2008 AG Opinions Date Description December 30, 2008 No. I08-013 (R07-031) Re: Application of One-Person, One-Vote Requirement of U.S. Constitution to Joint Technological Education District Elections December 18, 2008 No. I08-012 (R08-047) Re: Average Daily Membership Calculation and Concurrent Enrollment December 12, 2008 No. I08-011 (R08-017) Re: Statutes Requiring Paving or Stabilization of Parking Lots and Driveways as Air Pollution Control Measures December 12, 2008 No. I08-010 (R08-026) Re: Cancellation of Contracts Pursuant to A.R.S. § 38-511 September 30, 2008 No. I08-009 (R08-037) Re: Excluding Passing Time in Calculating Instructional Time for Determining Average Daily Membership September 29, 2008 No. I08-008 (R08-036) Re: Application of Open Meeting Law to Meetings of Public Bodies Conducted Online September 2, 2008 No. I08-007 (R08-027) Re: Calculation of Average Daily Memberships by School Districts August 18, 2008 No. I08-006 (R08-023) Re: Election Procedures for School District Unification Elections July 10, 2008 No. I08-005 (R08-022) Re: Publicity Pamphlet Argument For or Against a School District Unification Plan June 4, 2008 No. I08-004 (R08-005) Re: Authority of the Arizona Commision for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing to Establish Advisory Committee March 20, 2008 No. I08-003 (R08-011) Re: Development Plans Regarding Ancillary Military Facilities March 18, 2008 No. I08-002 (R07-032) Re: Availability of Funding for Water Lines Adjacent to District Property March 11, 2008 No. I08-001 (R08-001) Re: Effect of an Open Meeting Law Violation Concerning an Improperly Noticed Agenda Item on the Validity of Properly Noticed Agenda Items STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL No. I08-003 (R08-011) ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION by Re: Development Plans Regarding Ancillary Military Facilities TERRY GODDARD ATTORNEY GENERAL March 20, 2008 TO: The Honorable John B. Nelson Arizona House of Representatives Question Presented Is residentially zoned land within the boundaries of an ancillary military facility’s high- noise or accident-potential zone exempt from Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 28-8481’s requirements where no “development plan” other than zoning was approved with respect to the land by December 31, 2004? Summary Answer Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-8481(F) exempts from A.R.S. § 28-8481’s requirements land with respect to which a “development plan” (as A.R.S. § 28-8481(P)(1) defines that term) was approved by December 31, 2004. Preexisting zoning does not constitute a “development plan” within A.R.S. § 28-8481(P)(1)’s meaning. Land that was zoned before December 31, 2004, but with respect to which no development plan was approved before that date therefore is not exempt from A.R.S. § 28-8481’s requirements. Analysis Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-8481(A) requires political subdivisions whose territory includes land within the boundaries of an ancillary military facility’s high-noise or accidentpotential zone to adopt comprehensive and general plans and to adopt and enforce zoning regulations “to assure development compatible with the high noise and accident potential generated by . . . ancillary military facility operations that have or may have an adverse effect on public health and safety.” Subsection B of the statute requires political subdivisions to incorporate sound attenuation standards into building codes that apply to land in the vicinity of ancillary military facilities. Subsection C of the statute requires political subdivisions whose territory includes land within the boundaries of an ancillary military facility’s high-noise or accident-potential zone to adopt, administer, and enforce the zoning regulations that subsection A of the statute authorizes in the same manner as the law requires them to enforce their comprehensive zoning ordinances, with the exception that they may not grant a variance without a specific finding that the variance preserves the purpose of ancillary military facility compatibility. Subsection 28-8481(F) provides an exemption for land with respect to which a “development plan” was approved prior to December 31, 2004. See A.R.S. § 28-8481(F) (“This section does not . . . authorize . . . any political subdivision to restrict . . . the right of a landowner to [develop] . . . any property located in a high noise or accident potential zone that is appurtenant to an ancillary military facility under the terms and conditions of a development plan 2 . . . approved on or before December 31, 2004 . . . .)”1 Subsection 28-8481(P) defines “development plan” as the following: 1. “Development plan”: (a) Means a plan that is submitted to and approved by the governing body of the political subdivision pursuant to a zoning ordinance or regulation adopted pursuant to title 9, chapter 4, article 6.1 or title 11, chapter 6 and that describes with reasonable certainty the density and intensity of use for a specific parcel or parcels of property. (b) Includes a planned community development plan, a planned area development plan, a planned unit development plan, a development plan that is the subject of a development agreement adopted pursuant to § 9-500.05 or 11-1101, a site plan, a subdivision plat or any other land use approval designation that is the subject of a zoning ordinance adopted pursuant to title 9, chapter 4, article 6.1 or title 11, chapter 6. (c) Means a conceptual plan for development that generally depicts densities on a particular property that a military airport, as described in paragraph 9, subdivision (a), deems is compatible with the operation of the ancillary military facility. (Footnotes omitted.) You have asked whether residential zoning, without more, constitutes a “development plan” for the purposes of this exemption from A.R.S. § 28-8481’s requirements. The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, 557, 136 P.3d 874, 876 (2006). The statute’s language is the best indicator of that intent. Id. When a statute’s plain language is clear and unambiguous, courts give effect to that language without resorting to any other rules of statutory construction. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 212 Ariz. 35, 39, 126 P.3d 1063, 1067 (App. 2006). Courts must 1 See also A.R.S. § 28-8481(E) (“This section does not . . . authorize . . . any political subdivision to restrict . . . the right of a landowner to [develop] . . . any property under the terms and conditions of a development plan . . . approved on or before December 31, 2000, or on or before December 31 of the year in which the development’s property becomes territory in the vicinity of a[n] . . . ancillary military facility . . . .”). 3 read and apply statutes in accordance with any special statutory definitions of the terms that the statute uses. State v. Hazlett, 205 Ariz. 523, 531, 73 P.3d 1258, 1266 (App. 2003). Subsection 28-8481(P)(1)(a) defines a “development plan” as a plan (1) that is submitted to and approved by a political subdivision’s governing body pursuant to a zoning ordinance or regulation and (2) that “describes with reasonable certainty the density and intensity of use for a specific parcel or parcels of property.” The statute does not define a development plan as a zoning ordinance or regulation. It instead defines it as a plan that must be submitted to and approved by a political subdivision pursuant to a zoning ordinance or regulation. Under this definition, a development plan is not identical to a zoning ordinance or regulation but is instead a plan that is submitted and approved after zoning ordinances or regulations are already in place. While a zoning ordinance or regulation might satisfy the second half of A.R.S. § 288481(P)(1)(a)’s definition of a “development plan” by “describ[ing] with reasonable certainty the density and intensity of use for a specific parcel or parcels of property,” this would not establish that such a regulation or ordinance was a development plan within the statute’s meaning. Because the statute includes the conjunctive word “and,” a plan would have to satisfy both parts of the definition to be considered a development plan within its meaning. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 188 Ariz. 237, 244, 934 P.2d 801, 808 (App. 1997) (stating that when a statute is written in the conjunctive, all of its elements must be satisfied); Guarrascio v. Fisher, 154 Ariz. 186, 188, 741 P.2d 319, 321 (App. 1987) (stating the same with respect to a court rule). Because a regulation or ordinance could not satisfy the first part of the definition, it could not be a development plan within the meaning of A.R.S. § 28-8481(P)(1)(a) even if it satisfied the second part. 4 Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-8481(P)(1)(b) lists examples of the types of plans that the term “development plan” may include.2 It identifies a series of plans by specific names and concludes with the phrase “any other land use approval designation that is the subject of a zoning ordinance.” (Emphasis added.) That concluding phrase must refer to plans of the same kind or type as the preceding ones listed. See State v. Barnett, 142 Ariz. 592, 596, 691 P.2d 683, 687 (1984) (stating that when a statute lists specific classes of items and then refers to them in more general terms, the general terms are limited to the same class as the items specifically listed); see also Wilderness World, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 182 Ariz. 196, 199, 895 P.2d 108, 111 (1995) (same). Thus, like subsection (P)(1)(a), this subsection contemplates that a “development plan” is a plan that is submitted for approval pursuant to a zoning ordinance. It does not provide that a zoning ordinance itself may be a development plan.3 Conclusion Because preexisting zoning does not constitute a “development plan” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 28-8481(F) and (P), land that was zoned before December 31, 2004, but with respect to which no development plan was approved before that date is not exempt from A.R.S. § 288481’s requirements. Terry Goddard Attorney General 2 Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-8481(P)(1)(c) does not apply to the issue raised because it applies to conceptual plans that a military airport deems compatible and does not make any reference to zoning ordinances. 3 Any issues regarding whether implementing A.R.S. § 28-8481 constitutes a taking under the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment and Arizona Constitution article 2, section 17, or requires compensation under A.R.S. §§ 12-1131 to -1138, are beyond the scope of this Opinion because they do not affect the statutory interpretation question at issue here and the analysis depends entirely upon the facts that relate to the specific parcel at issue. 5 STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION No. I08-002 (R07-032) by TERRY GODDARD ATTORNEY GENERAL Re: Availability of Funding for Water Lines Adjacent to District Property March 18, 2008 TO: Kellie Peterson, Esquire Mangum, Wall, Stoops & Warden, P.L.L.C. You have submitted to the Attorney General’s Office for review an opinion that you prepared for the Camp Verde Unified School District (“District”) regarding the availability of funding under the Adjacent Ways statute, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 15-995 (“Adjacent Ways”), to construct a two-mile water line from the school district property to the municipal water supply in order to comply with the orders of the State Fire Marshall and the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality.1 You concluded in your opinion that the District cannot use Adjacent Ways funds because the water line was not a project designed to provide physical access to the school. Additionally, you concluded that Adjacent Ways monies cannot be used to fund improvements that are more than one-quarter mile from the school property. Finally, you concluded that the SFB’s Emergency Deficiencies Correction Fund, A.R.S. § 151 The Arizona School Facilities Board (“SFB”) has agreed that an “emergency” as defined in A.R.S. § 15-2022(E) exists and has agreed to fund improvements needed on the school site. 2022 (“Emergency Fund”), can fund the water line’s construction. We have revised your opinion to clarify that the use of Adjacent Ways funds to improve public ways off school property is not restricted to projects that provide physical access to school property. Additionally, we have revised your opinion to clarify that Adjacent Ways funds are not restricted to being used within one-quarter mile of school property. Questions Presented 1. May the District use Adjacent Ways funding to construct a water line that is not being built to assure safe ingress to and egress from public school property? 2. May the District use Adjacent Ways funding to extend a water line from the school site for more than one-quarter mile to the closest municipal water line? Summary Answer 1. The Adjacent Ways statute does not restrict the use of the funds that it makes available for projects off the school site to projects that assure safe ingress to and egress from school property. 2. The Adjacent Ways statute does not restrict the use of the funds that it makes available for projects off the school site to projects that are within one-quarter mile of school property. Background The District has been informed that its current on-site well does not comply with applicable fire codes and that it will not meet the water quality standard for arsenic that became effective in January 2008. The District determined that the most financially effective long-term solution was to construct a two-mile water line from the school property to the municipal water supply. The District applied to the SFB for funding from the Emergency Fund. In a letter dated 2 October 22, 2007, the SFB’s Executive Director recommended that the District pursue Adjacent Ways funding for the off-site costs because the SFB had a longstanding policy of not funding costs related to off-site developments. The District contends that Adjacent Ways funding is inappropriate for the water line extension for two reasons. First, the District contends that Adjacent Ways funding is limited to projects that provide physical access to schools and that a water line does not provide such access. The District further contends that even if a water line could be deemed to provide such access, the two-mile distance does not fit within the established meaning of “adjacent,” which the District has defined as being no more than one-quarter mile from school property. Based on its conclusion that Adjacent Ways funds cannot be used to construct the water line, the District states that the SFB must pay for the off-site improvement. Analysis The Adjacent Ways statute provides a funding mechanism (1) that enables school districts to construct certain improvements, including utility lines, along any public way that is adjacent to school district property and (2) that permits school districts to pay for the improvements by levying a special assessment upon the taxable property in the school district. The relevant portion of the Adjacent Ways statute, A.R.S. § 15-995(A), states as follows: The governing board of a school district may contract for constructing, maintaining or otherwise improving any public way adjacent to any parcel of land owned by the school district or leased for school purposes by the school district, or an intersection of any public way adjoining a quarter block in which the parcel of land is situated, and for the construction of sidewalks, sewers, utility lines, roadways and other related improvements in or along such streets and intersections, and to pay for such improvements by the levy of a special assessment upon the taxable property in the school district. A school district shall not use any portion of the monies generated from the special assessment for any construction, maintenance or other improvements to the school district’s 3 property except improvements necessary to assure the safe ingress to and egress from public school property directly adjacent to the public way for buses and fire equipment. The primary goal of statutory construction is to find and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. See Mail Boxes, Etc., U.S.A. v. Indus. Comm’n, 181 Ariz. 119, 121, 888 P.2d 777, 779 (1995). The best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statute’s own language. Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996). “When the statute’s language is not clear, [courts] determine legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole, giving meaningful operation to all of its provisions, and by considering factors such as the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” Id. A statute’s individual provisions must be considered in the context of the statute as a whole to achieve a consistent interpretation. State v. Gaynor-Fonte, 211 Ariz. 516, 518, 123 P.3d 1153, 1155 (App. 2005). The Adjacent Ways statute authorizes a school district’s governing board to levy a special assessment on the taxable property in the school district to pay for certain improvements that the school site or its occupants will use. A.R.S. § 15-995(A). Subsection A of the statute addresses the use of adjacent ways monies under two specific circumstances. In the first circumstance, the funds are used to improve public ways that are adjacent to school property— that is, they are used off-site. In the second circumstance, the funds are used on the school property to provide safe ingress and egress for buses and fire equipment—that is, they are used on-site. The District’s proposed use of the funds to construct a water line off-site along the public way is subject to subsection A’s first sentence, which concerns off-site use. It is not restricted by the language in subsection A’s second sentence, which concerns only on-site use. 4 Accordingly, the District’s construction of the water line off the school property is not subject to any public ingress or egress restrictions. The next issue is whether the District is precluded from using the Adjacent Ways funds more than the one-quarter mile from the school site. The statute does not define the word “adjacent.” See A.R.S. § 15-995. When statutory terms are undefined, courts look to the plain meaning of the terms. See, e.g., Mail Boxes, 181 Ariz. at 121, 888 P.2d at 779. Arizona Attorney General Opinion I90-098 concluded that a school district could use Adjacent Ways funds for improvements that did not abut the school property for their entire length but were adjacent to it. In doing so, the Opinion relied on previous Arizona Attorney General Opinions and case law from other jurisdictions that stated that “adjacent” did not require “contiguousness” or “abutting or touching” but meant “in the neighborhood of,” “in the vicinity of,” or “within a reasonable distance of” the property in question. (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) The public way at issue in the Opinion happened to be one-quarter mile from the school site. The Opinion did not discuss the improvement’s distance from the school site, and none of its language would support the conclusion that one-quarter mile from a school site was the furthest distance at which one could use Adjacent Ways funds. In fact, none of the prior Opinions that it cited addressed the issue of how far an improvement could be from school property and still be considered “adjacent” to it. The prior Opinions were fact-specific and recognized that the term “adjacent” was a relative one that depended on the particular facts and circumstances of the funds’ anticipated use. See id. (stating that the proposed improvements at issue would upgrade the existing connecting road and construct a second connecting road to provide safe access to the school). Accordingly, it can only be concluded from the Opinion that under the specific facts and circumstances at issue in the Opinion, the public way one-quarter 5 mile from the school site was “adjacent” to the site. However, there is no language in the Opinion from which to conclude that a location more than one-quarter mile away from school property was too far to be considered adjacent to it. It is also instructive that the Legislature used the word “adjacent” differently depending upon whether the funds at issue were to be used on-site or off-site. Specifically, with respect to the on-site use of funds, the Legislature used the phrase “directly adjacent” to describe the physical relationship between the on-site ingress and egress and the public way. The use of the word “directly” clearly implies that a close physical proximity is required between the on-site use of the funds and the public way, although the statute does not require that the public way be contiguous to or abutting the school site. Therefore, by comparison, use of the word “adjacent” alone with respect to off-site improvements necessarily contemplates a further permissible distance from the school site for them than for on-site use improvements. Accordingly, the determination of whether Adjacent Ways funds can be used for a specific off-site improvement is fact-specific. Your Opinion correctly noted that the applicable statute and the rules promulgated pursuant to it neither prohibit nor require the SFB to fund an off-site project. The statutory language and legislative history of A.R.S. §§ 15-2001 to -2041 provide no guidance to the SFB regarding the funding of off-site improvements. We understand, however, that the SFB has a longstanding general policy of not funding off-site improvements that Adjacent Ways monies have traditionally funded. The interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency such as the SFB that administers it is entitled to deference. See, e.g., Better Homes Constr., Inc. v. Goldwater, 203 Ariz. 295, 299, 53 P.3d 1139, 1143 (App. 2002) (stating that the court accords great weight to an agency's interpretation of a statute); Berry v. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 Ariz. 6 12, 13, 699 P.2d 387, 388 (App. 1985) (stating that the “historical statutory construction placed upon a statute by an executive body administering the law will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous”). As long as the SFB ensures that it provides the funding necessary to comply with its statutory obligations, the statutes do not require it to fund off-site improvements for which Adjacent Ways funding is available. The application of the SFB statutes to this particular factspecific situation, however, is beyond this Opinion’s scope. Conclusion We revise your opinion to clarify that Adjacent Ways funds used to construct projects off school property are not restricted to projects that provide safe ingress to and egress from school property. They may therefore be used to construct a water line off school property. Furthermore, such funds may be used more than one-quarter mile from school property. Additionally, the SFB is not statutorily prohibited from funding off-site improvements, but it may have a general policy of not funding such improvements. Terry Goddard Attorney General 7 STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION No. I08-001 (R08-001) by TERRY GODDARD ATTORNEY GENERAL Re: Effect of an Open Meeting Law Violation Concerning an Improperly Noticed Agenda Item on the Validity of Properly Noticed Agenda Items March 11, 2008 TO: Candyce B. Pardee Deputy County Attorney Cochise County Attorney’s Office Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 15-253, you submitted for review an opinion that you prepared for the Superintendent of the Valley Union High School District. This Office concurs with your conclusion that when a meeting subject to the Open Meeting Law (“OML”) is properly noticed, a violation of the OML during the meeting with respect to a single agenda item does not render all legal action taken with respect to other agenda items null and void. We issue this Opinion to provide guidance concerning this matter to all public bodies subject to the OML. See Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. I06-003 (stating that review may be granted when facts have broad statewide applicability). Questions Presented Does the OML render null and void all legal action taken at a meeting when a public body violates the OML at that meeting by discussing, proposing, or taking legal action on a single improperly noticed agenda item? Summary Answer The OML does not render null and void all legal action taken at a meeting at which an OML violation occurs with respect to a single improperly noticed agenda item. Analysis “The OML is intended to open the conduct of government business to public scrutiny and prevent public bodies from making decisions in secret.” Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. I05-004 (citing Karol v. Bd. of Educ. Trs., 122 Ariz. 95, 97, 593 P.2d 649, 651 (1979)); see also A.R.S. § 38431.09.1 “A meeting held in the spirit of this enunciated policy is a valid meeting.” Karol, 122 Ariz. at 97, 593 P.2d at 651. The OML protects the public’s right to attend and to listen to the deliberations and proceedings of public bodies. A.R.S. § 38-431.01(A). Public bodies obstruct this right when they hold discussions, make propositions, or take legal actions outside of a properly noticed open meeting or concerning matters not properly noticed on an open meeting agenda. See A.R.S. §§ 38-431.01(A) (stating that all legal action must occur during a public meeting); 38-431.02(H) (stating that a public body may only hold discussions or take legal action concerning items on an agenda). When these types of OML violations occur, the OML’s ratification procedures restore the public’s right to attend and to listen to a public body’s proceedings and deliberations by requiring that the public have at least seventy-two hours’ advance notice of the meeting at which 1 Section 38-431.09 provides in pertinent part as follows: “It is the public policy of this state that meetings of public bodies be conducted openly and that notices and agendas be provided for such meetings which contain such information as is reasonably necessary to inform the public of the matters to be discussed or decided.” ratification will occur and advance access to a “detailed written description of the action to be ratified and all deliberations, consultations and decisions . . . related to such action.” A.R.S. § 38-431.05(B)(2)-(4). This allows the public to learn what discussions it missed when the improper act took place and to be present when the public body considers the matter in accordance with the OML. The question posed here involves how to treat legal action properly taken at a meeting at which an OML violation occurred. In Karol, the Arizona Supreme Court considered whether a Board’s refusal, in violation of the OML, to allow members of the public to record a meeting made all business conducted at the meeting null and void. The plaintiffs argued that A.R.S. § 38-431.05, which has since been amended, invalidated all action taken at the meeting. At the time, the statute provided as follows: “All business transacted in any body during a meeting or public proceedings held in violation of the provisions of this article shall be null and void.” See Karol, 122 Ariz. at 97, 593 P.2d at 651. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ broad interpretation of the statute in light of a reading of the OML as a whole. Instead, the court held that a technical violation having no demonstrated prejudicial effect on the complaining party does not nullify all the business in a public meeting when to conclude otherwise would be inequitable, so long as the meeting complies with the intent of the legislature . . . . Id. at 98, 593 P.2d at 652. Consequently, this Office has explained that Karol “imposes a substantial compliance test and requires a weighing of the equities before a court will declare an action void.” Arizona Agency Handbook § 7.12.1 (Ariz. Att’y Gen. 2001). Karol preceded amendments to A.R.S. § 38-431.05 that specifically authorize public bodies to ratify legal action taken in violation of the OML in accordance with certain procedures. See A.R.S. § 38-431.05(B). Although courts have not addressed whether these amendments affect Karol’s holding, this Office believes that Karol’s guidance is relevant to the question presented here.2 For example, A.R.S. § 38-431.05(A) is substantially similar to the statute that the court considered in Karol.3 Additionally, the ratification procedures, which correct notice deficiencies, would become superfluous if they were extended to action taken on properly noticed agenda items. When a public body takes action on an item properly set out in the agenda of a properly noticed meeting, the public’s right to attend and to listen to the deliberations has been satisfied with respect to that action. For that action, there is no notice deficiency for the ratification procedures to correct. A properly noticed meeting at which a public body takes action on properly noticed agenda items complies with the OML. A.R.S. § 38-431.09. If the public body also takes action at that meeting on a single item not properly noticed on the agenda, that particular action violates the OML and is null and void. Johnson, 199 Ariz. at 570, 20 P.3d at 1151; A.R.S. § 38431.05(A). The public body may ratify the action pursuant to A.R.S. § 38-431.05(B), although the violation may still subject the public body to the penalties described in A.R.S. § 38-431.07.4 2 Three cases have considered A.R.S. § 38-431.05 since the enactment of the 1982 amendments. See Tanque Verde Unified Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. Bernini, 206 Ariz. 200, 76 P.3d 874 (App. 2003); Johnson v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3 Governing Bd., 199 Ariz. 567, 20 P.3d 1148 (App. 2001); City of Prescott v. Town of Chino Valley, 166 Ariz. 480, 803 P.2d 891 (1990). Tanque Verde held that action taken during an executive session in violation of the OML could be ratified and did not address whether any other action taken during the meeting required ratification. 206 Ariz. at 208-10, 76 P.3d at 882-84. Johnson affirmed that legal action taken in violation of the OML is itself null and void, but it did not address any other action taken at the meeting. 199 Ariz. at 570, 20 P.3d at 1151. City of Prescott held that members of a public body could meet in executive session with the public body’s attorney to discuss aspects of proposed legislation including its legal propriety, phrasing, and scope because such discussions fell within the legal advice exception to the OML requirement but that discussions concerning the merits of enacting the legislation or what action the body should take based on the attorney’s advice fell outside the exception and must be open to the public. 166 Ariz. at 485-86, 803 P.2d at 896-97. 3 Compare A.R.S. § 38-431.05(A) (2008) (“All legal action transacted by any public body during a meeting held in violation of any provision of this article is null and void except as provided in subsection B.”) with A.R.S. § 38431.05 (1974) (“All business transacted in any body during a meeting or public proceedings held in violation of the provisions of this article shall be null and void.”). See also A.R.S. § 38-431.05(B) (“A public body may ratify legal action taken in violation of this article.”). 4 Section 38-431.07 allows a court to impose civil penalties, order payment of attorneys’ fees, and remove public officers from office for OML violations. The actions taken on the properly noticed agenda items are not void.5 Karol, 122 Ariz. at 98, 593 P.2d at 652. Conclusion When a public body violates the OML by discussing, proposing, or taking legal action on a matter not properly noticed on the agenda, that violation does not nullify all other legal action taken at the meeting when the violation has no demonstrated prejudicial effect on the complaining parties 5 There may be some situations in which an action taken on a properly noticed agenda item is so interrelated with an action taken at the same meeting on an improperly noticed agenda item that both actions become void, but those facts are not presented here. Cf. Karol, 122 Ariz. at 98, 593 P.2d at 652 (finding “no demonstrated prejudicial effect”).