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December 21, 1944.

to last, must be "a peace without victory." Victory, he said, humiliates the vanquished, and by stirring up feelings of hatred and vengeance, leads inevitably to another war.

Professor Mortimer Adler has stated the point somewhat differently: "Nothing less than world government will establish world peace, even in the least degree" (*Common Sense*, January 1944, p. 15).

President Roosevelt favors peace. But he also wants unconditional surrender, under which the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, under which the Big Three will hold a monopoly of the world's arms and arms-making plants.

W.T.R. Fox (*The Super Powers*, Harcourt, 1944, pp. 8-9) offers this post-war picture: "Fifty years from now, or five hundred years from now, men may have discovered a substitute for armed force in world politics. . . To understand the international relations of the next generation, however, one needs to know the precise location of preponderant military power." After pointing out that Britain, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. are unwilling to lay down their arms or to create a supra-national authority "with preponderant force at its command," Mr. Fox goes on to discuss "the prospects for a war between the Soviet eastern power nucleus and the Anglo-American western aggregation" (p. 103).

Walter Lippmann takes precisely the same position: "A universal society can only be a voluntary association of sovereign states. It cannot be a world government because there is no way, now conceivable, by which this government could obtain . . . the power to legislate and to execute its laws" (*U.S. War Aims*, Little, Brown, 1944, p. 183). Mr. Lippmann goes on to discuss, as did Mr. Fox, the pertinent question, "Where does the armed power lie? He finds this power in a nuclear alliance that includes China and the Soviet Union, but is centered about the Atlantic Community."

The Atlantic Community is based upon a close association of the British Empire, the United States and other countries bordering on the Atlantic. "A rational military policy for the United States can be founded only upon a solid political understanding that war within the Atlantic region is unthinkable and that war beyond it, and in defense of it, is certain to be a combined operation" (p. 72). Mr. Lippmann, like Mr. Fox, is preparing in advance so that, when the next war comes, the preponderance of military power will be on the side that he favors. He therefore looks forward, not to peace, but to victory in World War III.

President Roosevelt's slogan envisages unity in a very narrow field. Certainly he does not

mean to include the outcast peoples and the "forces of evil" against which he is now waging his struggle for all-out victory. And he is surely mistaken if he supposes that peace will follow victory.

We live among nations every one of which has a war department and not one of which has a peace department.

We live among nations that spend more money on the waging of war than on all other items in the national budget.

We live in a lawless world, because there is in the world no authority competent to make or enforce law. All issues on which the nations cannot reach agreement must therefore be submitted to trial by armed force.

Peace is possible only in an orderly world.

Order, in our times, presupposes law.

Obviously, until a world law-making and law-enforcing body is set up, there can be no peace. On the contrary, as Spykman so clearly pointed out, "war in the twentieth century is total war, the combination and integration of military, political, economic and ideological tactics into one great war effort . . . The result is that the distinction between the war-time and peace-time forms of the power struggle have now been effaced completely. No state can think any longer of preparation for national defense merely in terms of preparation for a future conflict. The struggle is waged continuously. Total war is permanent war" (*America's Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt, 1942, pp. 38 and 40).

Modern statesmen, including the President, are directing affairs in a world dedicated to the waging of permanent war. On what other assumption could they be justified in calling for universal military conscription after the unconditional surrender of their present enemies? The President, his Secretaries of War and Navy, his Chief of Staff and many of his lesser spokesmen are on record in favor of peace-time conscription because he knows and they know that, while the competitive struggle for wealth and power endures, war will continue to be one of its instruments. They and we must choose between world law under world government and the settlement of world conflicts by an appeal to arms.

Well, how about it? Are you convinced of the validity of this argument? Or can you still be fooled by slogans such as, "Let us unite to win the war and to achieve a lasting peace?"

Scott Nearing.

December 21, 1944
Jamaica, Vermont

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World Events

INTERPRETED BY

SCOTT NEARING

VOL. 1

No. 11

Friends:

NOTHING that has happened since the beginning of World War II has caused more concern to thinking people than the conflict between the Greek Liberation Front and the British army of occupation. Although Greece is relatively small, with an area equal to New York State and a population equal to New York City, its armed forces inflicted heavy losses upon the invading Italian armies and were defeated only as the result of extensive German support.

AFTER the German occupation, the Greeks took to the hills and continued their struggle. Lord Dunsany, who was teaching in Athens at the time the Germans overran Greece, has dramatized the conflict in his vivid novel, *Guerrilla* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1944).

While Yugoslav partisans under Marshal Tito were winning world-wide acclaim by their unexpected successes against the Axis armies, the Greek Resistance was carrying on its less publicized campaigns. As the Red armies swept across Southern Europe during the late summer of 1944, the Greek Resistance, like the Yugoslav Partisans, was harrying the retreating Nazis. While Marshal Tito was celebrating his triumph by launching the Moscow-blessed Yugoslav Federation, members of the Greek National Liberation Front were refusing to lay down their arms at the command of the British-backed Papandreou government. The same newspapers that announced the establishment of the Yugoslav Federation reported fighting between Greek ELAS armies and the British army of occupation.

Nazi withdrawal from Greece was immediately followed by British military occupation. Greek citizens welcomed the British as liberators and assumed that they would now be able to establish a government of their own choice. They were soon disillusioned.

Churchill's Tory government had no intention of allowing the Greek people to chart their own course. Quite the contrary, Mr. Churchill had two very specific interests in Greece. First, and incidentally, he was working to restore the Greek monarchy. Monarchy is dear to the

Churchillian heart, and the exiled King of Greece has been one of his titled protégés for years.

Churchill's second reason for interference in Greece is more fundamental. The present war has demonstrated, as strategists had foreseen, that British communications with India through the Mediterranean depended, not only upon Gibraltar and Suez, but also upon intervening points in North Africa and Southern Europe and upon a number of strategic islands, from Pantelleria and Sicily to Crete and the Greek island of Cyprus.

British post-war policy will aim at sufficient control of the Mediterranean area to safeguard the Life Line. Greece is an essential factor in Mediterranean hegemony.

Although no documents have been published, it seems evident that some understanding has been reached under which the Soviet government recognizes the Mediterranean as a British sphere of influence. Presumably it was this agreement that stopped the Red army at the Greek frontier. Ernest Bevin, speaking in London on December 13th, insisted that the British policy in Greece was accepted and initiated at the recent Quebec conference between the President and the Prime Minister. Washington answered that only military proposals were considered at Quebec.

Papandreou, the exiled Greek king and the Churchill government seem to be unpopular with the Greek Resistance forces that have been carrying on their unequal struggle since the country was occupied by Italian-German armies. When the British decided that the time had

come to disarm the Resistance forces in all of the liberated countries, from Belgium in the west to Greece in the east, the Greek leftists refused to give up their arms unless the Greek rightists were also disarmed.

This refusal of the Left to lay down their arms was followed by clashes that led to bloodshed in Athens and the proclamation of a general strike that threatened the existence of the Papandreou government. Thereupon Prime Minister Churchill personally ordered the British military commander in Greece to take necessary measures in support of the Greek government.

Churchill's explanation to Commons on December 11th justified British intervention on the ground that the British were doing everything in their power to provide the Greeks with sorely needed relief and employment. "But we cannot do this if the Tommy guns which were provided for use against the Germans are now used in an attempt to impose by violence a communist dictatorship without the people being able to express their wishes." Mr. Churchill added, "It would be very much easier for us to allow everything to degenerate, as it would, into anarchy or a communist dictatorship."

In the same statement to Commons, the Prime Minister recognized the principle of self-determination: "Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. . . These are entirely matters for them." But, Mr. Churchill continued, "until they are in a position to decide, we shall not hesitate to use the considerable British army now in Greece, and being reinforced, to see that law and order are maintained."

With that the war was on. Early dispatches described the success of the British in capturing Left headquarters and in clearing three square miles in the centre of Athens. Then came reports of street fighting, strafing and bombing from British planes, British tank movements and bombardment by British warships in the Piraeus area. On December 11th the leftist forces were reported as ready to surrender, but on December 12th they had occupied all but two of the strategic high points in the centre of Athens and had massed large forces in the provinces. On December 14th ELAS forces were again fighting from street to street in the capital.

Even the *Times* of London, always a stalwart supporter of British imperialism, writes that the Churchill government is running into a full-scale war in Greece. ELAS, warns the *Times*, is strong enough in Athens to fight a real war, while in other areas of Greece, including especially the region of Salonika, the National Liberation Front is in control, if not a numerical majority. It may be true, if not a numerical one, that there is danger of a Left dictatorship

in Greece, but in British government policy the "forcible restoration of right-wing dictatorship was taken equally for granted."

British military action in support of its chosen government in Greece was paralleled by non-military action directed against Britain's political opponents in Italy. Premier Bonomi, who had the support of the Italian Allied Commission in his attempt to re-form a cabinet, was advised by a British representative in Rome that Count Storza would not be acceptable either as premier or as foreign minister. (Churchill to Commons, Dec. 8: "The British minister did undoubtedly say to the Italian inquiry that we did not think Count Storza a particularly good choice, or words to that effect.")

Big Three political policy in Italy is made, at least theoretically, by the Allied Commission. The British, in attempting to exclude Count Storza from certain offices, were speaking quite out of turn. British justification for interfering in Italy as in Greece; the necessity of controlling Italy as an essential link in Mediterranean hegemony.

Newly appointed Secretary of State Stettinius was not convinced, however: "The position of this country has been consistently that the composition of the Italian government is purely an Italian affair except in the case of appointments where important military factors are concerned. This government has not in any way intimated to the Italian government that there would be any opposition on its part to Count Storza. Since Italy is an area of combined responsibility, we have reaffirmed to both the British and Italian governments that we expect the Italians to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from outside. This policy would apply to an even more pronounced degree with regard to governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories."

This forthright, specific statement ranged the United States government against the British government's position in Greece as well as in Italy. There is no shadow of doubt but that Messrs. Roosevelt and Stettinius are as anxious as Messrs. Churchill and Eden to prevent a communist dictatorship in Greece or anywhere else, but they question whether Britain's machine-gun diplomacy is the proper method of procedure.

British Labour Party delegates met in London December 11th and decided to continue their support of the Churchill coalition government until after the end of the European war. Acting chairman Harold J. Laski referred to the Prime Minister as a "gallant and romantic relic of eighteenth-century imperialism." Bitter criticisms were directed by speakers from the floor

against government policy in "liberated" countries, but the conference accepted the necessity of working in Tory harness so long as the war lasted, and decided not to break with the Tory government until the post-war general election.

Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and most influential of the British labor leaders now on the government payroll, took the floor at the Labour Party Conference in an all-out defense of the Prime Minister and his policies. Mr. Bevin said, "I took part with my labor colleagues in the whole of these discussions, going over nearly four years, trying to work out these terrifying problems that would arise at the end of the war." As he looked over the discussions, Mr. Bevin added, he did not feel that any mistakes had been made. Greek stability was essential to the stability of the Balkans. The stability of both was related to the position in the Mediterranean. "The British government cannot abandon its position in the Mediterranean. It is impossible for it to do so."

There Mr. Bevin put his finger on the vital issue. On that issue Mr. Bevin and his fellow labor leaders and Mr. Churchill and his fellow Tories see eye to eye. The future of the British Empire depends upon British control of the Mediterranean, and all other issues are secondary to this primary consideration.

What a picture of power politics and of the ideological depths to which collaboration leads labor representatives. It might be assumed that Ernest Bevin, head of the largest trade union in the British Isles, would throw at least a few crumbs of comfort to the half-starved Greek masses in their struggle to free themselves from the second armed occupation within five years. But, ironically, the comfort comes from the Tory *Times*, while laborite Bevin defends the Tory conqueror.

Active military participation by a British coalition government in the Greek civil war seems to justify several rather significant generalizations:

1. Britain, by playing a minor role on the western invasion front, is able to devote time and attention to building up her fences around the Mediterranean.
2. Prime Minister Churchill's government, backed by a huge fund of U.S.A. lend-lease supplies, is leading the forces of Europe's counter-revolution in Greece, Italy and perhaps also Belgium.
3. Political expediency compels the leaders of the British Labour Party to continue their collaboration with the Churchill government and to refrain from any direct criticism of its counter-revolutionary activities. The only official word of protest against the Churchill policy has been uttered by Wall Street-trained Secretary of State Stettinius.

General de Gaulle's visit to Moscow resulted in the signing of a twenty-year French-Soviet treaty. This treaty, like the Anglo-Soviet twenty-year treaty of 1942, is an offensive and defensive alliance, directed against German aggression, with a clause providing for mutual economic assistance.

The signing of the treaty is an event of major significance:

1. France regains her status as a major European power.
2. This status is recognized first by the Soviet Union.

Moscow now has close treaty ties with Britain, Czechoslovakia, France and Japan. Thus, while the two other major powers, Britain and the U.S.A., are in one (anti-Axis) world, the Soviet Union is at the same time in the United Nations world and in the Axis world and thus, and in the broadest sense, is the one cosmopolitan world power.

In my last letter I quoted President Roosevelt's slogan, "Unite to win the war and to achieve a lasting peace," and asked everybody to think over its adequacy as a basis for post-war peace and security. The President's slogan suggests three ideas—unity, victory and peace.

Unity is an excellent concept, provided it is sufficiently inclusive. With whom does Mr. Roosevelt propose to unite? With the American economic royalists and the British Tories? Of course. They are his buddies. With the executives of the American and British labor unions? Certainly. They are his henchmen. With the French Resistance and the Spanish Republicans? Well, perhaps. With the lim-Crowded American Negroes and the jailed leaders of the Indian National Congress? Hold on. Not so fast. And how about the Yugoslav Federation, under Marshal Tito, and the Greek Liberation Front, battling Mr. Roosevelt's British Tory buddies for a chance to set up a government of their choice? But they are revolutionaries! And the 70 million Japanese and 75 million Germans? Absurd. They are the enemy! The President's slogan really begins with the unity, not of the human race, but only of special privileged groups among the best-armed peoples.

Now as to victory. Will victory bring peace? A large body of historic experience answers in the negative. In 1918, for example, the Allied Nations won a sweeping victory over the Central Empires. Did this victory bring peace? No. It led directly to World War II. Similarly, the many brilliant victories won by Napoleon between 1793 and 1812 did not bring peace. On the contrary, they led to the bloody field of Waterloo.

President Wilson stated this point very clearly when he declared that the peace, if it was