II - 65 - 1. The University of Chicago Round Table - Crisis In China
September 2, 1945

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

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

CRISIS IN CHINA

~~#65~~ #65

September 2, 1945

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

II-65-1

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"All the News That's Fit to Print."

The New York Times.

CITY EDITION
Fair and mild today. Tomorrow mostly cloudy and mild, possibly light showers at night.
Temperatures Yesterday—Mon., 31; Min., 28

August 27, 1945

HANDS OFF CHINA
by
Tillman Durdin

The Chinese Communists can expect no aid or comfort from the Soviet Union in the threatened civil war in China. This, on first consideration, seems to be the implication of the Sino-Soviet treaty, whose terms were released here last night.

Once in the main body of the treaty and once in reply to a Chinese note, the Soviet Union pledges itself to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. In this note is a paragraph dealing with Soviet moral and material aid to China that emphasized that this aid is to be given entirely to the "National Government as the Central Government of China."

The Sino-Soviet treaty and the related agreements clearly deal with China as represented by the present Chungking Government, and it is difficult to see how Russia now could render any material support to Yenan without violating the spirit and the letter of the treaty. The meaning of the treaty seems to be that Premier Joseph Stalin has conceded the prospect of a China dominated by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's regime, strongly supported by the United States, and has exacted in return what he feels he needs in Asia to make the Soviet Union secure and to establish Russian power in the Pacific.

China has had to pay a price for the Soviet "Non-interference" pledge. The price amounts to the reestablishment of the position--Russia held in Manchuria before the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, plus the exclusion of the Chinese from Outer Mongolia. Yet the initial reaction of Chinese and foreign observers here is that the price is lower than it might have been, than many had expected and than rumor had reported.

Preliminary reports of the contents of the treaty here had it that the compact gave Russia joint management of Manchuria's industries and mines and conceded Soviet domination of Korea. A review of the text of the treaty actually has caused relief in some quarters and there were sighs of "it might have been worse." Premier T. V. Soong receives credit for close, astute bargaining with Premier Stalin.

It is too early yet for considered reactions, and nothing has been vouchsafed from Communist quarters. At present there is no ranking Communist representative in Chungking and really authoritative comment would have to come from Yenan. It is known, however, that the local Communist representatives have showed nervousness over the outlook ever since Premier Soong went to Moscow the first time. Russian policy being as devious and hidden as it is, few would choose to be categorical over whether the Chinese Communists ever

would receive material Soviet support in the future. On the face of it, however, it looked as if they were on their own. And thus they were confronting formidable power in the strength of Generalissimo Chiang's armies plus United States support for these armies in the way of air and ground transportation and in equipment. There still may be civil war in China, but the prospect is less that such a war would be a camouflaged struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Russian receives joint ownership and management with China of the main railways of Manchuria and joint use with China of Port Arthur as a naval base under the terms of the treaty of friendship and alliance and related agreements as concluded in Moscow on August 14. The text of the treaty and agreements were released last night following the ratification Friday by the Chinese and Soviet Governments.

In a note appended to the treaty, China agrees to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if after the defeat of Japan a plebiscite of the people should confirm their desire for independence. In reply, Russia agrees to respect the "political independence and territorial integrity of the Peoples Government of Outer Mongolia." (The area has been operating since 1924 under a constitution drafted along Soviet lines.)

In another exchange of notes, Russia agreed to give China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, this aid and support to be given entirely to the National Government as the Central Government of China. Russia reaffirms her respect for China's full sovereignty over the three eastern provinces of Manchuria and recognizes their territorial and administrative integrity.

Article V of the treaty provides that the contracting parties will act "according to mutual reppect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party." In a note, Russia agrees to the specific application of this article to Sinkiang. (The Central Asian province where Chinese and Moslem tribes have engaged in civil war since 1932.) The treaty states that it is concluded for the purpose of insuring Sino-Soviet collaboration in the war against Japan until complete victory is won and of preventing a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan. The treaty and agreements are to remain in effect for thirty years.

Appended to the treaty is an agreement in which China declares Dairen a free port, agrees that the harbor master shall be a Russian and leases to Russia free of charge half of all port installations and equipment. The railways affected by the treaty are the Chinese Eastern and the South Manchuria, as well as auxiliary lines.

A minute appended to the treaty records that Premier Stalin stated that Russian troops would begin withdrawing from Manchuria three weeks after the capitulation of Japan, the withdrawl to be completed in a maximum of three months. The agreement regarding the railways provide=

that "except during such time when joint military operations are carried on by the two countries against Japan the railway shall not be used for transportation of Soviet troops."

The names of the two railways involved are to be dropped and hereafter are to be called by the name, Chinese Changchun Railway.

The agreement provides that the general manager shall be a Russian but the president of the board of directors a Chinese. An agreement for the period of hostilities in Manchuria—which the Japanese took over in 1931-33—provides that the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters relating to the prosecution of the war will be vested in the zone of operations, for the time required for the operations, in the Commander in Chief of Soviet forces. The Chinese National Government representative and his staff will be appointed to administer recovered territory and insure Chinese civil cooperation with the Russians. A Chinese military mission will be named to the Soviet commander to insure the active cooperation of the Chinese Administration, "being guided by the requirements and wishes" of the Soviet commander.

The agreement on Port Arthur provides for an area around the port in which the Russians have the right to maintain an army, navy and air force. The civil administration of Port Aruthur and its surrounding area will be Chinese, but in the city the leading posts will be filled in agreement with the Soviet military commander and in the whole area the posts will be filled "taking into account Soviet interests in the area." The agreement says Soviet proposals in the area "will be fulfilled" by the Chinese Administration, The Soviet Government is entrusted by China with the defense of the naval base.

In case of war with Japan, Dairen shall be subject to the military supervision and control obtaining in the Port Arthur naval base. All properties jointly shared with Russia or installations made by Russia in Manchuria after thirty years will revert to China without compensation. The Russians receive the right to transport over the Chinese Changchun Railway military goods in sealed cars without customs inspection, but the guarding of such goods will be done by Chinese railway police. The agreement says the Chinese Changchun Railway will be operated as a "purely commercial transportation enterprise, with profits divided between China and Russia."

PM
5 cents
NEW YORK DAILY

August 18, 1945

U.S.A. LEANING TOWARD CHIANG IN CHINESE ROW

by

Alexander H. Uhl

The desperate jockeying for position that is going on in China between Chiang Kai-shek and the Yenan Communists is threatening daily to drag the U.S.A. into a dangerous position of partisanship. So far we have kept out of trouble, but the next few days may see us in a peck of it.

The Chungking-Yenan row over who shall receive Japanese surrenders, and who is going to take over what territory, is growing more bitter and there are no signs of a solution. Into this delicate situation both Ambassador Hurley and Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer are advancing with unmistakable evidence that one of these days we're going to find ourselves up to our neck on Chiang's side and thoroughly enmeshed in the Chinese political mix-up.

On Friday, Wedemeyer announced in Chungking that all Japanese surrenders will be made to Chinese officials designated by Chiang Kai-shek. Announcement also was made that American planes and American personnel would be used to fly Chinese officials to cities now under Japanese control to take surrender.

Claims and Dangers

The big danger here is that a good many of these cities in the north are in territory that the Yenan Government declares comes under its jurisdiction. And it has made it clear that it has no intention of abandoning any claim to them or to the arms of the Japanese there. What happens if there is shooting?

Wedemeyer says he doesn't want any shooting and will do his best to see that there isn't any. But, obviously, American soldiers must protect themselves. And in that process the inevitable consequence will be that they will find themselves fighting for Chiang against the Communists. That taking os sides is precisely what official U.S. policy says mustn't happen.

The gravest danger lies in territory north of the Yellow River, where the Communists are strongest. The Hurley-Wedemeyer school of thought has taken the position that the unity of China centers in Chiang and that the Communists are a minority group with roving bands of soldiers, not necessarily representative of the people in their territory.

Basis for Erring

It is precisely here that the danger of miscalculation is greatest. For Chinese experts contend that Chiang has very little strength among the people north of the Yellow River; that by far the overwhelming support in that territory is behind the Communist Government.

The result may be that U.S. forces aiding Chiang north of the Yellow River may find themselves fighting the Chinese people rather than simply scattered Chinese Communist troops. Churchill's troubles in Greece would be minor alongside what this North China business might then be.

Hurley is trying to get Gen. Mao tze-tung, Communist leader, to come from Yenan to Chungking in an effort to straighten out the surrender situation. Thus far Mao has balked.

The Communists have insisted they cannot be disregarded; that they have 1,000,000 men in the field and that they represent the majority of the Chinese people. There is every indication that they are stronger than either Hurley or Wedemeyer cares to admit.

Meanwhile, Yenan has kept up a train of accusations against Chungking and the Chinese puppets whom it accuses of trying to make deals with Chiang and even the Japanese. Latest Yenan charge is that Gen. Chsi-shan, recently appointed Governor of Shansi by Chiang, already has made a deal with the Japanese to protect their interests in his province.

Where the Soviets stand is not yet clear, but all indications are that they will follow a "hands off" policy. Certainly the treaty that Moscow has just signed with Chiang would indicate that some satisfactory arrangement on the Communist problem has been reached.

Abandoned?

On the face of it this would appear like an abandonment by Moscow of Communist China, yet perhaps it regards Yenan as strong enough to look out for itself.

Prime Minister T. V. Soong, now in Washington, spent an hour with Secretary of State Byrnes Friday. Although no official statement was issued, it is known that he discussed in detail the treaty between Moscow and Chungking.

Thus far the text of the treaty has not been published, but there is reliable information that Soong and Stalin worked out an agreement which all but restores Russia's 1904 position in Manchuria, which means special Soviet privileges in Dairen and Port Arthur and pretty thorough USSR control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which Japan "purchased" from the Soviet Union in what had all the earmarks of a forced sale. It was a sale bitterly resented by Stalin.

Reports from Calcutta declare, too, that Soong had agreed to cede the strategic Tanu Tavu area on the border of Siberia and to have given the Soviets a free hand in Outer Mongolia. Inner Mongolia still remains in China's hands, as does political control of Manchuria.

For Your Notes . . .



Causes of Stilwell's conflict with Chiang:

1) Refusal to give Am. Lend-Lease for civil war

1a) Rejection of recog. of Ch. Army;

2) Chiang's refusal to fight Japs after 1940.

Passivity, sabotage

Stilwell made repeated flights to Chungking to get Chinese troops. Suddenly, reluctantly given – 1 div, then 2, then 3.

3) Chiang's use of 500,000 of his best troops to blockade 8th Rt. Army since late 1939 instead of fighting Japs –

4) Ho Ying-Chin's sabotage of contact with Chiang & Chou-en-lai and Japs.

5) Chiang traps by hundreds of thousands went over to Japs. No action or condemnation of them.

6) Open, disgraceful war-profiteering; Am. exchange flowed to Japs.

PM
5 cents
NEW YORK DAILY

August 14, 1945

CHINA POLITICAL STRIFE HEADS TO SHOWDOWN

by

Agnes Smedley

Peace in the Far East will place Chiang Kai-shek and his regime on the horns of a dilemma - and in China this dilemma has numberless horns. With the coming of peace, Chiang will no longer have the right under lend-lease to U.S. war material on which he has reckoned and which he has been accumulating for civil war against the Chinese Communist-commanded guerillas. Some U.S. weapons only recently were used in Shensi province when Fascist Gen. Hu Tsung-nan attacked 8th Route Army troops and opened a new phase in the civil war.

With peace, Chiang Kai-shek's troops will have the advantage of disarming Japanese soldiers, thus accumulating large quantities of weapons and ammunition. However, the bulk of the Japanese army is north of the Yangtze and in Manchuria. The 8th Route and New 4th Route armies are mainly north of the Yangtze, fighting the Japanese in their stronghold.

With peace, these guerillas will do a little disarming of the Japanese of their own, in which they will be ably aided by Japanese war prisoners whom they have helped to educate and whom they have treated as brothers for so long. At last these guerillas will get war material which Chungking has refused them and which we also refused them.

There is still another horn of the dilemma: Since the end of 1938, when Chinese reaction took on a new lease of life, the Chung-king Government has hidden behind "war necessity" to deny democracy to the Chinese people, to shield corruption and war profiteering and to impose high taxation and other forms of looting on peasants. This "anti-Japanese war necessity" will now vanish and unless there is a coalition democratic government, truly representative of the entire Chinese people, the Chungking Government will be stripped naked of all pretense.

One of the most serious issues arising after the peace will be the puppet troops who have fought for the Japanese. In late June, Chiang stated in a press conference that most of the 800,000 puppet troops would "desert to the Allied cause" when U.S. troops land in China.

While some of these puppets are poor peasants conscripted by the Japanese or their quisling Nanking Government, and others are professional gangsters, the vast bulk are former Kuomintang troops who had deserted to the Japanese under the leadership of their own high officers. According to reliable reports, some 80 Kuomintang generals went over to the Japanese after Pearl Harbor when it appeared that Japan would win the war.

To the present day, Chungking has not deprived one such general of his commission nor sent one punitive expedition against such traitors. Instead, in reply to questions by foreign correspondents, Chungking spokesmen defended some of them as patriots who would later return to the fold. The Kuomintang retained contact with such traitorous generals and directed them against Chinese Communists.

Among these Kuomintang armies who deserted to the enemy are over 50,000 men under the command of generals Li Chunkiang and Ho Shing-chin, whose supreme commander was none other than General Tai Li, head of the secret police and known as the Himmler of China, and with whom some military men have been working in China. Some of Tai Li's agents operate against Chinese students and against anti-Kuomintang Americans in the U.S.A.

Unless the Allied nations work out some democratic plan to solve the problem of the 800,000 puppet troops, as well as other focal points of conflict which could defeat the peace, there may be civil war.

A powerful and united Chinese coalition democratic government, preliminary to the national elections and responsible to and serving the interests of the entire Chinese people, could solve such problems.

Certainly the Soviet Union would welcome such a government, as would the British Labor Government.

* * *

The Reader's Digest

June, 1945

THE FATE OF THE WORLD IS AT STAKE IN CHINA

by
Max Eastman and J.B. Powell

China is a giant among nations. Larger than all Europe, its population is one fourth of the human race. And this giant is waking up. Following the example of Japan and Russia, it is entering the industrial age.

Therefore, the question whether China goes democratic or totalitarian is the biggest political question of today. In war or peace the weight of this giant of manpower may well be decisive in settling the fate of the world.

China at present is split into three parts. Manchuria and the eastern half, including most of the seaboard, are occupied by Japan. A north-western region not far from the Soviet border is held by the Chinese Communist Party. The rest of China is still under the Chiang Kai-shek government, which commands the loyalty of an immense majority of Chinese everywhere.

Chiang Kai-shek is the successor of Sun Yat-Sen, father of the Chinese Revolution and founder of the Kuomintang (People's Party), which is dedicated to these three aims: national independence, political democracy and the people's welfare. From 1927 to 1937 Chiang defeated the war lords, crushed the attempt of the Communists, Moscow-led, to seize power, and united under the Kuomintang pracitcally all China except the small north-west region into which his armies drove the Communists. Though popular and powerful enough to make himself permanent dicatator, Chiang set a date, November 12, 1937, for a Constitutional Convention. Japan attacked in July of that year, and the Convention had to be postponed. With victory now in sight, he has set the date again — November 12, 1945 — Sun Yat-Sen's birthday.

Just before Japan's aggression in 1937, the Communists formed a united front with the Kuomintang and promised to fight under Chiang Kai-shek. But they cooled off after the Stalin-Hitler pact, and finally renounced their promise. Explaining that they were "revolutionaries, not reformers," they declared themselves and their Red Army independent. They now have their own money, run their own Party-controlled newspapers and suppress all others. They recently declared a boycott against Chiang's effort to produce a democratic republic, denouncing his Constitutional Convention, six months before its delegates are elected, as a "slaves' congress."

Such is the present state of China's hope for democracy. Japan, we are now sure, will be driven out; but whether Manchuria and North China, which hold the principal makings of great industry, will fall to the Communists and thus ultimately swing the whole gigantic nation down the totalitarian road, is undetermined. We Americans cannot evade our responsibility in this, for the question which social system prevails — that of democratic America or of totalitarian Russia.

American modes of influence are cultural persuasion, the example of prosperity, skilled technical assistance, capital investment, and above all, military and economic supplies. Russia's weapons are conspiratorial organization and Party-controlled propaganda, leading to seizure of power and a liquidation of all democrats, and if necessity arises, military invasion in the name of "liberation." Russia cannot furnish capital, an example of prosperity, technical assistance, or supplies on a scale comparable to ours. This gives us the trump cards if we play our hand with clear understanding of the forces involved.

The Communists know this, and are doing their best to cloud our understanding of these forces. A flood of books, articles, reviews, news dispatches, lectures and radio broadcasts is pouring across our country dedicated to the sole purpose of confusing American public opinion about the situation in China. There are four main points in this deception now being practiced upon us — all equally false and all aimed at persuading us to abandon another 450 million people to the totalitarian infection spreading from Russia.

Deception 1. That Russia is a "democracy" and that China can therefore safely be left to Russian "influence."

Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous conception. Mr. Lattimore appraised the net result of the Moscow Trials and the blood-purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936-39 as "a triumph for democracy." He now urges our government, in a book called Solution in Asia, to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in Central Asia. His publishers thus indicate the drift of his book on its jacket:

> He (Mr. Lattimore) shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.

This deception was set going in Moscow in 1936, when a new constitution was filled with jazzed-up phrases from our Bill of Rights so that it could be advertised as more democratic than ours. Instead of establishing popular government, however, it legitimized the dictatorship of the Russian Communist Party. (Article 126) Stalin himself, addressing the Congress which ratified the draft of the constitution, frankly stated this fact:

> I must admit that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in force the regime of the Dictatorship of the Working Class and preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party. In the Soviet Union only one party can exist, the party of Communists. (Pravda, November 26, 1936)

In the "elections" held under this constitution in 1937 and 1938, only one candidate's name appeared on each ballot. He had been endorsed by the Party, and the "voting" consisted of assenting to the Party's choice. The ceremony has not been repeated, and would make no difference if it had. The constitution is merely a facade for dictatorship, and anyone who protests the fact is shot or sent to a concentration camp. In Siberia whole regions are given up to these concentration camps where from 15 to 20 millions* of Russian citizens are dying a slow death at hard labor. That is the kind of "democratic practices" the Chinese would see "across the Russian border," if they could look. But looking is not permitted by totalitarian states.

First of all then, if our policy in China is to be wise, we must hold in steady view the fact, frankly admitted by Stalin, and once vigorously stated by President Roosevelt as follows: "The Soviet Union is a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world."

If this dictatorship spreads its tentacles across China, the cause of democracy in Asia is lost. As is well known, these tentacles need not include invading Soviet troops, but only the native Communist parties now giving allegiance to the Soviet Union, and taking their directives from Moscow. When these Communist parties get control of a neighboring state, the Moscow dictatorship and its fellow travelers call that a "friendly government." It is by means of these Communist-controlled "friendly governments" — not by overt military conquest — that Russian power and totalitarian tyranny is spreading from the Soviet Union, in Asia as in Europe.

Hence, for those who cannot swallow Deception No 1, there is another We shall quote it from a recent book, Report from Red China, by Harrison Forman:

Deception No. 2 "The Chinese Communists are not Communists — not according to the Russian definition of the term. I saw not the slightest tangible connection with Russia."

Forman is backed up by Edgar Snow, the best-known popularizer of the pro-Communist view, with the remark that the Chinese Communists and their leader, Mao Tse-Tung, "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of establishing Communism in China in the near future."

To unmask this deception, you need only go to the Daily Worker's bookshop on 13th Street, New York City, pay 25 cents for Mao Tse-Tung's book, China's New Democracy (1941), published with an introduction by Earl Browder (1945) and read the book. You will find that the "Lenin of China" is a devout, orthodox and obedient disciple of "Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism," and gives unqualified allegiance both to Soviet Russia and the Communist world revolution.

Here are a few quotations from Mao's book:

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* Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Red Army, estimates that the number is about 12,000,000. Boris Souvarine, French historian of Bolshevism, estimates 15,000,000. Victor Kravchenko, redently resigned from the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington, who has visited many camps and had official relations with their managements, says these estimates are low, and puts the figure at 20,000,000.

II-65-1

The world now depends on Communism for its salvion, and so does China.

We cannot separate ourselves from the assistace of the Soviet Union or from the victory of the anticapitalist struggles of the proletariat of Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France and Germany.

No matter whom you follow, so long as youare anti-Communist you are traitors.

Mao explains learnedly that Communism in China has two steges: first, the present stage of "New Democracy," which is but a preparation for the second state: i.e. "proletarian revolution" and the establishment of collectivism on the Soviet model. Mao excoriates those who do not understand this, and insists that "the second stage must follow the first closely, not permitting a capitalist dictatorship to be inserted between them." ("Capitalist dictatorship" is Mao's term for democracy as we understand it.)

How different this is from Edgar Snow's dulcet assurance that the Chinese Communists "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of establishing Communism in China in the near future."!

Mr. Snow also says, "Long before it became defunct, the Comintern ceased to have much direct contact with the Chinese Communist Party." The fact is that Mao Tse-Tung was one of the three Chinese members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from 1935 to its dissolutionin 1943. At the last congress of the Russian Communist Party the growth of the Chinese Party was enthusiastically reported and the Party congratulated on bedoming "tempered in the fires of civil war and national war," and on "building a Soviet regime." Mao sent the congress a "flaming Bolshevik greeting" lauding the Russian Soviet system and concluding with "Long live Comrade Stalin!"

The Chinese Communist Party is the darling of Moscow and of Communists all over the world. Its national congress has actually met in Moscow. All its maneuvers, even the most "reformist," have been executed under orders from the Kremlin. A glance in the Moscow Party press is enough to prove thatthere has been no letup of this intense concern with the Chinese Communist Party. Obviously the success of the Chinese Communists in building a Red Army and establishing an independent nation just over their border — a nation whose leader declares, "We cannot be separated from the Soviet Union" — would only intensify the interest of the heads of the Soviet Union.

To complete the record of this deception: In the translation of Mao's book, Earl Browder omitted words and passages which would, if printed in America, expose his own game of playing democratic patriot in order to get his henchmen into positions of power. In the Chinese edition Mao is outspoken in advocating the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and explaining that democracies like England and the United States are "capitalist dictatorships," which "have become, or are about to become, blood-stinging military dictatorships of the capitalist class." "On the point of death," they have become "imperialist" and will soon be replaced by "the newest Soviet-style socialist republic, a dictatorship of the proletariat." He explains that in this respect there is no difference between the "Eastern (i.e. Japanese) imperialists" and "the s.o.b. imperialists of the West." (The Chinese epithet ..."

This is not true.

Chiang's "Chinese Destiny"

16

13
Lin Yu-Tang

is fouler, but s.o.b. will do.) All this, which is of the essence of Mao's orthodox Communist position, is omitted from the American edition.

The Chinese Communist Party is more honest. Late in 1944 it passed a resolution "accepting American demands to establish military bases in the Northwest," but adding: "We are heir to the orthodoxy of Marx and Engels which calls for a class revolution of the workers and peasants....The cooperation of the Chinese Communist Party with the United States is a temporary strategy...."

?!

That disposes of the propaganda-myth that the Chinese Communists are not Communists.

Deception No. 5. That the Chinese Communists are fighting the Japs, and that the Chinese National Army is not.

The truth is that the Chinese Communists are fighting the Japs enough to hold their border, but not enough to make it worth while for the Japs to move in and clean them out. This can be seen by a glance at the map The front east of Yenan, where the Communists claim they have an army of 450,000 soldiers heroically fighting the Japs, is stationary. It hasn't moved since Japan came up to the Yellow River in 1938. Although the Japanese have attacked in some areas, there have been no real battles. American military observers agree that a virtual truce has existed in several front sectors, especially along the railways supplying Japanese forces fighting American and Chungking troops in the south.

that true

Where Chiang Kai-shek's National Army fights, the record of bloody and heroic battles has been spread on the pages of the world press for years. We all know of the great struggles in 1937 and 1938 in which the flower of Chiang Kai-shek's armies was lost together with such modern armaments as China possessed. China has received only a trickle of aid as against the flood of lend-lease sent to Russia, but Chiang's armies have fought on. There were at least 100,000 casualties in the battles they fought last year on Chinese soil, and certainly 85,000 in the furious Burma campaign which has broken the blockade by reopening the Stilwell Road.

positional warfare

Casualties among Chiang's troops run to over four times the total number of soldiers the Communists claim to have.

The tragic fact is that while fighting the Japs a little, but never enough to menace Japanese communication lines to the war against Chiang in the south, the Communists are also waging "revolutionary war" against the Chinese National Army. When the war began, the Chinese Communist Central Committee declared: "In Chinese politics the decisive factor is military power. We must, in the course of the war of resistance, expand as far as possible the military power of the Party as the basis for captureing the revolutionary leadership in the future." Since Pearl Harbor Mao naturally has been willing to let the "s.o.b. Western imperialists" finish the Japs while he concentrates on "capturing the revolutionary leadership."

This makes less astounding the statement of Lin Yutang: "For every Japanese the Communists claim they have killed they have killed at least five Chinese, for every town they have captured from the Japanese they have

!!

captured 50 towns from other Chinese." It explains Congressman Walter Judd's statement that when, last summer, the Japanese armies raided down from the north through four to six hundred miles of country the Communists claim to control, they got free passage. Not a single one of the hundreds of trains carrying Japanese soldiers and supplies was derailed. (Congressman Judd of Minnesota served ten years as a medical missionary in China, and saw Communism firsthand. He revisited the country last September and October.)

While this process of Communist revolution is going forward according to a published schedule, such fables as the following are related by Harrison Forman and solumnly quoted in a review of his book by Edgar Snow:

"In the seven years of war the Communists have fought over 92,000 battles. They have killed and wounded 1,100,000...and captured 150,000 of the enemy.... For the same period the Communists suffered over 400,000 casualties."

Ninety-two thousand battles in seven years is 36 battles a day, or one battle every 40 minutes. In these battles the Communists, although a good number of them were armed only with "old blunderbusses, mines, or any weapon at hand," are alleged to have knocked off enemy troops at the rate of 20 per hour, or one every three minutes — this without allowing for mealtime or rest hours, night or day, for seven years running. Beside these astronomical achievements, the deeds of our Marines at Tarawa or Guadalcanal are, of course, mere child's play.

It is doubtful if a more fantastic tale was ever told with a straight face to the American people. And we repeat: To expose it, you have only to look up the documents and use your brains.

Depeption No. 4. That Chiang Kai-shek is a fascist, and that his totalitarian regime is preventing the Communists from establishing democracy.

What kind of "democracy" the Communists aim to establish we have heard from their leader: a "Soviet-style dictatorship of the proletariat." Not only Chiang Kai-shek but everyone in the world who intelligently opposes this kind of dictatorship is denounced as a "Fascist." This has been the Communist smear-technique ever since Hitler broke his pact with Stalin.

Chiang's regime is not democratic. When he assumed power in 1926, it was the opinion of the leaders of the Kuomintang that only a military dictatorship could achieve the unity and independence of China. Until that should be achieved China, thanks as much to the Communists as to foreign intruders and war lords, could not create a democratic republic. Whether they were right or wrong, it is certain that, except for the Communists and their subservience to Moscow, Chiang has achieved both the unity and independence of China; and he is moving toward a democratic republic.

He once remarked to Ambassador Hurley: "If I become a dictator I will be forgotten, like all dictators in our history, within 48 hours of my death. But if I sincerely work to return power to the people, I will be remembered as the George Washington of China. Can there be any doubt of my choice?"

Chiang's speech of last March, in which he set the date for a constitutional convention, is sensible and convincing. It concludes:

> Upon the inauguration of constitutional government, all political parties will have legal status and enjoy equality. The Government has offered to give legal recognition to the Communist Party as soon as the latter agrees to incorporate its army and local administration in the National Army and Government. The offer still stands....
>
> I am optimistic of national unification and the future of democratic government in our country.

No one, comparing Chiang's speech with the schedule of steps toward proletarian dictatorship drawn up by Mao Tse-Tung, could fail to see which of the two is on the road to democracy. Chiang has permitted the publication of a Communist daily in his capital throughout the war, while Mao will not even admit a correspondent of any Kuomintang, or non-Party, newspaper in his capital. There is a maddening press censorship under Chiang, but under Mao there is no free press to censor. That is a rough indication of how things stand.

The Chinese Communist regime is a ruthless party dictatorship, camouflaged like Russia's with ceremonial elections, but ruled with executions, purges, concentration camps. The Chinese National Government has tabulated, with name, place, date and circumstance, the persons known to have been officially murdered by the Communists as "traitors and Trotskyites" from April 1939 to October 1944. They total 34,758, of whom 26,834 were military personnel, 3069 government officials, 1387 Kuomintang Party workers, and the rest civilians. This does not include the unnumbered Chinese soldiers killed by the Communists in combat action against Chiang's troops.

The fact that China under Chiang is not yet democratic is the very thing that makes the Communist danger so great. If the Chinese knew freedom and possessed it, they would be less ready victims of the totalitarian infection. Having known little but the arbitrary rule of rival war lords, and then the equally arbitrary enforcement of national unity by the Kuomintang, they are as open to this infection as the Russian peasants were who had known only the regime of the Czar. They are poised at a crossroad, ready to go either way -- the way of the Russian totalitarian state toward which Mao and the Chinese Communist Party are pointing, or the way of American democracy toward which Chiang and the Kuomintang are pointing. That is why the Chinese liberals, as even pro-Soviet reporters admit, while fighting for more freedom under Chiang, are not for the Communists.

What Chiang needs is our political understanding, technical assistance, loans, investments, munitions and supplies in support of his plan to introduce constitutional government and make China democratic. The two most important items on this list at the moment are supplies and understanding. Supplies our State Department has recently, to the relief of all wise men, decided to give to Chiang and not to the Communists. But we must give understanding too.

It shows no understanding to demand of an anti-Communist government that it "unite" with Communists. An American foreign policy based on this mistake may very soon prove fatal, not only from the standpoint of democracy but of every American interest in Asia. Put yourself in the place of Chiang Kai-shek, and you will see why. Chiang has fought the Communists in bloody war and desperate intrigue for 20 years. He gained his power by saving China from a Communist revolution in 1927. He knows the Communists. He knows that one word from Stalin -- and no word from anywhere else in the world -- could produce the "unity" some critics are so irritatingly urging him to pull out of a hat.

Chinese courtesy will survive a lot of irritation. But Chinese patriotism has a limit beyond which it will not go. And there lies behind our pressure upon Chiang for a "unity" he cannot achieve, an implication that can only infuriate Chinese patriots. The implication is that the Roosevelt-Churchill pledge at Cairo to return Manchuria to China at the end of the war may, if unity fails, be interpreted to mean turn over Manchuria to the Stalin-dominated Communist government of Yenan.

Washington rumor, reported in the New York Times, even says that Stalin was promised a free hand in Manchuria for his help in the war against Japan. But Stalin may never have asked for Manchuria. That is not his method of expansion. All Stalin needs in order to establish his power in Manchuria is a "friendly government": a quick march in there by Mao's Red Army, followed by the usual made-to-order puppet state. Our acquiescence in that operation will be sufficient to sell out Chiang -- sell out the hope of democracy in China, and the hope of a strong independent American ally in Asia.

Chiang's loyalty to the Western democracies, and to America in particular, throughout the long war for Manchuria has been inflexible. It survived our unlimited export of war materials to Japan; it survived our "defeat Hitler first" policy and the loss of Burma and Malaya, which enabled the Japanese to blockade China, and prolonged her sufferings interminably; it survived the Stilwell incident; it has survived the recent, Communist-kindled flare of anti-Chinese slander in the American press; it has even survived, so far, our inane demand for "unity" with armed revolutionists who are waging war against him. But it will not survive the knowledge that we propose to turn over to Stalin, through the agency of these revolutionists, the richest lands of China about which, essentially, the whole war with Japan has been fought.

Chiang, because of his belief in Western institutions, has stood like a rock against those in his party who advocate a rapprochement with Russia as against his close friendship with the United States. But should it become apparent that we intend to bargain away all North China for the sake of Russia's help in the war, will Chiang be able to resist this pressure? With what arguments can he answer those Chinese patriots who will suggest that China do her own bargaining with Russia, and renounce the policy of special trust in the United States? Only the smoke-screen of deception laid down by the Communists and their fellow travelers blinds us to this momentous question, and all it entails -- for us and for world democracy.

These pro-Communists are playing the same game in Asia that succeeded so brilliantly in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, for instance, on his principle of "arming anybody who will kill a Hun," Churchill sent munitions and supplies to the rebel Tito, veteran Comintern organizer and agent of Moscow, enabling him besides killing Huns to wage a civil war against our ally, the legitimate government, whose troops were commanded by General Mikhailovitch. Mikhailovitch was also killing Huns, but he had not the backing of Moscow, and he had no propaganda machine with which to counter this same four-sided lie; Russia is a democracy, Tito is not a Communist, Tito is fighting the enemy and Mikhailovitch is not, and Mikhailovitch is a "fascist."

Except for Chiang's loftier position as head of his government for 18 years, the situation in China is ominously similar. And the choice for us is unescapable: Either we face the facts and side with the growth of democracy, or we swallow the lies and endorse the totalitarian strangulation. There was never a plainer or more simple issue before a United States Government.

But there is one big difference -- that is the size of China. To sell out Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese "Tito" will not add a paltry 13 million to the totalitarian Colossus. It will bring under totalitarian regimentation 450 million people. This vast population, united in their policy with the Soviet totalitarian empire of some 200 million, would certainly threaten the hope for a democratic world. When Iran and India followed China, as they almost certainly would, that would mean a solid block of one billion people under a totalitarian regime.

Facing such a prospect, it seems obvious that as intelligent democrats we must abandon the whole policy of meek appeasement toward Communist propaganda and power in China. Even Russia will have greater respect for us if we make unmistakably clear our loyalty to those free institutions which have enabled our American nation to arm, equip, feed and rescue from destruction a half of the planet. If we really believe in democracy, let us implement that belief, with a peaceable but clear-headed, informed and resolute campaign to promote the democratic way of life throughout the earth.

We have not uttered one word about democracy in China. Made no demands on Chiang — as we have in Europe.

Or do imperialists!

VITAL SPEECHES

June 1, 1945

WHAT IS THE TRUTH ABOUT CHINA?

by

Walter H. Judd

Because our forefathers came from Europe, because our sentimental attachments have been there, and because the foreign history we studied was European history, most Americans have understood fairly well the nature of the struggle raging in Europe. Because we live in this hemisphere and because we have a Monroe Doctrine and a Panama Canal, naturally we have been concerned and informed about problems in this hemisphere. But up until Pearl Harbor Sunday most Americans simply could not or would not believe that either ancient or modern events in Asia could be of real significance to us. Yet when the war ends in Europe, as we hope and pray it will in not too distant a future, America's attention will inevitably shift more and more to the far Pacific, and we must know and understand the situations there better than we have in the past if we are to adopt wise policies which will bring the war there to a decisive conclusion with a minimum of cost in men and money and time, and with a maximum of security and trade for the future.

We got into this war through Asia; and if America gets into another war, almost certainly it will also be through Asia.

There are few subjects about which American thinking is more confused today than it is about China. During 1938, 1939, and 1940, when I was going up and down the country reporting what I had seen in China in the preceding years, including a period of 5 months under the Japanese Army, and trying to awaken my fellow citizens to the dangers of Japan's and our own policies at that time, most people were inclined to say "Oh, don't worry about the Japanese. You are unduly alarmed. After all, the Japanese can't even lick the Chinese, and of course the Chinese can't fight, so what could the Japanese do to us?"

But that easy thinking was based on two false premises. The first was that the Chinese could not fight. I have always wondered just where anybody got that notion. The second was that we could fight---on short notice. And I have always wondered where anybody got that notion. Where did anyone get

the idea we could bring up a generation of youth believing that never again would Americans need to fight for their country, that they had little or no need to think about anything except their own comfortable ways; and then suddenly take them out of the university or off the farm or out of the factory and overnight convert them into trained warriors, conditioned emotionally as well as physically to stand up against the hardened veterans of Europe and Asia who had been taught to glory in killing.

A great many American boys are dead today unnecessarily because we engaged in that sort of wishful thinking.

Then one morning Japan gave us the worst defeat in our whole 168 years of independent history. We woke up with a start and said: "Why, those Japanese are good. And if they can do that to us, how in the world have the Chinese been able to hold out against them for four and a half years? The Chinese must be good, too." Our estimate of the Chinese began to soar.

Then Madam Chiang came to this country and she captured American imagination as few foreigners ever had, and certainly as no Asiatic ever had. Our estimate of the Chinese soared still higher—too high. To hear many Americans talk, including commentators and columnists, practically every Chinese was wholly selfless in his devotion to his country, patriotically sacrificing everything for freedom and his nation's welfare, and so forth. We who had lived there were concerned, and Chinese leaders were even more disturbed, because we and they knew that it was not a true picture of the situation in China or in any country, and that such over-idealization would inevitably lead to a swing-back into over-disillusionment. We are in the midst of that swing-back now. Those who a year ago could hardly find words good enough with which to describe our Chinese allies, now can hardly find words bad enough. To hear them talk now, all Chinese are lazy, are crooks, and grafters, are obstructionists, anti-foreign, hopelessly inefficient, split up into political factions interested more in preserving themselves than in defeating Japan, expecting us to do all the fighting, and so forth, and so forth. Between those two extremes, where is the truth? Some of you have asked me that question. I thought if you were going to ask my views, I ought to have a fresh look at the situation. I had been home for 6 years and I wanted to get the feel of things as they are in China today. So I went out to China last fall for that purpose.

I had worked there 10 years as a medical missionary, 1 year in Nanking, 5 years in South China, and 4 years in north China. I was able to talk in their own language with many Chinese whom I had known well in the past, doctors whth whom I had worked , nurses we had trained in our hospitals, principals and teachers and students from our schools, presidents and deans of universities, businessmen. These people fled to west China to escape Japanese enslavement. They have fairly frequent contact back and forth across the lines with their relatives in occupied China. They know exactly what is going on. And they would sit down and discuss with me as a friend their thoughts and hopes and fears as freely, I suspect, as they would with new American officials or Army officers or reporters, or perhaps

even as frankly as they would with Mr. Wallace, who drops in for a few days and comes back with positive views as to just what should be done. I did not talk to high Chinese Government officials until the last 2 days. I talked with Chinese people. It is on the basis of such observations that I want to present some of the high lights, if I can.

The first thing to say, is that we are being deluged nowadays with a flood of reports from people who do not have an adequate background of experience in Asia. Some of you have traveled in the Orient and you remember your first glimpse of it. The poverty, the overcrowding, the dirt, the squalor, the disease, were all right out there in full view; and your first reaction was: "Why, these people are living almost like animals. Their condition is hopeless."

It was just about all you could take under ordinary circumstances, wasn't it? How much worse after almost 8 years of war and invasion?

In former years most reports on China came from Americans who went out as missionaries, or as teachers, or as businessmen, or as long-term reporters or students. They soon observed also the tapestries and cloisonnes, and porcelains, the literary achievements, the mature wisdom, the basic good ness and friendliness of the people. They wanted to live their lives happily there, so they looked for and found the best. They learned what the Chinese have long known, that the loveliest flower of all, the lotus, frequently grows in the most uninviting surroundings.

But thousands of Americans are there today who are not interested in China's culture. They did not go because they wanted to go. They went because they were sent, by their newspaper or by Uncle Sam. They are not looking for the best. They frequently see only the external things, almost all unprepossessing, and they do not like it. I find our boys abroad do not like any country except one, and that is the United States of America. They want only to get back to it. They write home to their families about the filth and the cruelties and the antiquated methods and what seem to be lackadaisical attitudes and all the rest. The fathers and mothers read it, and then they know all about China because their boy, John, well, he is there and he saw and he knows.

Likewise most reporters---they do not want to be sent to that assignment and they do not like it. There are a few American girls out in Chungking, and few movies, and hardly any electric light most of the time, no running water, and no fun. It is an awful place to which to be sent.

Understandably, these Americans tend to judge China, not in terms of China's own past but in terms of the West. They assume the bad conditions are the result of the present Government's failures, when in reality conditions became not worse, but very much better under that Government in the years prior to the war.

We must judge China not in relation to conditions in America, but in terms of conditions as they were in China 20 years ago and 200 years ago.

Outsiders without adequate background of historical perspective understandably play up the superficial differences, almost all to China's disadvantage.

The second fact which many fail to appreciate fully is that China was still in the midst of a great revolution when she was plunged into this war against her wishes.

Revolutions are almost always disorderly and long-drawn-out affairs. It took the French 80 years to get through their revolution. There was a revolution and a counter revolution; another revolution and another counter revolution; then a third revolution before they got political stability. It took us 90 years, including a great Civil War, before we got straightened out after our revolution. You will remember that when our Republic was older than China's is, conditions in this country in the latter part of the War of 1812 were so bad, the corruption and factionalism were so rampant in the Government, inefficiencies in the Army were so notorious, and the administration of affairs was so bad that representatives of the people of New England met in Hartford, Conn., and solemnly voted to secede. They were giving up as hopeless the attempt to get internal unity and stability in this struggling Republic. Their problem was child's play compared to China's.

In addition to her internal difficulties, she was undergoing constant interference from without. It was only 4 years after the revolution began in 1911 that Japan tried to force on China the 21 demands which would have made China a vassal state. Four years later a group of 4 white men sitting at Versailles took Shantung, the sacred province of China, and tried to award it to Japan. Japan invaded that province again in 1927, took Manchuria in 1931, and bit off 3 other pieces of Chinese territory in the next 6 years before starting full-scale war in 1937. In addition, several other nations were meddling in China's affairs, trying to prevent her achieving real unity and strength. Naturally the Chinese were not able to get their revolution completed and a modern, efficient, unified, and democratic government set up.

During our election last fall there were people in this country who were profoundly concerned as to what the effects on our country of a possible 16-year dynasty might be. But China had been under one dynasty, not for 16 years but for 267 years when her revolution began, and yet she is expected to have no internal trouble.

Superimposed on the inevitable difficulties involved in carrying through a revolution, getting a new type of government established and the people organized and unified, is a third factor. China is suffering acutely from what Mr. Churchill has well called "the diseases of defeat." She has undergone seven and one-half years of almost uninterrupted reverses. She lost 80 per cent of her modern industry in the first 3 months of the war, because that industry was down at the coast, where Japan struck.

She has not had anything that could properly be called an arsenal since the fall of Hankow in 1938--6½ years ago. Yet we expect her men to be able

to fight just as well as our boys can now. But we could not fight very well for a few months after Pearl Harbor, could we? Even with all our industry intact it still took us almost a year to get going. How about the British after Dunkerque? With enormous assistance from us it still took them over 2 years to get back on their feet. And yet the Chinese, after all these catastrophies and with almost negligible supplies, are supposed to be just as fresh as a daisy and are berated as noo good if they cannot start r right now a vigorous counteroffensive to save our bases in south China.

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt made the basic decision right after Pearl Harbor, to hold defensively in the Pacific while disposing of Germany and Italy in Europe. The fundamental strategy was to concentrate on beating Hitler first. So we poured over 98 per cent of our supplies into Europe, and sent less than 2 per cent to east Asia, and less than 10 per cent of that went to the Chinese. Up until a few months ago when we finally began to consider the Chinese armies of sifficient importance to make an all-out effort to get more assistance to them, they had had only two-tenths of 1 per cent of all the supplies that we sent abroad to our allies.

Now suppose Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had reversed their decision, had decided to beat Japan first and sent 98 per cent of our aid to Asia. Where would England have been? She would have been gone long ago. Nobody would have cursed the British as cowards and worthless allies because they could not fight without arms. And Russia could not possibly have held as she is doing now, if she had not had help—lots of it. China did not get such help.

We and our western allies made a decision which gave brilliant results in Europe. But that decision inevitably led to almost disastrous results in Asia. If we take the credit for good results in Europe, there is no way we can escape some of the responsibility for the bad results in Asia. We could not fight at full strength on both fronts. So we chose to concentrate first on one. That is nothing to be ashamed of. Why do we not stand up and admit the bad as well as the good effects of our decision, instead of trying to blame our Chinese allies for defeats that were inescapable if we could not help them more? I am not criticizing; I am merely trying to see things in perspective.

China lost her major railroads in the first few months of the war. She lost control of the Yangtze River Valley, which is far more important to her transportation than the whole Mississippi River Valley is to us. These things made it impossible to shift troops rapidly or to get food from the areas of plenty to those of acute deficiency.

You have read of Chinese soldiers foraging on the common people, and of Chinese peasants rising up against their own armies. You probably thought, "What kind of troops are these that take food from their own citizens? What kind of allies are these that will not support their own armies?" But the soldiers simply have to live off the land at times, or starve.

And I would remind you that the same thing happened in our Revolution. George Washington's men had to live off the land at times and they were royally hated and resisted by some of the Colonists because of that fact.

Frequently the only way to transport food from areas in China where there are surpluses is for men to carry it. A Chinese coolie will carry about 130 pounds of rice 25 to 30 miles a day; but he has to eat, and by the time he gets to where he is taking the rice, he has eaten it all up and has no way to get back. It is not as simple as some of the back seat drivers in America imagine.

We supplied the Japanese with Dodges, Fords, Chevrolet, Studebakers— I saw them by the thousand. We even sent over representatives of our great automobile and truck-manufacturing companies to establish plants in Japan, so she would be sure to have enough. Her armies are on wheels. The Chinese are still afoot, leading donkeys, pushing wheelbarrows, carrying loads on poles.

In the Reader's Digest of last August, I believe, there was an article written by an American woman who had lived for many years in France. She described the "diseases of defeat" as she saw them developing there. She described friends of hers whom she had known from childhood, people of the noblest birth and background and the finest education and the highest integrity and the most sensitive culture and personal charm. She told how she witnessed those friends being forced by the sheer urge to survive biologically, to abandon step by step all the niceties of civilization and become almost like hungry dogs in the street, fighting for a bone in order to live.

There are social amenities and graces that we take for granted, but which are general only when people have food and order. This is one of the basic reasons why we simply must succeed in devising some other way than war of settling international disputes, because no civilization, no culture, can stand too prolonged or too frequent or too exhausting wars.

What are the diseases of defeat? First, there is physical deterioration. I was shocked last fall by the apperance of many Chinese, particularly among the soldiers. I had seen famine refugees in times past, and thought I was used to malnutrition, but this was even worse. The Chinese soldiers will have to have just plain good food for at least 6 months before anyone can possibly expect them to have the strength and vigor and stamina to start a counteroffensive.

We Americans, if we believe all the advertisements we read, have to take a vitamin pill or two every day to get through that little let-down we are said to have in the middle of the afternoon, and most of us are pretty well supplied with vitamins in our regular diet. But the Chinese haven't had enough vitamins for years and years, and they are more jittery and irritable and restless than ordinarily, and they are tired. They are anemic, they are full of parasites and malaria and tuberculosis and dysentery.

They have got to have adequate food and medical care.

Then there is economic deterioration. China was able to keep her economy surprisingly good balance until a complete blockade was slapped upon her in 1942, and that was not her fault. We and the British controlled the seas, but we could not keep the sea lanes open to China and the British could not hold Burma and so China was completely cut off. The blockade had the same effect on her as it had on our South in the War between the States. The South was not industrialized, as China is not industrialized. The South had to get supplies and equipment and machinery and munitions from abroad, just as China did. The South had to sell its cotton and other products abroad in order to get foreign exchange to keep its currency stable, just as China did. When the blockade shut off trade the South had to resort to the printing press and inflation resulted. It was this economic breakdown and lack of supplies as a result of the blockade which led to the weakening and defeat of the South more than any other single factor.

That same sort of economic deterioration and inflation has taken place in China since the blockade. And how did we try to cure it? One of the ways was by sending in paper money when we began to be able to fly over the hump. Here is a hundred-dollar bill, Chinese money, printed in America, by one of the American bank-note companies. This hundred-dollar bill is worth about 23 cents in American money at the present time. We flew over the hump 100,000 pounds of this paper money. This is a new way to cure inflation--less goods and more paper money. I talked to American officers over there who were bitter about the way we characteristically assume we can cure any problem with more money--and then blame the Chinese because they could not prevent inflation.

Then there is moral deterioration--graft, corruption, profiteering, black market. These things develop in any country in war, and especially in defeat. But there are several things to say about the graft in China. First, while it is bad, it is not nearly as bad ad I expected to find, considering the circumstances. Second, there has always been in China, the "squeeze" system, which we consider graft, but they do not. Any Chinese who handles a transaction for you takes 10 per cent. If he takes 20 per cent, he is dishonest; but, if he does not take 10 per cent, he is not considered honest, he is just dumb. The Chinese say that dishonesty consists in leaving somebody with the wrong impression. So it is not graft from the Chinese point of view, because everybody knows perfectly well it is being done. It is "old custom," has always been done, and everybody understands it.

When Chinese come to this country and do business with us, they have to do it on our terms. And, Mr. Chairman, when we do business with them in their country, we have got to do it on their terms, that is if we want to get much accomplished. More missionary wives have lost both their money and their relition trying in vain to beat this "squeeze" system than from any other cause.

When the Chinese do it, it is "graft"; when we do it, it is a commission. But it is the same thing.

If some Americans, whether in the General Accounting Office or the War Department, or elsewhere, try to insist that the Chinese do just as we wish, they will not rudely defy us, they will be very obliging and sweet about it, but things will not get done just the same. All through history people have been trying to force the Chinese to do this or that. No one has yet succeeded for long. We will save effort and money, and get better results if we have the sense not to try, even as we are not trying to force Stalin to let his handling of our lend-lease goods be supervised by us.

Newly arrived Americans may be unable to understand why Chinese do not instantly see how much "better" our ways are than theirs. Well, we are only 168 years old and not doing so well in spots. They will wait until we are 1,000 years old and then see how we are coming along before they will scrap all they have learned and take over our system en bloc. Our gadgets are better than theirs, but our manners are much worse. Of the two the latter is to them the more important. They have been unfavorably impressed by many of our aggressive, rude go-getters as some of our people there have been unfavorably impressed by their mechanical backwardness and their refusal to get as excited about things as we do.

Doubtless you have read Leland Stowe's book or other reports about the graft on the Burma Road--and the graft was there. But, as one American colonel who has been out there all the time, told me, "If the Chinese had stolen everything we sent over the Burma Road, it still would have been nothing compared to what some of our allies have stolen." Chiang Kai-shek shot some ringleaders and tried his best to clean things up, but he could not completely eliminate the graft any more than we have been able to stop it in our own Army.

That is the third thing to say. Look at the graft by Americans--and with far less excuse. After I got to China and saw what some American were doing, I felt ashamed. You have not heard much about it there, but recently you have read some sorry stories out of France, where hundreds of Americans are engaged in cheating their own Government. And they do not need to do it, in order to exist. They get $50 a month and good food. And there are officers involved too. When we look at our own corruption without any cause except moral break-down, it seems to me that we ought to be slow about jumping too severely on people who are starving and drain some gasoline out of a bomber or jeep, when no one is looking, and sell it in the black market to keep their families alive another week or so. Let him that is without sin in this respect cast the first stone. If America were to go through half of what China has gone through, for half as long, and come through in no worse condition internally, I should be astonished and proud.

Then there is political deterioration. In any country the "outs" want to get in, and, when the "ins" have almost nothing but defeats to show, the "outs" inevitably increase their opposition. They complain to those in power,

"Why did not you follow our advice, our policy, then the country would not be in such trouble? Get out! Let us have some other party in control." You know, we in America do not wait to attack our leaders until they have defeats. We start sniping at them if their victories are not right on schedule—our schedule.

The surprising thing is not that there has been and is opposition in China to Chiang Kai-shek. The miracle is that after 7 years of almost unending defeats he still has the confidence of an overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, that he is still in the ring— a little wobbly, to be sure, but not on the ropes—and that he is still slugging awya on our side. We ought to be thanking God that he is still able to divert much of Japan's strength from ourselves, instead of complaining too bitterly because he has not been able in the midst of all his disasters to carry out a lot of internal reforms, desirable and important as they are. Where is our sense of proportion?

And when there is political deterioration, and opposition grows and there are "subversive" attacks on those in power, then, of course, there follows governmental deterioration. When a Nation's unity begins to break down, those responsible for order always reach out and restrict freedoms. They increase cnesorship, they tighten up on the radio, tighten up on the newspapers, they hand out propaganda instead of information, they have agents to keep watch over any suspected malcontents. If it is in some other country, we call it a Gestapo. If it is in our country, we call it an F.B.I.

Not a bomb has dropped in our American streets. There has been no internal violence or armed rebellion, and yet would anyone contend that we have all our democratic freedoms in America today?

Mr. Churchill announced today they are going to hold an election in England after the war. England, the mother of parliaments and the oldest democracy, has not dared risk an election for 10 years in a time of trouble. Yet you have heard Chiang Kai-shek cursed up and down because he has not held an election in the midst of a cruel war for sheer survival and in a country which has never before held an election in its 4,000 years of history, and half of which is occupied by an enemy and 80 per cent of whose people cannot read and write. It is ridiculous. Yet he has gone to the extreme length of saying that he will call next November, even before the war is over, the constitutional convention which was shceduled for 1937 but which had to to be postponed because of the war's outbreak.

The established democracies all restrict their people's freedoms in war, even in victory; but Chiang is supposed to extend freedoms in his country even in the midst of defeat. It is an absurd counsel of perfection.

Then there is deterioration of morale, one more of the diseases of defeat. You can hold on indefinitely as long as you have hope, or can see a turn in the road ahead; but if you begin to lose faith in the ultimage objectives of some of your allies, then something goes out of you. That is what is happening in China's heart and therefore morale. Under Chiang's

leadership they have done their best to hold the line against Japan so that we in the West could concentrate on beating Hitler first. They have tried to do their part loyally according to the strategy which we determined. They do not wholly like that strategy because it put them last, though they had been fighting tyranny first, but they accepted it without complaining. But now there is a mounting fear that, no matter how great their efforts and their sacrifices, they are not going to be given a chance to become really strong, free and independent in their own right. They wonder whether they may not be sold down the river in the peacemaking, whether the western nations in the old power-politics way are not already dividing up Asia and even China into spheres of influence, and will demand so-called friendly, that is, puppet, not free governments.

I witnessed this effect last fall when I was in Chungking. Two white men who had not been in China met in Quebec, and there in North America, in the Western Hemisphere, and without a single Asiatic present, they announced that they had come to settle the fate of Asia, where live one-half of all the people in the world. Was that calculated to increase Chinese confidence and morale? Why should they fight for white men's schemes?

Defeats from one's enemy are bad enough; verbal attacks and pressures from one's allies are even worse. They are the straw which has threatened to break the back of China's resistance.

For over a year there has been in this country a concerted propaganda campaign against the Central Government of China and the Generalissimo. There are three main sources. One is some of the imperialists of Europe. They know the foundation stone of the whole colonial system in Asia is people's continuing to believe that all Orientals are congenitally incapable of governing themselves ad democracies. If China gets on her feet and moves along progressively under her own power, that fallacy is automatically exploded and the foundation of the empires begins to collapse. Even if the Filipinos succeed, it will endanger the colonial system. Therefore the imperialists seldom miss an opportunity to point out faults and defects in China.

When Mr. Churchill got back from Quebec, he said, in his first speech in Parliament that "after all the lavish aid which America has given to China, these defeats in China are most disappointing and vexatious."

I was reminded of a story Jesus once told, about a man who had some very great debts, and he and his family were going to be sold into slavery because he could not pay the debts; but he plead that he be given another chance, and he was forgiven. And then the self-same man went out and grabbed somebody who owed him a hundred pence and without mercy threw him in jail.

England did not do so well in Belgium and France. Did we jump on her? No. She had some rather "disappointing and vexatious" defeats in

Greece and Crete and Tobruk and in Burma. Did we spend our time pointing them out? No--we redoubled our efforts to help hold her up. And she had had really lavish aid--millions of tons and billions of dollars worth of supplies. How much had China had?

The Chinese had never complained publicly about the smallness of the assistance they had received but after that statement by Mr. Churchill, a Chinese official spokesman in Chungking called in the newspaper reporters the next day, not to complain even then, but merely to set the record straight. He told them just how much aid the Chinese had received from America. It was the amount required to keep one American division in the field for 1 week.

The next day reporters in Washington asked a high American official about that and he got around it with one of the fast curves at which he is so skillful. He said, "Why, we are shipping more than 20,000 a month over the hump to China." That seemed to give the lie to what the Chinese were saying. But it did not. What he said was perfectly true, but it was one of those technically correct statements that nevertheless leaves a wrong impression. The catch was in the word "China." The material was going to the place on the map called China, yes, but almost all of it was going to the American Air Force in China. Only a dribble got to the Chinese.

We have trained and equipped two Chinese Armies to fight in Burma. They have dona a magnificent job, liberating Burma so it can be taken back into one of the empires. But, to put as much into training Chinese for saving their own country---no.

Now, I understand the military reasons for what we have done in Burma and so do you, but, if you were the last stop on the longest line of communications in the world, and if the stuff which was started to you got diverted elsewhere if anyone anywhere along the line wanted it, and if you had been fighting and starving all these years, you, too, would wonder whether you were not being played for a sucker, whether you were not just being used to hold the line for the white man until he could finish in Europe and then come to Asia to make the final kill, and reestablish himself on top once more, the old status quo restored, with its special privileges for white men. Would that encourage you to fight?

I am not saying anything here which we did not say to members of the British Government, including Mr. Eden--Mr Churchill was in Quebec--when some of us Congressmen were over there last fall. True friendship for England and determination to cooperate closely with her in the days ahead required us to lay the cards on the table. It is unfair to the British and to our other allies not to make clear that we Americans will never pledge our men and resources to maintain any empire or to prevent other people from doing the same sort of thing we ourselves did in 1776.

One of the reasons that took some of us to England--both Democract and Republicans--was to try to establish contacts with younger men in the British Parliament and Government with whom we could talk a common language in planning the future. I speak with the utmost respect and admiration and

gratitude for Mr. Churchill as a war leader. America can never fully repay its debt to him. He is unquestionably the authentic voice of the British people for the war. I hope, and I believe I can assure you, that he is not the authentic voice of all the British people for the peace.

I take off my hat to the greatness of the men who build the world's empires. They were giants, but of a day that is gone. I am not talking about the British Commonwealth. That sort of voluntary free association is the hope of the future. But empires are the way of the past. Let us not delude ourselves or anyone else.

Nobody can accuse me of being anti-British. I went up and down this country urging assistance for England 2 years before most Americans would admit her fate was any of our business. It is just because I want closest collaboration with the British people in the years ahead that I plead with them not to make it impossible by trying to restore the status quo in Asia.

Do you remember when we landed in north Africa, and, fir the first time in all the war, the tide turned and it became reasonably certain that we could win? Within a week Mr. Churchill made the speech in which he made it clear that he "did not become His Majesty's First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." You see, he gets there first. He declares his objectives and then, if any of us naive persons come along with the idea that this war has something to do with human freedom, even for Asiatics, we are told, "Oh, you mustn't say that; you are creating disunity among the Allies." What I would like to know is why don't we get there first once? Why not let him or someone else be the one that is creating disunity?

I am not ashamed of the principles of freedom and equality on which this Nation was founded and for which it has stood. Our allies do not hesitate to declare their position, frankly and frequently, just in case, as Mr. Churchill put it, "there should be any mistake about it in any quarter." Why should we be less forthright? Instead of timidly wondering "What will Churchill do? What will Mr. Stalin say? What will somebody think?" Why do not we decide what we ourselves think and then make it clear in unmistakable terms? We do not need to condemn any other nation's position. All we need to do is to declare our own. Seventy-five per cent of the people of the world would rally in eager support of a clear statement of what we really believe and stand for in Asia as well as elsewhere. If we do not do it quickly, it will soon be too late to do it without risking serious clashes with our allies.

Just a year ago in this city an eminent Chinese physician—he is not an official or a politician, he was here on a scientific mission—said, "When we lost our great cities back in 1937, 1938, and 1939, and our casue seemed hopeless, our hearts were heavy, but our spirits were high. We knew we were on the side of right and justice. We knew that eventually even you and the others who were helping the Japanese would realize the true situation and come to our side. Now you are in the war

on our side and we have powerful allies. It is clear we can win over Japan. But we are more discouraged now than ever before." I asked, "Why?" He said, "Because, despite all our sacrifices, despite our bleeding ourselves white to buy for you the precious months in which you could rearm and carry out your strategy of beating Hitler first, despite all our efforts to cooperate, loyally, we fear that we are likely to be betrayed in the political settlements, that we may not be permitted a real chance to establish a truly free republic."

I asked, "Why do you fear that?" He said, "Because we know Tory England and other imperialist powers do not want us to be free and strong, for that would put 'dangerous' ideas into the minds of other Asiatic peoples. We have reason to fear that the Russians do not want us to be really free, strong and independent. We know you Americans do. Your record is perfectly clear. It has been during all your years of contact with Asia and especially in the Philippines. We know you want us to be free, but we fear you are already so deeply involved in compromises and these power-politics deals that when it comes to a show-down you will not be willing to stand up and be counted on the side of human freedom, if to do so means that you have to oppose the wishes and views of your powerful allies, England and Russia. They have might. We Chinese do have only right."

They could have had peace by deserting their allies. Instead they have spent themselves to exhaustion; their military weakness is not a disgrace but a badge of honor. But they fear honor will not count—only power. Surely we can understand why there has been deterioration of morale in China.

We have only one objective in Asia, and that is to defeat Japan, but some other nations have two objectives. The second one is to defeat Japan, the first is to restore their empires or to block out new spheres of influence.

We want only to make Japan lose so we can come home; but there are others who want to win the war so they can stay on in control of the resources, man-power, bases, industry, and markets in Asia.

I tell you, the American people have to get down to bed-rock and see also that it is not enough to beat Japan, if we would have peace. We have to win the war so it will stay won, and for freedom, or we will have to do it over again under infinitely more difficult circumstances.

The second source of the propaganda against the Government of China and against the Chiangs personally, is the Communist group in China, and the Communists in America. I will put documents on this into the Record at a later date. I want to be careful not to be misunderstood at this point, because to many Americans, the word "Communist" automatically means Russia. One of the things I wanted to find out in China was how much, if any, is the Kremlin behind the Communists in China. Russia's official conduct with regard to the Chinese Communists since they made a pact with Chiang in

1937, has been perfectly correct and circumspect. There was no evidence that I could find or hear about that Moscow has been backing or supplying, either with materials or with guidance, the Communist government in China during the last 7 years.

So I am not making charges against the Russians. But I am charging that the Communists in China and the Communists and fellow-travelers in this country are working primarily in terms of what they believe will best serve Russia's future policies and interests. I am increasingly convinced the Chinese Communists are first Communist and second Chinese, just as we know American Communists are first Communists and second Americans. In the case of the Chinese Communists this is a reluctant reversal of the opinion I held some years ago. I, too, was taken in for some time by the talk of their being agrarian reformers, just Chinese patriots struggling only for the freedom of China and for democracy. I am convinced now the primary allegiance of the Chinese Communists is to Russia, whether Russia wants it that way or not, and their purpose is to make Russia overwhelmingly the strongest power in Asia as well as in Europe, which I think would be as bad in the long run for Russia as it would for Asia and for ourselves, requiring enormous armaments and constant tensions and suspicions which I hope profoundly will not have to be in the post-war world.

How can the Chinese Government be asked to furnish arms to a rebel government whose primary allegiance it has every reason to believe is to a foreign power? No government in the world could be rightly expected to do that. The Communists cannot be given full recognition in China until they are willing to give up their separate army. That they have never been, and, I think, never will be, willing to do.

Let me just sketch their history.

Beginning in 1927, the Communists tried to win in China by bloody revolution. For 8 months, May to December in 1930 I was in an area under their control down in south China. I saw first-hand their utterly ruthless purges and slaughterings of anyone who crossed their will. But they could not win converts by that method because the Chinese are basically too peace loving and orderly a people. Then they shifted the party line to confiscation of all property and redistribution among the workers. That too failed. It may be possible in some countries to buy the good will and support of a good many by taking other people's things, whether by taxation or otherwise, and redistributing them by government hand-outs, but the Communists couldn't do it on any large scale with the Chinese because the Chinese have too highly developed a sense of private property, what is mine and what is thine. So, when the Communists in China had reached the end of their rope, they shifted to another method. They adopted a great propaganda program to sell to the world the belief that they are merely downtrodden patriots, seeking to escape the tyranny and oppressions of Chiang Kai-shek in order to get freedom and establish democracy--just like our forefathers in 1776. By talking about freedom and democracy and unity and so forth, and by

calling all who disagree with them Fascists and dictators, they have succeeded in selling to millions of Americans one of the greatest hoaxes any unsuspecting people ever bought in all history. I spent more time and effort in China on this than on any other subject, including a morning discussing it with Mr. Lin Tsu-han, the chairman of their soviet government, the so-called border region government, and I can assure you that their propaganda is a gigantic fraud. They know, like Hitler, that if a big claim is made often enough, a lot of people will come to believe it is the truth. It is amazing how many American people will gullibly take good words as a substitute for facts.

The Communists have said, first of all, that Chiang Kaishek and his Government will not unite with them in the fight against Japan. Now is it not to our own country's interest to have China united? Therefore, must we not insist that Chiang Kai-shek and the established Government of China cooperate with the Communists?

But is it not strange that no one ever insists that the Communists cooperate with the government?

Their argument is given credence by some Americans on the naive assumption that the Communists are just a political faction, a minority or an opposition and in war we need cooperation, even a coalition, of all parties. We ask why will not Chiang take in the Communists as Roosevelt takes a few Republicans into his Cabinet. But there is a very considerable difference. We Republicans do not maintain a private army exercising arbitrary armed control over whole sections of the country because we do not like some New Deal policies. But the Communists do have a private army and a separate government. They are not just a political party. They are an armed rebellion.

We in America ought to understand such a situation. We had a slavery party in our country, and for 50 years we had compromises such as the Missouri Comprimise, the 1850 Compromise, trying to cooperate, reconcile, unite. But when the slavery faction pulled away and went down to Alabama and set up a separate government with a separate flag and a separate currency and separate taxes and a separate army under a separate command, did we unify them then? Or reconcile ourselves to the situation? No. We fought them for 4 years in one of the bloodiest wars of all history. We, who fought 4 years against our brothers to prevent a splitting of our country, are now in the intolerable position of constantly condemning Chiang Kai-shek because he will not consent to a splitting of his country—and under the name of "unity."

Perhaps you recall seeing this three-quarter page advertisement by the Communists last summer in papers all over the country, in which Earl Browder says: "The time is more than ripe for the United States to insist that the Chungking Government shall put its house in order with a real, not a formal, unification of all Chinese fighting forces." Mr. Chairman, the United States has no more right to insist that Chiang start arming the

Communists against himself than Chiang has to insist that Roosevelt "put his house in order" by getting a real unification of all anti-Japanese forces in America. He would have to take into his Cabinet as a starter, William Randolph Hearst, Col. Robert McCormick, and Hamilton Fish, because they were anti-Japanese long before he was.

Mr. Chairman, the word "unity" means one, not two; one government, not two; and one army, not two. Chiang has said from the beginning and during all these 7 years, and reiterated the offer last month, that he will accept them in a coalition government immediately if they will become just a political party; that is, will give up their separate army and their separate government. For us to insist that Chiang Kai-shek reconcile himself to a splitting of his own country and send military supplies to an armed rebellion is to ask him to be a traitor. Of course, he has not been willing to do it, and will not, unless the Communists will, first of all, give up their separate government and army. There is no law or logic whereby the head of a legitimate government can be asked to recognize, let alone assist, a wholly independent sovereignty within his own country.

But Chiang has leaned over backward in long suffering and patience trying to get the Communists to play ball in the war against Japan. He offered last fall to put the Chinese Government's armies under an American general's command if the Communists would do the same. They refused. In recent negotiations he suggested a committee to try to work out a way to get all the Chinese forces coordinated against Japan. He would put the Chinese Government on a basis of equality with the Communists, each having one representative, and the third man of the committee an American officer if the United States would consent to that. The Communists rejected the offer. Well, just what do they want? Do they expect to appoint all three members of the committee? Their pretenses are clearly exposed. It is impossible to get unity with them because there is no concession Chiang can make, short of complete surrender, which they will accept. They do not want unity. What they want is all the advantages of appearing to want unity so they can get arms and sympathy and support from abroad, while at the same time having all the advantages of complete independence. They are stalling along, taking advantage of Chiang's tolerance to expand their own strength while he weakens his in fighting the Japanese.

If they can stall along until the war in Europe ends, then they can hope for powerful support from Russia. They can try an "October revolution" in the hope of getting control of all of China. If that fails, they can at least rebel and try to split off north China, including Manchuria--of course, in the name of freedom--and then the new "independent democracy" can invite Russia in to prtoect it as she is protecting the new "independent" governments in eastern Europe. The new "North China" can even voluntarily insist, if it desires, on being taken in as one of the united socialist soviet republics. I do not like to make such suggestions. But I do not believe any unbiased person can go through all the evidence and escape the belief that this is the sort of thing Communists in China have in mind.

They claim they must have their separate army, because otherwise Chiang will destroy them, and that he is more interested in fighting Communists than in fighting the Japanese. There is no evidence whatsoever in his record to support that accusation. Look at the number of men who fought Chiang Kai-shek and who, after he defeated them, were not destroyed but were taken into his army and government and are today being used in high positions. I do not know of any other record in history that will surpass him in this respect. Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian general, fought him for years. When Feng had a change of heart, Chiang Kai-shek took him in, and he is now in charge of training Chiang's troops. Yen Hsi-shan, the Governor of Shansi Province, fought Chiang for years. I served as physician for Yen and his family. He finally agreed to unite with the Central Government and he is still in charge of his own troops as a part of the Chinese Armies. Man after man of the war lords and independent leaders, like Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, agreed to give up their separate armies and come in with Chiang Kai-shek, when the nation faced the Japanese peril, and he has not destroyed a single one of them. Only the Communists have refused to unite against the common enemy.

If Chiang's primary purpose had been to destroy the Communists, why did he not do it in 1938 or 1939 when they were much weaker and he much stronger? Can anyone imagine a real dictator or tyrant allowing a rebellion to simmer along for 7 years within his own domain? Such a claim does not make sense. Yet many have believed it.

The Communists are selling us a gold brick when they try to make us think that they must maintain their army or be destroyed. They maintain their separate army because they want to seize power after Chiang has armed them with American supplies under the pretext of unity.

And that brings up the next argument; that Chiang Kai-shek is not democratic, but that the Communists are—that since we Americans are democratic, therefore, we should support all democratic movements and that means support the Communists. But of course, neither Chiang Kai-Shek's government nor the Communists are democratic in our sense of protecting the full rights of minorities and of opposition parties. China has never in her history had a political democracy, although there is more social democracy, less of class, than in America.

I investigated this talk about democracy. Since most of the Chinese people still cannot read and write, I asked Mr. Lin how the Communists mark their ballots in their so-called elections. "Well," I was told, "We have a system of bowls, and the voter who cannot read or write drops a bean into the bowl of the man who is his choice."

I said, "I would like to know whether the voting is in private or out in public, because, if it is done in secret, I can imagine how easy it would be for some people I have read about in some cities in America to stuff that ballot box. They could fill the bowl with beans out of their sleeves in one trip into the booth. And if it is out in public so that the ever-present Communist police can be sure that the voter drops in

only one bean, you do not imagine he would drop his bean into the wrong bowl, do you, if he wanted to retain his head?" All Mr. Lin could do was grin.

The real low-down on this pretense of democracy came from the experience of the newspaper reporters who went up to the Communist area last fall. Some of them were taken in by the show that was presented to them and are now bringing out the sort of reports I spoke about earlier. But two of them told me that in the whole 5 weeks they were not permitted to talk privately to any Chinese they wished. That tells the story. Of course, they did not hear anything unfavorable. All those Chinese that are living, or that want to live, ardently praised the Communist regime.

It is perfectly true the indoctrinated members are fanatical in their loyalty to it. They are almost monastic in their devotion, as a Catholic priest put it. Unfortunately, a great many people accept such devotion to a cause as meaning the cause must be a good, or even a righteous, cause. But would we admit that Hitler's cause is good just because his storm troopers are utterly devoted to him? The Japanese on Iwo Jima support their Emperor fanatically. That does not mean we should support him, does it?

I have never seen such absolute devotion voluntarily given as in the Communist armies and amont their political agitators. I have never seen vice or a case of venereal disease among them, which surely is unique. It is also true that they have done a lot with very little and have improved the condition of some groups, partly by giving the have-nots what they confiscated from the haves, partly by brilliantly skillful propaganda and organization of the peasants. But it is at the price of rigid regimentation and the loss of basic freedoms.

True Marxism cannot win in China as it did in Russia, because its primary appeal is to the totally dispossessed, such as the serfs in Russia were. But China is not a nation of serfs. It is predominately a nation of lower middle-class people. Most every family has had a little piece of land for centuries. A hardheaded Chinese family does not take the little piece of land that it has, and just because it is inadequate dump it into a common pot on somebody's promise that up around the corner somewhere is something better. Therefore, those whom the Communists cannot persuade they either coerce, or liquidate as "anti-Marxist counter-revolutionaries"--their own spokesman's phrase.

I think they have real democracy within their own party--that is the source of much of their strength--but when it comes to extending democratic rights to those who disagree with them, their record is infinitely worse than that of the Central Government. They use the word as a slogan by which to get support from abroad.

The most devastating exposure of the fraudulent nature of their so-called democracy is the document I hold in my hand. It is the annual report of Chairman Lin Tsu-han last year to the Communist

government. You will note it is not an ancient document from the days before the Communists became, we are told, just agrarian reformers. It is dated August 1944, and Mr. Lin gave it to me personally last October. He thought it would win me over. Actually nothing else could be so eloquent in refuting their claim of democracy. May I read a sentence or two?

He is talking about the four main "defects" in their Communist government which they had striven to remedy. He says one was "the tendency of liberalish which found its expression in the nominal obedience but actual disobedience of Government policies, in the neglect of discipline, in the indifference to the mistakes of other fellow workers"—that is, the party members are not spying with proper diligence on other citizens and even other party members—"and in the want of alertness against bad elements." It is a vice if the Communist government is not alert to "bad elements"; that is, to any who disagree with it. But it is a crime if Chiang is alert to "bad elements"; that is, to his opposition, namely, the Communists.

Mr. Lin continues, "Last year this tendency was corrected after the continued movement for purging non-Marxist ideology." That tells you how much freedom of thought and real democracy there are in the movement we are asked to support on these grounds.

The other main Communist argument for foreign consumption is that they are doing the bulk of the fighting against Japan and therefore we should support them just as we supported Tito rather than Mihailovitch, because Tito was allegedly doing most of the fighting against Germany. Mihailovitch was said to be a collaborationist, and therefore we should not support him. But no one can accuse Chiang of being a collaborationist. As a matter of painful fact, we were the collaborationists with Japan—for four and a half years; and I fear might still be today if Japan had not been so stupid as to attack us. Chiang is the one political leader among the Big Four who has not been a collaborationist, whose record is completely clear on that point.

What are the facts on this matter of fighting the Japanese? There have been hundreds of skirmishes between the Communists and the Japanese, especially when the latter sent out expeditions to seize or destroy the crops. But no neutral observer has seen anything that could be called a battle between the Communists and the Japanese since September 1937. On the other hand, they have witnessed a dozen terrific battles between Chiang's troops and the Japanese, several in the last year.

An air force is no good without air bases, and it is proved that air bases cannot be defended against determined ground assault without ground troops. We did not have any combat ground troops in China. And I was told by Americans there that we did not give the Chinese infantry who had to defend those bases one rifle or one machine gun or even one

bullet for the job. We put $60,000,000 into one base at Kweilin and now the Japanese have the base because we did not equip the Chinese to defend it. Does it do anybody any good to aliby by shouting that the Chinese cannot fight? Of course they cannot under those circumstances.

After going along according to our own views for almost 3 years, we were further back in China than when we began and so last fall, we finally had to send out Donald Nelson to start building up China's industry, doing the thing that Chiang Kai-shek had told us 3 years earlier we would have to do. It was a bitter pill for our military pride to swallow. We were wrong in this respect—and the Chinese were right, and we did not like to admit it. It was easier to lay the blame for our failures on someone else; so, the constant barage from Washington about the inefficiency, cowardice, corruption, and so forth, of Chiang's armies—partly true, but not the whole truth.

You read the article by Hanson Baldwin in the Reader's Digest last summer telling how generally no good the Chinese armies are. Where did he get that line? He hadn't been out there. He got it from our War Department. Where do the columnists get their gossip about conditions in China? Mostly from our own War Department and other Washington officials. I am sorry to say this, and I say it not to criticize our leaders but only because I see what it is doing to the hearts of Allies on whose ability to hold on in confidence, our own hopes of early victory depend. It is too dangerous a pastime.

In a recent issue of the Saturday Evening Post there was a typical article called Vinegar Joe and the Reluctant Dragon. Its main facts were essentially correct, but the main conclusions drawn therefrom were essentially incorrect. Chiang's inability to give General Stilwell all the properly trained troops the latter wanted just when he wanted them was attributed to obstinate refusal by Chiang to cooperate, persistently defensive and obstructionist psychology so that the Chinese are practically incapable of taking the offensive and expect us to fight their war for them, greater concern on Chiang's part with his own internal problems than with fighting Japan, et cetera.

But one could use the same arguments to write just as convincing an article on Uncle Joe and the Reluctant Eagle and Lion. Mr. Stalin wanted us and the British to take the offensive and invade western Europe in 1941. Did we do it? No. He wanted us to do it in 1942. Did we do it? No. Apparently we, too, were obstructionists and defensive-minded, wanting Russia to do our fighting for us, et cetera. Uncle Joe could not force us into a counteroffensive until we were prepared and equipped. Neither could Vinegar Joe nor can anyone else force Chiang to take the offensive until he is prepared and equipped.

Chiang said when the war began that there would be three stages: First, the stage of strategic retreat, trading space for time; second, the stage of stalemate in which China has been for almost 3 years; and, third, the stage of counter-offensive to drive the Japanese out of China.

He will not start the third until he is ready, any more than we would.

When we delay till ready, it is to save precious American lives. If he delays, till ready, it is because he is a poor ally, a reluctant dragon. Do we expect him to care less about his people's lives and his country's interests than we care about our own? Sometimes I think our intolerable arrogance regarding other peoples is surpassed only by our incredible ignorance of them.

The Chinese have been studying and dealing with Asia and the Japanese a good deal longer than we have. Surely it is not surprising and nothing to be ashamed of that they know more about the situation in some respects than we do. Is it a disgrace for a white man to learn anything from a Chinese?

We do not fool others with our pretenses. Then why fool ourselves with our air of omniscient infallibility? Why cannot we admit it frankly when we make an honest miscalculation--whether it is manpower in this country, or quantities of munitions needed, or our policy in China--then just tighten our belts and go ahead. A Senator on the Truman committee remarked last year, "The Army seldom will correct, it just covers up." That is why in the last analysis we do not dare allow our country ever to get completely under a military clique or any hierarchy with absolute power. It would happen here as has happened elsewhere.

All these complicated factors have led to a great struggle in China between three main groups, although not as acute now perhaps as it was last fall--I think we may be around the corner. First, is a group of Chinese who are completely disillusioned regarding the white man. Some of them are in the Japanese puppet governments. They do not consider themselves traitors. They consider themselves hard-headed patriots and Chiang a misguided fool for trusting the West. Their argument goes like this, "When have white men ever treated colored peoples on a basis of equality? Now, Chiang Kai-shek, come down out of the clouds and get your feet on the ground. Why are pulling England's and America's chestnuts out of the fire? Why are we having our cities laid waste, our women raped, our economy destroyed, our people homeless and starved? Why are we holding the line in Asia so the white men can concentrate on saving their precious Europe first? Will they treat us decently and justly afterward? Well, wh y not get peace for ourselves now, stop this slaughter and suffering? How can we fight with nothing but bare hands? Let America and England fight it out with Japan. They made the money arming her, did they not? Why not let them do the fighting? We Chinese will never get a chance to be really free unless the white men and his empires are kicked clear out of Asia. Japan is the only Asiatic nation with the military know-how to do it. All right let Japan kick the white man out. Let her weaken herself, while we get peace and build ourselves up. Then when the war is over and the white man is out of Asia, we Chinese will be strong. We can defeat

the Japanese or absorb them. This is the only way to get real freedom for China and for Asia." These men are not pro-Japanese. They are merely pro-Chinese, and disillusioned regarding the West. I submit that has been a rather potent argument, and all the more honor to Chiang and his government for resisting it.

There is a second group, led by the Chinese Communists. Their argument goes like this: "For 200 years our communication with the rest of the world has been largely by the sea, and therefore we got our ideas—political, economic, social—from the nations that controlled the sea, England and America, the democracies. But not another avenue of communication has been opened up to Russia. This is a day of land and air transportation. We are no longer dependent solely upon the sea. Now, which of the white allies has been utterly realistic in its thinking and called the turns in this war correctly from the start? Russia. Which is the one that started at scratch and industrialized in 15 years, which is what we Chinese want to do? Russia. Which is the one that has proved itself a master of transportation and supply, by railroads, highways, busses, trucks, and airplanes? Russia. Which is the one that does not discriminate against people of a different color? Russia. Then where do our real Chinese interests lie—in going in with the white countries with their empires and spheres of influence in Asia? Or in going in with Russia?

Their argument continues, "Our great natural resources in China are not at the coast, where we built our great cities, Canton, Tientsin, Shanghai, because it was more convenient for the white man's ships. Most of our iron, our coal, our oil, our copper, our natural resources are way up in the interior, right next to Russia. Well, then, isn't it sensible for us to go in with the Russians and use, not unemployed American engineers, but Russian engineers and experts to guid our industrialization? Not technology from Chicago or Detroit, but from Russia. Why not build up trade and markets for Russia, rather than for America and England? In cooperation with Russia, we Chinese can build in Central Asia the greatest industrial bloc in the world, in the midst of the greatest land and population bloc on the earth."

That, too, is a rather potent argument, is it not? Would it be in America's interest? And yet some sincere but mistaken Americans vigorously support the Chinese Communist program.

And then there is the third group, the central Government of China led by Chiang Kai-shek and men who are mostly western-trained students, from America and England. There are unquestionably some who have been in power too long, are reactionary, even corrupt. But on the whole they have been loyal to the ideas and ideals they learned here and have tried their best under enormous difficulties to make China a sister republic in Asia. Now for their effort they get kicked in the teeth by the nation whom they tried most to imitate and support.

In a sense, if one wants to be cynical, Chiang Kai-shek has made only two major mistakes. One was that he did not give up at the end of the first three months of the war. Nobody would have criticized him then. That was what everybody expected him to do. How could the unarmed Chinese fight against such superior military might? Nobody criticized the Poles when their nation went down in 18 days, or the Norwegians and Greeks because they could carry on formal resistance for only a few weeks. Nobody criticized the Russians when they retreated 1,000 miles before superior German armored might. Nobody would have said a word against the Chinese if they had folded up after the fall of Nanking in December 1937. But, poor fools, they did not fold up. They kept on fighting almost alone for 7 long years, and now they get criticized because they cannot go on for 7 more, I guess, without help. I ask again, where is our sense of propriety and of elementary fairness?

The second mistake Chiang has made, if one wants to be really cynical, is that he did not completely clean out the Communists in '38 and '39, when some of his generals wanted him to. They said, "You can't trust the Communists. They are just playing for time. They are using the truce to expand their own power and control and to organize all of North China. Clean them out now while there are only 70,000 of them." He could have done it then, liquidated them the way Stalin liquidated the Kulaks, 3,000,000 of them. Of course, he would have been called a great heathen, oriental, barbarian war lord. So was Stalin, but everybody has forgotten it. He is a great hero now, is he not.

But Chiang Kai-shek, instead of being a heathen, barbarian, war lord, was a Christian. He surrounded the Communists so they could not start civil war in China and has spent 7 years trying to get them to give up their separate government, and come along with the rest of China in a united effort against Japan. I talked to him about this. He did not bring it up; I brought it up. It is pretty hard to have the nation which sent over missionaries to ask him and his people to become Christians, now berate him because he tried to act as a Christian.

The situation is nearing the crisis. The Japanese made one incredible mistake—they did not knock China out or win the Chinese over to their side by treating them decently, before they attacked Pearl Harbor. Now it is a race between Japan's desperate attempt to repair that blunder, knock the Chinese out and get land lines of communication established to take the place of the sea lines that are being destroyed by our air and sea power, and get the coast of China fortified before we can capture the Philippines and get onto the continent with large beach-heads where we can unload men and supplies in shiploads. On the surface, it looks as if Japan has the race won, as if once more we are "too little and too late." But I do not think so. One reason is because I have more confidence than ever before in the American fighting man and his officers in the field. And I have confidence in the Chinese. I have learned never to sell them short. They always seem to be able to reach down and get from some invisible source extra reserves of

ability to hang on a little longer. I believe they will do it this time. I am sure they will if they know we will stand by them, both in the war and in the peace settlements, as faithfully as they have stood by us.

What can we do to help win the race? Four or five things. I have time only to enumerate them. First, we have got to cur out this irresponsible, unbalanced criticism of the Chinese for things that do not exist or are not their fault or would be present in any country after comparable disasters. We have got to stop trying to force the Chinese to do what we think is best. They are an eminently reasonable people, but they cannot be browbeaten or coerced.

Second, we have got to make constructive the criticisms that are justified, of things that are bad, sometimes very bad indeed. I want to pay tribute to General Hurley and Donald Nelson in this respect. They got off to a wonderful start because they have been sympathetic and constructive as well as critical. Their approach was not, "Now China, you are our problem. What shall we do with you?" But rather, "China, you have some problems. How can we help you with the problems? How can we help each other most? There is a world of difference.

Third, we have got to get more material assistance, more supplies to China, quickly. I know it seems impossible. It was impossible for China to hold out 7 years, but she had. It was impossible for the British to hold out in the summar and the fall of 1940, but they did. It was impossible for the Russians to hold at Leningrad and Moscow and Stalingrad, but they did. Now, we have got to perform a miracle too. We have got to get across to the Continent of Asia quickly, and I think we will.

Fourth, we have got to get more political assistance to the Chinese, more spiritual assistance. They can and will fight on valiantly and with increasing effectiveness if we will make it clear to them that this is a war for their freedom too. That will save a good many American divisions and billions of dollars.

Fifth, we here at home have got to get a deeper understanding of the real nature and significance of this struggle in Asia. That is the only reason I have taken your time today to try and present these high lights of the picture. We must be better prepared for the tough going ahead. I told you here in a speech 2 years ago that the Japanese used to say to me when I was under them, "We will probably have a war with your country eventually. It will be a hard war, because you are stronger and richer and have greater resources and manpower and industry than we have. Nevertheless, we Japanese will win--because we have spirit. Oh, we may not win the first time; but, if we do not win the first time, we will win the second time. And if we do not win the second time, then we will win the next time. Some day, we Japanese will win. Or," as one said to me one day,"At least, you will lose." Which is just as good, of course, from their point of view.

Now, they know they are not going to win this time; but I venture the prediction there is not one half of 1 per cent of the Japanese in or our of the army that is not perfectly convinced--and with some good reasons--that we are going to lose, that we do not have what it takes to carry through. They are prepared to lose 8,000,000 men and never flicker an eyelash. Are we? Indeed we are not. They are prepared to work without any profits whatsoever or any increase in wages, and nothing but sheer subsistance for 20 years, and never waver. Are we? Indeed we are not--yet.

Our test will come when the war in Europe ends. The armed forces cannot decide it. You and I have got to decide it, and we will decide it rightly only if in our hearts we fully understand what is involved.

Here is Mrs. Smith and her boy is home from Europe. Next door is Mrs. Jones and her boy is still out in the jungles or swamps or mountains of Asia, and may be for 2 or 3 more years. There inevitably will be a strong urge, a subtle temptation to let down and not carry through to complete liberation of China. Well, have we not freed the Philippines and discharged our obligations there, clipped Japan's wings so she cannot attack us again in the Aleutians or Hawaii? Surely we have no obligations to the Chinese that justify our sacrificing more American lives and piling up additional debt. Why, the Chinese cannot govern themselves anyway. Look at them quarreling among themselves. Why not be sensible and get out of this mess and get our boys home and tend to our own business and get back to normal living?

That will be the way the temptation will present itself. If we yield to it, then God help our children's children, because next time the Chinese will not be on our side. The only thing that saved us this time, Mr. Chairman, was a great moral decision on the part of Chiang Kai-shek and of the Chinese people to fight, not on the basis of blood and color but on the basis of principle; a decision to fight against those of their own race and with us of an alien race because they believed it was a war for human freedom. But if after they have held the line so valiantly, they are let down and our commitments are not fulfilled, then there is no place they can go next time except to the Communists and a world class war, or to Japan and a world race war. If we fail this time, we will have two-thirds of the people in the world who are colored against the one-third who are white. We can win all the battles, but we will still lose the war because they can outwork and undereat the white man, they will out-suffer him, they will outwait him, and they will outbreed him.

This is the issue that we have got to understand if our children would be free and at peace. The decision that is being hammered out in Asia these critical days is not one for 4 years, but one for 40 years or

even 400 years. Are the Chinese, the most numerous and incomparably the strongest of the colored peoples, to stay on the side of the democracies, or are they to be driven in despair to the other side? The answer to that is still in our own hands.

We must understand what we are up against, grit out teeth and stay at it until we get, not just defeat of Japan, but a victory which really frees China and assures all Asia of ultimate freedom as its peoples work and struggle and grow to full nationhood and independence.



For Your Notes . . . .

What 8th Rt did – 3 Peop. Prin. carried out.

~~Increase in~~

1) Reduction of rent by 25% (formerly 50–75% of crop)

2) Usury abolished. Interest on loans formerly 36–100% a month. now 10%.

3) Ind. Coops.

4) Ed. campaigns ~~in~~ followed by secret democ. elections ~~followed by~~ in which all over 18 took part.

5) armed common people in anti-Jap. resistance.

THE SATURDAY EVENING POST

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MUST CHINA GO RED?

by
Edgar Snow

A little-noticed and profoundly significant change has been taking place in Sino-Soviet relations, and the Crimean Conference did nothing to alleviate the strain, as many had hoped it might. In general, the Soviet attitude has shifted from six years of "formal "neutrality" in the internal quarrel between the Kungchantang, or Communists, and the Koumintang, the nationalist party of the Generalissimo, to one of openly expressed repugnance for the "ruling circles" of the Kuomintang.

Since China is the only foreign area where American political, economic and military forces are likely to impinge directly upon Soviet frontiers, and a vast region where we need Soviet co-operation against Japan as well as after the war, it is obviously important for us to see how Russia now looks at our mutual Ally, and to understand the reasons for its revised attitude.

From the beginning of the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 till 1943, practically no adverse comment on Chiang Kai-shek or his government was heard in Russia. Yet deep fissures in China's two-party co-operation against Japan were already evident in 1938. It finally broke down entirely in 1940, after the Generalissimo destroyed the rear echelon of the Communist-led New 4th Army in its only base in unoccupied China. Subsequently, Chiang Kai-shek stopped paying all the Communist-led partisans and imposed a blockade against their bases in North China that still exists today. Since then, Kuomintang-Communist clashes behind the Japanese lines have at times amounted to a major civil war.

Despite that early break-up of the "united front" in China, however, Moscow voiced no open criticism in Chungking. In 1939, 1940, and 1941--when our merchants were still selling war materials to Japan--the Kremlin continued to lend advisers and to send supplies to the Generalissimo, even though it was then widely known that Soviet supplies were being used by Chiang to equip troops maintaining his anti-Red blockade.

By 1943, Stalin began to reveal signs of impatience. Soviet aid ceased. For the first time, the Soviet press published a candid account of the deterioration of Chinese war leadership, and of the internecine strife which had already been widely publicized in Britain and America.

Today, Moscow views the Kuomintang regime with only slightly more confidence than it ever placed in the Polish government in exile.

When, for example, A. Avarin wrote, in December, 1944, in War and the Working Class, that "calls for reform, appeals to progressive elements of the Chungking government to take measures to improve the situation, are cries in the desert," Chinese in Moscow knew that it reflected the Kremlin's deep dissatisfaction. Mr. Avarin leveled charges against Chungking such as these: Its policy is dominated by reactionary militarists and defeatists who "play the role of a kind of Mikhailovich"; among the 800,000 puppet troops working for Japan, nine tenths are former Kuomintang troops whose generals are now "serving as Quislings"; the government tolerates "unrestrained speculation" rather than help the people to develop China's resources; generals such as Ho Ying-chin--now Chiang Kai-shek's chief of staff--insist upon diverting the best-equipped Kuomintang troops to blockade the "heroic and patriotic" 8th Route and New 4th--Communist--troops in North China, rather than fight the Japanese; and by opposing unification of China and the formation of a coalition--Kuomintang-Communist--government, high Kuomintang officials are sabotaging the war effort.

Izvestia took note of much the same factors in long editorial comments. Quoting foreign reports, it fortified its conclusion that the November, 1944, reorganization of the Chinese government--when Chiang Kai-shek's brother-in-law, T. V. Soong, became "acting premier" to replace brother-in-law H. H. Kung--represented little improvement. It was observed with disapproval that a government spokesman had declared China's Communist Party could not be legalized until after the war.

Another discussion in the authoritative Bolshevik reported that "40 per cent of the territory of North China has been liberated by partisans operating under the leadership of the 8th Route Army and the Communists," who "have their own administration effecting democratic measures in political life." Meanwhile it found that "Kuomintang troops act as passive spectators, at best," in the struggle for liberation of the north, "or they even assist the enemy." Significantly, Bolshevik concluded that only by a Kuomintang-Communist agreement could Chungking now "consolidate China's position in the international situation."

Even more notable were the prophetic words of War and the Working Class: "It is quite clear that collaboration, the uniting of all the forces of the Chinese people, based on democratic policy, is particularly important now, when the defeat of Hitlerite Germany is approaching. . . . It is now impossible to put off till tomorrow the transition from the policy of reaction to a policy of progress."

Diplomatic relations, too, noticeably cooled. Even at the time of the Moscow Conference the Russians objected when we wanted Chiang Kai-shek's government included in the Moscow declaration. It was only the stubborn perseverance of Cordell Hull that won that concession. He was not finally permitted to call in Ambassador Foo Ping-sheng from a waiting room, where he had sat cooling his heels, till the document was ready to be signed.

Since Chungking took over Sinkiang--Turkestan--from the formerly pro-Soviet governor there, and the Kuomintang extended its blockade of the Chinese Communists to Western Mongolia, China has not been represented in any Allied consultations held in Moscow. The present ambassador has never been received by Stalin, though he arrived in 1942.

Now, what explains this new emphasis in Soviet policy? The answer must be sought in the fundamental changes which was has brought about in the internal balance of political forces in China itself and in the balance of international forces in the broad world arena.

Internally, the armed and politically organized following of the Chinese Communists has greatly increased during eight years of bitter struggle against Japan. Under most adverse conditions, these people have won an astonishing increment of power and territory behind the Japanese lines, and without any help from any government--including Chungking, Moscow and Washington. Meanwhile, Kuomintang power--except that of the puppet Kuomintang at Nanking--has been obliterated in just those same areas. The "legitimate" Kuomintang is seeking to recover its power and prestige largely with the economic, military and political support of the United States.

But in the world scene, too, the picture has greatly altered. The Soviet Union is no longer an isolated and "encircled" power cautiously awaiting a trial of strength. It has won momentous victories. Now it is indisputably the strongest power, the only great military power, from the Atlantic eastward to the Pacific. Leaders in both Britain and the United States have frankly staked their future in history on making a success of keeping the peace by sharing world power with the Soviet Union.

To understand how this affects China, one must note that Soviet Policy in the East, like Soviet policy in Europe, has long been a synthesis of two considerations: a combination of supposed broad strategic needs for maximum security, on the one hand, and the skillful active promotion of political forces friendly to the Soviet Union and likely to help improve that security, on the other. The only contradiction between these two aims lies, ax we can now see, in the factor of time. In the long view, the main policy and alternative policies work together; they synthesize.

Today, in China, contradiction between Soviet strategic needs and political aims is reduced to a minimum. It is no longer necessary for Russia to give unqualified support to hostile political forces there purely in the interest of strategic security. The Soviet position in the East, and particularly in Manchuria, can now be stabilized, provided the Japanese are succeeded by a Chinese regime backed by political forces friendly to the Soviet Union. And the international situation is now such that Russia can dynamically encourage "the transition from reaction to pregress" without jeopardizing her general pattern of strategic security.

Another way of saying the same thing is that what Russia wants in China, at least at this moment, seems to coincide with out own immediate needs. Our strategists long ago came to the conclusion, quite independently of Moscow, that unification of the military and political forces was the prerequisite of making China effective as a power against Japan and a

bastion of future security in the Pacific. Obviously, General Stilwell is no Communist, nor is General Hurley, and neither is taking orders from the Kremlin; yet it became well known that hose and other spokesmen of American policy had urged in Chungking precisely the same reforms and the same political reconciliation advocated by the Soviet press.

For it became clear to our people that the anti-Communist group in Chungking was not fighting quite war we were. From the time of Pearl Harbor onward, especially, they considered the defeat of Japan primarily our problem,, while theirs was largely one of preparation for the eventual showdown with the internal opposition--the war to recover territory "lost" to the Communists, including what they had recovered from the Japanese.

In 1936 the Generalissimo reportedly said, "Only when every Red soldier in China is exterminated will it be possible to talk about co-operation with Russia." Shortly afterward, he was "detained" by Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang and had to postpone his plans, but few who know him intimately believe that he has fundamentally changed his mind.

There is good reason to suppose that Kuomintang chieftains have been aiming at a strategy embracing the following steps: First, the rebuilding and modernization of Kuomintang armies and the creation of an air force, with American help. Second, the recovery of power in the rich Yangtze, Valley and Shanghai, and in Canton, behind a vanguard of American air, naval and ground forces. Third, an expedition to recover North China ports, also behind American spearheads. Finally, into Manchuria the same way.

All this the Kuomintang leaders hoped to accomplish without any political changes, without any agreement with or support for the Communist-led guerrilla forces now spread across all the northern provinces clear to the northern cities and onto the railways now occupied by Japan, and then demand the surrender of all the partisan troops in the towns and villages, as "illegal forces." Those who might resist would be blockaded and gradually exterminated as "bandits."

In realizing such a program, Chungking counted upon the support of American forces right up to Manchuria and the Soviet border. Indeed, there were expressions of genuine astonishment by Kuomintang officials upon learning that Americans would like to see the two parties get together. Although General Stilwell, former Vice-President Wallace and Donald Nelson were known to have told the Generalissimo that we would not support his forces in an anti-Communist war, it was stated that he and his staff were still unconvinced.

If the Generalissimo carried out the program outlined above, very likely big forces of the Communist-led troops would infiltrate Manchuria well in advance of his own campaign. They already have nuclei there which could be expanded on the style of Marshal Tito's forces, at a later stage, when Japan's continental forces begin to disintegrate. They would certainly seek unilateral contact with the Far Eastern Red Banner Army along the vast frontiers stretching through Manchuria and Mongolia. And if, at that time, we were backing the anti-Communist liquidation program, the Chinese followers of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh would probably get Red Army help, just as Tito got it. That is one implication of present Soviet warnings--which

doubtless has been reflected in informal Soviet-American diplomatic conversations.

Unless we were prepared to fight Russia then and there, the denouement of such a struggle would, I believe, be fairly certain. There would emerge a Communist-led regime in Manchuria, and quite likely a left-wing regime in Korea. The Korea Communists, who are a section of the Chinese party, also have extensive connections with the Korean guerrillas in Manchuria, and would certainly rise to prominence under such conditions. Mongols in Russia told me that they expect to give eventual support to the revolt of the Southern Mongols against the Japs. There the outcome might be a reunification of Mongolia as an extension of the present People's Republic, under Soviet protection.

Thus, if the Communists were forced into Manchuria, we might get a regional solution of the internal Chinese struggle, but not a permanent one. Whoever rules the northeastern provinces could eventually dominate all China. Manchuria contains about 90 per cent of the useful mineral and industrial resources of the whole country, and it is economically very advanced. Given a decade there, the Communists would be in a position to insist on recognition for their party south of the Great Wall, and soon we might again be called upon to preserve an anti-Red government at Nanking.

That is why the alternative seemed to be favored by us up to the moment Franklin D. Roosevelt became our war casualty No. 1--the attempt to persuade the Kuomintang that it is better to have half a loaf than none at all. Yet this alternative seems quite as unpalatable to the Kuomintang as the regional solution. General Chu Teh offered to place all his forces under General Stilwell's command, and some say it was Stilwell's request that Chungking accept the Communist troops as allies on an equal footing in the war against Japan and permit them to receive Lend-Lease aid which threw the Generalissimo into a rage and led directly to Stilwell's recall. As the logical historical end of it, the Generalissimo and his cohorts could see nothing but the Communists eventually getting power not only in Manchuria but in an all-China central government. Is there such a danger?

What the Communists demanded was the withdrawal of the military blockade, the payment and supply of their troops with Lend-Lease materials on a basis of equality with the Kuomintang armies, modification of the one-party dictatorship and the setting up of a government in which they as well as other parties could be represented. They said they wanted a minor but a legal position which would enable them to participate in councils and in general mobilization for an intensified war effort.

The Kuomintang, however, realized that if the legality of the party were once recognized on a constitutional basis giving it equal privileges with the Kuomintang, it would never be possible to suppress the Communists. "After the war," the Kuomintang people say, "the Communists will go on agitating and stirring up the mob to demand universal suffrage and popular elections, and we shall never get rid of them."

The Kuomintang fears that they would win any mass election.

That is probably true, for these reasons: The basis of the Communist movement in China is land reform--just as it is in many countries in Europe. Since the war, the Communists have stopped confiscating big estates, but everywhere they have gone they have reduced rents and taxes, "temporarily" divided the land of absentee owners, resettled landless peasants, promoted co-operatives, organized labor, enforced anti-usurer measures, set up local self-governing councils of peasants and workers, and generally disturbed the gentry's monopoly of power.

Chiang's nationalists differ from the Communists in that they have always sought ways and means of maintaining power by keeping the peasants out of politics--they have never held a popular election in even one district--whereas the Communists perforce have had to find methods of getting the peasants actively in politics, of enlisting the mass of the people behind them, in order to sustain and strengthen themselves.

More than 80 per cent of China's population is rural. The greater part of it is hungry for land, burdened with debt, hounded by usurers, filled with hatred for grasping, corrupt high officials, and ready for a change. As for the working class, it has never had freedom of speech, press, organization or assembly. Its exploitation on a subhuman standard was even worse in Japan. It has no stake in the present regime. On the whole, one cannot but agree with the Kuomintang that both peasants and workers would vote for a party which voiced their dissatisfaction--as the Communists would.

For the foreign reader it is somewhat confusing that this Chinese agrarian-reform movement is called "Communism." In Chinese, the party name is Kungchantang, which has not quite the same connotation as "Communist"--literally, it means "share-in-production party." Even if there had been no revolution in Russia, there would surely have arisen some share-production crusade in China with much the same aims as those of the nearly 1,000,000 young people now enrolled in the party. Properly viewed in history, they are the logical successors to the many abortive peasant uprisings of the past century--greatest of which was the Christian-inspired Taiping Rebellion. It nearly overthrew the Manchu dynasty, and was suppressed only after the loss of about 20,000,000 lives--with the help of the British under General Gordon.

After years of the empirical process already described, the "Kungchantang" is, at the moment, standing upon a moderate agrarian-reform platform with a Marxist coloration. "Communism" in China, if by that is meant the program now enforced in areas controlled by the Communists, is a watered-down thing today.

Communist leaders admit that it may be many years before China will be able to go beyond the present "bourgeois-democratic" stage of the revolution. This stage--in their view--envisages equalization of land ownership--not collectivization--social ownership of heavy industry--railways and communications are already state-owned--and all natural resources except the land, but with a scope left for private enterprise; and constitutional government, in which all "classes" would have equal suffrage. Even under ideal conditions,

it would take another decade to realize that program. Theoretically, there is no reason why the Kuomintang and Kungchantang couldn't work together in a coalition government during that decade.

But here a word of warning. It is wrong to suppose that these people do not aspire to ultimate complete power. It is also wrong to suppose that they, any more than the Kuomintang, would establish a liberal democracy in China in the American sense, although they would probably bring about a kind of democratic equaliterianism such as is now practiced in areas they control. China is still a semifeudal country and has never enjoyed the luxury of capitalist democracy as liberals know it, and probably never will in our time, whoever rules.

The whole war is regarded by both sides as a continuation of the long internal struggle for power. The Kuomintang is quite correct when it says that the Communists have utilized Japan's invasion in order to expand. The Kuomintang has also utilized the war as an emergency to deny political and military recognition to the Communists. "War is a continuation of politics" even in our country. In China, where the center of national power has never been fully stabilized, politics is the essence of war; political organization.

"We must struggle for leadership everywhere and at all times," I was told by Po Ku, a leading member of the Chinese party's Politburo, as far back as 1938. "We do not deny that. A political party that does not lead has no reason for existence."

It is misleading to contend that Chinese Communists are not Marxists, however, or that they do not hope, ultimately, to build up a classless, socialist state in China, or that they are not very close to the Soviet Union in their sympathies. People who try to persuade Americans to accept them on the ground that they are not real Communists, in the foregoing sense, are either misinformed or deliberately dishonest. That kind of argument belongs in the same category with appeals to tolerate Soviet Russia because it is "abandoning Communism" or because it offers us a huge postwar market and a solution of our unemployment problem.

It is also true that there is a very strong nationalist element in the Chinese party---as in Russia and among other European Communists. Mao Tse-tung was once expelled by the Comintern for "deviation" and he and Chu Teh first organized the Chinese Red Army without Russian directives, and only later won Comintern sanction. Having built up their armed power long after Moscow had more or less forsaken their struggle as hopeless, the Chinese Red leaders have a strong feeling of independence. We begin to see that here, as in Europe, the coming to power of Communists will not wipe out nationalism overnight. Once a party has the responsibility of state power, it tends to inherit all the national history and culture, and to cling to all the national aspirations, in a political sense, that go with it. In Russia, it took the Communists twenty-five years fully to recognize that fact. In China, because of their prolonged and bitter armed struggle for existence, the Communists have learned it before attaining power.

Another thing: Whoever runs China will have to look chiefly to America for economic help. This factor is certain to influence internal policy. Russia herself would not be able to help China on the scale needed, not for some years.

On the other hand, we have already given up extraterritoriality to the Chungking government. This means that whatever happens, the era of foreign concessions, investments of foreign capital in terms of great foreign economic monopolies, has passed. Both the Kuomintang and the Communists would expect to get large American Government loans to build up the country. Both are privately convinced that they would never have to repay more than the interest on them.

One very important observation, however: Under a Communist-dominated government there would be state planning. The industrialization of the country would probably aim primarily at the internal market--the achievement of self-sufficiency, production for use, and elevation of the people's own standard of living, as in Russia. The Communists themselves would not be bankers and industrialists, bankers and landowners, China would prematurely enter the world market, as did Japan. There would be sharp competition for overseas trade lost by the Japanese, where the richest profits are to be made on goods produced by coolie-level slave labor. Kuomintang China had already entered the world market with such goods even before the war.

But would not our economic collaboration with a China influenced by Communists tend to comfort the cause of Communism in general? Obviously it would--though not nearly so much as our present and future aid to Soviet Russia. We face here exactly the same choice--and the same dilemma--which we have already settled in general agreement with Russia throughout Europe.

Finally, would not a Chiang Kai-shek China be more likely to support our side in some future hypothetical war against Russia? Not necessarily so--if the Kuomintang's party boss, Chen Li-fu, succeeded in building up the kind of Oriental Fascist state he has been aiming at. But at the moment Chungking probably would not reject such an opportunity. Which is precisely what the Russians don't like about Chungking, and why they always look upon our promotion of the Generalissimo, as one of the Big Four, or Big Five, with distrust and suspicion. If the Dumbarton Oaks proposal is adopted, Moscow knows that we and the British could always count on Chiang for the necessary vote in any issue against Russia. In view of the fact that China is a neighbor of the Soviet Union, while we are separated from her by a very wide ocean, the Russians think they have a right to expect a "friendly" government there.

Whether, in a future anti-Soviet war, the Generalissimo's help would be worth more to us than it is now, however, or whether he would still be saving up ammunition to "resume his war against the Chinese Communists without distraction," as Brooks Atkinson has defined his present postwar aim, is another question. In any case, if we are going to fight Russia someday, as pessimists believe, we have been backing the wrong people everywhere else, this war has no meaning, and this analysis should be included out."

But Roosevelt's policy clearly was not based on that assumption. Nevertheless, we wasted three years during which a solution might have been imposed. Today, any fundamental agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung is possible on only one of two conditions: first, that the Communists surrender their armed forces to the Kuomintang and abandon their struggle for leadership and ultimate power; or, second, that the Kuomintang give up their monopoly of power, grant suffrage to the people and permit them to elect a constitutional government.

What we may get is a Chinese compromise. That was foreshadowed in a recent address by the Generalissimo, when he promised that a constitutional convention would be called this year. But the rules laid down by the Kuomintang for the selection of delegates to this convention, which has already been postponed half a dozen times, are such that they guarantee an overwhelming majority of Kuomintang party members and their hand-picked appointees. But the time is much later than the Generalissimo thinks. A "democratic" convention which would merely confer constitutional status on his "group of aging reactionaries" could neither solve his internal dilemma nor meet the conditions created by the new balance of international power.

Indeed, the Chinese Communists lost no time in disassociating themselves from such plans. Their press branded Chiang's project as a potential "congress of slaves," and insisted that only an assembly directly chosen by the people in "free elections" could fram a democratic constitution. For the first time since 1937, Yenan denounced Chiang personally as a "despot" and "dictator," and called for his removal as head of the government. As this open crossing of swords coincided with Ambassador Patrick Hurley's return to report to the late President, and close upon the convening of the San Francisco conference, it had to be interpreted as a complete vote of nonconfidence in Chungking as the legitimate government of China.

What has seemed obvious ever since then is that only combined Anglo-American-Soviet pressure on both parties in China could impose a formula to unite the anti-Japanese forces in our common war. Such a compromise might make it possible for the United States and Russia to work with the same Chinese government to avoid the "Bolshevization" of Manchuria and to prevent a return to the old system of two Chinas--one in the North, and one in the South. It seems certain that the late President discussed China with Stalin when they met in the Crimea, but what was said is so far a military secret. And whether President Truman will now consider himself committed to all details covered in those informal conversations remains at this writing a moot point and a major question--the answer to which could gravely affect the outcome of our war in Asia, as well as our hope for permanent peace in the Pacific.

KMT is kept in power only by military, financial & diplomatic aid of USA. If left to face Chinese people ~~[illegible]~~ alone, Chinese people would long since have destroyed it.

For Your Notes



When Japs attacked in Honan, Hu Tsung-nan's troops, near-by, -500,000- were not sent ~~to~~ against them.

The KMT cried out because ~~[illegible]~~ a few Jap troops moved along Ry. They said Com. did not stop ~~them~~.

Yet since 1939 the KMT had ~~blockaded the 8th Rt preventing~~ ~~[illegible] not only~~ weapons, ammun. but medical supplies to reach ~~them~~, hoping they ~~[illegible]~~ could starve ~~them~~ to death from rear while Japs wiped them out from front. The 8th Rt. owed no allegience whatever to KMT which tried to destroy it. Its sole allegience is to Chn. people.

~~Tang~~ KMT troops conduct so atrocious in Honan that peasants arose & disarmed 50,000 KMT troops & even said: "Better the Japs than Tang En-po."

Soviet Union holds allegience of all subjected people of Asia.

THE Nation

March 24, 1945

CHINA AND ITS CRITICS

by

Lin Yutang

In Edgar Snow's article "China to Lin Yutang," in The Nation of February 17, I saw for the first time a real attempt to discuss or dispute the facts contained in my new book. This is important, for only by a fair and open examination of facts in the spirit of sober intellectual inquiry can some clarity be brought into the present confusion. Mr. Snow's opinion of my book is of course not for me to reply to; his statements of fact about China are. I am particularly happy to find the attempt made by a man whose sincerity cannot be questioned and whose friendship I value highly.

As Mr. Snow concedes my honesty and intelligence, he must concede that I knew I had nothing to gain personally by writing against the tide of opinion, even though it was to restore a sane balance. All critics admit that I have allowed merits to, and made severe indictments of, both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. By the very nature of my indictments, I can please neither party. No one can say that I have concealed, or failed to score, the failures of the Chinese government in censorship, in conscription, in drawing up a bill of rights, and above all in taking a clear stand for the rights of peasant and workingman, the common people. At least, I have not fallen, like some apologists, into the error of painting one side all white and the other all black. I was fully aware of the sanctity of America's sacred cow, the Chinese Communists, and knew that to suggest that the sacred cow was in fact a red bull in a china shop would be to arouse the ire of the cow-worshipers. Under the circumstances I could do one of three things -- jump on the band-wagon and win cheap plaudits, evade the Communist issue and the civil war, or speak the truth as I saw it. I chose to speak out. I have never cared which way the wind blows, and I still don't.

My attitude toward the Chinese Communists is based on two major premises, arrived at after an investigation of sources and documents on both sides; first, that they are not true democrats but totalitarians of the Russian type in theory and practice, and that theirs is not the democracy China wants; second, that they have taken advantage of the war to set up a separate state and separate army for expanding party power at the cost of national unity, and that they have done so and will continue to do so in accordance with a set program. These conclusions of mine are at variance with those of others who have not examined the same sources.

Neither Mr. Snow nor I saw Yenan after 1940 -- I never saw it -- and the "democratic" reforms were started after the winter of 1941. The main question is the reliability of available sources and documentation. I maintain that sources and documents are adequate and are available to all who take the trouble to read them or have them specially translated. My sources are (1) Kuomintang documents and publications, (2) Communist publications, especially the books and essays of Mao Tse-tung (Yenan edition), (3) successive Communist resolutions and declarations and published official telegrams on both sides, (4) editorials of the Communist paper Hsin Hua Jih Pao, published in Chungking, and (5) talks with Chinese people, not officials, who have lived in the occupied areas. Tens of thousands of Chinese have come over from the occupied areas, including thousands of students. Their impression of these areas is very different from the romanticized picture given to the American public. I have talked with hundreds of people who have lived and served under Communist rule, or whose relatives have. When the "Grandmother of the Guerrillas" told me that her son was shot in a boat by the Communists from the bank, together with 120 young men and girls fighting as guerrillas in Hopei, I could ignore her evidence simply because she herself had not been to Yenan.

Some of the Communist writings are extremely important as sources. I note especially Mao Tse-tung's book "The New Democracy," published in March, 1940, now in its fifth edition; the all-important "Chengfeng Wenhsien," first published in eighteen chapters, then, in 1943, revised, in twenty-five chapters (this is the sole educational material and is compulsory reading for all schools, army units, and party members); the Communist resolution of May 26, 1943, on the dissolution of the Comintern and the resolution of September 1, 1942, setting up absolute party control of all civil, military, and mass agencies after the "democratic" innovations; the important exchange of long telegrams in the winter of 1940 between the Communist commanders Chu Teh and Pen Teh-huai and the Chinese War Minister on the civil war; and, lastly, the extremely revealing "Chinese Communist Tactics and Party Lines" by Chang Hao (Lin Yuying), published in 1937, a complete "Tanaka Memorial" of the Chinese civil war, which, like the Japanese Tanaka Memorial, is denied by the originating party but whose authenticity has been vindicated by the ensuing pattern of events, step by step, stage by stage, up to the present month. Unfortunately Lawrence K. Rosinger's "China's War-Time Politics" does not draw on all these, and a continuing volume should be issued. Communist writings are more revealing and more valid sources than what the Communists say through their interpreters to foreigners on a conducted tour. I am sure that after a study of this material any objective student would come to conclusions similar to mine.

Furthermore, there are strange and inexplicable lacunae in the reports on China; about many things an obstinate silence is preserved. Nothing is said about the freedom of the press in Yenan. Bald statements about the "blockade" and "stopping of pay" and internal "clashes" are made without relation to time and space. When I tried to fill in the lacunae and write a coherent story that made sense, I came out with facts highly unpleasant to the Communist side. I should like to have someone explain to me why it is that intelligent observers are content to repeat bald statements without a search for causes. They uncritically accept Communist figures even where it is possible to check them. They repeat, for example, the figure of a "half-million" troops blockading the border -- put out for foreign consumption -- whereas the Yenan editorials and speeches addressed to Chinese people at the height of the controversy in July, 1943, never spoke of more than 150,000. The government version mentions six divisions and two brigades, under 100,000 with specific designations and distribution points.

Mr. Snow's article fairly bristles with inaccuracies, distortions of fact, and reticences about other facts which I cannot let pass. I shall deal with them under three heads.

1. Mr. Snow's distortions and inaccuracies. As these are in the main unfair representations about my book or my journey, I shall make only brief corrections.

Mr. Snow states that "nowhere" did I "give evidence that" I had "lived with workers and peasants for even a few days." I toured the entire Northwest Highway for twenty days with no companions except the drivers and the strangers whom I met; I was squeezed in a bus from Neikiang to Chungking that no foreigner would care to ride in and few could survive. I made the entire railroad journey from Kewilin to Kukong and back without any companion except my nephew, and during my stay of three weeks at Kunming and Kweilin I saw only one commander, Lo Kuan-ying of the Burma campaign, and not one local official. I went back to Chungking by truck with doctors of the Emergency Medical Service Training School and repeatedly stopped at inns definitely not for foreigners. Does Mr. Snow imagine that one could escape eating, sleeping, living, talking with the ubiquious, garrulous, frank, and classless Chinese people on such a journey? And I came out with fewer reticences and a less one-sided presentation than Mr. Snow in his report on China or Russia (vide William L. White).

Mr. Snow's quotations from my book are intentionally inexact since he used them to point up his contentions. He quotes me as saying baldly, "I am all for the government," whereas I said, "I reserve my criticism of government failures and mistakes [for elsewhere] .....Here I am dealing strictly ... with the question of China's unity in time of war, in which I am all for the government." He quotes what I call an "amusing but sad story" of conflict between guerrilla forces as merely "an amusing story," and proceeds to make fun of my "amusement." Mr. Snow says I heard a machine-gun "for the first time in [my] life" and that I "heard it then, ironically enough, not at the front, but ... at the 'model concentration camp' for Communists, at Sian." Mr. Snow wilfully distorts the truth. I said I heard it at the military academy, not at the concentration camp, and I said it was "the first time I heard the terrific rattle of machine-guns going off ten feet above my head" (p. 137). He represents me as "fearing that they may soon control half of China, especially if America should give them arms, food, medicines, and financial help." Nowhere did I say, directly or indirectly, that the Communists should not receive American arms; do I need to answer that one about food and medicines? I said that the Communists fear American supplies for Chungking and have sabotaged them by groundless rumors, and that America should give supplies to Chungking despite these rumors.

Where Mr. Snow does not misquote me, he questions my sources and authorities. He says, "He thinks [that is, I think] things must be better at the front, where he has heard the soldiers 'have the best of everything'." I do not think, I know - from my personal visit to the Changsha front, and from Dr. Robert Lim, who has spent the past years at the extended front, where Mr. Snow did not go. The words "have the best of everything" are the exact words of Dr. Lim, as those who heard him in New York will confirm. My authority for the statement that the Communists staged

loud cheers of welcome for national troops passing close to Japanese garrisons -- when their presence should have been kept secret -- is none other than Governor Chungling, who was hounded out of Hopei by the Communists. Mr. Snow refers to an "anonymous informant," implying that my source was unreliable. The informant in question personally witnessed the atrocities I referred to, and I will give Mr. Snow his name and address any time he asks for them.

Mr. Snow sticks to his story that Ho Ying-chin is "pro-Japanese" and says if I "had been in China," "I could have heard 10,000 students denouncing him as such, as early as 1936, on the streets of Peiping." I was on the streets of Peiping in 1936 and witnessed the student demonstration against the Tangku truce and saw wounded students put in rickshaws. That does not alter my statement that "General Ho signed the Ho-Umetsu Tangku agreement before the war under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek, which is the only basis for this persistent charge. If the Chinese Communists attacked Chiang as 'pro-Japan' the charge would sound too ridiculous." Mr. Snow has failed to give any additional basis for this charge. This parroting of fifth-columnist talk is undiscriminating and mischievous, for General Ho is now commander-in-chief of all ground forces for the counter-offensive. It hurts the morale of every American soldier.

2. Mr. Snow's reticences. To further understanding of the China situation there are needed a factual study of the civil war, the blockade, and the stopping of pay, and an examination of the ideology and program of the Communists as expressed in their own writings.

Mr. Snow complains that he "had no way of determining the truth about most of the conflicts.....I refrained from writing about them, as did other correspondents, not ....because both sides did not furnish abundant material, but because of utter lack of means of verification or documentation." It is true that there is an abundance of meterial, and documentation is perfectly possible. I have read at least a dozen Communist documents on the civil war, including editorials in the Emancipation Daily, published in Yenan, especially during July, 1943; the speeches of Chu Teh, Ho Lung, Lin Tsu-han, and Chou En-lai dealing with the civil war; and the important long telegram of Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai to War Minister Ho, November 9, 1940, in reply to the latter's account of the conflicts. Whereas the government story, based on telegrams from field commanders, gives places and dates, the Communist charges give no details.

Take the case of General Pang Ping-hsun, whose name is misspelled by Mr. Snow as Pan Pinhsien (Russian spellings regularly drop the g in ng, as "Kuomintan"), and who is cited by him as a Kuomintang general who joined the puppets. Mr. Snow conceals the fact that General Pang was forced to surrender by the Communists. According to the telegram of Field Commander Chiang Ting-wen, dated July 31, 1943, Pang, while he was fighting against 20,000 Japanese, was attacked from south of Pingshun by 5,000 Communist troops of the Eighteenth Army Corps; after he broke through, his troops were ambushed by 2,000 Communist troops near Kaoping, and all the sick and wounded soldiers were murdered. At Kuhsien he was again attacked simultaneously by 6,000 Communists of the same Eighteenth Army Corps and by 2,000 Japanese. One cannot ignore official telegrams from field commanders with names and dates or brush them aside as "Kuomintang propaganda" or just "charges and counter-charges." In other cases Communist telegrams fit in with Chungking sources,

as when the Communist commander Chu Teh, in his telegram of April 14, 1943, apologized for the capture of Governor Han Teh-chin "by mistake." And what about the resolution of the Yenan Central Politburo, October, 1937? This said, "In Chinese politics the decisive factor is military power. We must in the course of the war of resistance expand as far as possible the military power of the party as the basis for capturing revolutionary leadership in the future." No, Mr. Snow, documentation is perfectly possible. We must sift and scrutinize evidence, but we must not pretend that the documents don't exist.

After two years of ruthless expansion came the blockade and the stopping of pay. I will refer only to (a) a radio communique from Yenan on December 13, 1944, recorded by the FCC, in which Nan Han-chen reported that the "blockade" and the "stopping of money and supplies" began in 1941; (b) the government report to the People's Political Council, March 8, 1941, saying they were "going to" bukld blockhouses and define the defense lines against the Communist border, after the experience of the "two-year-old conflicts" -- this agrees in date with the Communist versin; and (c) the regulations issued at Yenan, January 30, 1941, eithteen days after the New Fourth Army's defeat, declaring that such money as was paid to them was contraband, subject to confiscation under the laws of Yenan. It is still contraband, and they are still complaining.

3. Are the Chinese Communists true democrats? This question is basic to my attitude. If they were genuine democrats, and permitted liberty of thought and of the press in their own area, I would be for them.

Mr. Snow knows as well as I do that they are genuine Communists ("Battle for Asia," pp. 290-91); that the first phase of their "democratic front" is a "transitional period" during which democratic freedoms can be used to overthrow democracy and establish a "proletarian dictatorship" and a Marxist Union of Soviet Republics in the second phase ("The New Democracy," by Mao Tse-tung, Yenan edition, p. 22); that "This (present-phase) revolution is again divided into several stages according to changes in enemy and allied camps, but that its fundamental nature is not changed until the time of socialist revolution" (p. 10); that the democratic freedoms are "suitable....for directing revolutionary struggles" (p. 24); that, according to Mao, the Kuomintang has only one object, "democratic revolution," but the Communist revolution has two stages, a "democratic revolution" leading to a "socialist revolution" of the proletariat (p. 41). Wang Chia-hsiang, former vice-chairman of the Chinese Soviets, said in 1939 -- note the date -- "They shall never abandon their ideals and the theories of Marxism and Leninism" (quoted by Snow). Now Mr. Snow says guardedly that they "happen to have renounced (in 1937) any intention of establishing communism in China in the near future." That harmless "near future" happens to be defined by Mao Tse-tung as "several years" (p. 89), no longer than the Nazi incubation period after the Munich putsch.

The Communist Tanaka Memorial (referred to above) is as prophetic as the Japanese Tanaka Memorial. After explaining every step of past developments, and I can predict future developments, after November 12, 1945, with its help. Explaining the change to the United Front, in the spring of 1937, to Chinese Communists, it says, "We are abandoning the former unworkable line of advance (open communism), and seeking a workable line, a line that is convenient for achieving proletarian dictatorship" (p. 50). Going into greater detail, it says: "(a) Only by

cooperating with the Kuomintang can we carry on the proletarian revolution, via the democratic republic, via a capitalist democracy, and pass over to a proletarian democracy to realize the proletarian dictatorship and establish a socialist society. (b) We are now making a compromise with the Kuomintang for the purpose of operating in the open and organizing a struggle for wide popular support....(c) We are now making a compromise with the Kuomintang for the purpose of immediately lifting the ban on the party, releasing political prisoners, obtaining freedoms of the press and assembly.... All these are in the direction of the road to proletarian dictatorship, and are at the same time preparations for the realization of proletarian dictatorship. (d) We are now making the compromise, for it is a good method.... to utilize the democratic republic to overthrow the party dictatorship of the National Government....The success of the democratic republic is the beginning of the second proletarian revolution and at the same time the realization of the proletarian dictatorship" (pp. 65-6). To study Chinese events of the past years without studying Chinese Communist writings is to go blindfolded.

The most rigorous "one-headed supremacy" (i-yuan-hua, or "unitary" leadership) of the party over all civil and military administrations was established soon after the "democratic" reforms were introduced by the party resolution of September 1, 1942. The "joint commission of civil, military, and mass organizations" was abolished and replaced by the "unitary" or "one-headed" supremacy of the party committee in any area of a given grade. The all-powerful person was not the elected officer of the local party committee but the party secretary appointed by the Central Politburo. The "unconditional obedience" of other administrations in the same area was decreed. "The responsible officers of the civil and military administrations and mass organizations must execute the decisions of the party committee of the same grade, even if they disapprove of the majority decisions." Even for the Red Army, "concrete military movements shall be decided upon by the political commissioner of the military headquarters -- that is, the party secretary."

As early as February, 1942, Mao Tse-tung started the "purification," or Chengfeng, movement, "to purify thought, purify education, and purify the party." (Cheng means to "rectify," and feng means "atmosphere.") How thought is purified is evident from the book "Chengfeng Wenhsien," or "Literature of the Purification." The concrete method of purifying thought is the "utter-frankness," or tanpai, movement, a political Oxford Group movement in which everyone's private life is made an open book. If a member is not utterly frank about his thoughts and private conversation, other members will be utterly frank about him. The result is of course unfortunate for those whose private conversations need "purification" or "rectification."

If there is still any mystery about the similarity of these Communists to the members in other countries all over the world, their record of primary loyalty to Moscow will banish it. I cannot exonerate people who fail to report on the extreme isolationist attitude of the Chinese Communists during Stalin's pact with Hitler, or on the sharply anti-British and anti-American attitude of Mao Tse-tung, member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, 1935-43. Hitler was a "mad dog" before the pact; during the pact he was graciously referred to as "chief of state" (yuan shou); after June 22, 1941, he became a contemptible cur again. I can give the dates of a dozen editorials of the Communist daily published in Chungking. How about the "Hands Off European War" editorial of May 12, 1941, coming awkwardly forty days before June 22? How about the editorial of April 25, 1940, calling joining the

European war a "certain road to death"? How about Mao Tse-tung's strident demand for "absolute neutrality" and his assertion that Roosevelt's lend-lease to England was "false neutrality," designed to "embroil" the United States in "the second imperialist war"? How about the sudden flare-up of intensive fratricidal warfare beginning with the signing of the pact in the summer of 1939? How about the Communist indorsement of Stalin's recognition of Japan's "Manchukuo" frontiers? And finally, how about Mao Tse-tung's calling the Anglo-American imperialists "sons-of-bitches" (tama, with a four-letter English word understood), while sparing the Japanese imperialists in the same sentence("The New Democracy," p.45)? How about his ridiculing those who think there is a difference between Anglo-American and Japanese imperialists? No, Mr. Snow, documentation is perfectly possible.

Americans owe it to themselves to study Communist programs through Communist writings. At least State Department officials should read and scrutinize the Communist Tanaka Memorial. Americans should ask themselves, Will the Chinese nation follow the Anglo-Saxon or the Russian model, and how will that affect China's alignment in the coming era of power politics in Asia? Will the Chinese gravitate toward the Anglo-American or toward the Russian orbit, and with them the other millions of Asia? And what are the forces in China today that will affect or determine that direction? What course will the 450,000,000 people of China take? Will Mr. Snow help me think and help the American people think?

Common Sense

March, 1945

FREEDOM BLOC in ASIA

by

Owen Lattimore

The basic element in our attitude toward the Orient must be recognition that the age of imperialism is over. This means that Asia will condition our life and times because so much of Asia is under colonial rule and because the end of the age of imperialism will affect so large a proportion of the people of the world directly that it will affect all the rest of the world indirectly. The democratic order has been so closely intertwined with the imperial order in its origins and through the whole history of its development that it cannot remain unaltered when the imperial order ends.

Unfortunately we cannot count on a breathing space at the end of the war in which to pick our economic opportunities and decide on the political programs that best go with them. We cannot restore the colonial system as it was before Pearl Harbor, counting on a comfortable margin of time in which to decide how far we want to go toward emancipation, and how fast. Russia will not stand still. China will not wait long. If we stand still, the colonial peoples will begin to pull away from us and to gravitate toward the moving forces. In most parts of the world the idea of a cooling-off period is foolish. In Asia it is an invitation to disaster. We must have a policy now.

A policy toward Asia involves two tasks: the imposition of terms on Japan and the creation of a democratic bloc of nations on the continent. These two tasks are really one, since the best assurance of a non-aggressive Japan is a group of strong, democratic nations in the rest of Asia.

The key countries in Asia's freedom bloc will be China, Outer Mongolia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Each of these countries -- even China -- will be weak in strategic power, industry, and political integration as compared with America, Britain, and Russia, the three giants. Individually, each of them will be tested in its own capacity to show stability and assume responsibility; and at the same time, both individually and as a group, they will serve as a test of the

political integrity and aptitude for cooperation of the three giants.

Within this freedom bloc China, already rated officially as a fourth giant power, will be of overwhelming importance. As China goes, so goes Asia. A free China means independence for something like half the people of Asia, and therefore a strong shift in the balance between the political life of free peoples and subject peoples. If the Chinese show that they are able to move beyond old provincial traditions of separatism, and at the same time to accommodate themselves to the organized partisan rivalry of political parties, they will weaken the most deeply rooted political assumptions which maintain the imperial system in India and the Asiatic colonies. If on the other hand they reveal that they are not yet able to reconcile the organized disunity of party politics with the fundamental unity of democratic nationalism, they will fortify all the prejudices that are built into the colonial system.

There is a delicate and critical relationship between the unduly prolonged system of "political tutelage" in China and the arbitrary discretion of colonial rulers on which conservatives rely for the prolongation of the colonial order. In hastening the solution of these interconnected problems the power of decisive action lies with the Chinese, and within China with the Kuomintang. If, by the time the war ends, the Chinese already have the right to organize under more than one party and to elect representatives to responsible office, then in the more advanced colonial regions, like India and Java, it will be difficult to continue "colonial trusteeship" except on a relatively short-term basis. If the war ends with an increasingly unpopular one-party tutelage still imposed on an increasingly unwilling and restive Chinese people, then the advocates of colonial trusteeship will justify a long-term retention of the colonial order on the ground that the Asiatic people which has had the best opportunity has not shown itself able to cope with the realities of democratic life.

Moreover, the direction taken by China may determine the fate of Japan for many decades. In proximity to a democratically progressive China, the evolution of democracy in Japan would be relatively easy. A politically retarded China would also be economically retarded and undermined by rural poverty and discontent; China's allies would feel the lack of support for a coordinated policy strong and assured enough to allow latitude for experiment, and in America and Britain, at least, this would result in demands for a long-range, authoritarian, control of Japan.

China's importance, great though it is, must not be allowed to hide from view the importance of the other countries of the freedom bloc.

Thailand, wedged between British and French colonial possessions and a close neighbor of China, was a free country before the war. Sir Josiah Crosby, a British advisor to the Thai Government before the war, however, maintains that Thailand should be reduced to tutelage for an indefinite period, because its rulers proved "irresponsible" during the period of Japan's aggression.

Irresponsibility, however, is not an absolute quality, and it would be extremely dangerous to discriminate between European irresponsibility and Asiatic irresponsibility. The Thai people, in the setting of Asia, are as politically mature as the Rumanian people in the setting of Europe. The Thai rulers were no

more irresponsible than the rulers of Rumania. To suspend Thai independence but not that of Rumania would imply racial discrimination to all Asiatics, both free and subject. Tutelage over Thailand would be very detrimental to our prestige, because it could not be imposed without our assent. Even a temporary tutelage over Thailand would be taken as a maneuver to expand imperialism in practice while talking in theory about emancipation out of imperialism. Everywhere in Asia the word "temporary" is suspect when it is associated with an extension of European control. The nation which assumed tutelage over Thailand would be regarded as attempting to add a part of Japan's imperial sphere to its own imperial sphere. In the past, America was always hopefully regarded as the country which might check Japan; but American assent to tutelage over Thailand would be taken as proof that we were opposed to Asiatic imperialism but are now not opposed to European imperialism.

Our most direct concern within the freedom bloc in Asia is with the Philippines. The welcome we have been receiving since General MacArthur's return to the Philippines is, however, of as much concern to our colony-owning allies as it is to us. The fact that we are succeeding in recovering the Philippines before the British, Dutch, and French recover their possessions will affect the whole character of the war in Asia. When British prestige in Asia was being roughly handled by the Japanese, before Pearl Harbor, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, then Chinese Ambassador in London, was asked what he thought. "I think," he replied, "that the sky is black with chickens coming home to roost." Black though the sky was then, there are still more chickens to come.

Apathy and even hostility in the colonial possessions, contrasting with the welcome for the Americans in the Philippines, confront our allies with difficult problems; but the fact that we have been welcomed in the Philippines does not mean that we are going to be free of problems. The Philippines Government in Exile has remained in closer touch and sympathy with its people than any other government in exile; but even so, President Osmena and the Americans who brought him back must deal with new political forces which have developed during the years of Japanese occupation. Among the guerrillas and in the resistance movement in areas under Japanese occupation new leaders have made their mark, and their followers represent political forces. The landlord problem is as important in the Philippines as it is elsewhere in Asia. In the Philippines, as elsewhere, property owners have tended to be cautious for fear of losing their property, while peasants and the common people have been the unfailing reservoir of courage.

Among the Filipinos, moreover, as among the Chinese who also have a stake in an actual and visible freedom, there is a vivid sense of community of interest with the peoples who are not yet free. The belief throughout Asia that freedom is indivisible is as important as the conviction all over the world that peace is indivisible. While we are fearful of setting people free before they are strong enough to walk alone, all Asia is convinced that the trend toward emancipation must continue as a steady, uninterrupted process, and intensely suspicious of any attempt to freeze this process at the immediate postwar level for a "cooling-off" period. Our conduct in the Philippines will accordingly influence opinions about our democratic character all over Asia; the primary essential is that our policy should avoid using individuals as "chosen instruments" -- the policy which has made us so unpopular in Latin America -- but should welcome and adapt itself to a widening political participation by the people as a whole.

At the Cairo Conference the United States, Britain and China declared for the independence of Korea "in due course." The manner in which we implement this pledge will be important for the whole freedom bloc in Asia as a test of whether we believe in people or in rulers of the people, in democracy or in the principle of Fuehrers and Gauleiters. The twenty-three-million Koreans have been under an alien police terror since 1910. Only those over forty-five or fifty can remember independence. The rest have not had means of presenting claims, even such limited means as exist in India. There are no visible political organizations, and even underground organizations are probably fragmentary. There is no way of computing the number of people who support any group or movement. Political action, as in the blackest days of repression in Ireland, has been reduced to the habit of sporadic terrorism, which is a bad form of training for government.

Outside of Korea there are several groups of exiled leaders. They have been exiled for so long that none of them would automatically be accepted as leaders or representatives of whatever underground movements may exist. They are in fact claimants with rival programs rather than leaders of competing followings. If we should arbitrarily attempt to impose one of these groups and its program we should make ourselves unpopular very quickly. Our political record up to the present shows that in some ways we are the most timidly conservative of all the United Nations. We tend to put our money, in liberated territories, on men whom we call moderate but whom their own people, all too often, call reactionary.

In Korea this will not do. It is as nearly certain as anything in politics can be that when the lid is taken off, the long-repressed political instincts of the Korean people will boil over in many factional movements. They will undoubtedly quarrel with each other, but undoubtedly the major tendency will be both fiercely nationalistic and radical. Like all other colonial peoples, the Koreans are in the main a peasant people. As in most of colonial Asia, the landlord class is the nearest thing to a quisling class. Some of the landlords, however, impoverished by the Japanese, will emerge as leaders of groups in sympathy with peasant needs.

Our own habits of political thinking will expose us to the danger of throwing our weight against Korean movements which we think "too radical." In the meantime both the Chinese Communists and the Russians will quickly get into touch with the few Korean Communists (as they will with the few Japanese Communits) and also with a rather wide progressive group which will fear a moderate Communist-sponsored program less than it will an immoderately conservative American program. Since we must live henceforth in a world in which Communism has become a permanent factor, and in a large part of Asia a "respectable" and progressive factor, we must allow for the fact that Korea is distant from us, and close to areas in which the Communists have a high prestige; it is to our interest that the Russians, and therefore Communism, should be associated with us, the Chinese, and the British in joint responsibility for a moderate but clearly progressive policy which will turn responsibility over to the Koreans themselves as fast as possible.

Finally, we should enlarge our acceptance of a freedom bloc in Asia to include Outer Mongolia. We need take no initiative in identifying ourselves either with the Chinese claim that Outer Mongolia is Chinese territory or with the Russian policy of recognizing Outer Mongolia as independent. The important facts for us are that Outer Mongolia has long been independent in fact and that the Chinese will not be in a position at the end of the war to conquer the Mongols by force.

The very existence of a freedom bloc extending from the Sino-Russian frontier into the geographical area of the Colonial order, and embracing both part of the Japanese Empire and territory liberated from Japanese occupation, makes it impossible to think of limiting the problems of policy by dividing up Asia into more or less permanent spheres of influence or control alotted to the greatest of the great nations. The freedom bloc exists because change is at work in Asia. Within the freedom bloc as a whole change cannot be halted or suspended. Within each of the countries of the freedom bloc the rate of change will vary. We must, therefore, adjust our minds to the necessity of shaping policy under the conditions of a long period of change. And Japan must be part of the changing picture.

Japan, like Germany, must be deprived of the power of resorting to aggression. Fortunately, Japan does not have, in its home islands, the industrial raw materials which Germany has; Japanese industry is not as complete and well rounded as that of Germany, and Japanese technology is much less versatile. Under the Cairo Declaration, it has already been decided that China is to recover the Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria), together with Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores. These losses will leave the Japanese nation of about seventy-five million people in an island territory of approximately 150,000 square miles -- not quite as large as California. Most of her fleet and merchant ships and a large part of her heavy industry will have been destroyed before the war ends.

In strictly military terms the problem of security is therefore relatively simple. Japan can be kept under observation from American island bases farther to the south, and from Russian and Chinese bases. The most important problem is to avoid competition in armaments between the United Nations, and for this reason it is important that any further territory taken from Japan, such as the Pacific islands, the Kuriles, or Southern Sakhalin, over and above the territories listed in the Cairo Declaration, should not be snatched by one of the victors but allotted by agreement of the United Nations. Air and sea patrol of Japan could be kept up for as long as necessary in one of two ways: either an international security force, of the kind discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, could be based on islands near Japan, or American, British, Russian, and Chinese forces could, by agreement, make use of each other's bases. An international security force would be preferable.

More important is the industrial disarmament of Japan and the prevention of a future secret war industry. The question of a "hard" or "soft" peace is directly related to this problem. There is great danger that the use of these terms will lead away from realities into emotional discussion. We must not let ourselves be distracted from the basic fact: defeat will in itself impose a hard peace on Japan. The industrial imperialists and military imperialists, working together, had built up a system combining control of raw materials outside Japan with control of selling markets. This system will automatically be destroyed when Japan surrenders her conquests. Of the seventy-five million Japanese, forty per cent will then be engaged in an agriculture which is not quite able to feed the country, while sixty per cent will be engaged in a damaged industry dependent for both supplies and markets on the consent of the United Nations.

We must avoid confusing industrial demilitarization with disindustrialization. In a Japan deprived of all industry, people would starve by the million. (In pre-industrial Japan, the population numbered at most about thirty million and increase was kept down by famines and by the widespread practice of abortion and infanticide.) We have never hated an enemy as we hate the Japanese, but we do not hate them to the point of starving several million of them. Japan must be left with some industry. It would be wise to warn the Japanese industrialists that if the army resorts to scorched-earth tactics in destroying industrial installation in the Northeastern Provinces and Korea, the equipment will have to be replaced out of Japan's home stock. This threat would do more to divide the industrialists and militarists than ideological propaganda. Apart from war measures of this kind, the wise policy is to forbid the manufacture of automobile and airplane engines, dismantle armament factories and naval yards, and let the rest of Japan's industry survive if it is able to survive under conditions of the world market. Because of the scarcity of raw materials in Japan, the stockpiling of military industrial materials can be prevented by checking imports of raw materials against production and export figures.

With this policy there could be combined, for as long as necessary, a policy of channeling Japan's industrial output toward the rehabilitation and the supply of consumer goods in devastated areas. Reparations can be handled partly by this method. It is impossible to settle reparations by confiscation except for transferring to China and Korea all Japanese property in Chinese and Korean territory, and the devastated and plundered countries in Asia do not have the man-power shortage which might make them call for reparations in the form of conscripted Japanese labor. By planning and directing Japan's output, however, the Japanese can be kept alive and at the same time be made to serve the over-all economic needs of Asia. The degree to which they cooperate in doing this successfully can be made one of the standards for judging Japan's fitness, eventually, to enter a world organization.

The question of the ownership and management of Japan's industries leads into the problem of the political handling of Japan. The Zaibatsu, or giant combines controlled by a few families, are well known. These families have had immense power over the state, and have supplied a great part of the motor energy driving the military mechanism. The only way to break their power over the state is to give the state power over them. Their holdings, and the vast holdings of the Emperor and Imperial Household in banks, insurnace, shipping, and other large corporations, as well as in industry, should be funded and placed under a Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Finance, where they can be supervised by a United Nations control commission.

The political effect of this would be to make possible the rise of a new generation of technicians, administrators, and executives loyal to the state. The rate at which such a class emerges and takes hold of things will help to determine the time at which economic autonomy should be returned to Japan. It will be necessary, of course, to exclude from such service the inside, trusted executives of the Zaibatsu, who encouraged a feudal type of devotion and loyalty among their picked employees. Among the lower-paid, professionally qualified men, however, there will be found ample numbers who will soon attach themselves loyally to the principle of promotion on merit in the public service.

New loyalties are formed only by men who get a new chance in life. They therefore require a change in system and a change in symbol. This is the key to the problem of the Japanese Emperor. At the present time there is a deceptive unanimity among American experts in agreeing that we should not make ourselves responsible, in the eyes of the Japanese people, either for deposing the Japanese Emperor or for maintaining him. This apparent unanimity actually covers a wide range of disagreement. There are those who think we should not intervene, because unless we intervene the Japanese people will themselves abolish the imperial institution. Others believe that unless we intervene the imperial institution will remain and we shall either be able to use the present Emperor or to replace him with another whom we can make our mouthpiece to order the Japanese people to carry out whatever terms we impose.

As a matter of political prophecy, I agree that the Japanese people are likely to overturn the throne unless we prevent them. As a matter of political principle, I think we should make the worst possible mistake in trying to use for our own purposes either the present Emperor or a successor nominated by us. It has long been a convention in Japan that those who have power express their power by putting words in the mouth of the Emperor. The militarists have identified themselves with this convention and it must therefore be destroyed. It can only be destroyed by showing that there are kinds of power which do not need to employ a puppet. If we use the Emperor, then after our withdrawal the power to use him would not pass to representatives of a democratic government, but to the militarists.

When Japan is defeated terrorists of the Black Dragon type, and many individual militarists, will go underground. If the Emperor continues in apparent power, and the voice of authority continues to be the imperial voice, they will be able to persuade people that the old system still exists and can be restored in full. On the other hand the underground terrorists and militarists will die off, failing to make recruits and perpetuate themselves, if we help to make possible new activities and new loyalties which are profitable to those who profess them, and at the same time make it possible for them to divert their thoughts in new directions. Belief in things like imperial divinity has no natural place in an age of chemistry, plastics, electronics, and stratosphere navigation; it can survive only with the aid of assiduous indoctrination, and if we lend support to that indoctrination while we are in Japan, then after we leave it will be used not by those who are looking forward to the future but by those who are looking back to the past.

If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an emperor, well and good. If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China but under the supervision of a United Nations commission, to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy.

I assume that the Japan of the future will be a republic. In helping the Japanese to launch this republic we should draw confidence from the fact that Japan has a larger literate electorate than any other country in Asia. It failed to create strong governments in the past not because it was politically stupid, but because it could not change the constitution and because militarist and terrorist organizations were unchecked. In the first interim government we should include political and parliamentary leaders still surviving who have a record of imprisonment or of being beaten up by political gangsters, or threatened with assassination. To protect them from terror we should include among war criminals all officers and civilians with proved associations of the Black Dragon type, who should be punished according to their guilt, with deportation and internment as the minimum.

We must, on the other hand, not be soft with the old-school-kimona "liberals," from Prince Konoye on down, who used to entertain the Embassy crowd so charmingly and made such a good impression on Wall Street, art collectors, and members of the Garden Club. They belong in Japan to the stratum which in Germany produced Schacht; they are part of the liaison between predatory militarism and predatory big business. When Japan begins to show an ability to make progress politically, we must expect the leadership to be left of center and at least liberal enough to be friendly with Russia. Friendly relations with Russia and China will in fact be as necessary for a democratic Japan as friendly relations with us.

For Your Notes . . .

