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DIGEST OF ADDRESS TO FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

MEETING ON JANUARY 23, 1942

I wonder if those who chose the topic for today's discussion realized just how significant it is? "Asia looks to the future." Asia does look to the future, and it does so more unreservedly than do the Western members of the United Nations. I cannot speak for Russia because I've never been there; But in England, and certainly in this country, large elements in the population seem eager to win the war quickly so they can turn back to the past. They felt comfortable, safe, secure within the political and economic frameworks that existed before the war, hence they want to return to them. These people seldom succeed in reversing the forward-moving tide of the Human Race, but they do hamper it--seriously at times.

But Asia today is different. Broadly speaking, Asia has no stake in the past. Run over in your own minds the political and economic pictures of Asia during the past 100 years. Could you imagine the peoples of Asia wanting to turn back to that? No. Asia's vote is wholly for the future. They not only hope--they are determined to move forward.

The potentialities of this great surge are tremendous. Upon the direction it takes, the fate of the world hangs, quite literally. The Japanese are trying to harness and lead this Great Force in one direction, a direction which most of us believe would be disastrous for the world. We of the United Nations are hoping that this Asiatic half of the World's people have move forward in quite another direction. But so far we have done little but hope.

I cannot speak for, or rather, about, all Asia. I can report to you something about China. As China faces the future, what are the courses open to her?

First, and perhaps easiest, China might choose to join Japan's greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. I do not think that this is at all likely to occur. China has fought for five and a half years against being included in such a bloc. The Chinese know from bitter experience just what inclusion in the "sphere" would mean for them. They know that every deterrent would be placed in the way of their becoming a strong, self-reliant nation. Every effort would

be made to discourage more than the most elemental education. With the possible exception of direct vocational training. This has been carried out in Manchuria for several years. Higher education, as a very special favor, would be available to a carefully selected few in Japan.

who would be sent to Japan.

The Chinese know, better than we seem to realize, that economically their country would be made into a mere appendage of the Japanese industrial-military machine. Chinese industry as such would be discouraged. Her raw materials would go into Japanese industrial plants, or Japanese-owned industrial plants in China. She would be forced to buy all her consumers goods from the Japanese. Chinese raw materials and labor would be used for the sole benefit of the Japanese. I need not fill in the details, but you can see how the Chinese business man, the Chinese industrialist, would react to this.

And politically, China would cease to exist as a Nation. Only the most venal politicians could hope to continue in office under such a regime. *would or*

The "New Order" as it is often called in Chungking, is a stench in the nostrils of all true Chinese. Only the most complete neglect and rebuff from friendly Western Powers, only if the Chinese were convinced that the others of the United Nations intend to wash their hands of China and leave her to fight it out alone with the Japanese after Hitler has been defeated in the West--Only then might the Chinese decide to negotiate for a deal with the Japanese.

However, we must not discount the appeal of the Japanese New Order in other parts of Asia. You know the appeal-- a bloc of sovereign, independent nations in Asia, exploiting one of the richest sections of the world under the leadership and protection of Japan, to the mutual benefit of all. But first and foremost, the eradication of "White Imperialism," of western domination and exploitation of Asia is played up. These selling points, specious though we may know them to be, are aimed shrewdly. Without discussing them in detail, you can see that they offer the people of Asia a definite program. And that definite program promises a drastic change-- a break with the past--a new future. So far this is the only blueprint that has been offered them. I know my Chinese friends see through it. I am not so sure about the other peoples of Asia.

Randall's article

I have indicated my belief that the Chinese will not take this course. What then? I think most Chinese want to hang on, despite hardships and difficulties which few of you can visualize, to strike back against the Japanese when and as they become able to do so, to participate in the United Nations victory and in what we may call a Four Freedoms post-war world. The difficulty of phrasing exactly what kind of

of a post-war world we mean is precisely the point which bothers the Chinese most. They agree wholeheartedly with the terms of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration, but they complain that these are principles, not commitments.)

Judd's article
What are the terms? What is the Machinery? What are the concrete plans to carry these principles into effect. And, more important, where is the evidence that the others of the United Nations will live up to these terms? The Chinese are independentminded and healthily skeptical. Recall their experiences with the concrete terms and commitments of the Kellogg pact, the League of Nations Covenant and the Nine-Power Pact. I do not mean to attack these instruments, or our behaviour under them. I merely ask you to regard them from the Chinese point of view.

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The Chinese themselves have devoted a great deal of thought to what they want in a post-war world. In fact, you will find more attention paid to these vital, long-range problems in Chungking than in other capitals more immediately preoccupied with campaigns in Africa and the Southwest Pacific. Very definitely the Chinese do not belong to the school who urge that we win the war now and worry about what to do with the victory after we have attained it. They challenge us to begin building that post-war world now.

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Briefly, they want what most of us have said we wanted: Some punishment of the aggressors and an International police system to insure that no one or two nations can repeat what Japan and her Axis partners have done to the world in the past eleven years. On the more positive side, they want some workable machinery for the settlement of International differences that will arise. They want an International economic system which will insure a fair chance for the newcomer, not a continuation of the economic free-for-all where no holds are barred. And perhaps most important to them, the Chinese want to be assured of a status of complete National equality. In brief, the post-war world should be one of "Order Under Law" in the opinion of most Chinese.

If we can demonstrate effectively that we, too, are fighting for this kind of a world, and will hold ourselves responsible for seeing that it is implemented, then in my mind there is no question but that the Chinese will follow this course, with the United Nations. *as among the leaders in taking*

I hope you have not interpreted my remarks as unqualified criticism of the United Nations, or this country's actions thus far in this war. Speaking again from the Chinese point of view, there have been two most encouraging actions, actions that have carried conviction that we do mean what we preach. The first was the inauguration of President Manuel Quezon as President of the Philippines Common-

wealth while the Battle for Bataan and Corregidor was at its height. Coupled with this was President Roosevelt's assurance to the people of the Philippines that every man and every resource of the United States was pledged to recover and protect the Independence of the Philippines. This pledge and this Inauguration made a profound impression throughout Asia. To the peoples of Asia it meant that we committed ourselves to the freedom and independence of an Asiatic Nation, and irrevocably pledged ourselves not to "wash our hands of Asia" once the victory over Hitler was won.

Too late! The other action which encouraged the Chinese was the American and British relinquishment of extraterritoriality in China. By it we committed ourselves to the practice, not merely the preaching, of equality among Nations.

But there is still another course open to the Chinese. Should we others of the United Nations fail to convince the Chinese that we have, and will carry out, post-war plans which will insure an equitable International Order Under Law, they might conclude that the only thing for them to do is to withdraw into themselves. They would wait out the war, with as little sacrifice and participation as possible, confident that we would not rest until we had defeated and disarmed Japan. Then, with as much strength as they could conserve they might chance it on the basis that they could hold their own during the period of International chaos that would ensue. A militarily strong China would be their fetish, their motivation, and Nationalism would be their watchword. Even as in this country where isolationism, discredited, is apparently seeking acceptance once more under the label of Nationalism, so in China would certain elements try to fashion the country into a mold of narrow patriotism of the type all too familiar to us in recent years throughout the world.

How, you ask, can we help China avoid the first and the last courses? The first thing is for us all to realize that we cannot direct or stage-manage China. We cannot send experts over to China and tell them how to run their country. We often speak glibly of teaching China how to be a democracy, how to rebuild their nation, how to educate her people. Intelligent Chinese raise their eyebrows and ask us if we ourselves have shown that we know how to do those things. China can be taught, can be guided, by demonstration and example, not by precept and exhortation. The first job is for us to show that we have a plan, a policy for the post-war world, and that we believe in it enough to work at it now.

If the United Nations are capable of doing that now, there is no chance that China will lag behind the rest of us. China is looking to the future. It is up to us to help make that future the right one.