

VII - 74 - 12. Precis (Extract from "Wah Kiu Tung Shun" No. 26)
January 22, 1941 with Chinese newspaper attached.

Precis.

110/41.

(Extract from "Wah Kiu Tung Shun" No.26)

The Disbandment of the New 4th Army.

Whether China can remain unified today depends chiefly on the outcome of the New 4th Army. Unless she remains unified, she will have little chance to emerge victoriously from her struggle.

By December last, the New 4th Army had concentrated all its troops scattered in South Anhwei, ready to cross the Yangtse River in accordance with orders. When they were about to cross the river they were encircled by no less than 70,000 Central Government troops. By the time nearly the whole of the New 4th Army had crossed the river; the troops left with the Army Headquarters in South Anhwei numbered only a few thousand, the majority of which were non-combatants. On the 7th and 8th, they were suddenly attacked by a force of nearly ~~100,000~~^{70,000} and as a consequence heavy losses were sustained by them.

On the 18th instant, the Central New Agency stated that the Military Council had ordered the disbandment of the New 4th Army. ^(Jan. 17) It further stated that Marshal ~~Yeh~~^{Yeh} Ting had been detained for disobeying orders and attacking friendly troops. As a matter of fact the New 4th Army had at the time less than 5000 troops stationed in South Anhwei, while the Central Government troops there numbered as many as several hundreds of thousands. Who should be responsible for launching an attack on friendly troops is therefore obvious. ~~There can be little doubt that by ordering the New 4th Army northward,~~ the Central Government intends to launch a campaign against the communists in Central China.

The crisis of a civil war is imminent. All those who advocate unification and resistance should demand the Central Government to abandon its anti-communist policy, to re-establish the New 4th Army and to release its officers detained at once. Unless this is done China will have to face a tragedy.

Jan. 22-1941

Precis.

111/41.

Manila

(Extract from "Wah Kiu Tung Shun" No. 26)

Knotty Problems arising from the Compulsory Northward Transfer of the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army.

(Chungking Airmail.) With the Kuomintang-Communist parley indefinitely adjourned since June last following the outbreak of the North Kiangsu Incident, the Military Authorities, headed by Ho Ying Chin, Chief of General Staff, have insisted that the principles concerning the defended area of the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army laid down in the "July Memorandum" should be carried out. In that memorandum it was laid down that all troops under the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army should be transferred to the provinces of Hopei, Chahar, North Shangtung and North Shansi, the transfer to be completed by end of December for troops south of the Yangtse and by end of January for those north of the river. Far sighted persons in Chungking look upon the compulsory transfer of the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army to the narrow region north of Hwangho as a plot to extinguish the two armies. From 3½ years' experience in guerilla warfare, it is well known that without extensive operation bases, the guerilla forces are like fish in a pond. If the said armies are cornered north of Hwangho they are destined to be swept out by the Japanese. It was also widely rumoured in Chungking that if the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army moved in accordance with orders to north of Hwangho, the 200,000 strong Central Government troops stationed at Hunan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Kiangsu and Shangtung would have them encircled and annihilated, and if on the other hand they did not act in accordance with orders, the Government would start a wide scale campaign against them. It was also reported that the pro-Japanese clique had recently been successful in forcing the Supreme Military Authorities to issue secretly a punitive order against the Communists, but there is no means to confirm the reliability of the report.

over

An officer of the 18th Group Army told our reporter that the problem was not as simple as it appeared. As was pointed out by Chu Teh, Pang Teh ^{Wei}, ^{Yeh} Ting and Han Ying in their telegram of the 9th, in the cause of unification, they had decided to move the troops under the New 4th Army stationed in South Anhwei northward, but it was impracticable to transfer the troops north of the Yangtse for the following reasons:

1. Having repeatedly subjected to Japanese plunders and famines, part of the inhabitants of North China had to come south to find a living. Thus to transfer their troops in Central China northward would mean to put them into a death trap.
2. Their troops in Central China are mostly local forces. They were organized in accordance with the Generalissimo's instructions to defend their native places. It would therefore be difficult to require them to leave their homeland.
3. Since the outbreak of the Ping ^{Kiang} Incident, members of the New 4th Army and their families had repeatedly ^{been} subjected to detention and assassination. That was another reason why they were unwilling to be transferred northward.
4. The 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army had been successful in embarrassing over half of the enemy forces. If they were transferred to the narrow region north of Hwangho, the Japanese would find it an easy task to have them annihilated and their control over Central China could easily be strengthened.

The said officer also pointed out that the chief cause of the present conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was due to the repeated promulgation of anti-communist legislation by the former. In order to smooth out this conflict, the Kuomintang should rescind all such legislation.

幸而的家属和留守人員，自平江修宋確山修宋學主後，幾無遺憾
和國或暗殺，這樣其地保障，也是他們不願北移的原因。整個八路軍新
四軍今天所有制敵軍力，已有半以上，假如強令北下，武裝力量甚
難察察，其地小地區，不僅在戰略上容易遭受敵軍消滅，而且會全
致。這近可加強其在華中的統治，便利其以攻為守的陸謀，這當試
國堅持抗戰保衛華中的局面非常不利，從前假設北移，已所北
種種危險，將重部隊北移的命令完全是沒有理由的，這至民族抗戰利
發軍軍人自後元國共兩黨之所以發生磨擦，原因至國所為國
民黨不斷發布反共法令，如防止異黨活動辦法等，前此種反共文件已
種宋盛反舉不勝舉，而吾人亦曾多舉列為。磨擦從何而來，今日之
困難問題，而今日之磨擦問題，三種小冊子國人觀此，即可知磨擦未
深究者責在何方，致於昨日之反共武裝行動，如石邊
三西去之不斷排異，小島改憲在華北所使自居於恢復舊觀，東
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困難，被國民黨首先商討，撤成取消一切反共法令，庶幾有
如八路軍新四軍以五十萬之眾，編為三個師，總額五千人之駒，待遇
殊不公平，而最近何部長更連此區區軍餉，亦不令停發，實亦當
置我軍於死地，此種慘無道之措施，其居心何在，至為明顯，六路
軍新四軍若支撐救後抗戰，軍事制敵人在華中力此，實在大功
於國家民族，非特不能受辱，原亦已顯，其亦內外而能何從圖者，
繼之，此強令八路軍新四軍調移黃河以北，實違背國家民族
抗戰之利益，違反全國人民及海外僑胞之公意，縱身投降，欲
借此完成其挑撥反共之陸謀，以助其其主下日寇而已，宋之
秦檜，以寸道金幣召岳飛，將其屈死於風波亭，今秦檜門
徒，亦口舌舌戶，以強他軍令，遂行其投降主義，唯吾人絕不
忍昧者此固為做了岳飛，則中華民族前途將從而斷送，吾
人做日寇的奴才牛馬，永遠不能翻身云。(五月四日高語部)

陝甘寧冀察晉邊區

抗日民主政權的團結與進步

惟有堅持民族統一戰線正確方針

中華民族才有光明前途

自抗戰既起，自政權繁榮，和平攻取以來，國內磨擦問題
頗形嚴重，據外間輿論，不忍見國面磨擦，磨擦反成分裂，名曰
全國加緊團結，切中計計，通奉外間，所傳中共違背諸言，種
自非法行動等，等誣謗非人，造謠污蔑，即保故甚至
曲筆文字，以淆亂全國人士，所聞，圖片反共分裂及藉口而已，有
其文化界負有聲望之士，曾在陝甘寧晉邊區及晉察冀
邊區視察，目前甫自陝北抵桂，記者即在探詢，當蒙
賜見，某君表示，日寇其在華南地帶撤退，但在華北地帶
正加緊，張滅掃蕩，由於敵好挑撥，國共分裂，致後抗戰處於
萬分艱苦之地，此時唯有加強團結，同仇敵愾，始能固存救國，
當記者與同所傳中共已將邊區蘇維化，是否事實，即詢
時，某君不覺大笑，再三種種謬言，認為不攻自破，並謂華邊
區實恐受毀之於後。

抗戰以來，在中共中共指導下，由於中共人士極極努力，
邊區成為全國模範的抗日民主根據地，已為海內外同胞所
公認之事實，但是這並非就邊區的政權，如同一般高意破
壞中共之奸徒所說的「包亦」亦化」那樣，邊區政府是
為真正實行三民主義的政權，剛強而奮發，辦事員長暨次
等，凡反汪運動，國民精神，動員等等，邊區人士莫
不熱烈響應，激發其行，邊區之政權，機關及村區以上的各

級民意機關，中共黨員只佔三分之一，其餘三分之二，包括當地
賢明公正紳士，商界人士，國民黨員以及其他黨派人士，
由此觀之，中共並無包亦為政，相反的，中共及全國抗
戰人士所堅決反對者，恰及「包亦」式的非民主的
執政，是也。

外傳自邊區實行沒收土地之說，更為荒謬，邊
區所實行的，乃為抗戰後，山西，浙江，廣西諸省所實行
之二五減租法令，至未減息，也從未越過了社會經濟
情況，實關係所可的範圍，土地所有權及財產所有
權，也仍歸之於地主，徵稅方面，自邊區人民百分之八
十，除少數貧苦者外，均須負擔國家賦稅，而且不歸
地主，實本家，智識份子，或工商農份子，均歸邊
區政府保護，一律有人權，政權，財權及言論出版
集會思想信仰之自由權。

經濟方面，由於抗戰生產量急遽增加，人民的需
要也跟著急遽增加，因此年來，邊區以土產布必需品
為主，的商業生意，突隆，獲利頗多，一部份商人在一
九三九年內，曾有七十萬元的盈餘，當地沒有苛捐雜稅，
所以省本家的盈餘，是特別豐厚，邊區政府所經營之國
營企業，僅佔整個企業之一部份，對於外地資本家到邊

是為我國同胞所必需，這里的問題就是打退

國幣的幣幣多不勝數的漫自排擠情狀接連起來就變了，
取決於他國匯票的兌換基礎是定全年具體的幣幣
的危機日益成熟，中國的抗戰已趨勝利，同時抗戰是
工作對於資金的需求，又是異常巨大迫切，因此這里主
要的問題，應當是在主觀的做決，在正確的主觀做
決之下，這個問題是不難迎刃而解的。

這里所謂主觀的做決，就是使國內有一定的條件，
保證你同胞們所經營的事業能有正常的發展，具體
的說，一方面是需要社會的安定，另一方面是需要政治
的進步，只有這兩個條件，才能使你同胞們對於自己所
經營之精神財力，獲得應有的收穫，從這里可以看出
國內政治的改善，乃是吸收你同胞歸國投資的主要的途
徑。

這里所謂主觀的做決，就是使國內有一定的條件，
保證你同胞們所經營的事業能有正常的發展，具體
的說，一方面是需要社會的安定，另一方面是需要政治
的進步，只有這兩個條件，才能使你同胞們對於自己所
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決之下，這個問題是不難迎刃而解的。

這里所謂主觀的做決，就是使國內有一定的條件，
保證你同胞們所經營的事業能有正常的發展，具體
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國內政治的改善，乃是吸收你同胞歸國投資的主要的途
徑。

(頁十)

八路軍新四軍戰報

(新華社：華北中十三日電) 我冀中各師各旅各團各連
續擊：第一團擊退敵自十百百至六日敵以平六六六
敵及七個敵砲隊八百餘，擊退偽軍七百餘，俘偽軍
百廿餘名，我繳獲輕機槍三挺步槍百廿餘支自行
步槍九輛，敵傷六十二匹，其他軍用物品甚多。敵傷六十七
匹，計重傷者甚多，動員五萬餘人，收獲銀五萬餘元，電
桿五百餘根，糧食本村十座，擊退十九個汽車團，破敵鐵
甲七號計廿隻，輕重車六十二隻，箱七十七個。第二團擊退自
十廿七日至十五日敵自廿九日，先後掃蕩四個，敵傷敵傷
四百餘人，俘敵傷三百餘名。……(持才索字)……其他軍用
品甚多。破壞公路七八段，計百廿餘里，動員群眾二萬
六千餘人，收獲銀二萬七千餘元，擊退敵車三輛，破敵
鐵甲七號計五隻，輕重車六十二隻，箱七十七個。我軍在此期間檢
獲大砲四十四百餘人。

(新華社：華北中十三日電) 我八路軍在艱難之情況下仍
繼續擊退敵自十百百至六日敵以平六六六
敵及七個敵砲隊八百餘，擊退偽軍七百餘，俘偽軍
百廿餘名，我繳獲輕機槍三挺步槍百廿餘支自行
步槍九輛，敵傷六十二匹，其他軍用物品甚多。敵傷六十七
匹，計重傷者甚多，動員五萬餘人，收獲銀五萬餘元，電
桿五百餘根，糧食本村十座，擊退十九個汽車團，破敵鐵
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十廿七日至十五日敵自廿九日，先後掃蕩四個，敵傷敵傷
四百餘人，俘敵傷三百餘名。……(持才索字)……其他軍用
品甚多。破壞公路七八段，計百廿餘里，動員群眾二萬
六千餘人，收獲銀二萬七千餘元，擊退敵車三輛，破敵
鐵甲七號計五隻，輕重車六十二隻，箱七十七個。我軍在此期間檢
獲大砲四十四百餘人。

我敵傷傷六十三百十日我軍二部在魏陽附近
擊退敵自十百百至六日敵以平六六六
敵及七個敵砲隊八百餘，擊退偽軍七百餘，俘偽軍
百廿餘名，我繳獲輕機槍三挺步槍百廿餘支自行
步槍九輛，敵傷六十二匹，其他軍用物品甚多。敵傷六十七
匹，計重傷者甚多，動員五萬餘人，收獲銀五萬餘元，電
桿五百餘根，糧食本村十座，擊退十九個汽車團，破敵鐵
甲七號計廿隻，輕重車六十二隻，箱七十七個。第二團擊退自
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四百餘人，俘敵傷三百餘名。……(持才索字)……其他軍用
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六千餘人，收獲銀二萬七千餘元，擊退敵車三輛，破敵
鐵甲七號計五隻，輕重車六十二隻，箱七十七個。我軍在此期間檢
獲大砲四十四百餘人。

(新華社：皖東北十三日電) 我八路軍某部二部十三日
日在皖東北某有陽附近與敵偽數百人激戰終日，
將敵偽全擊潰，計擊退敵偽二百餘名，繳獲步槍
百數十支，其他軍用品甚多。

廿五期第三頁上，第一行不應再印成五種分職長
為正，免字錯。

本期廣告