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The people's partisans will quickly become the most advanced army of the people.

The most important experience we have gained from the four months of fighting is the knowledge that the Government armies alone cannot stop the Japanese occupation of our country. To be victorious in this war, we must organize and arm the masses. The people are just now arising to struggle. And although we have had many defeats and many bloody lessons, still we are not defeated. If we resist the enemy firmly and ceaselessly, we will be victorious.

It is not only the masses who have realized that the anti-Japanese mass movement must be freed. The authorities of the Central Government and of many of the Provincial Government have come to realize this. They now realize that the pre-condition for victory in this protracted warfare is the liberation of the mass movement. For instance, on the 12th, Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan in Nanking, sent our army a telegram stating that military action is not enough and that we must develop the mass movement. General Chiang Kai-shek has also said that the people's movement must be

*broadened.*

From the military viewpoint, we have learned many lessons from the Japanese invasion. The first of these is the essential change in strategy and tactics of the Chinese armies. Our people now know that defensive tactics alone cannot *lead to* victory. We must *take* the offensive. I have given interviews, and I wrote a small pamphlet about this problem. I said that a weak country cannot depend entirely on positional warfare, but must fight chiefly by mobile warfare. We must attack the flanks and rear of the enemy, using partisan tactics. Few people paid any attention to what I said. But after bitter experiences and many bloody lessons, our people have gradually learned that we can not depend on positional warfare alone. We have a great advantage in mobile warfare because we can use our whole country, we know our country very well, and we have the entire people to help us.

Many of our people formerly believed that Japanese tactics, and the Japanese command, were incomparable, infallible. But after these past months of fighting, I personally feel that Japanese tactics are not very good. They depend almost entirely on big guns, airplanes, and tanks. Our Eighth Route Army has met them in two hundred large and small battles, and we have the worst weapons of any army in the country, and yet we have lost not one rifle to them. Instead, we have captured over 3,000 Japanese rifles, destroyed over one thousand motor trucks and tanks, captured big guns, many machine guns, large quantities of ammunition of every kind, over one thousand military horses, poison gas masks, anti-air craft guns, large quantities of clothing and food. We have defeated the Fifth Division, the best of all divisions of the Japanese imperial army. Our weapons are the worst of all Chinese armies, and when we fought the enemy they were always from three to ten times our number. We have killed and wounded ten thousand of them, but our own losses have not been even one-half that number. These facts prove that Japanese tactics and Japanese command are not infallible. To regard them as such, is utterly wrong.

China has an army of about 2,500,000 men. Its losses in killed and wounded amount to about one-tenth. The Japanese have a regular army of about 300,000 and its losses have been nearly half. They have had to re-enforce their army for the third time already. With our regular army, we can continue warfare for over one year. If we continue to fight, the spirit of the people will rise daily, and from them we can raise a new army which, coming as it does from the workers and peasants, will have the closest relations with the people, and will have their active help so that its fighting strength will increase day by day. If, in addition, the government gives democratic rights to the people and improves the livelihood of the soldiers' families, a great impetus will be given to the people and the army. Simultaneously, the political consciousness of the army will become clearer. An improvement in the livelihood of the people means that sources of the Army's strength will be healthier and stronger. The soldiers will have no need to worry about their families, their political attitude will change, and their conduct toward the people will change.

Up to the present time the Government does not realize that political education in the Army is very important, nor that an improvement in the livelihood of the people is essential. But if the war continues, it will realize this. With the development of the war, the people will be more firmly united so that the Japanese will meet the united resistance of the whole people. The attitude of the Government has changed much since the Mukden incident, with the result that the attitude of the Chinese armies and people has also changed. If the Government continues its firm stand, the people will strongly support it, and the Government will have a strong base for final victory.

Speaking of traitors in the country, Peng Teh-hwei said that there are indeed many traitors in the country willing to be the running dogs of the Japanese. They spread propaganda that China cannot fight any longer, that our forces are destroyed, and that our weapons are too bad to defeat the enemy. Such

