory or patrolling, and 0 otherwise.
29. `clashes`: Clashes. Coded as 1 when a self-defense organization of the municipality is engaged in clashes with a warring party, and 0 otherwise.
30. `t_rebels`: Rebels as target of the campaign. Coded as 1 if an insurgent group was one of the targets of the campaign that year, and 0 otherwise.

31. t_state: State forces as target of the campaign. Coded as 1 if state forces were one of the targets of the campaign that year, and 0 otherwise.

32. t_progov: Paramilitaries as target of the campaign. Coded as 1 if a paramilitary group was one of the targets of the campaign that year, and 0 otherwise.

33. onset: Onset of the campaign. Coded as 1 when there is explicit and enough evidence that a civil campaign has started in that year. Two criteria guide this selection:

(a) At least one of the following tactics of resistance is reported for the first time in that year and territory: collective disobedience, physical nonviolent intervention, declaration of a territory as off the conflict, or violent control of territory.

(b) One of the following tactics is reported at least twice in that year for the first time: protests and demonstrations against the warring parties' behavior or presence in the territory, clashes with armed groups, or unilateral actions by civilians against warring parties' members or allegedly sympathizers in the territory.

Given that a campaign is defined as a process, the coder needs to decide whether there is enough evidence that the tactic regarding (a) tends to occur in a regular or frequent basis that year or the tactic regarding (b) occurs at least twice in a year.

34. active: Active campaign. Coded as 1 the years that the campaign operated or even the first two years after the last report of a campaign's tactics. This variable also takes the value of 1 the years of the onset and the decline of the campaign.

35. decline: Decline of the campaign. Coded as 1 Coded when there is evidence that the resistance campaign is no longer active or has transformed into a different phenomenon in that year. A campaign can decline under two circumstances:

(a) When it is not registered any resistance tactic for a period of three or more consecutive years in the municipality(s) in which the campaign took place.

(b) When there is enough evidence that the violent campaign transformed into a different type of organization.

The coder should register 'active' rather than 'decline' in two situations: (1) the first and second (consecutive) year in which it is not registered any resistance tactic; and (2) when a campaign splits and some civilians maintain the mobilization, while others decide to launch an armed group or being annexed to an existent organization.

36. decline_type: Type of decline of the campaign. It takes the following values:

'1. Suspension': Coded when a campaign declines for the criterion (a) in the previous variable and it is ambiguous whether the campaign is completely abandoned by civilians or not.

'2. Suppression': Coded when a campaign declines for the criterion (a) in the previous variable and there is evidence that civilians dismantled the organization(s)

associated with the campaign or publicly quit the mobilization, in both cases to appease one or both warring parties.

‘3. Transformation’: Coded when a campaign declines for the criterion (b) in the previous variable and there is evidence that leaders or members of the campaign decided to launch either a rebel group or a pro-government militia organization. A key difference with cooptation (explained below) is that the emerging group maintains its autonomy even if it shares similar ideologies or agendas with already-existent organizations.

‘4. Cooptation’: Coded when a campaign declines for the criterion (b) in the previous variable and there is evidence that the campaign is incorporated into an already-existent insurgent movement or counterinsurgent organization (either directly related to the state or a pro-government militia). In this case, the emergent organization depends on the leadership of another group.

37. *difficulty_greyzone*: Difficulty to code the campaign. It takes the following values:

‘1. Easy’ when the most important descriptive elements of a campaign (e.g., its year of creation, kind of tactics employed, etc.,) are clearly stated in the source and there is no major disagreement across sources.

‘2. Not so easy’ when some important descriptive elements of a campaign were not clearly stated by the source and the coder needed to infer from the contextual information provided by the source(s), but there is no major disagreement across sources.

‘3. Difficult’ when many important descriptive elements of a campaign are absent or there is some level of disagreement between the sources.

‘4. Very difficult’ when many important descriptive elements of a campaign are absent or there is some level of disagreement between the sources or there is a high level of disagreement between the sources and the coder needed to make a judgement call.

Note: The coder always provides a brief description of the elements of disagreement or lack of information and the reasons behind its final decision about the case.

38. *level_doc*: Level of documentation of the campaign. This variable describes the quantity rather than the quality of the documentation. It takes the following values:

‘1. Few’ when only one source documents the campaign.

‘2. Some’ when two or three sources documents the campaign.

‘3. Good enough’ when more than three sources document the campaign, but not too many.

‘4. Abundant’ when the campaign is broadly described by multiple sources.

39. *quality_sources*: Quality of the sources. This variable describes the quality rather than the quantity of the documentation. It takes the following values:

‘1. Low’ when the campaign is poorly documented by renown sources (e.g., listed in an inventory of campaigns without description of the campaign) or it is

exclusively documented by questionable sources (e.g., in social networks or informal blogs).

'2. More or less' when the campaign is documented by renown sources but not extensively.

'3. Good enough' when the campaign is well documented by renown sources such as newspapers, NGOs, foreign aid agencies, etc.

'4. High' when the campaign is extensively documented extensively by renown sources, including academic works.

10.2 Brief Description of Campaigns

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00001.

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Escopeteros, ACMM - Antioquia, Caldas, Tolima, Cundinamarca - led by Ramón Isaza.

Period: 1978-1984.

Location: Antioquia: Puerto Triunfo, San Francisco, etc. Caldas:, etc.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2020). *Isaza, el clan paramilitar. Las Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio*. CNMH.

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2016, February 29). Sentencia 110016000253201300146 [M.P: Jiménez, U.].

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2019). *El Estado Suplantado: las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá*.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00002

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Escopeteros - led by Gonzalo y Henry Pérez, Autodefensas Campesinas de Puerto Boyacá (ACPB)

Period: 1982 - 1985

Location: Boyaca: Puerto Boyaca. Caldas: La Dorada. Cundinamarca: Caparrapí, Pacho, Puerto Salgar, Yacopí. Antioquia: Puerto Triunfo, San Francisco, San Luis, Sonsón. Santander: Cimitarra.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2019). *El Estado Suplantado: las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá*. CNMH.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2020). *Autodefensas de Cundinamarca. Olvido estatal y violencia paramilitar en las provincias de Rionegro y Bajo Magdalena*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00003

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Autodefensas de San Juan del Bosco de la Verde, San Juaneros, Escopeteros, Autodefensas Campesinas del Chuchurí, Grillos

Period: 1981 - 1994

Location: Santander: Betulia, El Carmen de Chucurrí, San Vicente de Chucurrí, Santa Helena, Simacota, Zapatoca

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2019). *El modelo paramilitar de San Juan Bosco de la Verde y Chucurí*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00004

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Autodefensas de Vicente Zabala, Autodefensas Campesinas de Camilo Morantes, Autodefensas Campesinas de Santander, Autodefensas Unidas de Santander y Sur del Cesar (AUSAC)

Period: 1993 - 1996

Location: Santander: Sabana de Torres y Rionegro.

Sources:

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2015, April 10). Sentencia 110012252000201300069 [M.P: Jiménez, U.].

Unidad de Restitución de Tierras. (s.f.). *Documento de análisis para uso interno No. 11*.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00005

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Cheperos, El Grupo de Chepe Barrera, Autodefensas del Sur de Magdalena

Period: 1992 - 1999

Location: Magdalena: Ariguani, Chivolo, El Banco, Guamal, Pedraza, Pivijay, Plato, Sabanas de San Angel, San Sebastián de Buenavista, San Zenón.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (2004, December 4). El fin de unos paras de bajo perfil.
<http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1520517>

Verdad Abierta. (2018, September 8). *Autodefensas del sur del Magdalena e Isla de San Fernando* .<http://www.verdadabierta.com/victimarios/bloques-de-la-auc/239-autodefensas-del-sur-del-magdalena-e-isla-de-san-fernando>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00006

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Autodefensa de 'Rojo Atá' (led by alias 'Canario')

Period: 1986 - 1992

Location: Tolima: Ataco, Planadas, Río Blanco, San Antonio.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *De los grupos precursores al Bloque Tolima (AUC)*. CNMH.

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2017, December 7). Sentencia 110016000253201400103 [M.P: Jiménez, U.].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00007

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Contraaguerrillas led by Silvio Oliviera

Period: 1986 - 1991

Location: Tolima: Ataco.

Sources:

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2016, December 7). Sentencia 110016000253201400103 [M.P: Jiménez, U.].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00008

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Autodefensas Campesinas de Yacopí led by Cifuentes, alias 'Águila'

Period: 1992 - 1998

Location: Cundinamarca: Caparrapí, La Palma, Puerto Salgar, Yacopí.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2020). *Autodefensas de Cundinamarca. Olvido estatal y violencia paramilitar en las provincias de Rionegro y Bajo Magdalena*. CNMH.

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2014, September 1). Sentencia 110012252000201400019 [M.P: Castellanos, E.].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00009

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega

Period: 1978 - 2003

Location: Cauca: Cajibío.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2018). *Bloque Calima de las Auc. Depredación paramilitar y narcotráfico en el suroccidente colombiano*. CNMH.

Verdad Abierta. (2012, April 12). *Las autodefensas que antecedieron al Bloque Calima*. <https://verdadabierta.com/las-autodefensas-que-antecedieron-al-bloque-calima/>

Verdad Abierta. (2013, June 12). *El detonante de las Autodefensas de Ortega*. <https://verdadabierta.com/el-detonante-de-las-autodefensas-de-ortega/>

Tribunal Superior de Medellín, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2014, December 9). Sentencia 110016000253200682611 [M.P: Pinilla, R.].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00010

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Autodefensas Campesinas de El Dorado

Period: 1983 - 1986

Location: Meta: El Dorado.

Sources:

Unidad de Restitución de Tierras. (2018). *Contexto de Violencia en el municipio de El Dorado*.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2015). *Pueblos Arrasados. Memorias del desplazamiento forzado en El Castillo (Meta)*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00011

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare (ACC), Buitragueños, Autodefensas Campesinas Sur del Casanare (ASUC)

Period: 1979 - 1991

Location: Casanare: Aguazul, Chámeza, Moonterrey, Recetor, Tauramena.

Sources:

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2016, July 25). Sentencia 110016000253200783019 [M.P: Valencia, A.].

Verdad Abierta. (2010, April 7). *Héctor Buitrago*, *Tripas*. <https://verdadabierta.com/el-prontuario-de-hector-buitrago-fundador-de-las-autodefensas-del-casanare/>

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El Tiempo. (2004, July 25). En el corazón de la guerra paramilitar de los Llanos.. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1503142>

Arrázola, M. (2010, April 10). “El tripas”, en primera persona. *El Espectador*. <https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/el-tripas-en-primera-persona-articulo-197646/>

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Perez, B. (2007). El paramilitarismo en Cundinamarca y Bogotá, 1997-2006. In M. Romero (Ed.), *Parapolítica. La ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos* (pp. 59 - 108). Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris.

El Tiempo. (2004, May 4). El papá de los paras en Casanare da la cara.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1503142>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00012

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Convivir - Defensores de Yarumal, Valdivia, Angostura, y Campamento (Deyavanc), Grupo de los Pérez

Period: 1996 - 1997

Location: Antioquia: Angostura, Campamento, Valdivia, Yarumal.

Sources:

Corporación Jurídica Libertad. (2018). *Colombia nunca más. Extractivismo - Graves violaciones a los derechos humanos. Caso Hidroituango: una lucha por la memoria y contra la impunidad.*

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00013

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Doce Apóstoles

Period: 1992 - 1994

Location: Antioquia: Yarumal.

Sources:

Corporación Jurídica Libertad. (2018). *Colombia nunca más. Extractivismo - Graves violaciones a los derechos humanos. Caso Hidroituango: una lucha por la memoria y contra la impunidad.*

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2018, December 19). Sentencia 110012252000201400059 [M.P: Jiménez, U.].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00014

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Autodefensas de Saiza (Tierralta), Grupo de Defensa Civil

Period: 1984 - 1988

Location: Cordoba: Tierralta

Sources:

Tribunal Superior de Medellín, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2014, December 9). Sentencia 110016000253200682611 [M.P: Pinilla, R.].

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00015

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Grupo del Mono López

Period: 1988 - 1992

Location: Córdoba: Canalete, Los Córdoba, Moñitos, Montería, Puerto Escondido.
Antioquia: Arboletes,

Sources:

Archivo de los Derechos Humanos. (2017). *Entrevista Jose German Senna Pico*.

Tribunal Superior de Medellín, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2014, December 9). Sentencia 110016000253200682611 [M.P: Pinilla, R.].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00016

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comandos Populares - Esperanzados

Period: 1992 - 1994

Location: Antioquia: Apartado, Carepa, Necoclí, Turbo.

Sources:

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2013, October 30). Sentencia 1100160002532006810099 [M.P: Castellanos, E.].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00017

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Grupo de Autodefensa de Maicao - Clanes Wayuu

Period: 2003

Location: La Guajira: Maicao

Sources:

Ochoa, M. (2011). *Horror sin nombre: Impacto de la entrada de los paramilitares en territorio Wayú*. Ediciones Uniandes.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00018

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Grupo de Autodefensa de Uribia - Clanes Wayuu

Period: 2004

Location: La Guajira: Uribia

Sources:

Ochoa, M. (2011). *Horror sin nombre: Impacto de la entrada de los paramilitares en territorio Wayú*. Ediciones Uniandes.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00019

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: La Escopeta

Period: 1986 - 1994

Location: Antioquia: Andes, Angelópolis, Ciudad Bolívar, Concordia, Jardín, Titiribí.

Sources:

Gutiérrez-Sanín, F., & Vargas, J. (2017). Agrarian elite participation in Colombia's civil war. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 17(4), 739–748. <https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12235>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00020

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Convivir Las Garzas

Period: 1995 - 1996

Location: Antioquia: Venecia.

Sources:

López, C. (2016). El fenómeno paramilitar en Titiribí, Antioquia. In F. Gutiérrez-Sanín & J. Vargas (Eds.), *El despojo paramilitar y su variación: quiénes, cómo, por qué* (pp. 177-200). Editorial Universidad del Rosario.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00021

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: El Grupo de Disney Negrete Polo y 'Chillo' Calenge

Period: 1992 - 1994

Location: Córdoba: Monteria, Tierralta.

Sources:

Archivo de los Derechos Humanos. (2017). *Entrevista Jose German Senna Pico*.

Fiscalía General de la Nación. (2013). *Informe de Policía Judicial Nro. 1282*.

Martinez, T. (2018, November 24). *El guardaespaldas de Mancuso*. Verdad Abierta. <https://verdadabierta.com/el-prontuario-de-hector-buitrago-fundador-de-las-autodefensas-del-casanare/>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00022

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Escopeteros, ACMM - Antioquia, Caldas, Tolima, Cundinamarca - led by Mono Celín

Period: 1981 - 1984

Location: Antioquia: Sonsón

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2020). *Isaza, el clan paramilitar. Las Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio*. CNMH.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2019). *El Estado Suplantado: las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00023

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Escopeteros - led by alias Don Chepe

Period: 1980 - 1982

Location: Caldas: La Dorada

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2019). *El Estado Suplantado: las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá*. CNMH.

Barón, M. (2011). *Apogeo y caída de las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá: del paramilitarismo a los señores de la guerra en el Magdalena Medio* [Master 's thesis, Universidad Nacional de Colombia]. Universidad Nacional de Colombia Repository. <https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/56291>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00024

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Escopeteros - led by alias Don Pedro

Period: 1977 - 1983

Location: Cundinamarca: Yacopí.

Sources:

Barón, M. (2011). *Apogeo y caída de las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá: del paramilitarismo a los señores de la guerra en el Magdalena Medio* [Master 's thesis, Universidad Nacional de Colombia]. Universidad Nacional de Colombia Repository. <https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/56291>

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2020). *Isaza, el clan paramilitar. Las Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00025

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Junta de Acción Comunal - Núcleo Veredal de Autodefensa - led by Enrique Tobón, alias El Mocho

Period: 1981 - 1982

Location: Boyacá: Puerto Boyacá.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2019). *El Estado Suplantado: las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá*. CNMH.

Barón, M. (2011). *Apogeo y caída de las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá: del paramilitarismo a los señores de la guerra en el Magdalena Medio* [Master 's thesis, Universidad Nacional de Colombia]. Universidad Nacional de Colombia Repository. <https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/56291>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00026

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Escopeteros - led by Nelson Lesmes

Period: 1981 - 1982

Location: Boyacá: Puerto Boyacá.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2019). *El Estado Suplantado: las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá*. CNMH.

Barón, M. (2011). *Apogeo y caída de las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá: del paramilitarismo a los señores de la guerra en el Magdalena Medio* [Master 's thesis, Universidad Nacional de Colombia]. Universidad Nacional de Colombia Repository. <https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/56291>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00027

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Escopeteros - led by Santiago Giraldo

Period: 1982

Location: Santander: Cimitarra.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2019). *El Estado Suplantado: las autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00028

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Los Masetos - Led by Rodolfo Rivera Staper, Los de Riverandia

Period: 1988 - 1994

Location: Cesar: San Alberto.

Sources:

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2014, December 11). Sentencia 2006-80014 [M.P: González, L.].

El Tiempo. (2004, October 7). Sepultan a ex congresista asesinado en el Cesar. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-230086>

Counter, M. (2020). La restitución de tierras en el posconflicto colombiano, San Alberto, Cesar, Colombia (1985 - 2018). Story Maps.arcgis. <https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/0bd1c08fd2a246248ea15215a046ff53>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00029

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Grupo de Autodefensas de alias 'Manaure' (Carlos Arturo Marulanda)

Period: 1996 - 1998

Location: Cesar: Chiriguaná, Curumaní, La Gloria, Pelaya, Tamalameque.

Sources:

Tribunal Superior de Cartagena, Sala civil en descongestión especializada en restitución de tierras. (2018, June 26). Sentencia 20001-31-21-001-2017-00030-00 [M.P: Castellón, Y.].

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. (2014, December 11). Sentencia 2006-80014 [M.P: González, L.].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00030

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Autodefensa Nasa Wes'X, en el corregimiento de Gaitania de Planadas, 'Defensa Territorial'

Period: 1981 - 1996

Location: Tolima: Planadas.

Sources:

Barros, N. & Padilla, S. (2017). *Sentido y memoria del acuerdo de paz Nasa We'sx: la autonomía como posibilidad* [Undergraduate thesis, Universidad de Ibagué]. Universidad de Ibagué Repository. <https://repositorio.unibague.edu.co/jspui/handle/20.500.12313/1325>

Maldonado, J. (2015, March 2). *Wêtwêt fxi'zenxi: La guerra y la paz de una dinastía nasa*. Pacifista. <https://pacifista.tv/notas/wetwet-fxizenxi-la-guerra-y-la-paz-de-una-dinastia-nasa/>

Garzón, O. (2015, May 10). Donde los indígenas y las Farc lograron vivir en paz. *El Espectador*. <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia/mas-regiones/donde-los-indigenas-y-las-farc-lograron-vivir-en-paz-article-559748/>

El Tiempo. (2006, December 2). Paeces de Gaitania viven en la posguerra. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-2298217>

Jurado, J. (2015). *Esta paz ya es mayor de edad*. Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00031

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Grupos de Autodefensa - Comunidad Nasa

Period: 1978 - 1985

Location: Cauca: Corinto, Inzá, Jambaló, Páez, Santander de Quilichao, Toribío.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2015). *Guerra propia, guerra ajena. Conflictos armados y reconstrucción identitaria en los Andes colombianos. El movimiento armado Quintín Lame*. CNMH-IEPRI.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00032

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - La Libertad

Period: 2004

Location: Sucre: San Onofre.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2011). *Mujeres y guerra. Víctimas y resistentes en el Caribe colombiano*. Taurus.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00033

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare (ATCC)

Period: 1987 - 2005

Location: Santander: Cimitarra, Landazuri.

Sources:

Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2011). *El orden desarmado: la resistencia de la Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare (ATCC)*.

Hernández, E. (2004). *Resistencia civil artesana de paz. Experiencias indígenas, afrodescendientes y campesinas*. Editorial Universidad Javeriana.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00034

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó (CPSJA)

Period: 1997 - 2005

Location: Antioquia: Apartado.

Sources:

Hernández, E. (2004). *Resistencia civil artesana de paz. Experiencias indígenas, afrodescendientes y campesinas*. Editorial Universidad Javeriana.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00035

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comunidad de Autodeterminación, Vida y Dignidad (CAVIDA)

Period: 2000 - 2005

Location: Chocó: Riosucio.

Sources:

Burnyeat, G. (2013). On a Peak in Darien: Community Peace Initiatives in Urabá, Colombia. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, 5(3), 1–11.

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Rettberg, A. (2006). *Buscar la paz en medio del conflicto: Un propósito que no da tregua. Un estudio de las iniciativas de paz en Colombia (desde los años 90 hasta hoy)*. Editorial Universidad de los Andes.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00036

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Proceso Comunitario por la Vida, la Justicia y la Paz, Asamblea Constituyente Popular de Micoahumado

Period: 2002 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: Morales.

Sources:

Hernández, E. (2012). *Intervenir antes que anochezca. Mediaciones, intermediaciones y diplomacias no violentas de la base social en el conflicto armado colombiano.*

Tovar, C. (2015). *Subjetividad política para la vida: resistencia al desplazamiento forzado e intervención psi como potencia política en Micoahumado* [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad Javeriana]. Universidad Javeriana Repository. <https://repository.javeriana.edu.co/handle/10554/19128#.XTtAScrUNYc.mendley>

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Caraballo, V. (2011). Desminado social y comunitario de Micoahumado. In F. Sarmiento (Ed.), *Lecciones para la paz negociada. Retrospectiva histórica en Colombia* (pp. 209 - 222). Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular.

Bolívar, I. (2006). Transformaciones de la política: Movilización social, atribución causal y configuración del Estado en el Magdalena Medio. In *Conflictos, poderes e identidades en el Magdalena Medio, 1990 - 2001* (pp. 373 - 466). Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00037

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Proceso Constituyente Ciudadano por Tiquisio

Period: 2003 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: Tiquisíó.

Sources:

Saiz, M. (2016). *Memorias de Tiquisio, Bolívar: por la defensa de la vida y la permanencia en el territorio*. Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

Redepaz. (2014, December 18). 3. *Área territorialidad para la paz*. <http://www.redepaz.org.co/webanterior/index.php/shortcode/territorio-paz>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00038

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comunidad Viva de Pensilvania, Proyecto Pensilvania, Pensilvania Laboratorios de Paz

Period: 1997 - 2003

Location: Caldas: Pensilvania.

Sources:

Rueda, M. (2003). En *Estrategias civiles en medio del conflicto: los casos de las comunidades de Paz y de Pensilvania*. Editorial Universidad de los Andes.

Rettberg, A. (2006). *Buscar la paz en medio del conflicto: Un propósito que no da tregua. Un estudio de las iniciativas de paz en Colombia (desde los años 90 hasta hoy)*. Editorial Universidad de los Andes.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00039

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asociación de Juntas de Acción Comunal (ASOJUNTAS); Movimiento Cívico por la Vida y la Paz

Period: 1998 - 2005

Location: Caqueta: Cartagena del Chaira.

Sources:

Carroll, L. (2011). *Violent democratization: Social movements, elites, and politics in Colombia's rural war zones, 1984-2008*. University of Notre Dame Press.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *La tierra no basta. Colonización, baldíos, conflicto y organizaciones sociales en el Caquetá*. CNMH.

Verdad Abierta. (2013, September 28). *La guerra ahogó en sangre a la política*. <https://verdadabierta.com/la-guerra-ahogo-en-sangre-la-politica/>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00040

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil San Vicente del Caguán; Corporación Caguán Vive

Period: 2004 - 2005

Location: Caquetá: San Vicente del Caguán.

Sources:

Carroll, L. (2011). *Violent democratization: Social movements, elites, and politics in Colombia's rural war zones, 1984-2008*. University of Notre Dame Press.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00041

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Consulta Popular por la Paz

Period: 1995 - 1998

Location: Cesar: Aguachica.

Sources:

Rueda, M. (2003). En *Estrategias civiles en medio del conflicto: los casos de las comunidades de Paz y de Pensilvania*. Editorial Universidad de los Andes.

Verdad Abierta. (2015, September 4). *Aguachica: el modelo de paz que solo duró un año*. <https://verdadabierta.com/aguachica-el-modelo-de-paz-que-solo-duro-un-ano/>

Mendoza, M. (2015, August 23). *Aguachica, precursora de paz territorial*. *El Pílon*. <https://elpilon.com.co/aguachica-precursora-de-paz-territorial/>

Reyes, S & Durán, I. (2020, December 3). *Aguachica, 25 años de una apuesta por la vida y la paz*. *Hay Verdad Magdalena Medio, Comisión de la Verdad*. <https://comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/blogs/aguachica-25-anos-de-una-apuesta-por-la-vida-y-la-paz>

Rettberg, A. (2006). *Buscar la paz en medio del conflicto: Un propósito que no da tregua. Un estudio de las iniciativas de paz en Colombia (desde los años 90 hasta hoy)*. Editorial Universidad de los Andes.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00042

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asamblea Constituyente Municipal de Argentina

Period: 2004 - 2005

Location: Huila: La Argentina.

Sources:

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. (2008, September). Construyendo el territorio en el que se quiere vivir. *Hechos del Callejón*, 4(39), 9-12.

El Tiempo. (2002, april 8). Asesinan al párroco de La Argentina, Huila. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1316203>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00043

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Proceso Constituyente del Municipio de Rivera

Period: 2005

Location: Huila: Rivera.

Sources:

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. (2008, September). Construyendo el territorio en el que se quiere vivir. *Hechos del Callejón*, 4(39), 9-12.

RCN Radio. (2021, February 23). *15 años de la masacre de nueve concejales en Rivera*. <https://www.rcnradio.com/colombia/region-central/audio-15-anos-de-la-masacre-de-nueve-concejales-en-rivera-huila>

El Mundo. (2006, April 11). En Rivera votaron por la paz y la reconciliación. Mandato por la vida. *El Mundo*. <https://www.elmundo.com/portal/resultados/detalles/?idx=16378>

El Tiempo. (2004, August 11). El alcalde al que todos querían. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1592550>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00044

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Lejanías, Gestión con Participación Ciudadana de Lejanias

Period: 1997 - 1998

Location: Meta: Lejanías.

Sources:

Duplat, T. (2019). *Paz en la guerra: Reconciliación y Democracia en el Alto Ariari*. Siglo del Hombre Editores.

Sandoval, L. (2004). *La paz en movimiento, 1993-2003*. Instituto María Cano.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00045

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Territorio de Paz, Asamblea Constituyente de Samaniego Resistencia Civil

Period: 1997 - 2005

Location: Nariño: Samaniego.

Sources:

Masullo, J., Mouly, C. & Garrido, M. (2019). Alternative forms of civilian noncooperation with armed groups: the case of Samaniego in Colombia. In C.

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Garrido, M., Mouly, C. & Idler, A. (2016). Jiu-jitsu en contexto de conflicto armado: el poder de la resistencia no violenta. *Ciudad paz-ando*, 9(2), 155-167.

Garrido, M. & Mouly, C. (2018). No a la guerra: resistencia civil en dos comunidades periféricas en Colombia. *Desafíos*, 30(1), 245-277.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00046

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Organización Femenina Popular (OFP)

Period: 1995 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: San Pablo de Borbur. Antioquia: Yondo. Santander: Barrancabermeja, Puerto Wilches, Sabana de Torres

Sources:

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00047

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asamblea Constituyente Municipal de Mogotes

Period: 1997 - 2003

Location: Santander: Mogotes.

Sources:

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00048

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asamblea Constituyente de El Olival

Period: 2003

Location: Santander: Suaita.

Sources:

Rettberg, A. (2006). *Buscar la paz en medio del conflicto: Un propósito que no da tregua. Un estudio de las iniciativas de paz en Colombia (desde los años 90 hasta hoy)*. Editorial Universidad de los Andes.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00049

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Acuerdos de Paz' - Comunidad Indígena de la Gaitania

Period: 1994 - 2005

Location: Tolima: Planadas.

Sources:

Caviedes, M. (2007). *Paz y resistencias: Experiencias indígenas desde la autonomía*. Cecoin.

Jurado, J. (2015). *Esta paz ya es mayor de edad*. Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00050

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil Barrancabermeja; Coordinadora Popular; Credhos; Albergue Popular; Espacio de Trabajadores y Trabajadoras del Magdalena Medio

Period: 1988 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: Cantagallo, San Pablo de Borbur, Simití. Antioquia: Yondo. Santander: Barrancabermeja, El Carmen de Chucurí, Puerto Wilches, Sabana de Torres, San Vicente de Chucurí, Simacota.

Sources:

Van Isschot, L. (2015). *The Social Origins of Human Rights: protesting political violence in Colombia's oil capital, 1919-2010*. The University of Wisconsin Press.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *Memoria de la infamia. Desaparición forzada en el Magdalena Medio*. CNMH.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00051

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asamblea Constituyente Municipal de Hato, Tejedores de Paz, II Cumbre por la Paz del Hato

Period: 2000

Location: Santander: Hato.

Sources:

Rettberg, A. (2006). *Buscar la paz en medio del conflicto: Un propósito que no da tregua. Un estudio de las iniciativas de paz en Colombia (desde los años 90 hasta hoy)*. Editorial Universidad de los Andes.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00052

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Neutralidad de la comunidad retornada de El Salado; Mujeres Unidas de El Salado; Asociación de Desplazados de El Salado, Bolívar (Asodesbol)

Period: 2002 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: El Carmen de Bolívar.

Sources:

Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2009). *La Masacre de El Salado : Esa guerra no era nuestra*. Taurus.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00053

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Organización Wayuu Munsurrat - Mujeres Tejiendo Paz

Period: 2005

Location: La Guajira: Uribia.

Sources:

Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2009). *Memorias en tiempo de guerra*. Puntoaparte editores.

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Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2010). *La masacre de Bahía Portete: Mujeres Wayuu en la mira*. Taurus.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00054

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil Granada; Comisión Vida, Justicia y Paz; Comité Interinstitucional; Asociación por la Vida (Asovida)

Period: 1997 - 2005

Location: Antioquia: Granada.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Granada: memorias de guerra, resistencia y reconstrucción*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00055

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil Puerto Wilches; Comité Cívico por la Paz

Period: 1990 - 1999

Location: Santander: Puerto Wilches.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *Memoria de la infamia. Desaparición forzada en el Magdalena Medio*. CNMH.

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Tiempo, E. (1991b, July 22). Marcha de alcaldes por la paz.

El Tiempo. (1993a, March 3). Paro en Puerto Wilches. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-61031>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00056

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: El Pueblo de la Memoria Histórica en Agualinda

Period: 1996 - 2005

Location: Chocó: El Carmen de Atrato.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2018). *Memorias que germinan: Iniciativas de memoria histórica para narrar vivencias del conflicto armado en Colombia*. CNMH.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00057

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asambleas Municipales de Paz, Constituyente Regional del Oriente Antioqueño, Asamblea Constituyente Comunitaria de San Luís

Period: 1998 - 2005

Location: Antioquia: Abejorral, Alejandría, Argelia, Cocorná, Concepción, El Carmen de Viboral, Santuario, Granada, Guarne, Guatapé, La Ceja, La Unión, Marinilla, Nariño, Peñol, Retiro, Rionegro, San Carlos, San Francisco, San Luis, San Rafael, San Vicente, Sonsón.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Granada: memorias de guerra, resistencia y reconstrucción*. CNMH.

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Hincapié, S. (2008). *Democracia y poder constituyente: movimiento constituyente de Antioquia* Instituto Popular de Capacitación.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00058

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Concejo Comunitario Mayor de la Asociación Campesina Integral del Atrato (Cocomacia)

Period: 1996 - 2005

Location: Chocó: Bojayá, Medio Atrato, Quibdó. Antioquia: Murindó, Urrao, Vigía del Fuerte.

Sources:

Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2010). *Bojayá: La guerra sin límites*. Taurus.

Rettberg, A. (2006). *Buscar la paz en medio del conflicto: Un propósito que no da tregua. Un estudio de las iniciativas de paz en Colombia (desde los años 90 hasta hoy)*. Editorial Universidad de los Andes.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00059

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: CRIC, Zona Norte, Proyecto Nasa

Period: 1985 - 2005

Location: Cauca: Buenos Aires, Caldono, Caloto, Corinto, Inzá, Jambaló, Miranda, Páez, Piendamó, Santander de Quilichao, Silvia, Toribío, Totoró.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2012). *Nuestra vida ha sido nuestra lucha. Resistencia y memoria en el Cauca indígena*. Taurus.

Hernández, E. (2004). *Resistencia civil artesana de paz. Experiencias indígenas, afrodescendientes y campesinas*. Editorial Universidad Javeriana.

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- El Liberal. (2004, September 19). La marcha fue un éxito de paz. 3B.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00060

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: CRIC, Resistencia Civil Caldono

Period: 2001 - 2005

Location: Cauca: Caldono.

Sources:

- Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2012). *Nuestra vida ha sido nuestra lucha. Resistencia y memoria en el Cauca indígena*. Taurus.
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- El Liberal. (1997, May 4). Caldono sería zona neutral. 11.
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Peñaranda, R. (2006). Resistencia y autonomía. In F. Gutiérrez-Sanín, M. Wills, & G. Sánchez (Eds.), *Nuestra guerra sin nombre. Transformaciones del conflicto en Colombia* (p. 543). Editorial Norma.

García-Peña, D. (2001, November 25). Pacíficos, pero no pasivos. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-693124>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00061

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Puracé

Period: 2001

Location: Cauca: Puracé.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

El Tiempo. (2001, April 8). Caminata por el Puracé.

Rivas, E., & Hurtado, R. (2002, January 6). La resistencia civil, a prueba. *El Espectador*.

El Liberal. (2001, December 20). A ritmo de chirimía. 6B.

Villota, A. (2001, April 4). Triunfa la vida. *El Liberal*, 2A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00062

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comunidades de Paz de Riosucio: Comunidad de Paz de San Francisco; Comunidad de Paz de Natividad de María; Comunidad de Paz, Nuestra Señora del Carmen, Comunidad de la Cuenca Ancestral del Río Jiguamiandó

Period: 1998 - 2003

Location: Chocó: Riosucio, Mutatá.

Sources:

Hernández, E., & Salazar, M. (1999). *Con la esperanza intacta: experiencias comunitarias de resistencia civil no violenta*. Oxfam.

García, C. I., Aramburo, C. I., & Domínguez, J. C. (2016). Orden social y conflicto en noroccidente de Colombia. Nariño (Antioquia), Riosucio (Chocó) y San Pedro de Urabá, 1991-2010. *Sociedad y Economía*, 30, 353–374. <https://doi.org/10.25100/sye.v0i30.3912>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00063

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asociación Indígena Embera - Wuounaan (ASOREWA)

Period: 1996 - 2005

Location: Chocó: Acandí, Alto Baudó, Bagadó, Bahía Solano, Bajo Baudó, Carmen del Darién, El Carmen de Atrato, El Litoral del San Juan, Juradó, Lloró, Medio Atrato, Nóvita, Nuquí, Quibdó, Riosucio, Unguía.

Sources:

Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2010). *Bojayá: La guerra sin límites*. Taurus.

Flóres, J. (2007). *Autonomía indígena en Chocó*. Editorial Nuevo Milenio.

Ministerio del Interior. (2004). *Plan Salvaguarda para el pueblo Embera de la Asociación Orewa del departamento del Chocó*.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00064

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asociación Campesina del Valle del Río Cimitarra (ACVC)

Period: 1996 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: Cantagallo, San Pablo de Borbur, Santa Rosa del Sur, Simití. Antioquia: Remedios, Segovia, Yondó. Santander: Barrancabermeja.

Sources:

Silva, D. (2011). *Asociaciones campesinas en resistencia civil: construcción de paz y desarrollo en el Magdalena Medio*. Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios.

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Hurtatis, H. (2012). *La Asociación Campesina del Valle del Río Cimitarra como mecanismo de resistencia política a los proyectos latifundistas en el Magdalena Medio (2006-2010)*. [Undergraduate thesis, Universidad del Rosario]. Universidad del Rosario Repository. <https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/3027/1020735538-2012.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y>"

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00065

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Consejo de Conciliación y Desarrollo Social de San Luis

Period: 1996 - 2003

Location: Antioquia: San Luis.

Sources:

Madrid, E., Lopera, L., & Ruiz, L. (2020). *Un pueblo que se juntó para salvar vidas en la guerra: Consejo de conciliación y desarrollo social de San Luis, Antioquia*. Instituto Universitario Colegio Mayor de Antioquia.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00066

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Región Naya, Unidad Territorial Interétnica del Río Naya

Period: 2001 - 2005

Location: Cauca: Buenos Aires, López. Valle del Cauca: Buenaventura.

Sources:

García, P., & Jaramillo, E. (2008). *The Colombian Pacific. The case of the Naya: territorial uprooting of indigenous, peasant and Afro-descendent populations as a war objective*. International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs and the Colectivo de Trabajo Jenzera.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00067

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Pacto por la Paz y la Reconciliación entre El Castillo y El Dorado, Asociación de Municipios del Alto Ariari (AMA); Programa de Desarrollo del Alto Ariari

Period: 1998 - 2003

Location: Meta: Cubarral, El Castillo, El Dorado, Fuente de Oro, Guamal, Lejanías.

Sources:

Duplat, T. (2019). *Paz en la guerra: Reconciliación y Democracia en el Alto Ariari*. Siglo del Hombre Editores.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2015). *Pueblos Arrasados. Memorias del desplazamiento forzado en El Castillo (Meta)*. CNMH.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00068

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil del Nordeste Antioqueño; Corporación Comité de Damnificados de Segovia y Remedios 'Once de Noviembre', Comité de Derechos Humanos de Segovia y Remedios

Period: 1984 - 1997

Location: Antioquia: Amalfi, Remedios, Segovia, Vegachí, Yolombó, Zaragoza.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2014). *Silenciar la democracia. La masacre de Remedios y Segovia, 1982 - 1997* (2nd ed.). CNMH.

Equipo Nizkor. (2001). *Colombia Nunca Más. Crímenes de lesa humanidad zona 14*. <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/libros/nm/index.html>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00069

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asociación Campesina del Centro del Valle (Acaceva)

Period: 1997 - 2000

Location: Valle del Cauca: Bugalagrande, Riofrío, San Pedro, Tuluá.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2014). *“Patrones” y campesinos: tierra, poder y violencia en el Valle del Cauca (1960 - 2012)*. CNMH.

El Tiempo. (1997, July 8). Los campesinos piden evitar la criminalización. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-641765>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00070

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comité de Integración Social del Catatumbo (Cisca)

Period: 2004 - 2005

Location: Norte de Santander: Abrego, Convención, El Carmen, El Tarra, Hacarí, La Playa, Ocaña, San Calixto, Sardinata, Teorama, Tibú.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2018). *Catatumbo: memorias de vida y dignidad*. CNMH.

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Guerrero, K. (2019). *Heredar la lucha y construir la paz: acción colectiva juvenil del Cisca en el Catatumbo*. [Undergraduate thesis, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana].

Cifuentes, S. (2018). *Buen vivir en Colombia, una apuesta de vida desde el campesinado catatumbero*. [Master 's thesis, Universidad Santo Tomas de Aquino].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00071

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asociación de Mujeres del Oriente Antioqueño (AMOR)

Period: 1997 - 2005

Location: Antioquia: Abejorral, Alejandría, Argelia, Cocorná, Concepción, El Carmen de Viboral, El Santuario, Granada, Guarne, Guatapé, La Ceja, La Unión, Marinilla, Nariño, Peñol, Retiro, Rionegro, San Carlos, San Francisco, San Luis, San Rafael, San Vicente, Sonsón.

Sources:

Londoño, N., Marín, T., & Alzate, G. (2005). *Una fuerza multicolor. Organización y participación de mujeres -Asociación Regional de Mujeres del Oriente- A.M.OR.* Alberdía.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Granada: memorias de guerra, resistencia y reconstrucción.* CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00072

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comité de Integración del Macizo Colombiano (CIMA), Tulpas por la Vida

Period: 1991 - 2005

Location: Cauca: Almaguer, Argelia, Bolívar, Cajibío, La Sierra, La Vega, Patía, San Sebastián, Santa Rosa, Timbío.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2012). *Nuestra vida ha sido nuestra lucha. Resistencia y memoria en el Cauca indígena.* Taurus.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Comité de Integración del Macizo Colombiano & Fundación del Suroccidente Colombiano. (2017). *Crecer como un río. Jornaliando cuesta arriba por vida digna, integración regional y desarrollo propio del Macizo Colombiano, Cauca, Nariño Y Colombia.* CNMH.

El Tiempo. (2001a, May 15). Caucanos marchan por la vida.

El Tiempo. (2001b, May 16). En pie contra la violencia.

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Bohorquez, G. (1993, March 7). Primer Cabildo por la Vida. *El Liberal*, 1, 2.

El Liberal. (1994, April 10). Cabildo por la Vida y contra la impunidad. 2A.

Arévalo, L. (2000, July 15). En marcha por la paz. *El Liberal*, 3A.

Espinel, A. (2001, May 16). Un mar de gente, una idea de paz. *El Liberal*, 8A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00073

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asociación Cívica para la Paz (ASOCIPAZ); Movimiento de 'No al Despeje'

Period: 2000 - 2001

Location: Bolívar: Cantagallo, Morales, San Pablo de Borbur, Santa Rosa del Sur, Simití. Boyacá: Puerto Boyacá. Cesar: Aguachica. Antioquia: Taraza, Yondo. Santander: Puerto Wilches, Sabana de Torres.

Sources:

Prada, E. (2006). Las luchas campesinas en el Magdalena Medio, 1990-2001. In *Conflictos, poderes e identidades en el Magdalena Medio, 1990 - 2001* (pp. 165 - 242). Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *Memoria de la infamia. Desaparición forzada en el Magdalena Medio*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00074

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comité Cívico para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos del Meta

Period: 1991 - 1996

Location: Meta: Granada, Mesetas, Villavicencio, Vista Hermosa.

Sources:

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00075

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Alianza departmental de Organizaciones de Mujeres del Putumayo, 'Tejedoras de Vida'; Resistencia de Mujeres - Bajo Putumayo

Period: 1996 - 2005

Location: Putumayo: Mocoa, Orito, Puerto Caicedo, San Miguel, Valle de Guamuez.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2012). *El placer: mujeres, coca y guerra en el Bajo Putumayo*. CNMH.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00076

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asociación Comunal Olvidada de los Montes de María (ACOMM)

Period: 2003 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: El Carmen de Bolívar, San Jacinto, Chalán, Coloso, Ovejas.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *Un bosque de memoria viva, desde la alta montaña de El Carmen de Bolívar*. CNMH.

Muñoz, L. (2003, March 14). Dejemos volver a ser campesinos. *El Tiempo*.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00077

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Malokas - Espacios Protegidos del Sur de Cesar en Puerto Patiño y en la Serranía de Perijá (Aguachica y La Gloria)

Period: 2003 - 2005

Location: Cesar: Aguachica, La Gloria.

Sources:

Barreto, M. (2012). *Laboratorios de paz en territorios de violencia(s): ¿abriendo caminos para la paz positiva en Colombia?* [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Coimbra]. <https://goo.gl/q1rwly>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00078

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia del Consejo Comunitario del Río Cajambre

Period: 2002

Location: Valle del Cauca: Buenaventura.

Sources:

Bermúdez, R. (2009). Gobernabilidad y control territorial en el Pacífico colombiano. In *Territorios y poblaciones en disputa* (pp. 21–44). Editorial Universidad Icesi.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00079

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comité Todos Unidos por la Vida y la Paz de Murindó

Period: 1997 - 2004

Location: Antioquia: Murindó.

Sources:

Inter Press Service. (2004, July 21). *Derechos Humanos - Colombia: el grito de Murindó*. <https://ipsnoticias.net/2004/07/derechos-humanos-colombia-el-grito-de-murindo/>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00080

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asociación Municipal de Mujeres de Buenos Aires

Period: 2005

Location: Cauca: Buenos Aires.

Sources:

Carabalí, C. (2019, May 23). Valentía. *El Tiempo*.
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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00081

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Empresa Comunitaria San Rafael

Period: 1993 - 1997

Location: Sucre: Ovejas.

Sources:

García, A., Vega, J., Montero, P., Velásquez, C., & Segrera, Y. (2010). Buenas prácticas para superar el conflicto: El caso de los Montes de María. In R. González & A. Mason (Eds.), *Colombia y el hemisferio frente al nuevo orden global*. Ediciones Uninorte.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00082

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil Pueblo Misak, Autoridades Indígenas del Suroccidente Colombiano

Period: 1984 - 2003

Location: Cauca: Silvia.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2012). *Nuestra vida ha sido nuestra lucha. Resistencia y memoria en el Cauca indígena*. Taurus.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00083

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Consejo de Paz de Nátaga

Period: 2000

Location: Huila: Nataga.

Sources:

Fundación Ideas para la Paz. (2016). *Consejos Municipales de Paz*. <https://www.ideaspaz.org/especiales/consejos-paz/consejos-municipales.html>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00084

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Asamblea Constituyente Comunitaria de Caicedo

Period: 2002 - 2005

Location: Antioquia: Caicedo.

Sources:

Hincapié, S. (2008). *Democracia y poder constituyente: movimiento constituyente de Antioquia* Instituto Popular de Capacitación.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00085

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comunidad de Vida y Trabajo El Paraíso

Period: 1999 - 2005

Location: Antioquia: Dabeiba.

Sources:

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Gutiérrez, S. (2019, December 20). *Las memorias de Dabeiba: en busca de la felicidad.* Contagio Radio. <https://www.contagioradio.com/las-memorias-de-dabeiba-en-busca-de-la-verdad/>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00086

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Organización Indígena de Antioquia (OIA)

Period: 1987 - 2005

Location: Antioquia: Apartadó, Arboletes, Carepa, Chigorodó, Dabeiba, Murindó, Mutatá, Necoclí, San Juan de Urabá, Turbo, Vigía del Fuerte.

Sources:

Salazar, M. (1999). La neutralidad activa de la organización indígena de Antioquia. In E. Hernández & M. Salazar, *Con la esperanza intacta: experiencias comunitarias de resistencia civil no violenta.* Oxfam.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00087

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Pueblo Koreguaje (Criomic)

Period: 1997

Location: Caqueta: Milan, Solano.

Sources:

Organización Indígena de Colombia (ONIC). (2013). *Experiencias de gestión de paz de las comunidades indígenas*. Bogotá: ONIC.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00088

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Consejo Permanente por la Vida, la Justicia, y la Paz de Alto Arenal; Espacio Campesino Humanitario para la Soberanía, la Paz, y el Desarrollo Integral

Period: 2003 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: Arenal, Río Viejo.

Sources:

Barreto, M. (2012). *Laboratorios de paz en territorios de violencia(s): ¿abriendo caminos para la paz positiva en Colombia?* [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Coimbra]. <https://goo.gl/q1rwly>

Programa de la Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. (2008). *Rutas, caminos y experiencias de nuestra gente del Magdalena Medio*. Pro-offset Editorial S.A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00089

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Espacio Humanitario en Ciénaga del Opón; Plan de Desarrollo Integral para la Paz

Period: 2003 - 2005

Location: Santander: Barrancabermeja.

Sources:

Barreto, M. (2012). *Laboratorios de paz en territorios de violencia(s): ¿abriendo caminos para la paz positiva en Colombia?* [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Coimbra]. <https://goo.gl/q1rw1y>

Programa de la Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. (2008). *Rutas, caminos y experiencias de nuestra gente del Magdalena Medio*. Pro-offset Editorial S.A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00090

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Espacio Humanitario del Bajo Peñón; Comunidades de Borrosco, Carare Opón, Miralindo, Plan de armas, San Ignacio, Río Blanco, la India del municipio de Landázuri y Bajo Peñón del municipio de Peñón

Period: 2003 - 2005

Location: Santander: El Peñón.

Sources:

Barreto, M. (2012). *Laboratorios de paz en territorios de violencia(s): ¿abriendo caminos para la paz positiva en Colombia?* [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Coimbra]. <https://goo.gl/q1rw1y>

Programa de la Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. (2008). *Rutas, caminos y experiencias de nuestra gente del Magdalena Medio*. Pro-offset Editorial S.A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00091

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comunidades de Carare Opón, Miralindo, Plan de armas, San Ignacio y Río Blanco, del municipio de Landázuri

Period: 2003 - 2005

Location: Santander: Landázuri.

Sources:

Barreto, M. (2012). *Laboratorios de paz en territorios de violencia(s): ¿abriendo caminos para la paz positiva en Colombia?* [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Coimbra]. <https://goo.gl/q1rw1y>

Programa de la Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. (2008). *Rutas, caminos y experiencias de nuestra gente del Magdalena Medio*. Pro-offset Editorial S.A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00092

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Espacios Humanitarios de la Ciudadela Educativa y las Comunas 4, 5, 6, y 7

Period: 1997 - 2005

Location: Santander: Barrancabermeja.

Sources:

Barreto, M. (2012). *Laboratorios de paz en territorios de violencia(s): ¿abriendo caminos para la paz positiva en Colombia?* [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Coimbra]. <https://goo.gl/q1rwly>

Programa de la Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. (2008). *Rutas, caminos y experiencias de nuestra gente del Magdalena Medio*. Pro-offset Editorial S.A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00093

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Comisión de Interlocución del Sur de Bolívar

Period: 2004 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: Arenal, El Peñón, Montecristo, Morales, Norosí, San Pablo de Borbur, Santa Rosa del Sur, Simití, Tiquisio.

Sources:

Barreto, M. (2012). *Laboratorios de paz en territorios de violencia(s): ¿abriendo caminos para la paz positiva en Colombia?* [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Coimbra]. <https://goo.gl/q1rwly>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00094

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Movimiento Social de la Cordillera Occidental de Nariño (o del Patía)

Period: 2004 - 2005

Location: Nariño: Cumbitara, El Rosario, El Tambo, Leiva, Los Andes, Policarpa, Taminango.

Sources:

Barreto, M. (2012). *Laboratorios de paz en territorios de violencia(s): ¿abriendo caminos para la paz positiva en Colombia?* [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Coimbra]. <https://goo.gl/qlrwly>

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00095

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Medellín; Comité de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de Antioquia (CDDHA)

Period: 1982 - 2004

Location: Antioquia: Medellín.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *Medellín: memorias de una guerra urbana*. CNMH.

Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2011). *Desplazamiento forzado en la comuna 13: La huella invisible de la guerra*. Taurus.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00096

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Corporación de Madres de la Candelaria

Period: 1999 - 2005

Location: Antioquia: Medellín.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *Medellín: memorias de una guerra urbana*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00097

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Eje Bananero de Urabá

Period: 1987 - 1995

Location: Antioquia: Apartadó, Carepa, Chigorodó, Turbo.

Sources:

Carroll, L. (2011). *Violent democratization: Social movements, elites, and politics in Colombia's rural war zones, 1984-2008*. University of Notre Dame Press.

Ramirez, G. (1988, September 15). Paro cívico en Urabá. *El Tiempo*, 8A.

El Tiempo. (1988, December 5). Decretan 48 horas de paro en Urabá. 9C.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00098

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Sindicatos del Cemento del Magdalena Medio

Period: 1986 - 1993

Location: Antioquia: Caracolí, Puerto Nare.

Sources:

Delgado, Á. (2006). El conflicto laboral en el Magdalena Medio. In *Conflictos, poderes e identidades en el Magdalena Medio, 1990 - 2001* (pp. 85 - 130). Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular.

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- El Tiempo. (1988b, February 21). Grave crisis en cementos; el lunes paran 9 fábricas. 9A.
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- El Tiempo. (1992, July 9). Paro indefinido en cementos Nare. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-153641>
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- Voz Proletaria. (1987, May 14-20). Puerto Nare rechaza a los sicarios. 11.
- Voz Proletaria. (1993, May 6-12). Siguen los crímenes y la impunidad. 10.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00099

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Región Sarare

Period: 1986 - 2005

Location: Arauca: Arauca, Arauquita, Fortul, Saravena, Tame.

Sources:

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- El Tiempo. (2002, December 24). Protesta paraliza a caño limón.
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Voz Proletaria, 14.
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- Voz Proletaria. (1987a, January 1-15). Los nuevos aletazos del “Plan Cóndor.” 4.
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- Voz Proletaria. (1989a, October 5-11). El crimen del obispo de Arauca, provocación contra la paz. 20.
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- Voz Proletaria. (1993a, May 6-12). Denuncias ante Procuraduría y Defensoría. 15.
- Voz Proletaria. (1993b, September 16-22). Militares en el banquillo. 9.
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Voz Proletaria, 6.

Voz Proletaria. (1998, April 1-14). Asesinado alcalde de Fortul. 6.

Voz Proletaria. (1999, January 13-26). Objetivo: la población civil. 6.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00100

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - San Vicente del Chucurí

Period: 1987 - 1993

Location: Santander: El Carmen de Chucurí, San Vicente de Chucurí.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *Memoria de la infamia. Desaparición forzada en el Magdalena Medio*. CNMH.

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El Tiempo. (1993, March 16). San Vicente pide paz.
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Voz Proletaria. (1991, June) 30-05. Tregua multilateral. 10.

Voz Proletaria. (1992, January 23-29). Campesinos integran movimiento cívico. 13.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00101

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Unions Palm Industry in San Alberto

Period: 1990 - 1992

Location: Cesar: San Alberto.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2018). *Y a la vida por fin daremos todo... Memorias de las y los trabajadores y extrabajadores de la agroindustria de la palma de aceite en el Cesar. 1950-2018*. CNMH.

El Tiempo. (1988, April 14). Preven pronto acuerdo para levantar paro en Indupalma. 8C.

Voz Proletaria. (1990, November 1-7). Racha criminal contra líderes. 11.

Voz Proletaria. (1986, July 10-16). Vuelve el paro cívico. 23.

Voz Proletaria. (1992, October 1-7). Con la oposición del gobierno siguen diálogos. 10.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00102

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Bolivar

Period: 2001

Location: Cauca: Bolívar.

Sources:

El Liberal. (2001, December 2). Bolsiverdes evitaron otro ataque al pueblo. 1.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00103

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Ciénaga

Period: 1994 - 1998

Location: Magdalena: Ciénaga.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1994a, February 22). Concejo de Ciénaga se declara en receso. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-51468>

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Perez, T. (1998, April 2). Comerciantes cerraron sus puertas en Ciénaga. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-757569>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00104

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: CRIC - Zona Tierradentro, Asociación de Cabildos 'Juan Tama'; 'Comité Municipal de Mujeres de Inzá'

Period: 2001 - 2004

Location: Cauca: Inzá

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

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El Liberal. (2004, September 24). Mujeres de Inzá alzan sus voces. 8A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00105

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Pueblo Yanacona

Period: 1994

Location: Cauca: Sotara.

Sources:

Ministerio del Interior. (2012). *Plan de salvaguarda del Pueblo Yanacona*.
http://siic.mininterior.gov.co/sites/default/files/p.s_yanacona.pdf

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00106

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Comunidades Reasentadas Batata & Saiza; Territorios de Paz

Period: 2004

Location: Córdoba: Tierralta.

Sources:

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00107

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Embera Katío

Period: 1999 - 2001

Location: Córdoba: Tierralta.

Sources:

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00108

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Esquina Sur del Tolima

Period: 2004 - 2005

Location: Tolima: Chaparral, Río Blanco.

Sources:

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00109

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Sur del Casanare

Period: 2003 - 2005

Location: Casanare: Aguazul, Monterrey, Tauramena.

Sources:

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00110

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Puerto Boyacá

Period: 1983 - 1992

Location: Boyacá: Puerto Boyacá.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1986, September 26). Hoy, marchas de la UP. 10B.

Molina, M. (1986, September 27). Campesinos piden regreso del Ejército. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

Osorio, C. (1987, November 17). Con pañuelos blancos reciben cadáver de Pablo E. Guarín. *El Tiempo*, 14A.

Moreno, J. (1987, August 17). Multitudinaria manifestación anti subversiva en Cimitarra. *El Tiempo*, 16B.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00111

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Región de Sumapaz & Tequendama

Period: 1991 - 2003

Location: Cundinamarca: Cabrera, Fusagasugá, Viotá.

Sources:

Defensoría del Pueblo. (2017). *Informe de riesgo No. 039-17 A.I.*

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Voz Proletaria. (1993a, May 20-26). Montaje militar en Viotá. 14.

Voz Proletaria. (1993b, October 14-20). No hubo pánico mudo. 7.

Voz Proletaria. (1994a, November 17-23). Foro Regional de Paz. 14.

- Voz Proletaria. (1994b, August 25-31). Proponen a Sumapaz para sede de diálogos. 15.
- Voz Proletaria. (1994c, January 13-19). Asesinado activista de la UP. 6.
- Voz Proletaria. (1994d, August 4-10). Rechazo a la violencia. 16.
- Voz Proletaria. (1995, June 31-06). Sumapaz está por la paz. 6.
- Voz Proletaria. (1997, December 3-9). Gobierno no actúa para impedir masacres. 5.
- Voz Proletaria. (1998, March 4-10). Sumapaz defiende su reserva de agua. 11.
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- Voz Proletaria. (2000b, October 18-24). Detener la militarización. 9.
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- Voz Proletaria. (2002, February 13-19). Por el diálogo, la paz y el desarrollo. 5.
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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00112

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - San José del Guaviare

Period: 1986 - 1988

Location: Guaviare: San José del Guaviare.

Sources:

- Falla, A. (1986a, September 24). Cinco mil campesinos inician marcha de protesta a Bogotá. *El Tiempo*, 15A.
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Voz Proletaria. (1988, October 20-26). Piden liberar a dirigente comunista Nicolás Roa. 21.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00113

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Calamar

Period: 1988

Location: Guaviare: Calamar.

Sources:

Torres, J., Gómez, L., Fajardo, D., Salamanca, D., Grillo, M., Cubides, J., Daza, M., Vergara, T., Ortiz, D., Valencia, L., Pacheco, A., Jaramillo, J., & Torres, J. (2017). El vuelo de las gaviotas: memorias de colonización y resistencias negras y campesinas en el Guaviare. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana/Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica/Consejo Comunitario Laureano Narciso Moreno. Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana & CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00114

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Soledad

Period: 1999

Location: Atlántico: Soledad.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1999a, July 13). Apoyo a la paz.

El Tiempo. (1999b, October 25). Más que una simple coincidencia.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00115

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Bajo Putumayo

Period: 1990 - 2001

Location: Putumayo: Orito, Puerto Asís, Valle de Guamuez, Villagarzón.

Sources:

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El Tiempo. (1998a, June 3). Campesinos llevan seis días en la Defensoría del Pueblo.

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El Tiempo. (2000, November 3). Putumayo se levanta. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1257037>

Voz Proletaria. (2001, January 17-23). Solo el diálogo ilumina el camino de la vida. 7.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00116

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Paz de Ariporo

Period: 1986

Location: Casanare: Paz de Ariporo.

Sources:

Voz Proletaria. (1986a, October 2-8). Convocan encuentro por el derecho a la vida. 21.

Voz Proletaria. (1986b, November 31-05). Foro por la paz y contra el militarismo. 9.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00117

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Mocoa

Period: 1991 -1992

Location: Putumayo: Mocoa.

Sources:

Comisión Andina de Juristas. (1993). *Informes regionales de derechos humanos Putumayo*.

El Tiempo. (1991, January 26). Muertos 4 guerrilleros disidentes del EPL. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-14905>

Parra, E. (1991, January 15). Farc asedian a Putumayo. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-9918>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00118

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Yumbo

Period: 1985 - 1989

Location: Valle del Cauca: Yumbo.

Sources:

Voz Proletaria. (1985, October 3-9). Sicarios asesinan dirigente comunista. 8.

Voz Proletaria. (1986, December 18-24). Con luto en sus filas, termina el año el movimiento sindical. 10.

El Tiempo. (1988a, February 4). Paro por asesinato de trabajador. 11A.

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El Liberal. (2004, September 17). La marcha fue un éxito de paz. 3B.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00119

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Jamundi

Period: 1987 - 2000

Location: Valle del Cauca: Jamundí.

Sources:

Acevedo, A. (1987, February 19-25). Enormes manifestaciones exigen derecho a la vida. *Voz Proletaria*, 1, 12, 13.

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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00120

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Líbano

Period: 2002 - 2004

Location: Tolima: Líbano.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (2002, September 13). Marcha del silencio. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1326039>

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El Tiempo. (2004b, April 23). Jornada de protesta.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00121

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Icononzo

Period: 1987

Location: Tolima: Icononzo.

Sources:

Voz Proletaria. (1987a, February 5-11). Icononzo aboga por la convivencia civilizada. 21.

Voz Proletaria. (1987b, April 26-1). Culminó exitoso foro por la paz. 21.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00122

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Dolores

Period: 1987 - 2002

Location: Tolima: Dolores.

Sources:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

Voz Proletaria. (1987a, January 15-21). Repudio a crimen contra dirigente cívico. 24.

Voz Proletaria. (1987b, September 24-30). 1.500 campesinos se toman Dolores. 11.

Sánchez, A. (1987, September 18). Solución en Dolores. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00123

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Cajamarca

Period: 2003 - 2004

Location: Tolima: Cajamarca.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (2003, August 29). Excesos en la operación Pijao.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1005630>

Voz Proletaria. (2003, November 19-25). Masacre en el Tolima. 9.

El Tiempo. (2004a, April 20). Protesta por Cajamarca.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1549793>

El Tiempo. (2004b, April 23). Jornada de protesta.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00124

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Chiquinquirá

Period: 1999 - 2001

Location: Boyacá: Chiquinquirá.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1999, October 22). Resumen.
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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00125

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Duitama

Period: 1999 - 2000

Location: Boyacá: Duitama.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1999a, August 1). Colombia esta semana.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-922326>

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<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1291178>

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<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1269303>

El Tiempo. (2000c, January 28). Oliverio amigo, Duitama está contigo.

El Tiempo. (2000d, January 29). Marcha del deporte.
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ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00126

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Sogamoso

Period: 1999 - 2000

Location: Boyacá: Sogamoso.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1999, October 22). Resumen.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-893473>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00127

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Labranzagrande

Period: 2001 - 2002

Location: Boyacá: Labranzagrande.

Sources:

Corporación Cospacc. (2014, December 20). *Masacre en el páramo de la Sarna*. Trochando Sin Fronteras. <https://trochandosinfronteras.info/trampas-de-la-crisis-de-la-educacion-en-colombia-2/>

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<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-711432>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00128

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - El Tambo

Period: 1996 - 2002

Location: Cauca: El Tambo.

Sources:

El Liberal. (1996, October 31). En el Tambo quieren encontrar la paz. 2A.

El Liberal. (1997, March 12). Clamando por la paz. 3B.

El Liberal. (2001a, August 21). Unidos por la paz. 2A.

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Villota, A. (2001, November 13). Canto a la vida. *El Liberal*, 3A.

El Liberal. (2002, July 9). Territorio de Paz. 8A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00129

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Región Central del Cesar

Period: 1987 - 1993

Location: Cesar: Becerril, Curumaní, La Jagua de Ibirico, Pailitas.

Sources:

Apieza, P. (1987, June 6). Empieza la movilización en el Cesar. *El Tiempo*, 12A.

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El Tiempo. (1990b, July 14). Los campesinos y los indígenas de Becerril vuelven a sus parcelas. 2C.

Oviedo, A. (1992, September 5). La Jagua de Ibirico marchó en paz ayer. *El Tiempo*.
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<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-72210>

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El Tiempo. (1993c, September 23). Caquetá, paralizada por la guerrilla.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00130

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - El Copey

Period: 1986

Location: Cesar: El Copey.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1996a, August 22). Secuestrado director del CTI en Rioacha.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-477089>

El Tiempo. (1996b, August 22). Bloqueo en la troncal de oriente por inseguridad.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-481265>

El Tiempo. (1996c, September 25). Guerrilla y paras, un enfrentamiento sangriento en Cesar. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-521879>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00131

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - La Mesa

Period: 1999 - 2000

Location: Cundinamarca: La Mesa.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1999, September 11). Jóvenes, en onda con la paz.

El Tiempo. (2000, September 9). Paz y Derechos Humanos.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00132

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - El Colegio

Period: 2004

Location: Cundinamarca: El Colegio.

Sources:

Voz Proletaria. (2004a, August 4-10). Asesinado Mauricio Tote, Dirigente popular del Cauca. 6.

Voz Proletaria. (2004b, August 25-31). Crisis humanitaria en Mesitas del Colegio. 10.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00133

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Girardot

Period: 1986

Location: Cundinamarca: Girardot.

Sources:

Arias, G. (1987, September 18). Marcha por la paz en Girardot. *El Tiempo*, 3A.

Voz Proletaria. (1987, November 29-04). Protesta en Girardot. 24.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00134

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Zipaquirá

Location: Cundinamarca: Girardot.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (2002a, February 21). La gente respondió con velas. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1307974>

El Tiempo. (2002b, November 13). Que digan qué quieren. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1312395>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00135

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Pasca

Period: 1996

Location: Cundinamarca: Pasca.

Sources:

Voz Proletaria. (1996a, April 24-30). Pasca: una población amenazada. 13.

Voz Proletaria. (1996b, June). Amenazados alcaldes de Sumapaz. 6.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00136

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Silvania

Period: 2000

Location: Cundinamarca: Silvania.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (2000a, September 9). Paz y Derechos Humanos.

El Tiempo. (2000b, December 4). Devuelvan a Lázaro.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/amp/archivo/documento/MAM-1295542>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00137

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Norte del Huila

Period: 1987 - 2005

Location: Huila: Algeciras, Baraya, Gigante, Neiva, Rivera, Tello.

Sources:

Voz Proletaria. (1987a, June 4-10). 2.000 campesinos ocupan Neiva. 24.

Voz Proletaria. (1987b, June). Huila: 5.000 campesinos sacuden a Neiva por derecho a la vida y a la tierra. 10.

Voz Proletaria. (1987c, September 10-16). Parlamentarios ayunan por la paz. 24.

Voz Proletaria. (1989a, February 9-15). Rivera, rincón de desaparecidos. 2.

- Voz Proletaria. (1989b, February 16-22). Se inicia diálogo regional. 2.
- Suarez, A. (1990a, November 14). Los sueños que apagaron las FARC. *El Tiempo*, 1A, 9A.
- Suarez, A. (1990b, November 15). Murieron cuando pensaban vivir. *El Tiempo*, 8B.
- Voz Proletaria. (1992, September 10-16). Diálogos regionales dan solidez al proceso de paz. 14.
- Voz Proletaria. (1993, October 7-13). Foro “Periodismo y Derechos Humanos”. 14.
- Voz Proletaria. (1995a, September 13-19). Un año del vil asesinato. 13.
- Voz Proletaria. (1995b, November 8-14). Crean Comité de Derechos Humanos. 15.
- El Tiempo. (2004, April 6). Protesta contra capturas. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1573610>
- Voz Proletaria. (2004, April 14-20). Barbarie militar. 15.
- El Tiempo. (2005, March 16). Campesinos marcharán hoy en Neiva. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1683945>
- Palacio, A. (2005, March 17). Mujeres fueron las protagonistas de marcha campesina ayer en Neiva. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/amp/archivo/documento/MAM-1681746>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00138

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Gigante

Period: 1987 - 2005

Location: Huila: Gigante.

Sources:

- Caracol Radio. (2000, June 5). *Gigante pide a las Farc que lo saque del conflicto*. https://caracol.com.co/radio/2000/06/05/nacional/0960184800_093333.html

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00139

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Coordinadora Educativa del Ariari

Period: 1999 - 2000

Location: Meta: Granada.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (2000, August 29). Vivir al máximo fue su filosofía. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1265694>

Corte Constitucional, Sala Séptima de Revisión de Tutelas. (2000, April 12). Sentencia T 435/00 [M.P: Morón, F.].

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00140

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Alto Ariari

Period: 1986 - 2002

Location: Meta: El Castillo, Granada, Lejanías, Mesetas, Puerto Rico, San Juan de Arama, Uribe, Vista Hermosa.

Sources:

Bedoya, H. (1986, July 10). Llega a Villavicencio marcha campesina. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2015). *Pueblos Arrasados. Memorias del desplazamiento forzado en El Castillo (Meta)*. CNMH.

Falla, A. (1986a, September 24). Cinco mil campesinos inician marcha de protesta a Bogotá. *El Tiempo*, 15A.

Falla, A. (1986b, December 24). Severo control militar en San José del Guaviare. *El Tiempo*, 1A, 12C.

Voz Proletaria. (1988, September 15-21). Multitudinario sepelio. 4.

Voz Proletaria. (1989, October 5-11). Foro por la vida en Lejanías. 10.

Voz Proletaria. (1990a, March 1-7). El luto del Ariari. 7.

Voz Proletaria. (1990b, August 23-29). Cumbre de reconciliación en el Alto Ariari. 13.

Voz Proletaria. (1990c, September 6-12). La redención del miedo. 12.

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- Jaimés, A. (1991, July 20). El Meta protestó. *El Tiempo*.
- Santos, E. (1991, July 18). Una neutralidad imposible. *El Tiempo*.
- El Tiempo. (1992a, February 20). Protesta en cuatro departamentos ayer. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-40745>
- El Tiempo. (1992b, July 9). Paro indefinido en cementos Nare. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-153641>
- El Tiempo. (1992c, April 11). Meta: Paro oficial contra violencia. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-90409>
- Voz Proletaria. (1992, April 15-23). La UP en la mira de los “Paras” y el militarismo. 14.
- El Tiempo. (1992a, August 17). El Castillo quiere borrar fantasma de la violencia.
- El Tiempo. (1992b, August 24). Solicitan hablar con autodefensas.
- El Tiempo. (1995a, January 30). Comisión de El Castillo busca diálogo en Bogotá. <https://www.eltiempo.com/amp/archivo/documento/MAM-272563>
- El Tiempo. (1995b, January 26). Éxodo campesino en el Ariari. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-300957>
- El Tiempo. (1995c, January 30). El Castillo busca diálogo. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-299926>
- Voz Proletaria. (1995a, June 14-20). Insistiendo en las salidas al conflicto. 11.
- Voz Proletaria. (1995b, October 18-24). La paz no es la simple ausencia de guerra. 12.
- Voz Proletaria. (1996, February 7-13). Foro por la convivencia pacífica. 6.
- El Tiempo. (1997, December 2). Que callen las armas.
- Voz Proletaria. (1998, June 10-23). El Ariari está amenazado. 12.

El Tiempo. (1998a, May 21). Éxodo campesino en el Castillo, Meta.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-756526>

El Tiempo. (1998b, May 22). Regresa presión campesina al Ariari.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-769085>

El Tiempo. (1998c, May 29). Terminó éxodo de campesinos.

El Tiempo. (1999, February 23). Guerrilla vigiló las elecciones.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-940621>

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<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1265694>

El Tiempo. (2002, December 31). Breves.

Voz Proletaria. (2003, July 23-29). Graves denuncias contra el Ejército. 8.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00141

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Ocaña

Period: 1987 - 1992

Location: Norte de Santander: Ocaña.

Sources:

Centro nacional de memoria histórica. (2017). *Campesinos de tierra y agua: memorias sobre sujeto colectivo, trayectoria organizativa, daño y expectativas de reparación colectiva en la región Caribe 1960-2015*. CNMH.

El Tiempo. (1987, June 6). Inquietud en el gobierno por paro. 1A, 12A.

Calderón, J. (1987, September 18). Llegó a Cúcuta marcha campesina de Ocaña. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

Voz Proletaria. (1989a, October 19-25). Fomentar la paz con obras. 9.

Voz Proletaria. (1989b, September 21-27). Foro por los Derechos Humanos. 24.

El Tiempo. (1990, March 23). Paro cívico en Urabá y cese en Barrancabermeja. 12C.

Voz Proletaria. (1990, June 14-20). No más desaparecidos. 9.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00142

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Región Occidental de Antioquia

Period: 2000

Location: Antioquia: Frontino, Peque.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (2000a, June 22). Bloquean vía a Urabá.

El Tiempo. (2000b, June 28). Nuevo bloqueo de desplazados en vía a Bogotá.

El Tiempo. (2000c, June 30). Sin solución, bloqueo de Autopista.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1230313>

El Tiempo. (2000d, December 30). Resumen.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00143

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Urabá Antioqueño

Period: 2000 - 2001

Location: Antioquia: Apartadó, Arboletes, Carepa, Chigorodó, Murindó, Mutatá, Necoclí, San Juan de Urabá, San Pedro de Urabá, Turbo, Vigía del Fuerte.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (2000, January 29). Marcha de paz en 125 municipios.

El Tiempo. (2001, January 13). Pretenden aislar a Urabá.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-651799>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00144

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Girardot

Period: 1994 - 1995

Location: Cundinamarca: Girardot.

Sources:

Voz Proletaria. (1994, November 17-23). Foro Regional de Paz. 14.

Voz Proletaria. (1995, April, 12-18). La sociedad civil tiene la palabra. 6.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00145

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Santa Helena del Opón

Period: 1991

Location: Santander: Santa Helena.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1991a, June 22). Marcha de alcaldes por la paz.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00146

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Vélez

Period: 1989

Location: Santander: Velez.

Sources:

Voz Proletaria. (1989, May 18-24). Nuevas actividades de paz. 4.

Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2011). *El orden desarmado: la resistencia de la Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare (ATCC)*.

El Tiempo. (1990, January 17). Foro de paz en el Magdalena Medio. 8B.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00147

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Buenavista

Period: 1999

Location: Sucre: Buenavista.

Sources:

Barrios, F. (1999, August 9). Peregrinación llenó de optimismo al Departamento. *El Tiempo*.

El Tiempo. (2000, July 11). Nada se sabe de Quintiliano.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1241422>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00148

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Riohacha

Period: 1996

Location: La Guajira: Riohacha.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1996, November 19). Rechazan las amenazas de autodefensas.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-600720>

El Tiempo. (1997a, September 13). Los guajiros marcharon ayer por el regreso de la paz.

El Tiempo. (1997b, September 25). Marchas contra la violencia.

Iguarn, J. (1998, May 22). Guajiros por la paz. *El Tiempo*.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-781803>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00149

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Armenia

Period: 1985 - 1989

Location: Quindío: Armenia.

Sources:

Galvis, C. (1985a, March 25). 10 mil quindianos dijeron no al secuestro y la extorsión.
El Tiempo, 1A, 2A.

Galvis, C. (1985b, November 14). Marcha silenciosa en Armenia. *El Tiempo*, 3A.

El Tiempo. (1989, March 17). La UP se tomó la catedral de Armenia. 12B.

Voz Proletaria. (1989, April 30-5). Entierro simbólico de Antequera. 8.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00150

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Yopal

Period: 1999 - 2001

Location: Casanare: Yopal.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1999, October 22). Libertad para la primera dama.

El Tiempo. (2001, April 22). Casanare marchará a Bogotá: Gobernador.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-543592>

Abu, L. (2001, July 20). La prensa ayudó a liberación. *El Tiempo*.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00151

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Manizales

Period: 1985 - 2005

Location: Caldas: Manizales.

Sources:

Voz Proletaria. (1985, December 5-11). ¡Jamás te olvidaremos querido Rubén! 11, 14.

Cadavid, O. (1985, November 10). Hoy, sepelio de magistrada. *El Tiempo*, 8A.

Voz Proletaria. (1986, December 18-24). Con luto en sus filas, termina el año el movimiento sindical. 10.

El Tiempo. (1988a, February 4). Paro por asesinato de trabajador. 11A.

El Tiempo. (1988b, February 21). Grave crisis en cementos; el lunes paran 9 fábricas. 9A.

El Tiempo. (1988c, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.

Voz Proletaria. (1989a, May 4-10). Asesinado dirigente de la UP. 24.

Voz Proletaria. (1989b, July 29-05). Se realizó diálogo regional por la paz. 11.

Voz Proletaria. (1999, March 10-23). Asesinados otros tres educadores. 10.

Cifuentes, S. (2005, October 28-04). Al rescate de la memoria. *Voz Proletaria*, 10.

El Tiempo. (2005, October 12). Para no repetir.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00152

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Montería

Period: 1987 - 1997

Location: Córdoba: Montería.

Sources:

Acevedo, A. (1987, February 19-25). Enormes manifestaciones exigen derecho a la vida. *Voz Proletaria*, 1, 12, 13.

Voz Proletaria. (1987, April 9-15). Muertos estudiantes en Córdoba y Villavicencio. 23.

Voz Proletaria. (1988, March 24-30). El sepelio. 8.

Voz Proletaria. (1989, March 23-01). Clamor de paz y concordia. 6

Voz Proletaria. (1995, May 10-16). Voces de paz y de guerra. 10.

El Tiempo. (1996, November 7). Maestros de Córdoba piden respeto a la vida. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-580487>

El Tiempo. (1997a, July 23). Por amenazas, paran maestros. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-614366>

El Tiempo. (1997b, July 24). Gran proclama por la paz en Montería. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-643392>

El Tiempo. (1997c, July 26). Organizan tres foros por la vida de los maestros del país.

Sanchez, T. (1997, September 24). No sabemos si vestarnos de luto. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-622145>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00153

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil – Tunja

Period: 1987 - 1999

Location: Boyacá: Tunja.

Sources:

Molina, M. (1987, October 14). Tensión en Boyacá. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

Voz Proletaria. (1987, December 26-02). Infame asesinato de dos estudiantes. 7.

El Tiempo. (1989, October 2). Colombia entera dijo ¡si a la vida! 9B.

Castellanos, R. (1990, March 23). Murió un soldado en los disturbios. *El Tiempo*, 6B.

El Tiempo. (1998, June 30). El lazo verde, el símbolo de paz.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-803446>

El Tiempo. (1999, October 1). Raquireños marcharán por la liberación de su paisano.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-859022>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00154

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Quibdó

Period: 1987 - 1988

Location: Chocó: Quibdo.

Sources:

Ruiz, F. (1987a, August 20). Quibdo. *El Tiempo*, 11A.

Ruiz, F. (1987b, August 27). Chocó. *El Tiempo*, 12A.

Ruiz, F. (1987c, October 14). Parálisis en Quibdó. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

Voz Proletaria. (1988, October 10-13). Constituyen Comité de Derechos Humanos. 7.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00155

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Pereira

Period: 1988 - 2000

Location: Risaralda: Pereira.

Sources:

El Tiempo. (1988, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.

Voz Proletaria. (1989a, January 19-25). Construir Frente Común por la Vida. 21.

Voz Proletaria. (1989b, April 30-05). Un camino seguro hacia la paz. 7.

El Tiempo. (1990, March 23). Paro cívico en Urabá y cese en Barrancabermeja. 12C.

El Tiempo. (1991, November 8). Maestros buscan frenar violencia.

El Tiempo. (1992, October 20). Aparecen asesinados un profesor y un sindicalista.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-225901>

Voz Proletaria. (1999, June 19-1). Matan otro educador. 9.

El Tiempo. (1999, July 31). Marcha, diálogo y bomba.

El Tiempo. (2000, December 2). Protesta por secuestro.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00156

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Santa Marta

Period: 1985 - 1995

Location: Magdalena: Santa Marta.

Sources:

Martínez, W. (1985, November 14). Normalidad en el Magdalena. *El Tiempo*, 3A.

El Tiempo. (1986, September 27). Pacíficas marchas de UP. 12A.

Voz Proletaria. (1987a, August 13-19). El miserable asesinato de Marcos Sánchez. 7.

Voz Proletaria. (1987b, November 5-11). Marcharon campesinos de la Sierra Nevada.
32.

El Tiempo. (1988a, June 1). Paros del magisterio en Magdalena y Santander. 8C.

El Tiempo. (1988b, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.

- El Tiempo. (1990, March 15). Empleados de Inderena anuncian paro. 7C.
- El Tiempo. (1991a, July 12). La costa Atlántica prepara gran movilización popular antiguerrilla.
- El Tiempo. (1991b, July 23). Santa Marta protesta mañana. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-124577>
- El Tiempo. (1991c, July 24). Santa Marta protesta hoy. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-125544>
- El Tiempo. (1991d, July 25). Santa Marta se puso de pie contra el terrorismo. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-126223>
- El Tiempo. (1993, April 18). Piden investigar la muerte de 3 personas. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-105671>
- El Tiempo. (1995, November 4). Universitarios samarios marcharon.
- Voz Proletaria. (1994, April 21-17). Foro por la paz. 13.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00157

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Florencia

Period: 1985 - 2005

Location: Caquetá: Florencia.

Sources:

- Voz Proletaria. (1985, July 18-24). Urgen verificación de la tregua en Florencia. 3.
- El Tiempo. (1986, September 27). Pacíficas marchas de UP. 12A
- Acevedo, A. (1987, February 19-25). Enormes manifestaciones exigen derecho a la vida. *Voz Proletaria*, 1, 12, 13.
- Perez, G. (1987, June 6). Marcha liberal contra extorsión en Florencia. *El Tiempo*, 1A, 6A.
- Osorio, N. (1987a, June 4). Marcha por la paz, el sábado en Florencia. *El Tiempo*, 7B.
- Voz Proletaria. (1987a, July 23-29). Fernando Bahamón: nueva víctima de la guerra sucia. 8.

Voz Proletaria. (1987b, October 8-15). Indica nuevos caminos en el Caquetá. 4.

Osorio, N. (1987b, August 27). Florencia. *El Tiempo*, 12A

Osorio, N. (1987c, October 14). Tranquilidad en Caquetá. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

El Tiempo. (1988, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.

Voz Proletaria. (1989, July 20-26). Paro en Caquetá. 12.

Voz Proletaria. (1993, June 24-30). Crean Comité de Derechos Humanos. 12.

Voz Proletaria. (1992, August 20-25). Trampas oficiales al diálogo. 9.

El Tiempo. (1996, November 28). Militares despejan 14.000 km en el centro de Caquetá. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-603414>

Cifuentes, S. (2005, October 28-04). Al rescate de la memoria. *Voz Proletaria*, 10.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00158

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Pasto

Period: 1988 - 2003

Location: Nariño: Pasto.

Source:

El Tiempo. (1988, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.

Voz Proletaria. (1988, September 22-28). Paralizado Pasto. 24.

Castellanos, R. (1990, March 23). Murió un soldado en los disturbios. *El Tiempo*, 6B.

Voz Proletaria. (1991, May 9-16). Un canto a la vida y al trabajo. 14, 15.

El Tiempo. (1996a, April 20). Los jóvenes de Pasto marcharon por la paz.

El Tiempo. (1996b, May 1). Marcha contra servicio militar. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-276820>

Voz Proletaria. (1996a, August 7-13). Nariño por la paz. 13.

Voz Proletaria. (1996b, August 21-27). Éxito en foro de Paz. 15.

- El Tiempo. (1997a, November 5). Callan emisoras por crimen de periodista. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-690352>
- El Tiempo. (1997b, November 5). Se silencia la prensa en Pasto. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-692119>
- El Tiempo. (1997c, November 7). Silencio hoy en 13 noticieros de Pasto. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-685642>
- El Tiempo. (1997d, November 8). Crimen silencio a los periodistas de Pasto. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-683455>
- El Tiempo. (1997e, December 27). Patascoy, una historia que se repite. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-713787>
- El Tiempo. (1998, August 7). Aparecieron heridos siete policías del Valle.
- El Tiempo. (2000a, March 13). Colegios de Nariño entraron en paro. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1283715>
- El Tiempo. (2000b, November 17). Putumayo sigue sin transporte. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1219939>
- El Tiempo. (2000c, November 15). Asesinan a tres docentes en Nariño. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1217475>
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- El Tiempo. (2001, November 12). Viajan periodistas amenazas por paras. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-666650>
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- El Liberal. (1996, June 1). Un paso hacia la igualdad. 8A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00159

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Cúcuta

Period: 1987 - 2002

Location: Norte de Santander: Cúcuta.

Source:

- Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *Campesinos de tierra y agua: memorias sobre sujeto colectivo, trayectoria organizativa, daño y expectativas de reparación colectiva en la región Caribe 1960-2015*. CNMH.
- El Tiempo. (1987, June 6). Inquietud en el gobierno por paro. 1A, 12A.
- Calderón, J. (1987b, August 20). Cúcuta. *El Tiempo*, 11A.
- Calderón, J. (1987a, September 18). Llegó a Cúcuta marcha campesina de Ocaña. *El Tiempo*, 2A.
- El Tiempo. (1988a, February 21). Grave crisis en cementos; el lunes paran 9 fábricas. 9A.
- Rueda, M. (1988 February 4-10). Enorme conmoción ante el asesinato de Aníbal Díaz Carvajal, líder de la UP. *Voz Proletaria*, 4.
- El Tiempo. (1988b, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.
- El Tiempo. (1989, October 2). Colombia entera dijo ¡si a la vida! 9B.
- Voz Proletaria. (1989, October 19-25). Crean Comité de Derechos Humanos Capítulo Cúcuta. 9.
- El Tiempo. (1992, March 16). El comercio de cucuteño protesta contra la CG. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-65838>
- El Tiempo. (1993a, March 18). Periodistas marcharán contra la violencia. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-77824>
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- El Tiempo. (1996, September 3). Semiparálisis en varios departamentos del país. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-489397>
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- Voz Proletaria. (1998, October 14-27). Éxodo hacia El Tarra y Cúcuta. 2.
- El Tiempo. (1999a, August 1). Colombia esta semana.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-922326>
- El Tiempo. (1999b, October 25). Más que una simple coincidencia.
- Voz Proletaria. (2000 February 9-15). Asesinado Pauselino Camargo. 8.
- Voz Proletaria. (2001, February 21-27). Protestas en Bogotá por asesinato de Iván Villamizar. 6.
- El Tiempo. (2001, July 31). Narcos, estarían tras muerte de fiscal.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-451793>
- El Tiempo. (2002, July 20). Sepultan a sindicalista.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1355058>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00160

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Valledupar

Period: 1986 - 2002

Location: Cesar: Valledupar.

Source:

El Tiempo. (1986, September 27). Pacíficas marchas de UP. 12A.

Romero, R. (1987, June 11-17). Por la vida y la tierra. *Voz Proletaria*, 14.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2018). *Tierra y carbón en la vorágine del Gran Magdalena. Los casos de las parcelaciones de El Toco, El Platanal y Santa fe*. CNMH.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2017). *Campesinos de tierra y agua: memorias sobre sujeto colectivo, trayectoria organizativa, daño y expectativas de reparación colectiva en la región Caribe 1960-2015*. CNMH.

El Tiempo. (1989a, March 6). Protestas por la ola de atentados contra la UP. 8A.

El Tiempo. (1989b, August 1). Foro por la paz. 6B.

El Tiempo. (1991a, July 12). La costa Atlántica prepara gran movilización popular antiguerrilla.

El Tiempo. (1991b, July 27). La Costa: no a la guerrilla.

Oviedo, A. (1992a, January 22). Cesar: marcha blanca de un pueblo contra la violencia. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-18766>

El Tiempo. (1992a, January 21). Cesar marcha por la paz. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-17506>

Oviedo, A. (1992b, January 23). Cesarenses clamaron: no más violencia. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-18907>

Voz Proletaria. (1992, September 3-9). Clamor por los diálogos regionales. 9.

El Tiempo. (1992b, October 21). Valledupar: otra protesta contra el secuestro. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-226952>

- El Tiempo. (1993, February 22). Exigen liberar a hija de Martínez Zuleta. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-51359>
- El Tiempo. (1998, May 20). La costa envió mensaje de paz. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-776894>
- El Tiempo. (1999a, April 16). En Cesar hoy marchan unidos por la paz. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-876852>
- Pulgarin, C. (1999, June 30). Guerrillas de Córdoba vienen del Caguán. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-855366>
- El Tiempo. (1999b, June 23). País Libre estará en la marcha del viernes. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-858629>
- Bolaño, P. (1999, June 26). No queremos ser botín de guerra. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-918915>
- Llanos, R. (1999, September 20). Tras pista del homicida de Guzmán. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-870053>
- El Tiempo. (1999c, September 20). Que mi hijo sea el último. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-869979>
- Bolaño, P. (2001, October 2). Llegaron amigos de todo el territorio nacional. *El Tiempo*.
- El Tiempo. (2002, August 16). Retorno a la Sierra.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00161

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Cartagena

Period: 1986 - 2003

Location: Bolívar: Cartagena.

Source:

Elles, H. (1986, July 3-9). ¡No más desaparecidos en la Costa! *Voz Proletaria*, 15.

El Tiempo. (1986, September 27). Campesinos se toman alcaldía. 12A

García, E. (1987, August 20). Cartagena. *El Tiempo*, 1A, 11A.

- Hernández, G. (1987, October 14). No hubo paro en Bolívar. *El Tiempo*, 2A.
- El Tiempo. (1988a, January 16). Graves disturbios ayer en Barrancabermeja. 3A.
- El Tiempo. (1988b, May 26). Jornada de terror ayer en Barrancabermeja y Ocaña. 1A, 8A.
- El Tiempo. (1988c, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.
- Voz Proletaria. (1991, May 9-16). Un canto a la vida y al trabajo. 14, 15.
- El Tiempo. (1991a, July 12). La costa Atlántica prepara gran movilización popular antiguerrilla.
- El Tiempo. (1991b, July 27). La Costa: no a la guerrilla.
- Voz Proletaria. (1992, February 30-5). Multitudinaria manifestación. 16.
- El Tiempo. (1992, November 24). Trabajadores en jornadas por la paz.
- El Tiempo. (1993, January 13). Sin acuerdo en pliego de Ecopetrol.
- Voz Proletaria. (1995a, April 5-11). Esperan mensaje de las FARC. 7.
- Voz Proletaria. (1995b, April 12-18). La sociedad civil tiene la palabra. 6.
- El Tiempo. (1997a, March 27). Marcha por los asesinados.
- El Tiempo. (1997b, August 1). Condenan la violencia en Bolívar. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-653926>
- El Tiempo. (1997c, November 12). Desplazados y deportados piden ayuda en Bolívar. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-673904>
- Char, E. (1997, November 8). SOS de campesinos del sur de Bolívar. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-684168>
- El Tiempo. (1997d, November 21). Bloque contra paramilitarismo. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-714480>
- El Tiempo. (1998, May 20). La costa envió mensaje de paz. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-776894>
- Arcieri, V. (2001, May 23). Marcha por la liberación de ex ministro Araújo. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-439602>

Cabrera, M. (2001, June 12). El paro nuestro de cada día. *El Tiempo*.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-491741>

El Tiempo. (2001a, December 7). Reunión clave Pastrana-Uso.

El Tiempo. (2001b, December 3). Desalojo en refinerías.

El Tiempo. (2001c, December 5). Pérdidas millonarias.

Cifuentes, S. (2001, December). Callado un cantor; pero no su canto. *Voz Proletaria*, 4.

El Tiempo. (2002a, February 27). Ecopetrol, de nuevo en paro.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1375142>

El Tiempo. (2002b, February 28). La parálisis en Ecopetrol.

Voz Proletaria. (2003, March 5-11). Se activa Comité de Derechos Humanos. 13.

Centro nacional de memoria histórica. (2017). *Campesinos de tierra y agua: memorias sobre sujeto colectivo, trayectoria organizativa, daño y expectativas de reparación colectiva en la región Caribe 1960-2015*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00162

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Ibagué

Period: 1986 - 2005

Location: Tolima: Ibagué.

Source:

Voz Proletaria. (1986, June 12-18). Imponentes marchas en toda Colombia. 9.

Sánchez, A. (1987a, August 20). Ibagué. *El Tiempo*, 11A.

Sánchez, A. (1987b, October 14). Operación tachuelas en Ibagué. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

El Tiempo. (1988a, February 4). Paro por asesinato de trabajador. 11A.

El Tiempo. (1988b, February 21). Grave crisis en cementos; el lunes paran 9 fábricas. 9A.

Voz Proletaria. (1988, October 13-19). Dialogan guerrillas y fuerzas políticas en el Tolima. 4.

- Angarita, A. (1989a, February 2-8). "No permitiremos que se tomen por asalto el proceso." *Voz Proletaria*, 7.
- Voz Proletaria. (1989a, February 9-15). Plebiscito por la paz en el Tolima. 2.
- Voz Proletaria. (1989b, February 16-22). "El Foro de Ibagué reafirma vocación de paz de los colombianos." 6.
- Angarita, A. (1989b, March). Cese al fuego bilateral. *Voz Proletaria*, 12, 13.
- Voz Proletaria. (1992, September 3-9). Buscar nuevas vías en el proceso de paz. 9.
- Voz Proletaria. (1994, September 15-21). Cortaron una rosa pero no la primavera. 16.
- Voz Proletaria. (1996, April 27-1). Nuevos esfuerzos por la paz. 6.
- El Tiempo. (1999a, August 18). Ibagué despidió a Garzón.
- El Tiempo. (1999b, September 29). Marcha por la paz en Ibagué. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-863536>
- El Tiempo. (1999c, October 25). La salida ciudadana. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-960845>
- El Tiempo. (2000, April 29). Medios lanzan campaña. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1298880>
- Voz Proletaria. (2001a, February 14-20). Amenazas de las AUC. 11.
- Voz Proletaria. (2001b, June 6-12). En Ibagué: Foro por la paz. 8.
- Sandoval, L. (2004). *La paz en movimiento, 1993-2003*. Instituto María Cano.
- Badel, L. (2004). Protesta por captura masiva en Chaparral. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1507706>
- El Tiempo. (2004a, March 2). Chaparralunos no desisten. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1547394>
- El Tiempo. (2004b, April 20). Protesta por Cajamarca. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1549793>
- El Tiempo. (2004c, April 23). Jornada de protesta.
- Voz Proletaria. (2005a, February 9-15). Dirigentes populares piden paro cívico. 14.

Voz Proletaria. (2005b, May 4-10). Vibrante y combativa celebración del Primer de Mayo. 8.

Voz Proletaria. (2005c, October 19-25). Multitudinario rechazo a la reelección y el TLC. 3.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00163

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil – Villavicencio

Period: 1986 - 2002

Location: Meta: Villavicencio.

Source:

Bedoya, H. (1986, July 10). Llega a Villavicencio marcha campesina. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

Falla, A. (1986a, September 24). Cinco mil campesinos inician marcha de protesta a Bogotá. *El Tiempo*, 15A.

Falla, A. (1986b, September 26). En Villavicencio. *El Tiempo*, 10B.

El Tiempo. (1986, October 13). Marcha campesina contra boleteo de las guerrillas. 9A.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2015). *Pueblos Arrasados. Memorias del desplazamiento forzado en El Castillo (Meta)*. CNMH.

Falla, A. (1987a, March 20). Manifestación de protesta por crimen del exgobernador Matus. *El Tiempo*, 3A.

Falla, A. (1987b, March 21). Multitudinario homenaje póstumo a Matus en Meta. *El Tiempo*, 8A.

Voz Proletaria. (1987a, March 19-25). El sepelio de Gabriel Alfredo Briceño. 24.

Voz Proletaria. (1987b, April 9-15). Muertos estudiantes en Córdoba y Villavicencio. 23.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2018). *Todo pasó frente a nuestros ojos. El genocidio de la Unión Patriótica 1984-2002*. CNMH.

Voz Proletaria. (1988, June 2-8). Masacre y provocación. 4.

El Tiempo. (1988, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.

- Voz Proletaria. (1988, August 4-10). Prosigue la Operación Exterminio. 24.
- Voz Proletaria. (1989, March 2-8). Indignación obrera por la muerte de Luis Eduardo Yaya. 12, 13.
- El Tiempo. (1991a, July 17). La Costa y el Meta en marchas contra CGSB. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-121798>
- El Tiempo. (1991b, July 19). Consigna del paro de hoy: No más terrorismo. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-122311>
- Jaimes, A. (1991, July 20). El Meta protestó. *El Tiempo*.
- Voz Proletaria. (1992a, July 9-15). Se realizó marcha del silencio en Villavicencio. 10.
- Voz Proletaria. (1992b, December 3-9). Los crímenes de la conmoción. 10.
- El Tiempo. (1993, April 22). Asesinado dirigente liberal en Mesetas. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-108046>
- Voz Proletaria. (1994, September 15-21). La jornada por la paz apenas comienza. 8, 9.
- Serrano, E. (1996, April 2). Ser llanero cuesta caro. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-322218>
- Voz Proletaria. (1996, July 26-2). Adiós a un gran hombre. 5.
- El Tiempo. (1996a, December 2). Con vibrante marcha empezó la cruzada contra el secuestro.
- El Tiempo. (1996b, December 2). Sentida marcha contra el secuestro. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-612496>
- El Tiempo. (1996c, December 3). Por un espacio nuevo.
- El Tiempo. (1996d, December 3). Gritos de libertad.
- González, W. (1996, December 3). Villavicencio dio otro paso contra el secuestro. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-613812>
- El Tiempo. (1997a, May 22). Villavo marchará por la paz.
- El Tiempo. (1997b, July 29). Protesta por masacre. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-718664>

- El Tiempo. (1998, March 31). Gremios piden solidaridad. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-770849>
- El Tiempo. (1999a, January 24). Colombia esta semana. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-887928>
- El Tiempo. (1999c, August 20). 80 mil personas y un solo propósito. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-955936>
- El Tiempo. (1999d, August 24). Una multitud para la paz.
- El Tiempo. (1999e, October 25). Más que una simple coincidencia.
- El Tiempo. (2000a, January 21). Por la vida en la vía. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1255100>
- Reinoso, G. (2000, January 25). El llano quiere vía libre hacia Bogotá. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1272353>
- El Tiempo. (2000b, January 27). El llano pidió respeto a su vía. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1269892>
- El Tiempo. (2000c, January 27). Presos en su propia vía. <https://www.eltiempo.com/amp/archivo/documento/MAM-1269865>
- El Tiempo. (2000d, June 27). Farc tendrían a la familia del alcalde. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1301113>
- El Tiempo. (2000e, June 30). Los consejos de la guerrilla. <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1R9ZX6-yMG3ocHcSaicxR4-0ObcdxLUXi>
- Voz Proletaria. (2000, September 30-5). Asamblea por la paz. 10.
- El Tiempo. (2001, August 3). Marcha por secuestrados en el Meta.
- Barragan, M. (2002, January 31). Cacerolas contra la guerra. *El Tiempo*.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00164

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Barranquilla

Period: 1986 - 2004

Location: Atlántico: Barranquilla.

Source:

- Voz Proletaria. (1986, November 31-5). Aspiración de paz y democracia. 3.
- Acevedo, A. (1987, February 19-25). Enormes manifestaciones exigen derecho a la vida. *Voz Proletaria*, 1, 12, 13.
- El Tiempo. (1987a, August 20). Paro parcial ayer en jornada por la vida. 1A, 11A.
- El Tiempo. (1987b, August 27). Hoy continúa paro de maestros. 12A.
- El Tiempo. (1987c, October 14). Una difícil prueba pasó el país. 1A, 2A.
- El Tiempo. (1988a, April 15). Disturbios en Barranquilla; asesinada familia en Tibú. 12A.
- El Tiempo. (1988b, May 26). Jornada de terror ayer en Barranca y Ocaña. 1A, 8A.
- El Tiempo. (1988c, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.
- El Tiempo. (1989a, October 2). Colombia entera dijo ¡si a la vida! 9B.
- El Tiempo. (1989b, October 9). El país dijo no a la violencia. 8B.
- Voz Proletaria. (1991, May 9-16). Un canto a la vida y al trabajo. 14, 15.
- El Tiempo. (1991a, July 12). La costa Atlántica prepara gran movilización popular antiguerrilla.
- El Tiempo. (1991b, July 27). La Costa: no a la guerrilla.
- El Tiempo. (1991c, July 31). Diálogo con la guerrilla pero con cese al fuego. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-129135>
- El Tiempo. (1992, November 24). Trabajadores en jornadas por la paz.
- El Tiempo. (1994, August 10). Paro de USO por muerte de Manuel Cepeda. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-192501>
- Pulgarin, C. (1997, March 12). Soñamos con poder vivir... *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-542151>
- El Tiempo. (1997, July 23). Por amenazas, paran maestros. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-614366>
- El Tiempo. (1998a, May 19). Por la paz.

- El Tiempo. (1998b, May 20). La costa envió mensaje de paz. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-776894>
- El Tiempo. (1998c, June 30). El lazo verde, el símbolo de paz. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-803446>
- El Tiempo. (1998d, September 10). Ya... Construyamos la paz.
- El Tiempo. (1999a, June 9). El viernes, movilización por el derecho a la vida.
- El Tiempo. (1999b, June 12). No más violencia!
- El Tiempo. (1999c, July 6). Libertad de secuestrados está en manos del presidente.
- Llanos, R. (1999, June 19). Caravana náutica por los secuestrados. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-857727>
- El Tiempo. (1999d, August 7). Dónde está la paz. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-882651>
- El Tiempo. (1999e, October 25). Más que una simple coincidencia.
- El Tiempo. (2000a, January 20). A botar corriente contra los sabotajes.
- El Tiempo. (2000b, January 24). Sobrecarga de energía ciudadana. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1274426>
- El Tiempo. (2000c, April 19). Claman por liberación. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1242778>
- Cifuentes, S. (2000, May 3-9). El primero de mayo del 2000. *Voz Proletaria*, 1, 7.
- Voz Proletaria. (2000, October 25-31). Grave situación de derechos humanos. 11.
- Voz Proletaria. (2001, January 17-23). Sólo el diálogo ilumina el camino de la vida. 7.
- El Tiempo. (2001, August 27). *Toman catedral de Barranquilla*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-470666>
- El Tiempo. (2002, February 21). La gente respondió con velas. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1307974>
- Voz Proletaria. (2003, April). Foro Caribe por los derechos humanos. 9.
- Cifuentes, S. (2004, June). "Por la vida de los Trabajadores Colombianos." *Voz Proletaria*, 4.

El Liberal. (2004, September 17). La marcha fue un éxito de paz. 3B.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00165

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Bucaramanga

Period: 1985 - 2005

Location: Santander: Bucaramanga.

Source:

Cala, J. (1985, September 20). Hoy, marcha contra la violencia en Bucaramanga. *El Tiempo*, 2A.

Voz Proletaria. (1987a, April 23-29). Se realizaron foros regionales por los derechos humanos. 24.

Voz Proletaria. (1987b, May 7-13). La UP ocupó la gobernación de Santander. 24.

Voz Proletaria. (1987c, September). Jornada por el derecho a la vida. 3.

Cala, J. (1987, September 11). Marcha contra la violencia. *El Tiempo*, 7C.

Voz Proletaria. (1987d, September 24-30). Se realizó Foro por la Vida. 10.

Voz Proletaria. (1988a, March 24-30). Asesinan a líder sindical universitario. 24.

Voz Proletaria. (1988b, August 4-10). Se toman oficinas del gobernador. 24.

El Tiempo. (1988a, June 1). Paros del magisterio en Magdalena y Santander. 8C.

El Tiempo. (1988b, July 30). La USO levanta paro en Barrancabermeja. 9A.

Voz Proletaria. (1993a, June 3-9). Sordera gavirista. 1, 7.

Voz Proletaria. (1993b, December 25-1). Éxodo campesino. 16.

Voz Proletaria. (1993c, December 9-15). No sea indiferente. 16.

El Tiempo. (1997a, May 27). EPL también pide despeje. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-578664>

El Tiempo. (1997b, August 10). Critican al gobierno en cabildo por la paz. <https://www.eltiempo.com/amp/archivo/documento/MAM-606586>

Mantilla, J. (1997, August 19). A los Morales aún no los han devuelto. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-629362>

Voz Proletaria. (1998, July 8-21). Desafiando el terrorismo. 15.

El Tiempo. (1998, November 1). Pensaron que éramos mexicanos. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-814691>

El Tiempo. (1999, April 16). Protesta del comercio. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-906236>

Chacon, E., & Ramirez, J. (2000, July 14). Rebelión empresarial contra la extorsión. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1304646>

Avella, J. (2000, October 4-10). Nororiente dijo no al Plan Colombia. *Voz Proletaria*, 11.

El Tiempo. (2001, November 7). Protesta de desplazados.

El Tiempo. (2002, February 21). La gente respondió con velas. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1307974>

Voz Proletaria. (2005, September 31-6). Solidaridad con el nordeste antioqueño. 4.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00166

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil – Cali

Period: 1986 - 2005

Location: Valle del Cauca: Cali.

Source:

Sánchez, M. (1986, April 30). Jornada de protesta ayer en Cali contra los secuestros. *El Tiempo*, 7C.

Voz Proletaria. (1986, October 9-15). La vida no vale nada, si cuatro mueren por minuto. 20.

Voz Proletaria. (1989a, March 21-27). Convocan nuevo Encuentro por la Paz. 14.

Voz Proletaria. (1989b, May 18-24). Nuevas actividades de paz. 14.

Voz Proletaria. (1989c, August 24-30). Cali crea comisión de Derechos Humanos. 8.

- El Tiempo. (1989, October 30). Desde hoy se paraliza la rama judicial caleña. 8B.
- Voz Proletaria. (1991, February 21-27). A la sombra de la impunidad. 10.
- El Tiempo. (1991, September 26). Justicia de luto: paro de 24 horas.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-160479>
- Voz Proletaria. (1992a, August 30-5). Pedagogía para la vida. 8.
- Voz Proletaria. (1992b, November 29-04). El secuestro de Amparo Torres Victoria. 15.
- El Tiempo. (1997, October 2). Reclaman por muerte de Neguí.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-641315>
- Voz Proletaria. (1997, December 10-16). Coordinadora sindical en el Valle. 8.
- El Tiempo. (1998a, March 5). Cali protesta contra violencia.
- El Tiempo. (1998b, March 6). Noticieros del Valle, en silencio contra la violencia.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-753707>
- El Tiempo. (1998c, March 7). Emisoras en silencio por la vida.
- Sterling, A. (1998, March 25-31). Avance político y pedagógico. *Voz Proletaria*, 13.
- Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2014). *“Patrones” y campesinos: tierra, poder y violencia en el Valle del Cauca (1960 - 2012)*. CNMH.
- Jimenez, C. (1999, July 9). La guerra en Cali. *El Tiempo*.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-941630>
- El Tiempo. (1999, June 13). En Cali esperan entre 30 y 40 liberados.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-904675>
- Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2012). *Nuestra vida ha sido nuestra lucha. Resistencia y memoria en el Cauca indígena*. Taurus.
- El Tiempo. (2000a, April 29). Medios lanzan campaña.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1298880>
- El Tiempo. (2000b, May 7). ¡Niños rechazan el secuestro!
- El Tiempo. (2000c, September 25). Caleños harían alcancías gigantes.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1210832>
- El Tiempo. (2001a, May 15). Caucanos marchan por la vida.

- El Tiempo. (2001b, May 16). En pie contra la violencia.
- El Tiempo. (2002, April 16). Aguablanca pide mejor trato.
- Sterling, A. (2003a, April). Exitoso foro por los derechos humanos. *Voz Proletaria*, 8.
- Sterling, A. (2003b, September). Crean capítulo del Comité de Derechos Humanos. *Voz Proletaria*, 14.
- El Tiempo. (2004, September 11). No permitiré bloqueo. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1501292>
- Aley, P. (2004, September 15). Primeros 20 km. por la dignidad. *El Tiempo*.
- Bohorquez, C. (2004, September 19). Asamblea indígena reclama justicia. *El Tiempo*.
- Voz Proletaria. (2004a, October 6-12). El PCC marchó por la paz en el Valle. 15.
- Voz Proletaria. (2004b, November 11-24). “Hay que persistir en los acuerdos humanitarios.” 9.
- Sterling, A. (2005a, June). Cruzada social por el intercambio humanitario. *Voz Proletaria*, 10.
- Sterling, A. (2005b, September). Se creó comisión para intercambio. *Voz Proletaria*, 10.
- Díaz, A. (1986, December 27-3). Un hecho sin precedentes en Cali. *Voz Proletaria*, 20.
- Espinel, A. (2001, May 16). Un mar de gente, una idea de paz. *El Liberal*, 8A.
- El Liberal. (2004, September 17). La marcha fue un éxito de paz. 3B.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00167

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Popayán

Period: 1986 - 2004

Location: Cauca: Popayán.

Source:

Voz Proletaria. (1986, July 24-30). Marcha por los desaparecidos. 8.

- Muñoz, G. (1987, October 14). Se toman asamblea en Cauca. *El Tiempo*, 2A.
- Castrillón, J. (1988, December 22-28). Primer Encuentro Nacional por la Paz. *Voz Proletaria*, 4.
- El Tiempo. (1989, April 22). Campesinos por la paz. 4B.
- Voz Proletaria. (1990, June 14-20). No más desaparecidos. 9.
- El Tiempo. (1991, October 9). Cauca marcha hoy contra la violencia. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-169910>
- El Tiempo. (1993, December 22). Quirá levantó huelga.
- El Tiempo. (1994, November 6). Colombia esta semana. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-243687>
- El Tiempo. (1996, September 11). Marcha indígena llegó a Popayán. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-496869>
- Voz Proletaria. (1996, November 30-5). Por un lenguaje abierto de paz. 7.
- El Tiempo. (1998, August 7). Aparecieron heridos siete policías del Valle.
- Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2012). *Nuestra vida ha sido nuestra lucha. Resistencia y memoria en el Cauca indígena*. Taurus.
- El Tiempo. (2001, May 15). Caucanos marchan por la vida.
- García-Peña, D. (2001, November 25). Pacíficos, pero no pasivos. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-693124>
- El Tiempo. (2002, July 18). A seguir resistiendo.
- Santander, C. (2002, December 11-17). Apoyo a diálogos regionales. *Voz Proletaria*, 6.
- Voz Proletaria. (2003, December 26-03). Coordinación Regional de Juventudes. 10.
- Cajamarca, M. (1991, October 10). El Cauca contra la violencia. *El Liberal*, 1A, 8A.
- Uribe, M. (1991, October 11). El Cauca gritó en silencio ¡No a la violencia! *El Liberal*, 1A, 8A.
- El Liberal. (1996a, September 10). Indígenas protestan. 1A, 6B.
- El Liberal. (1996b, September 11). Temor por retaliación. 1A, 6B.

El Liberal. (1998, February 20). *Gobierno sigue en silencio*. 2A.

El Liberal. (1999, October 25). Manchas de paz. 2A.

Arévalo, L. (2000, July 15). En marcha por la paz. *El Liberal*, 3A.

El Liberal. (2001a, February 5). Fortaleciendo el tejido social. 2A.

El Liberal. (2001b, February 11). Clamor por la vida. 8A.

El Liberal. (2001, February 16). Paro completa dos semanas. 3A.

El Liberal. (2002, July 9). Territorio de Paz. 8A.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00168

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil – Bogotá

Period: 1985 - 2005

Location: Distrito Capital: Bogotá.

Source:

El Tiempo. (1985, October 1). Compañeros de Camila realizan marcha para pedir que la liberen. 3A.

Voz Proletaria. (1985, December 28-4). 10.000 claveles blancos para las víctimas del Palacio de Justicia. 24.

Voz Proletaria. (1986, November 13-19). Nada ni nadie será olvidado. 4.

López, R. (1985, December). Asesinado Jesús Alberto García. *Voz Proletaria*, 11.

Voz Proletaria. (1987a, July 25-1). Nuestra respuesta es avanzar con la lucha. 1.

Voz Proletaria. (1987b, August 30-5). Vigorosa respuesta de masas. 16.

Voz Proletaria. (1987c, September 10-16). Se extiende la protesta. 8.

Voz Proletaria. (1990, February 1-7). El peor golpe contra Provienda. 11.

Voz Proletaria. (1991, February 21-27). A la sombra de la impunidad. 10.

Matias, J. (1993, July 1-7). Los transportadores de la muerte. *Voz Proletaria*, 11.

- El Tiempo. (1993, July 7). Buscan la paz en Ciudad Bolívar. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-165120>
- Voz Proletaria. (1993b, December 2-8). El gobierno es el responsable. 6, 7.
- Voz Proletaria. (1995, March 8-14). Los hilos de otro montaje. 7.
- Voz Proletaria. (1997a, August 6-12). Congreso Distrital de Derechos Humanos. 14.
- Voz Proletaria. (1997b, October 15-21). La desaparición de dos estudiantes en la U.N. 7.
- El Tiempo. (1998, May 8). Por Yenny, mucho más que un minuto de silencio. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-788336>
- Voz Proletaria. (1999, March 24-9). Más sangre a la hoguera de la impunidad. 3.
- El Tiempo. (2001, May 17). Marcha contra el secuestro. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-511501>
- Raigozo, C. (2002, April 24-30). Homenaje a la memoria de Eduardo Umaña Mendoza. *Voz Proletaria*, 4.
- El Tiempo. (2003, April 14). Una protesta infantil.
- Voz Proletaria. (2005, February 26-2). Continúa asesinato de jóvenes. 9.
- Voz Proletaria. (1988, July 7-13). Foro por la paz en la Gobernación de Cundinamarca. 21.
- El Tiempo. (1991, October 10). Toma campesina.
- Voz Proletaria. (1998, September 2-15). *La integración del Sumapaz*. 16.
- El Tiempo. (2000a, January 21). Por la vida en la vía. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1255100>
- Reinoso, G. (2000, January 25). El llano quiere vía libre hacia Bogotá. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1272353>
- El Tiempo. (2000b, January 27). El llano pidió respeto a su vía. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1269892>
- El Tiempo. (2001, September 1). Por la paz y los derechos humanos.
- Voz Proletaria. (2003, April 9-15). Por la defensa de los derechos humanos y las libertades políticas. 10.

Voz Proletaria. (2005, June 1-7). Aumenta drama en Sumapaz. 4.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00169

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - Bolívar

Period: 1986 - 1995

Location: Cauca: Bolívar.

Source:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Comité de Integración del Macizo Colombiano & Fundación del Suroccidente Colombiano. (2017). *Creced como un río. Jornalando cuesta arriba por vida digna, integración regional y desarrollo propio del Macizo Colombiano, Cauca, Nariño Y Colombia*. CNMH.

Campo, C. (1986, April 25). A piedra y palo población impide ataque de las Farc. *El Tiempo*, 1A, 2A.

Osorio, M. (2018). “Sin territorio no hay vida”: luchas y resistencias en Micoahumado Sur de Bolívar. *Revista Kavilando*, 10(1), 78–93.

Roa, C. (2001, December 13). Sabemos que Farc volverán. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-712746>

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

El Liberal. (2001, December 2). Bolsiverdes evitaron otro ataque al pueblo. 1.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00170

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - Sopetrán

Period: 1986

Location: Antioquia: Sopetrán.

Source:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00171

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - Buenos Aires

Period: 1987

Location: Cauca: Buenos Aires.

Source:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00172

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - Curillo

Period: 1987

Location: Caqueta: Curillo.

Source:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00173

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - Almaguer

Period: 1989

Location: Cauca: Almaguer.

Source:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Comité de Integración del Macizo Colombiano & Fundación del Suroccidente Colombiano. (2017). *Crece como un río. Jornaliando cuesta arriba por vida digna, integración regional y desarrollo propio del Macizo Colombiano, Cauca, Nariño Y Colombia*. CNMH.

El Liberal. (1989, May 10). Choque entre el ELN y comunidad, tres muertos y cuatro heridos.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00174

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - Cajamarca

Period: 1991

Location: Tolima: Cajamarca.

Source:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00175

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - San Marcos

Period: 1992

Location: Sucre: San Marcos.

Source:

Romero, Laureano. 1992. Crónica de una Resistencia.
<https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-240581>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00176

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - San Pedro

Period: 1994

Location: Antioquia: San Pedro.

Source:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016). *Tomas y ataques guerrilleros (1965 - 2013)*. CNMH.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00177

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada – Cantagallo

Period: 2002

Location: Bolívar: Cantagallo.

Source:

Voz Proletaria. (2002, June 5-11). Cantagallo, Bolívar. Resistencia popular a “paras”. 12.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00178

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Armada - San Pablo

Period: 2004 - 2005

Location: Bolívar: San Pablo de Borbur.

Source:

Santander, C. (2004, March 17-23). El pueblo se alzó contra los paramilitares. *Voz Proletaria*, 7.

Voz Proletaria. (2005, May 4-10). Población se rebela contra “paras” y policía. 4.

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00179

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Grupo de Autodefensa - Don Matías

Period: 1991

Location: Antioquia: Don Matías.

Source:

García, Jorge. 1994. Asociaciones De Seguridad Rural Son Un Invento Viejo. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-266209>

ID of Civilian resistance Campaign: crc_00180

Name of Civilian resistance Campaign: Resistencia Civil - Sincelejo

Period: 1991

Location: Sucre: Sincelejo.

Source:

- Voz Proletaria. (1987, November 29-4). Repudio a la muerte, homenaje a la vida. 24.
- Voz Proletaria. (1989, April 30-05). Un camino seguro hacia la paz. 7.
- Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2010). *La tierra en disputa. Memorias de despojo y resistencia campesina en la Costa Caribe (1960-2010)*. Taurus.
- Voz Proletaria. (1993, September 16-22). Jornada por la vida. 16.
- Voz Proletaria. (1994, May 12-18). Compromiso por la vida. 10.
- Romero, L. (1987, August 26). Paro médico en Sucre por secuestro de galeno. *El Tiempo*, 2A.
- El Tiempo. (1987, August 27). Sucre: marcha de silencio. 12A.
- El Tiempo. (1988, June 3). Rotundo no a la violencia. 1A, 8A.
- El Tiempo. (1991a, July 12). La costa Atlántica prepara gran movilización popular antiguerrilla.
- El Tiempo. (1991b, July 27). La Costa: no a la guerrilla.
- El Tiempo. (1997, September 2). Asesinado subgerente de Telecom en Sincelejo. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-620934>
- El Tiempo. (1998b, May 20). La costa envió mensaje de paz. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-776894>
- Vila, R. (1998a, May 23). Mensaje - Región Caribe de paz. *El Tiempo*. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-787423>
- El Tiempo. (1999, August 4). Zona de distensión en Sincelejo. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-883217>
- Barrios, F. (1999, August 9). Peregrinación llenó de optimismo al Departamento. *El Tiempo*.
- El Tiempo. (2001, August 31). Asesinan a fiscal del caso Chengue. <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-473552>