INQUIRE 1 2015 36-56

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Assassinations and Mass Shootings
The Role of Critical Events in the Struggle for U.S. Gun Policy

Carolina Hernandez and Alexandria Montgomery
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, New College;
Arizona State University

Introduction
Writing about movement mobilization and the crucial role of the
countermovement, political scientist Clifford Bob points out in The Global
Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics that “deploying recurrent tactics
and themes, rival networks advance their positions and slash away at the
enemy’s. They influence one another’s development, strategies and
outlook” (Bob, 2012, p. 5). We found this important—though neglected—
sociological and political process easily translates to the national stage of
gun policy debate. In this paper, we primarily examine Handgun Control
Inc. and the National Rifle Association’s contributions to mobilizations,
for and against gun control. As with any social and political movement,
we find these two opposing networks, the proponents of gun control and
the anti-gun control groups, utilizing each other’s frames, actions and
policies as a way of countering the opposition and advancing their own
agendas.
Copyright © 2015 Caroline Hernandez & Alexandria Montgomery:
carolina.r.hernandez@asu.edu

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Despite this theoretical framework of “movement” versus
“countermovement,” Bob fails to thoroughly portray the vital role of
public events, specifically violent events such as political assassinations
and mass shootings, in advancing or hindering the two tightly-contested
movements. We, on the other hand, found throughout our analysis of the
gun control debate that these violent events were crucial, perhaps even
imperative, in propelling the cause of both sides of the gun control
movements. This approach is mirrored in Suzanne Staggenborg’s work,
“Critical Events and the Mobilization of the Pro-Choice Movement”(1993)
where she writes, “social movements are event-driven insofar as critical
events alter expectations and perceptions of threats, focusing or
distracting the attention of movement constituents and other important
actors on or away from movement issues” (Staggenborg 1993, p. 320). She
goes on to explain that large-scale political events, which here we
interpreted as political assassinations and other critical encounters like
mass shootings, function to draw attention to the particular movement’s
cause and to manipulate public opinion. Thus, critical, spontaneous events
can function very much like the strategic events staged by a movement (p.
330). In the case of mass shootings, these critical events serve to remind
the public and activist groups of the seriousness of the issue. These varied
initiatives have all been used by both sides of the gun control movement
in the last few decades.
In this paper, we explore the consequences of these violent critical
and political events on the gun control and anti-gun control movements
by analyzing the movement responses. We also look at how a
combination of critical events and the consequent movement
mobilizations have resulted in federal gun control policy throughout the
late 20th century. We rely on publicly available information to create the
timeline of assassinations, mass shootings and proposals for gun control
legislation. Gallup polls provide data on American public opinion on guns
and gun policy after these political assassinations and mass shootings.
Information on the counter-mobilization by the National Rifle Association

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is based both on their own publications (notably The American Rifleman)
and outside studies of the organization and its gun policy. Information on
the movement, Handgun Control Inc. is taken from publically available
information and the works of Spitzer (1998), Kopel (2012), and Davidson
(1993).
Critical Events and the Gun Control Movements
Although our focus begins primarily in the 1960s, this is not to say
that this social phenomenon is not applicable to the beginnings of the gun
control movement. Although the early half of the twentieth century saw
few gun control laws, it also saw few mass shootings or critical
assassinations. Gun laws were common only in the southern US, where
restrictions on firearm use were created specifically against African
Americans, and later, in fear of organized immigrants and race riots
(Kopel, 2012, p, 1529). Furthermore, contrary to the myth of a bloody Wild
West, Western settlements did not experience the degree of concentrated
bloodshed seen today, and some had strict gun control laws. Tombstone,
for instance, experienced only five deaths in its most violent year in the
heyday of its existence (Spitzer, 1998, p, 11).
One of the first Northern gun laws passed in response to a violent
event was the New York Sullivan Act of 1911. In line with our theory, this
law was created only after the murder of a prominent New York
Democratic politician (ibid. p.1529). The prominence of gangster shootings
and the mobster violence of the 1920s, and especially the St. Valentine’s
Day Massacre in Chicago in 1929, prompted the 1934 National Firearms
Act, levying high taxes on machine guns and modified rifles, and
requiring registration for concealed firearms (ibid. p.1533).
Hence, after starting the century with a burst of violence and
retaliatory gun laws, the federal legislative field saw little subsequent
action when it came to firearms. As for gun group mobilization, the
strongest proponent of guns, the National Rifle Association, responded to
these laws by employing a strategic initiative that would “provide
information that stimulates grievances and alerts potential activists to
problems,” namely by encouraging its members to write to their
legislators (Kopel 2012, p. 1530; Staggenborg 1993, p. 330). This lobbying

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tactic was though not a common practice until 1934, when the NRA began
a full-scale letter-writing campaign after the National Firearms Act was
passed, thus launching the struggle between gun control activists and the
countermovement (Davidson 1993, p. 29).
Our concern, however, is with the period beginning in the 1960s,
when a significant increase in political assassinations and mass shootings
greatly heightened public concern about guns, and led to extensive
mobilization of groups supporting—and opposing—various degrees of
gun control (see Table 1 below).
Critical Events of the 1960s.
The pattern of political assassinations began with the dramatic
Presidential assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963, although
that was not even the first shooting of a political nature for that year.
Medger Evers, a prominent African American civil rights activist in
Mississippi, was also shot and killed just months before. The shooter,
Byron De La Beckwith, was an active White Supremacist who carried out
the assassination with a handgun (Bjelopera, 2013). The decade concluded
with the assassinations of the country’s leading civil rights leader, Rev.
Martin Luther King, Jr., and a leading candidate for the Democratic
presidential nomination, Robert Kennedy.
Nestled directly in between the political assassinations of the
decade, the one mass shooting of the 1960s involved the scandalous attack
at the University of Texas in Austin. In this shooting, Charles Whitman
shot and killed 17 people from the campanile tower of the University
(Bjelopera, 2013). He was ultimately shot and killed by the police,
effectively ending the assault, though the headlines continued for months.
The deaths and 32 wounded caused it to be easily the bloodiest gun attack
of the decade.
While the assassination of Evers was shocking, King’s death led
many to believe that there was about be a pattern of killings carried out
against activists. Similarly, the public venues in which the shooters chose
to carry out their assassinations gave rise to the concern of public violence.

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Table 1: US Gun violence 1963-2012. Key legislation and results of Gallup
polls on gun control are included (see ‘Notes’).

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The state of unease after the successive political assassinations of
the 1960s was, like any war or large-scale event might be, a definite
“turning point” in the political and social atmosphere of the country.
Staggenborg notes that events like these are tied with “‘psychological
realignments’ among the population,” which in the case of gun control,
proves accurate (Staggenborg 1993). This change in the nation led the
federal government to pass the first major gun law act since 1934, the Gun
Control Act of 1968 (Kopel 2012, p. 1545). Although the first
assassinations—of Evers and Kennedy—began to place the issue of guns
in the limelight, they had few effects on the American atmosphere
towards control. For instance, Senator Thomas Dodd (CT) spent the 1960s
trying to pass an effective gun law to no avail; his original purpose for a
gun control proposal was aimed at preserving the East Coast gun
manufacturers from foreign gun imports from Eastern Europe. Ironically,
Dodd’s initial bill was supported by JFK himself, and this alliance with the
gun industry also led the President to become a member of the NRA
(Kopel, 2012). Because of proposed gun regulations after the death of
Kennedy (including bans on handguns and interstate sales to those
without a gun license), Dodd’s S. 1592 lost the support of the NRA and
died in Congress (National Rifle Association, 1966).
In 1968, another version of the bill was proposed thanks to the
frustration and anger spurred by the race riots and street violence after the
assassinations of MLK and RFK. It wasn’t until this moment that support
for federally-enacted gun laws increased dramatically. Enough pressure
had built over the expanse of the decade to turn the public’s eye towards
the new grievance of political violence. In fact, by the end of the 1960s, an
Emergency Committee for Effective Gun Control was formed and was
advocated for by multiple celebrities and organizations, including Frank
Sinatra, the AFL-CIO, and the US Chamber of Commerce. This committee
called for several anti-gun provisions, such as national gun registration
and licensing (Kopel, 2012). The gun control group used this large-scale
social occurrence as a critical event to draw attention to their cause of
controlling a perceived problem—violence done by firearms—and altered
the perceptions of grievances and threats, “either among aggrieved
groups or among bystanders publics” (Staggenborg 1993, p. 323).

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Soon to become the most diligent enemy of any sort of gun control
legislation, the National Rifle Association was initially supportive of the
1968 Act. In fact, NRA Vice President Orth announced his backing of the
law and his deep distress over the political assassinations. He went so far
as to testify before Congress in support of the Act (Davidson, 1993).
However, the NRA received a backlash of disapproval after the
assassinations; so much so that in the January 1968 American Rifleman,
Orth claimed that “never before has the NRA or any other sportsmen’s
organization been more assailed and misrepresented” (Orth, 1968). Later
in that article, he detailed that the organization was “systematically
smeared with false allegations of gangsterism, greed, and selfishness.”
This, however, was only the start of the NRA’s problems. In the
July 1968 Rifleman issue, NRA staff reported receiving a phone call bomb
threat to NRA Headquarters outside of Washington, D.C. Alongside the
bomb threats, multiple calls accusing the NRA of perpetuating gun
violence were made. This culminated in picketing of the NRA
Headquarters by what the Staff described as “middle-income office
workers...a smattering of straggle-haired hippies, a few Poor People
marchers, and very small children” (National Rifle Association Staff,
1968). The strike was organized by the United Auto Workers, and the
picket rally was attended by several Congressional Representatives calling
for stronger gun laws.
Despite the adversity facing the NRA—or perhaps in consequence-its membership numbers skyrocketed during the 1960s. In the January
1968 American Rifleman, Orth reported an increase of 50,000 members
between 1965 and 1966 (Orth, 1968). Circulation numbers from January
1968 showed a membership of 985,000. This is a perfect example of the
negative effects a movement’s successful initiatives (here, gun control) can
have on that movement by creating more support for the
countermovement (anti-gun control). Staggenborg examines this effect,
stating that “paradoxically, threatening events generally help movement
mobilization while favorable outcomes may lead to movement decline
and/or countermovement mobilization (p. 332).
Meanwhile, on a national level, the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA)
had mixed support. While most media outlets, celebrities, and prominent
groups supported the GCA and handgun control legislation, the voting

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results from the elections of 1970 and 1972 showed a different side of
public opinion. The NRA claimed that thanks to the passage of the 1968
act, politicians supporting gun control (such as Sen. Thomas Dodd) lost
their seats. Throughout the US, the defeat of gun-control advocates was
witnessed in Chicago, Buffalo, and New York. In the Senate, too,
incumbents who voted for the gun-control bills were defeated (Snyder,
1973).
Regardless of the NRA’s preliminary support of the GCA, most of
the NRA’s members disapproved of the Act. By 1970, there were petitions
within the NRA to repeal the 1968 act, beginning with a statement by
NRA President Woodson D. Scott. The July 1970 American Rifleman urged
members to appeal to their Congressional representatives to get rid of the
Act, which was deemed “intolerable” by Scott. This intolerance for the
Gun Control Act directly led the NRA to increase its legislative activity in
1973, creating a separate lobbying unit to ensure that NRA members’
interests were “more effectively represented in Washington and the
various State legislatures” (National Rifle Association Staff, 1973). Called
the Legislative Action Unit, this blossoming branch of the NRA was only a
shadow of the future Institute for Legislative Action (ILA) formed in 1975.
Led by the legendary Executive Director Harlon Carter, a crucial figure
within the NRA, the ILA vociferously opposed any sort of gun control
legislation. As the more moderate members of the older, sportsmen
generations were outnumbered and replaced by the more extreme, prolobbying younger NRA members, the creation of the ILA signaled an
ideological shift in the internal workings of the NRA (Davidson 1993, p.
34).
The Institute was created not just out of the pressure of members
for the repeal of the GCA, but perhaps in response to the increasing
mobilization of those in favor of gun control. In 1974, the National
Coalition to Control Handguns (NCCH) was created. The predecessor of
Handgun Control Inc. in the 1980s and the Brady Campaign in the 1990s,
NCCH was founded by Nelson Shields in San Francisco (Kopel, 2012,
p.1555). Working within another anti-handgun group, the National
Coalition to Ban Handguns, NCCH and NCBH together opposed
handguns because of their concealability, and thus their threat to the
public (Kopel, 2012). By joining together and institutionalizing their

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concerns within NCCH and NCBH, gun control supporters finally posed a
legitimate challenge to the movement against gun control (Bob 2012, p.
23).
In the case of critical events, the 1970s did not see any mass
shootings (see Table 1 above). However, this decade did bring the highest
record of political assassinations to date, further worsening the state of
tension in the nation. Reaching the highest peak of the century, the 1970s
witnessed seven political assassinations in total (Bjelopera, 2013). The
bloodshed began in 1978 with the assassination of California State
Congressman Leo Ryan, who was assassinated on the airport tarmac of
Jonestown, Guyana, on an advocacy trip on behalf of his constituents
concerned about the members of People’s Temple. This event was closely
followed by the assassination of Harvey Milk, City Supervisor of San
Francisco. He was the first openly homosexual political figure of the time,
and was shot in his City Hall office in 1978 by former City Supervisor Dan
White (Garvey, 2013). George Moscone, Mayor of San Francisco, was also
killed by White that day. Finally, John H. Wood Jr., Judge for the US
District Court of Texas, was shot in San Antonio by hit man Charles
Harrelson, alleged to be hired by drug trafficking mogul Jamiel Chagra.
Though unsuccessful in their attempts, there were additional
individuals who attempted to assassinate larger names in the political
spectrum. President Richard Nixon had two separate assassination
attempts against him, one in 1972 and one in 1974 (Bjelopera, 2013).
Arthur Bremer was responsible for the first attempt, carrying a firearm
into an event but ultimately being thwarted by security. He gave up on
his attempt against Nixon and instead settled for shooting and severely
injuring the Governor of Alabama, George Wallace. Following Bremer’s
intentions, Samuel Byck planned to hijack a plane and crash it into the
White House. He shot and killed both of the pilots of a commercial
airliner, but was shot by police. He survived the gunshot wound from the
police, but ultimately killed himself.
Similar to Nixon, Gerald Ford suffered two attempted
assassinations. In 1975, just two weeks apart, Ford had guns pulled on
him by two separate women—Sarah Jane Moore in San Francisco and
Lynette Fromme in Sacramento. Each was unsuccessful in her attempt
thanks to bystanders and nearby police (Garvey, 2013). Closing out the

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decade of aggression, Jimmy Carter was targeted in May 1979. Before
any damage could occur, Raymond Lee Harvey was arrested outside the
Civic Center Mall by Secret Service agents for having a starter pistol with
alleged intent to assassinate the President, although charges were
ultimately dismissed due to lack of evidence.
This period of unrest did not go unnoticed. Polling establishments
such as Gallup began to take a general interest in the way society felt
about firearms. Though there was little research for comparison, the 1970s
allowed for a solid base of reference. According to the first Gallup poll
taken specifically regarding firearms, 1960 saw an average of 49% of
American homes containing firearms while this number decreased to
approximately 45% from 1972-1976 (Gallup).

Figure 1: Polling on gun ownership by Gallup, 1960-2012:
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx

This is only a slight decrease from the previous decade, though the
political assassinations increased. In contrast to this increase in violence,
Gallup also found a decrease in support for banning and restricting
handguns from 41% of American support in 1975 to a low of 31% support
in 1979 (Gallup). This can be explained by Staggenborg’s theoretical work,
in that after periods of policy change, such as the Gun Control Law of
1968, supporters fall into a state of complacency. Organization numbers
tend to rise in crisis eras such as the 1960s, but decrease after a favorable

Figure 2: Gallup polling on gun control: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx

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event (Staggenborg 1993). Although still important events, the attempted
assassinations of these less prominent politicians in the 1970s may not
have disquieted the American public.
In the timeline of violent events, a shift also occurred. As we have
seen, the 1960s saw few but critical, political assassinations or mass
shootings. The 1970s proved more violent in the way of political violence,
with seven assassination attempts but no mass shootings. The 1980s,
however, took on a profile of violence yet unseen, with a total of six
political assassination attempts and eight public mass shootings (Garvey,
2013). The gruesome events of the decade displayed a level of violence
not experienced before in the US. The average number of people killed in
each mass shooting was 10 (Bjelopera, 2013). Further study regarding
public opinion on firearms and possible legislation to control their use
continued throughout the 1980s. Though the questions were infrequent,
Gallup indicates through random sampling in 1987 that the percent of
individuals indicating a desire to restrict the ownership and use of
handguns rose to 42% in 1987 (see Figure 2). It seems that the numerous
outbreaks of social aggression inspired a reconsideration of laws meant to
protect society from itself. Similarly, as Gallup continued to poll families
to find out if they owned guns and kept them in their homes, by the end
of the decade 47% of respondents stated they did protect their homes with
handguns (Figure 1, above).
Also during this epoch, the NRA further confronted the federal
government and the handgun control groups. After a decade of
complaints against the GCA and its primary enforcer, the Federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), the NRA finally managed to
introduce the Firearm Owners Protection Act (FOPA) in 1986 (Davidson,
1993, 53). The FOPA made several changes to the GCA, including
dropping the ban on interstate sale of firearms, allowing dealers not to
keep records of ammunition sales, and provisioning that BATF agents
must have “reasonable cause to inspect dealer records” in addition to
giving prior notice of inspection (Davidson, 1993, p. 57). The FOPA was
significant to the gun control movements primarily as a demonstration of
the institutionalized lobbying power of the NRA. Contributing $1.6
million dollars in lobbying and advertising initiatives, the NRA’s financial
and political strength made the gun control movement’s contributions

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seem meager. By comparison, the police coalitions working to undermine
FOPA spent only $15,000 (Spitzer 1998).
In a strategic countermove, Handgun Control Inc. aimed to counter
the FOPA by deploying a carefully constructed national “Cop Killing
Bullet” scare, which affected the NRA by alienating its law-enforcement
supporters. This tactic involved creating a public frame, or perspective,
that pitted the NRA as radical and anti-law enforcement, thereby
weakening the organization in the eyes of the American public. Clifford
Bob defines these countering initiatives, which focus on shaming the
opposition by questioning their very credibility, sanity, and ethical nature,
as a vital and natural part of movement building (2012, p. 30).
Staggenborg’s theories of drawing attention to movements by creating
new grievances also relate well to this example (1993, p. 330).
In essence, this scare revolved around the notorious KTW bullets,
created with a brass or iron core, which were able to shoot through glass
and some metals. They were designed only for police special units, not for
public use or sale. Moreover, KTW bullets were thought to pierce
bulletproof vests, although no evidence of this was available. Nonetheless,
with the help of Handgun Control Inc., strong supporters of gun control
like New York representative Mario Biaggi, used the pretext of “CopKilling Bullets” to initiate a new bill that would ban an extensive range of
ammunition and thus offset the FOPA (Kopel 2012, p.1571).
The NRA lobbyist Wayne LaPierre adamantly opposed the Biaggi
Bill, thus branding the NRA as a cold, “gun-nut” supporter of “CopKilling Bullets” (Davidson 1993, p. 85). This anti-law enforcement frame
wounded the NRA’s once strong relationship with police organizations,
then some of the main pro-gun supporters in the country (Kopel, 2012, p.
1573). Although the bill did not pass Congress, it turned the Law
Enforcement Steering Committee, a group of police chiefs and other
organizations, against the NRA. In response, the NRA lobbied against
these attacks by putting $150,000 into counter-shaming their primary lawenforcement opponent, Police Chief Joseph McNamara, by running
negative advertisement campaigns (Davidson 1993, p. 99).
Despite the efforts of the strengthening gun control movement, the
Biaggi bill did not pass; it did, however, manage to force the NRA into
some compromises on the almost stagnant FOPA. When it passed in May

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1986, FOPA contained an amendment to ban the sale of new machine
guns after 1986 (Kopel, 2012, 1574). Handgun Control Inc. continued to
shame and damage the reputation of the opposition with the introduction
of another exaggerated frame, this time playing on America’s fears of
terrorism. This capitalized on the creation of a semi-plastic Austrian gun,
the Glock. Said to be able to pass undetected through metal detectors, this
new threat to American safety prompted Senator Metzenbaum of Ohio to
create the preliminary to the Undetectable Weapons Act (Kopel 2012, p.
1575). This early draft of the bill was supported by a council of police
chiefs from across the country; it demanded that any handgun contain at
least 8.5 oz. of stainless steel, making it easily traceable via a metal
detector (Davidson 1993, p. 100). An added bonus of this bill draft was
that it would end up outlawing small, cheap, all metal handguns, dubbed
“Saturday Night Specials” commonly purchased by criminals (Kopel 2012,
p. 1575).
As predicted, the NRA protested this bill, and the NRA-supportive
White House shut the gun control lobby out of discussions over this act. A
new bill, similar to Metzenbaum’s, was created with NRA concessions to
the gun control movement. This time, however, the amount of steel that
handguns were required to contain was halved to only 3.7 oz. (Davidson
1993, p. 100). Additionally, the NRA fought to counteract its tarnished
reputation by commencing a strategic initiative of its own. Under the
advertisement campaign title “I am the NRA,” this movement-building
strategy sought to combat the growing stereotype of the NRA as an
organization of isolated gun fanatics.
This is a perfect example of what movement-formation theorists,
such as Bob, call “framejacking,” or a movement’s more favorable
reinterpretation of the opposition’s attack perspective (Bob 2012). In this
case, the NRA bent the handgun-control coalition’s portrayal of the NRA
as “gun nuts.” Depicting average people, everyday families and an
overall cross-section of America, the NRA portrayed itself as a rational,
gun-safety promoting, inclusive organization. These television
advertisements ran from 1982 to 1989 (Davidson, 1993, p. 47).
As well as bolstering its own image, the NRA also tried to destroy
the images of some of the most prominent members of the pro-gun control
movement. A well-known liberal and supporter of gun control,

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1988 Democratic Presidential candidate, Michael Dukakis, for instance,
found himself on the end of a $1.5 million dollar initiative to publicize his
image negatively. Although he supported relatively moderate gun
control, such as handgun purchase waiting periods, regulation of gun
sales to criminals and the mentally unstable, and even the responsible
owning of firearms for personal protection, his position combined with
the opposition’s exaggerations and forceful attacks destroyed any support
Dukakis might have had in vital gun-prominent Southern states. His
campaign for the Presidency ultimately collapsed (Kopel 2012, p. 1577).
Despite this massive political power in many states, the NRA was
not immune to the wave of resistance coming from the gun control lobby.
Outbursts of violence created enough fuel to affect the NRA initiatives
and further strengthen the gun control movement. The start to the
violence came in the shape of the attempted assassination of Ronald
Reagan in 1981 and the permanent injuring of White House Press
Secretary, James Brady (Kopel 2012, p. 1567). Upon joining Handgun
Control Inc. in 1985, the latter’s spouse Sarah Brady lent force and
credibility to the organization. As a prominent Republican, Sara Brady
also served as a bridge into the gun control movement, connecting to a
broader group of people who might not have otherwise supported this
bipartisan effort at gun control. It could though not sway the established
power of the NRA and other gun supporters in the 1988 elections (Kopel,
2012, p. 1575).
However, the culmination of the 1980s saw a diminution in the
NRA’s power. In 1989, the Stockton, California shooting of 34 elementary
school children stunned America and put the gun debate back on red
alert. It also introduced the issue of a semi-automatic weapons ban into
Congress. The gun control lobby used the Stockton event and the
emphasis on automatic weapons as a shocking novelty to revive gun
control interest in the media and to the public (Kopel 2012, p. 1578).
Promptly after the massacre, once NRA-supporter Senator DeConcini
proposed a middle-ground ban on assault weapons (Kopel, 2012). Again
subverting their own reputation, the NRA was adamantly against the ban
on assault weapons (Davidson, 1993). Thus ensued yet another struggle to
pass some form of gun control in the face of the NRA’s lobbying efforts.

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After several laborious attempts to get it through Congress, the
Brady Bill was finalized and passed in 1993. As a concession, it contained
an NRA-backed provision to end the original five day waiting period on
handgun purchases after 5 years. Also, it directed $200 million of federal
money a year into helping States computerize and improve their systems
of tracking criminal records, thus facilitating the demand that police run
background checks on gun buyers. Additionally, the Brady Bill raised the
licensing price for firearms to a federal level, at least for the first few years.
Although basic and even minimal in its gun control provisions, the Brady
Bill faced much opposition, especially from the NRA. Opponents went so
far as to challenge the Bill’s constitutionality, on the basis of State’s rights,
which resulted in the Supreme Court knocking down the Brady Bill’s key
clause requiring police background checks on gun buyers (Spitzer, 1998,
p. 124-125).
The level of popular support, however, overpowered those
contesting the bill. The media, Handgun Control Inc., famous figures and
even former Presidents Carter, Reagan, Nixon and Ford all came out with
their support (Davidson, 1993, 240). It seemed that after the deranged
shooting of 34 school children, America had had enough. Moreover, The
Brady Bill also enabled the passing of other gun control measures by
simply showing that it could be done and that mythically powerful
organizations, such as the NRA, weren’t invincible. One such gun control
enactment empowered by the Brady Bill was the Recreational Firearms
Protection Act, which passed in 1994. It contained several bans on 19
specific guns, 200 general gun types, and banned magazines with over 10
rounds (Kopel, 2012, 1585).
Despite the passage of these gun laws, the 1990s experienced a total
of 11 mass shootings from 1990-1999, the most prominent being the
Columbine High School shooting in 1999, which claimed the lives of 15
people including the killers and injuring an additional 21. Though there
were other shootings in the decade that claimed far more lives, this event
went down as the most heinous and received the most media attention.
Gallup polls previously discussed opinion on what should happen
with legislation concerning handguns throughout the 1990s. Following
the tide of support for gun control after the critical Stockton shooting
event and the resulting Brady Act, there was a natural and substantial

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decline in the polling results, indicating the national desire for stricter gun
control laws (Gallup). However, the same question, posed in the same
month as the Columbine occurrence, produced results of approximately
66% claiming they desired stronger legislation on guns and support for
handgun bans rose to 38%. The poll was not specific in what type of law
was desired, just that it should be stricter in the use and purchase of
handguns. Just as Staggenborg outlines in her work, this shows that
during the times of mass shootings and other critical events, people have
more awareness and desire to do something to counter the highly
publicized violence (Staggenborg 1993). Conversely, if not utilized to its
full potential and in new, creative frames, a critical event such as
Columbine can pass to the hands of the opposition. This is perhaps what
occurred in the case of the late 1990s and the 2000s. We theorize that by
this point, the Brady victory combined with the constant violence instilled
a sense of indifference towards further control, as Staggenborg points out,
“favorable outcomes may lead to movement decline and/or
countermovement mobilizations” (1993, p. 332). This can be further
validated through an analysis of the NRA’s foremost anti-gun control
frames in the 2000s. An examination of their website and speeches by
prominent leaders within the organization shows that the NRA’s
consistent cure for the public epidemic of gun violence is further arming
of the population (NRA.org).
Staggenborg also notes that if movements are “tied to events and
temporary stimuli,” such as the gun control movement has historically
been tied to spontaneous violence, they risk weakening their movement.
(1993, p. 333). This may perhaps also explain why, not withstanding
Handgun Control Inc.’s efforts to shame and shine negative light on the
NRA, the more established and bureaucratic NRA rode with relative
public favor through the massive violence of the 1990s. By the early 2000s.
60% of Americans thought positively of the NRA, and this number rose to
68% by 2012, evenly among all political demographics (Kopel 2012, 1589).
Likewise, although eleven mass shootings took place in the first
decade of the 2000s, no new gun control legislation has been passed in
more than fifteen years. There were two mass shootings worthy of
individual mention during this time period: The Amish Schoolhouse
shooting of 2006, which left 6 dead, and the Virginia Tech shooting of 2007

53
in which 32 faculty members and students were killed. Taking place only
six months apart, these attacks again left the nation in a severe state of
concern regarding gun use. As noted before, the decade saw nine other
attacks against members of the public. Some were easily understood to be
planned massacres; other seemed to be mindless behavior driven by
reaction to specific circumstances.
One might assume that Gallup polls would find results supporting
the desire to restrict gun ownership and use; however, in line with our
theories, polls indicate exactly the opposite. In 2008, the desire for stricter
gun control decreased to 51% while support for handgun bans dropped to
29%.

Figure 3: changes in attitudes to gun control legislation:
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx

These are the lowest numbers seen, yet the twenty years preceding the
poll were the bloodiest by far. It seems as though it was once believed
that restricting the ownership or use of guns would limit the chances of
mass shootings. When they continued—even increased in number despite
legislation restricting their use—people desired to protect themselves
more, something echoed and even propagated the NRA. As stated before,
this new frame, which plays on American’s fears of being the victims of
seemingly unstoppable, widespread public violence, overwhelmingly

54
counteracts any calls for action that gun control groups may initiate. This
conclusion can be drawn from the steady decline in the numbers of people
desiring the government intervention in restricting firearms.
Again as outlined by Staggenborg, yet another critical event
occurred to change the gun control movement. In 2012, the numbers in
support of gun control skyrocketed back up to 58% immediately following
the brutal attacks on an elementary school in Connecticut and a movie
theatre in Colorado. On December 14, 2012, Sandy Hook Elementary
School felt the repercussions of 156 fired rounds by a 20 year old assailant.
This shooting took the lives of 20 children and six adults, including the
gunman. It was followed by the shooting of 82 people (12 of whom died),
at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado. Both of these attacks led to
extensive media attention. The Gallup poll demonstrating the shifting
public opinion on individual gun rights was taken in December, just after
the Newtown, Connecticut event. The time proximity of events and
polling may allow insight into the temporal context theory, though there
is nearly no information regarding the validity of such a theory in
sociological references. Although retaliatory laws were passed in both
Colorado and Connecticut after these shootings, the gun control issue
failed to initiate strong federal action.
Conclusions
Despite the steady increase in violence, the lack of public and
political support for gun control may be explained by Staggenborg’s
observation, “whether the policy outcome is positive or negative, new
strategies and tactics and goals are required as a result of changes in the
political environment” (ibid. p. 332). After a main policy change, like
Brady, the political stage is “reset” and movements and their countermovements must change fundamentally or bring in new tactics and
strategic initiatives to redeploy another policy change. To enable the
passage of stricter, more enforcing laws against guns, or to prevent such a
movement, the gun control movements will have to apply new strategies
and new techniques to better move and gain the attention of this new
generation. The violence increases, but the two movements must
creatively and strategically use it in mobilizing. This, plus a combination
of complacency after the Brady Act, or an acceptance of this new social

55
trend towards mass violence, may have led to the stagnant and deflated
atmosphere in the gun control policy movement.
Furthermore, the mass violence that simultaneously occurred
during this same time period, starting with September 11th, the War on
Terrorism, conflicts in the Middle East and in Korea, and ending with
Syria, may have turned public attention away from the national conflict
over gun control. Other issues, such as the turn of attention towards the
gay rights movement, illegal immigration, health care laws, and national
surveillance breaches, have also diverted the public gaze. Whether or not
gun control proponents manage to resuscitate the issue depends on their
inventive use of new strategic initiatives, including the use of social media
and the internet to confront the changing tide in the way Americans
understand, process, and react to situations.
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