Needs Assessment on
Information Sharing Among
West Valley Police Agencies

Technical Report

Needs Assessment on Information Sharing
Among West Valley Police Agencies

Prepared for
Glendale Police Department and
WISE Information Sharing Committee
Prepared by
Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety
Charles M. Katz
Steven Ballance
David Choate

Justice & Security Strategies, Inc.
Craig D. Uchida
Shellie Solomon

March 2006

About the Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety
Arizona State University, in order to become more committed to the Arizona community
and to society as a whole, is setting a new standard for research universities through the
model of the New American University. As a New American University, ASU is
measured not by who we exclude, but by who we include; we pursue research that
considers the public good; and we assume major responsibility for the economic, social,
and cultural vitality of our community. Social embeddedness is core to the development
of ASU as the New American University. Social embeddedness is a university-wide,
interactive, and mutually-supportive partnership with the communities of Arizona.
Toward the goal of social embeddedness, Arizona State University established the Center
for Violence Prevention and Community Safety in July 2005 to respond to the growing
need of Arizona’s communities to improve the public’s safety and well being. The
Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety is a research unit within the
College of Human Services at Arizona State University. The Center’s mission is to
generate, share, and apply quality research and knowledge to create “best practice”
standards. The center specifically evaluates policies and programs, analyzes and
evaluates patterns and causes of violence, develops strategies and programs, develops a
clearinghouse of research reports and “best practice” models, educates, trains and
provides technical assistance, and facilitates the development of and construction of
databases. For more information about the Center for Violence Prevention and
Community Safety please contact us using the information provided below.
Mailing Address
Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety
Arizona State University
P.O. Box 37100
Mail Code 3250
Phoenix, Arizona, 85069-7100
Street Address
Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety
Arizona State University
4701 West Thunderbird Road
Glendale, Arizona 85306-4908
Phone
(602) 543-6607
Web site
http://www.west.asu.edu/cvpcs/

i

Acknowledgements
The authors thank Bryan Hill and members of the WISE information sharing committee
for all of their hard work on this project. We also thank the chiefs, patrol officers,
investigators, crime analysts, and RMS/CAD, communications, records, homeland
security, and command personnel who participated in the interviews and provided much
of the data used in the present study.
This project was funded by the Arizona Department of Homeland Security through the
Glendale Police Department. Opinions contained herein are those of the authors and do
not represent the position of the Glendale Police Department or the Arizona Department
of Homeland Security.
© 2006 by the Arizona Board of Regents for and on behalf of Arizona State University
and its Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety.

ii

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements

i

Executive Summary

iii

Introduction

1

Section I: Background

3

Section II: The Present Study
Table 1: Study Site Characteristics
Table 2: Socio-demographic Characteristics for West Valley Cities
Table 3: Data Collection Sources

6
7
8
10

Section III: Patrol Officer Findings
Major Findings: Patrol

12
16

Section IV: Investigator Findings
Major Findings: Investigators

18
22

Section V: Crime Analyst Findings
Major Findings: Crime Analysts

24
29

Section VI: Records Management and Communication Supervisors
Table 4: Information Infrastructures for West Valley Agencies
Table 5: Data and Report Entry by Department
Table 6: Web Sites of the West Valley Police Agencies

30
30
32
35

Section VII: Homeland Security Officials
Major Findings: Homeland Security Personnel

37
38

Section VIII: Command Personnel Findings
Major Findings: Command Personnel

40
44

Section IX: Web Sites

46

Section X: Conclusions

48

Section XI: Recommendations

50

References

52

Appendix A: Interview Instruments

53

Appendix B: Reviewed Web Sites – National
Reviewed Web Sites – Arizona

59
68

iii

Executive Summary
Introduction and Background
This report assesses the needs of the West Valley Information Sharing Enterprise
(WISE), a group of 10 law enforcement agencies within Maricopa County, Arizona, that
is attempting to build an infrastructure for sharing information and data. These agencies
share a common vision for increased efficiencies and performance through the sharing of
accurate and reliable information. In November 2005, the Center for Violence Prevention
and Community Safety at Arizona State University was contracted to conduct a needs
assessment for implementing WISE. This report is one of several products that will be
provided by the Center and that are intended to begin a dialogue for creating a strategic
plan for building the required infrastructure for information sharing. This assessment
serves as a guide for the WISE Committee to move forward in developing that strategic
plan.
The needs assessment has four objectives that will affect West Valley police agencies:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Define the current technological environment.
Define how technology is used or consumed.
Identify current and future data-sharing needs.
Determine the obstacles that may interfere with regional information sharing.

Methods
To accomplish these objectives, we interviewed personnel from 10 participating West
Valley law enforcement agencies and two comparison agencies, Phoenix and Chandler
police departments, that are not part of the West Valley. The 10 West Valley agencies
included Avondale, Buckeye, El Mirage, Glendale, Goodyear, Peoria, Surprise, Tolleson,
Wickenburg, and Youngtown. We also examined more than 100 Web sites to obtain a
picture of how data are used and presented to the public in the state of Arizona and
nationally.
We interviewed 239 sworn personnel and civilians from the 12 police agencies. They
represented six stakeholder groups: patrol, investigations, crime analysts, CAD/RMS
managers, homeland security, and command personnel. Stakeholder interview protocols
contained 10 to 16 questions. Although a predetermined list of questions was used to
guide discussions, participants were afforded significant range to discuss topics and
issues as they arose.
Findings
Objective 1: Define the current technological environment.
• Technological resources are severely limited in some agencies, but in others the
potential for growth mirrors future population increases.
• The technological infrastructure (hardware and software) for information sharing
varies across the West Valley. Wickenburg, for example, had no CAD, RMS, or
MDCs in patrol cars. At the other end of the spectrum is Glendale which had
CAD, RMS, MDCs, GIS, an interactive Web site, and a crime analyst.

iv

Objective 2: Define how technology is used or consumed.
• Some West Valley agencies are or will soon be able to share information through
their current systems. For example, El Mirage currently supports Youngtown
through its CAD system. Four agencies, Avondale, Buckeye, Surprise, and
Tolleson, are on the cusp of sharing information because they all use the Spillman
system. Glendale is able to obtain information from Phoenix through PACE, and
Peoria will soon be able to share information with Phoenix through COPLINK.
• Eight of the 10 West Valley agencies have recently acquired or updated their
CAD/RMS systems. Many still are in the process of converting data and bringing
their systems up to full operational capacity. Glendale plans to upgrade its
CAD/RMS over the next 5 years.
• No police department in the West Valley has an existing system readily capable
of collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and distributing information and knowledge
in an efficient and user-friendly manner to all of the involved agencies.
Identified Technology Needs
•
•
•

Patrol officers in El Mirage, Youngtown, and presumably Wickenburg expressed
a need for MDCs in their cars, and investigators throughout the West Valley
expressed a need for MDCs in their vehicles.
Youngtown and Wickenburg sought basic technology (e.g., CAD, RMS) for their
agencies.
Half of the chiefs and commanders sought mapping capabilities for their agencies.

Objective 3: Identify current and future data-sharing needs.
• Patrol officers and investigators want direct access to data about persons,
including an individual’s prior contact with police, criminal history, Field
Interview card data, photograph, aliases, associates, addresses, and outstanding
warrants.
• Patrol officers want access to Attempt to Locate suspect and vehicle information
and knowledge about ongoing investigations.
• Investigators want information derived from Field Interview cards, access to
crime trend data from neighboring jurisdictions, and access to internal and
interagency RMS data in the field.
• Patrol officers and investigators both seek additional information from crime
analysts including mapping, crime trends, hot spots, and predictive information.
• Chiefs and commanders support their officers’ requests for modus operandi (MO)
information and person data.
• Crime analysts indicated that person data, MO information, and address-level data
are most needed.

v
Objective 4: Determine the obstacles that may interfere with regional information
sharing.
• Current MO data was found to be unreliable and not valid in most of the study
agencies.
• At least half of the agencies do not have the capacity to engage in place-based
(address-level) analysis.
• For some agencies, the cost of implementing an information-sharing system could
be a deterrent to participating fully in WISE .
• Administrative and management problems with the development of a regional
data-sharing initiative could cause problems with project implementation.
• Issues pertaining to data management, data security, data ownership, quality
control, system maintenance, standardization of terminology, and training
requirements all need to be discussed in order not to derail the sharing of
information.
• Turf battles among all personnel levels could hinder data sharing.
• Some West Valley police agencies have already committed to costly information
systems; they may not want to spend additional monies on yet another
information system.
Recommendations
Based on this assessment, we recommend the following steps:
1. Create a governance structure to assure the success of the project. This should
include representation and leadership from the West Valley Chiefs of Police. We
recommend that the committee serve as a subcommittee for the Far West Valley
Chiefs Association to provide oversight and guidance for the WISE effort.
2. The subcommittee from the West Valley Chiefs Association should select a
project manager for the WISE initiative. It is recommended that this person be
independent of West Valley police agencies so that he or she can offer
independent and unbiased advice and direction. The project manager should be
responsible for guiding the strategic planning process, identifying money to
implement the WISE project, serving as liaison between the West Valley Chiefs
of Police and the WISE subcommittee, and for implementing the project.
3. Create a team or subcommittee from within WISE to initiate a strategic planning
process that will lead to the implementation of a West Valley-wide system and
intelligence-led policing efforts. This team would develop a strategic plan, based
upon the needs assessment, to bring to the WISE group for feedback and
approval. As noted previously, the strategic plan should have as a primary focus
the sharing of person-level data.
4. A written statement about the West Valley effort thus far to create an informationsharing initiative should be distributed to the public through local newspapers and
television stations. This not only will foster legitimacy for the West Valley
agencies and their chiefs, but it will convey information to other Maricopa County

vi
law enforcement agencies about the growing organizational capacity and strength
of the West Valley.
5. Create an external advisory board. The board should be comprised of individuals
who have played a primary role in the creation of data-sharing projects within
their jurisdictions. This group will be able to provide WISE with valuable
experiential advice on how to proceed and how to address obstacles.
Recommended Next Steps
• Hire a project manager who is independent of West Valley police agencies.
• Develop a preliminary strategic plan for implementing the WISE project.
o Assign individuals from the WISE committee to a subcommittee for
accomplishing this task.
• Determine the timeline for the above two action steps.

1

Introduction
Since 9/11, building the necessary infrastructure for law enforcement information sharing
has been an increasing priority. Such an infrastructure must include not only the
technological means for exchanging information, but the business processes and
communication associated with sharing information and working together. The challenge
of sharing information across jurisdictional boundaries is a formidable one. With these
challenges, however, come significant opportunities to leverage resources and to build
strategies and partnerships for fighting crime and preventing terrorist activities.
The development of the Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM) has served as a
catalyst for data integration efforts throughout the country. The standards brought forth
through GJXDM have increased the opportunities for data sharing in a consistent format
with partners across the criminal justice field. The rapid increase in the number of datasharing initiatives in Arizona and across the country is notable.
Unfortunately, integration and information-sharing projects have been found to be
associated with high failure rates and deemed to be high-risk ventures. Given the history
of these types of projects, it is important to take advantage of lessons learned. One of the
lessons learned is that the needs assessment has a critical role in the development of a
strategic plan for implementing a successful information-sharing initiative. It is also
important to acknowledge the need for long-term commitment from chiefs and upperlevel management to such a project.
Most experts agree that the greatest population growth in Maricopa County will occur in
the West Valley (MAG, 2006). This expansion will place a substantial burden upon all
service agencies in that region. Without question, the information infrastructure
supporting law enforcement in the West Valley will be substantially affected by the
anticipated growth. Through extensive interviews with sworn and civilian personnel, an
examination of their data systems, and a review of Web sites, we assessed the state of
information sharing in the West Valley. The importance of a comprehensive strategy
based upon a systematic needs assessment is the basis for this report.
This report assesses the needs of the West Valley Information Sharing Enterprise
(WISE), a group of 10 law enforcement agencies within Maricopa County, Arizona, that
is attempting to build an infrastructure to share information and data. These agencies
share a common vision for increased efficiency and performance through the sharing of
accurate and reliable information. Local law enforcement agencies often possess vital
information that is not shared with their law enforcement partners (SEARCH, 2005).
Increased information sharing provides a clear benefit to all levels of law enforcement.
The report is divided into 11 sections. First, in the Background Section, we briefly
discuss information technologies and data sharing, and what it takes to succeed with
projects of this nature. Then we examine components of intelligence-led policing, a
national trend that incorporates information, analysis, intelligence, and tenets of problem
solving and community policing. Second, we describe our study, including the setting

2
and our research methods. Sections III through VIII describe our findings with respect to
six stakeholder groups: patrol, investigations, crime analysts, CAD/RMS managers,
homeland security, and command personnel. Section IX reports on our examination of
Web sites across the country. Sections X and XI provide conclusions and
recommendations, respectively.

3

Section I: Background
During the past decade, the advancement of information technologies has been
phenomenal. Significant progress has been made in areas of data storage, Internet access,
and data security. More recently, progress has been made in standardizing data elements
and in the willingness of agencies to share information beyond their present political
comfort zones. Currently, numerous data-integration and information-sharing projects are
occurring at national and local levels of government. 1 This provides both a challenge and
an opportunity for new data-integration and information-sharing projects.
Information-sharing initiatives are generally complex, which increases the risk of failure
and the likelihood of wasted resources. Further, the complexity of data-integration and
information-sharing issues can be a deterrent for moving forward. Often the challenge is
deciding which data-integration or information-sharing projects are the best fit for an
agency or region. Unfortunately, there are no perfect solutions. Rather, there are
strategies and processes by which agencies can reduce their risk and increase their
certainty of achieving specific value-added benefits.
The commitment of decision makers while developing both partnerships and long-term
solutions is critical to the success of information-sharing projects. The organizational
changes necessary for such a paradigm shift to occur must come from the highest
organizational levels. A strong commitment among agency management and leaders to a
long-term strategy for information sharing and the building of partnerships will
contribute greatly to the project’s likelihood of success.
Experts in the field of data integration also indicate that trust and willingness to share
information are critical to information sharing within the law enforcement domain.
Researchers from COPLINK point out that agencies must see an immediate gain or
benefit in order to be motivated to share knowledge and information. The need for an
immediate or short-term value-added for an agency is an important prerequisite for
creating a project design directed toward building an information-sharing and
collaboration infrastructure (Chau, 2001).
Information-sharing initiatives are most likely to succeed when they are based on a
comprehensive and systematic needs assessment of organizational, system, and technical
requirements (BJA, 2006). The assessment provides a means for beginning the dialogue
about an initial course of action and for building consensus and an understanding of the
complexities involved in completing a regional information-sharing initiative. The
importance of this issue is underscored by recent findings presented at the 2006
SEARCH Symposium on Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing. There, it was
reported that:
•
1

Over half of all data-sharing projects will cost 189% of original estimates.

According to SEARCH, Inc., every state is attempting to integrate data systems. In addition, there are 27
local and regional data sharing projects underway. See www.search.org for more details.

4
•
•
•

Large organizations end up with only 42% of the features and functions that they
originally desired in their products.
Thirty-one percent of data-sharing projects are canceled before completion.
Only 16% of information-sharing projects are completed on time and within
budget (Harris, 2006).

Part of the complexity of information-sharing initiatives lies in defining information
sharing within a law enforcement context. Information sharing can occur within a single
law enforcement agency and across multiple jurisdictions. There are also increasing
mandates for sharing information at the state and local levels of government, as well as
across diverse agencies within the criminal justice system. During the past decade, we
have seen an increase in requirements for sharing information with non-criminal justice
government agencies, as well as with the public at large. Obviously, there are multiple
definitions needed for information sharing, each resulting in different strategies for data
inclusion and data security.
We have defined information sharing as “an exchange of information that provides value
to law enforcement agencies, both at the operations and the management levels of the
organization.” The advent of computer technology has increased the opportunities for
sharing information that increases productivity for law enforcement operations and
management activities.
Evidence can be found regarding the benefits of increased access to information at both
the operations and the management levels of law enforcement. For example, Zaworski
(2005) examined the impact of the Automated Regional Justice Information System
(ARJIS) on the performance of officers and investigators in the San Diego Sheriff’s
Department. The findings indicated that information-sharing technology in general
increases effectiveness and job performance. More specifically, Zaworski reported,
information-sharing technology increased arrests for patrol officers and improved case
clearance rates for detectives. The report indicated that with the technology, officers were
more satisfied with the data available to help them perform their jobs, and they believed
that officer safety was enhanced by increased officer knowledge in the field.
Zaworski’s findings are not unique. Research repeatedly has found that the role of
information within the job functions of patrol and investigations has changed remarkably
over the past decade. Both patrol officers and detectives have been found to rely upon
computer systems and information-sharing technology in performing their duties. “Police
detectives and patrol officers are both faced with high degrees of uncertainty and
voluminous amounts of data to analyze. This makes the use of computers critical to
improving field officer productivity” (Ioimo, 2000, p. 127).
Intelligence-Led Policing
The phenomenon of information sharing across jurisdictions has not gone unnoticed by
those concerned with the bigger picture of terrorism prevention, problem-oriented
policing, and community policing – three major themes in law enforcement. One national

5
trend is the movement toward intelligence-led policing. The idea of intelligence-led
policing 2 involves “a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations
and community-oriented policing and problem solving” (Peterson, 2005). At the core of
intelligence-led policing is the notion that information sharing must become policy, not
just informal practice, and that intelligence is contingent upon the quality analysis of
data. In its simplest form, intelligence means information plus analysis (Peterson,
2005:3). Intelligence is the product of data that are collected, evaluated, and analyzed.
Ideally, with intelligence-led policing, chiefs, commanders, and supervisors are provided
facts, alternatives, and intelligence before they choose a course of action.
Thus, intelligence becomes critical for decision making, planning, strategic thinking, and
crime prevention. It not only applies to homeland security, but to policing in general. The
key is whether an agency is aware of intelligence as a concept – whether it is involved in
collecting information and engaged in some form of analysis, creating a “culture of
knowledge and intelligence” (Peterson, 2005: 13). Intelligence information is critical to
effective decision making; however, it is often not available or incomplete at either the
patrol or command levels of an organization. “In many law enforcement agencies,
planning is performed without an understanding of the crime problems facing the
jurisdiction and without sufficient operational input” (BJA, 2005). For this reason, the
WISE initiative has solicited feedback from all levels of operations as the foundation of
developing a strategic plan.

2

Intelligence-led policing originated in Great Britain through the Kent Policing Model, which deemphasized responding to service calls, instead calling for intelligence units to focus on property crime and
other serious criminal behavior. See Peterson, 2005, p. 9, for more details.

6

Section II: The Present Study
In November 2005, ASU’s Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety was
contracted to conduct a needs assessment for the implementation of the West Valley
Information Sharing Enterprise (WISE). This report is one of several products that will be
provided by the Center, and that are intended to begin a dialogue for creating a strategic
plan. This assessment is intended to serve as a guide for the WISE Committee as it
develops a strategic plan for the initial steps toward building an infrastructure that will
improve information sharing for West Valley law enforcement agencies.
The needs assessment had four major objectives. The first was to define the current
technological environment within West Valley police agencies. Specifically, we were
interested in identifying the current technology used to collect, maintain, and disseminate
information for the purpose of assessing the technological infrastructure baseline within
the West Valley. The second objective of the needs assessment was to define how
technology is used or consumed within West Valley police agencies. This will help with
understanding how information is used to accomplish particular goals and with
identifying the goals and needs of police agencies. The third objective of the needs
assessment was to identify current and future data-sharing needs of West Valley police
agencies. In particular, we were interested in locating information gaps and determining
what information agencies need to achieve their goals. The last objective of the needs
assessment was to determine the obstacles to regional information sharing among West
Valley police agencies so that these might be addressed.
To accomplish the above objectives, feedback was solicited from 10 participating West
Valley law enforcement agencies and Phoenix and Chandler police departments, two
comparison agencies not part of the West Valley. The 10 West Valley agencies included
Avondale, Buckeye, El Mirage, Glendale, Goodyear, Peoria, Surprise, Tolleson,
Wickenburg, and Youngtown. We also examined more than 100 Web sites to obtain a
picture of how data are used and presented in the state of Arizona and nationally. The
next section describes our research setting and methods used for the present study.
Setting and Methods
This section describes the methodological strategies used as part of our needs assessment
on data sharing among West Valley agencies. In particular, we describe the settings in
which the study took place, explain the characteristics of the police departments
examined, and discuss the approaches used to collect data.
Table 1 shows the general characteristics of the study sites. The geographic size of the
jurisdictions varied substantially. For example, although four of the police departments
are responsible for geographic areas of less than 15 square miles, two of the police
departments are responsible for geographic areas that are more than 175 square miles in
size. Likewise, police agencies varied substantially in their numbers of authorized
employees, ranging from 15 employees in the Youngtown Police Department to 523 in

7
the Glendale Police Department. 3
An examination of calls for service shows that West Valley police department workloads
also vary by agency. For instance, Glendale Police Department handles more than
153,000 calls for service per year, followed by Peoria (107,646) and Avondale (75,000),
whereas El Mirage and Youngtown police departments handled only 27,000 and 5,305
calls for service respectively. Similarly, study sites varied on the amount of crime taking
place within their communities. For example, El Mirage, Glendale, and Youngtown
report substantially more violent crime than Surprise, Goodyear, and Wickenburg, and
Tolleson and Buckeye report comparatively high rates of property crime compared with
cities such as Surprise and Peoria.
Table 1. Study Site Characteristics
Agency

City Sq
Miles1

2

Agency Personnel
Sworn

Civilian

UCR Data 4
Crimes per 1,000
pop.
Violent
Property

Estimated
Calls for
Service 3

AVONDALE+

42.92

91

49

52,410

--

--

BUCKEYE

218.57

31

10

--

2.98

74.99

EL MIRAGE

11.2

43

8

27,000

7.79

45.90

GLENDALE+

56.49

384

139

153,131

5.97

57.70

GOODYEAR+

117.10

68

22

31,839

2.00

47.49

PEORIA+

175.94

170

80

107,646

2.31

42.85

SURPRISE+

74.34

105

37

66,543

1.53

32.19

TOLLESON+

5.11

26

10

10,800

4.87

124.57

WICKENBURG

13.78

10

7

--

2.16

42.16

YOUNGTOWN

1.51

13

2

5,305

5.07

42.71

CHANDLER+

63.60

294

142

126,710

3.19

42.68

PHOENIX+

513.7

2,916

894

1,764,259

6.68

66.57

1 Maricopa Association of Governments
2 Crime in the United States for 2004, jurisdiction noted with (+) indicates internally provided figures effective April 14,
2006.
3 Estimated calls for service data provided by individual agencies.
4 Arizona Department of Public Safety, 2004.

3

It is our understanding that the data shown in Table 1 might not be up-to-date by the time this report is
distributed. Due to population growth in many West Valley cities, we found over the course of this study
that West Valley police agencies were growing exponentially and communities were continuously
authorizing increasing numbers of police personnel.

8
Table 2 shows socio-demographic characteristics for West Valley cities and the
comparison study sites. The population of the West Valley sites varies considerably. The
region contains four of the most populated cities in the state, yet three cities have
populations under 10,000. According to 2005 Arizona Department of Economic Security
population estimates, the largest population was in Glendale with more than 230,000
residents; the smallest site was Youngtown with slightly more than 4,000 residents.
Dramatic population growth is characteristic of the majority of sites. The growth rate for
the entire West Valley in the past 5 years is approximately 42%. Eight of the cities
experienced in excess of 25% growth, with five of these cities experiencing greater than
80% percent growth. This is substantially greater than the growth rate of the two
comparison sites and of Arizona. Since 2000, Arizona has had the second fastest
population growth of any state, trailing only Nevada (ACJC, 2005). Table 2 shows
projected growth for these cities. By 2010, Buckeye’s population is anticipated to nearly
triple, and Surprise and Goodyear will increase by 47% and 49%, respectively. Cities
such as El Mirage, Tolleson, Wickenburg, and Youngtown will experience slower
growth. Avondale and Glendale will see growth spurts of 24% and 23%, while Peoria,
Chandler, and Phoenix will grow at moderate rates of 17%, 12%, and 17%, respectively.
Table 2 also demonstrates substantial ethnic variation among West Valley cities. The
percentage of Hispanic population in the West Valley ranged from a high of 78% in
Tolleson to a low of 11% in Wickenburg. Avondale, Buckeye, and El Mirage have the
next highest percentages of Hispanic population. The overall median household income
for the West Valley cities was $41,086. The range for the median household income for
this region was a high of $57,492 in Goodyear and a low of $23,164 in Youngtown.
Overall, however, the West Valley cities were similar to the median household income of
Phoenix ($41,207).
Table 2: Socio-demographic Characteristics for West Valley Cities
Population Estimates1
Agency
AVONDALE
BUCKEYE
EL MIRAGE
GLENDALE
GOODYEAR
PEORIA
SURPRISE
TOLLESON
WICKENBURG
YOUNGTOWN
CHANDLER
PHOENIX

2000
35,883
6,537
7,609
218,812
18,911
108,364
30,848
4,974
5,082
3,010

20052
66,110
20,780
29,630
236,030
41,225
137,295
78,265
5,460
6,590
4,055

%
Change
84.2
317.8
389.4
7.8
217.9
26.6
253.7
9.7
29.6
34.7

176,581
1,321,045

231,785
1,452,825

31.2
9.9

(Projected)
20103
82,100
58,600
29,700
290,400
61,300
160,800
115,200
6,100
7,700
5,400

% NonHispanic
53.8
63.3
33.2
75.2
79.2
84.6
76.7
22.0
89.0
87.3

260,000
1,700,300

79.0
65.9

%
Hispanic
46.2
36.7
66.8
24.8
20.8
15.4
23.3
78.0
11.0
12.7

Median
Household
Income ($)
49,153
35,383
33,813
45,015
57,492
52,199
44,156
38,773
31,716
23,164

21.0
34.1

58,416
41,207

1 Except where noted, socio-demographic data were obtained from 2000 Census.
2 Arizona Department of Economic Security: http://www.workforce.az.gov/admin/uploadedPublications/1943_EEC05.PDF
3 Maricopa Association of Governments

9
Research Design
We interviewed multiple stakeholder groups because of the diverse nature of the
participating agencies and their varying needs for information. In particular, we
interviewed representatives from six stakeholder groups: patrol, investigations, crime
analysts, CAD/RMS managers, homeland security, and command personnel. We believed
that each of the stakeholder groups could offer a unique view as to their information
needs, and different opinions about how a future, regional information-sharing initiative
might be structured. We were interested in understanding their perceptions of information
infrastructure and availability, current information use and sharing, regional informationsharing needs, and potential obstacles to regional data sharing.
Stakeholder interview schedules contained 10 to 16 questions. Although a predetermined
list of questions was followed to guide discussions, participants were afforded significant
range to discuss the topics and issues as they arose. This method allowed for cross-group
comparisons, without sacrificing an environment in which individual groups could
discuss issues of their own. Interview schedules can be found in Appendix A.
Patrol and Investigations. The focus groups for the patrol and investigator
sessions varied in numbers of participating officers with the size of the groups; they
generally ranged between four and seven participants. The sessions typically lasted
approximately an hour. Two facilitator-evaluators were present at each session, and all
sessions were audio recorded for improved efficacy. Independent notes were taken by
each evaluator to maintain the integrity of their individual perceptions of each session;
these were later compiled. The officers and investigators participating in the focus groups
were selected by their agencies. In total, 31 focus group sessions were conducted with
176 officers from 11 of the 12 participating agencies. Wickenburg was unable to meet
within the time constraints imposed by our data collection and was not included in the
patrol or investigation focus groups.
Crime Analysts. Interviews were conducted with all six agencies. The interviews
included a full-time crime analyst in the West Valley, and one crime analyst each from
the Phoenix and Chandler police departments. Four agencies, Buckeye, El Mirage,
Wickenburg, and Youngtown, were found not to have a full-time employee committed to
the crime analyst function. The interviews lasted between 0.5 and 1.5 hours. We
interviewed individuals who managed their crime analysis units or, in many cases, who
were solely responsible for crime analysis within their agencies. Participation in the study
was voluntary; all individuals who were asked to participate agreed.
CAD/RMS Managers. Interviews were conducted with communications,
records, and information technology staff in all 10 West Valley agencies and the Phoenix
and Chandler police departments. All interviews were conducted in a group setting. They
were focused on information management and systems within each of the agencies. The
purpose of the interviews was to gain an understanding of current information
management within the departments. Interviews lasted between 0.5 and 1.5 hours.

10
Homeland Security. Interviews were conducted with five police department
commanders who currently oversaw homeland security issues. These interviews were
combined with those for command personnel.4 Four of five interviewees indicated that
for them, homeland security was one of many responsibilities. Interviews lasted about
one hour.
Command Personnel. Interviews were carried out with the chiefs of police and
commanders in all of the West Valley agencies, except that the Wickenburg Chief of
Police was not interviewed due to a scheduling conflict. The interviews were intended to
provide an overview of agency information infrastructures, information about how
commanders used data and shared information, and an overall assessment of the
agencies’ willingness to use and share information with one another. Interviews lasted
about one hour.
Table 3: Data Collection Sources
Patrol

Crime
Analysts

CAD/RMS
Managers

Homeland
Security

Command
Personnel

# Focus
Groups

#
Persons

# Focus
Groups

#
Persons

#
Persons

#
Persons

#
Persons

#
Persons

AVONDALE

2

5

1

5

1

4

--

2

BUCKEYE

2

9

1

4

--

4

1

1

EL MIRAGE

1

5

1

4

--

4

--

1

GLENDALE

4

21

2

5

1

3

1

2

GOODYEAR

1

4

1

4

1

1

--

1

PEORIA

2

18

2

7

2

2

--

2

SURPRISE

2

15

1

7

1

1

1

2

TOLLESON

1

11

1

3

1

2

1

1

WICKENBURG

0

0

0

0

--

1

--

1

YOUNGTOWN

1

5

1

2

--

1

1

1

CHANDLER

1

10

1

8

1

2

--

--

PHOENIX

1

15

1

9

1

6

1

3

18

118

13

58

9

31

6

17

Agency

TOTAL

4

Investigations

In Table 3, we did not double count these individuals.

11
In total, for the current needs assessment, we interviewed 239 sworn personnel and
civilians and we held 31 focus groups, from 12 police agencies. The findings of our
interviews are contained in the following sections. Although for the most part, the
responses were quite consistent across the groups, some differences will be discussed. In
addition, on some occasions, individuals within the groups (patrol and investigations)
presented conflicting information. Given the complexity and rapid growth of information
technology and individual information systems, this was expected.
Web Site Applications. To obtain further insight into the ways in which police
departments and other criminal justice agencies use and present data, we examined more
than 100 Web sites. We wanted to determine whether agencies outside of this study used
specific software applications for data collection, mapping, and analysis. In addition, we
wanted to obtain a picture of how data are more generally used and presented to the
public in the state of Arizona and nationally. The Glendale Police Department provided a
list of law enforcement and criminal justice agency Web sites from across the country
and Arizona.

12

Section III: Patrol Officer Findings
Overview of Information Systems
Each focus group opened with introductions of the participants and a brief overview of
the scope of the project. We began the discussion by inquiring what information
technology (IT) hardware and software was available to officers in the field and how
comfortable they were using these tools. They were asked for their perceptions of the
performance of their in-field IT resources.
Fourteen of the groups identified the squad car computer, or mobile data
computer/terminal (MDC/MDT), as the primary piece of IT equipment used by their
agencies. The other two agencies, Youngtown and El Mirage 5 , did not have MDCs in
their vehicles. 6 A majority of the groups (69%) also identified their agencies’ record
management systems (RMS) as being available, although only five groups identified the
call for service (CFS) or computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems as part of their IT
equipment. The responses to this question could suggest that for some agencies, the line
between their RMS and CAD systems might be fairly seamless, so that officers were less
aware of differences between the two.
Officers reported that they were comfortable with their systems and found them generally
reliable; the systems were easy to use and data was easy to retrieve. Some officers (from
four groups) complained that their systems were slow. The following problems with IT
systems or devices were also cited: “time-consuming to use,” “limited training on
system,” and “not user-friendly.”
Officers in the focus groups said that the bulk of the information they had available in the
field was person data, directly related to specific individuals. Specific characteristics and
information about an individual were most frequently identified as the items accessible to
officers in the field. These data included names, social security numbers, dates of birth,
physical vitals (i.e., height, weight, hair color, eye color), and race or ethnicity.
Several groups indicated difficulties with obtaining address-level (place) information
while in the field. Only six groups indicated that they had access to information about a
person’s last known or previous addresses. Ten groups stated that they could retrieve
information about a driver’s history (e.g., suspended license, prior DUI) and outstanding
wants and warrants (available through NCIC/ACIC). Nine groups reported having access
to comprehensive information regarding their own agencies’ prior contact with a person,
and eight groups reported that they retrieved criminal histories through dispatch’s use of
an ACJIS terminal.
The most commonly discussed property data were vehicle registration and plate
information from the Motor Vehicle Division. Seven groups reported having access to
5

El Mirage, in conjunction with Arizona’s Office of Homeland Security and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s
Office, is in the process of implementing MDC technology, expecting completion in the coming months.
6
In non-patrol officer interviews, we found that Wickenburg also lacked laptop computers in vehicles.

13
vehicle registration information. Other property-related information, chiefly about stolen
property, was identified as what typically would be found in NCIC/ACIC sources. Four
groups named NCIC/ACIC; five cited stolen or recovered firearms and six cited access to
stolen property information from other jurisdictions, in accord with NCIC/ACIC
definitions. The latter reported that they could also search property criteria for stolen or
recovered property within their own jurisdictions.
Information as it related to physical locations, whether places of business or residences,
was largely unavailable, in the perceptions of our participants. Seven groups identified
call for service (CFS) histories for given addresses as available, but that information was
limited to whatever dispatch and the responding officer may have captured at the time of
the original call. For example, an officer might access the CFS history at a particular
address and find previous calls to that address, the nature of the calls, the responding
officers’ disposition codes (e.g., arrest, report taken, no action), and perhaps brief
narratives (e.g., “arrested Subject 1 told Subject 2 not to return to address until
tomorrow,” or “no action taken”). Officers described CFS information as limited, noting
that often the history will not go back far enough, or it might fail to distinguish between
apartment numbers within a given complex. Brief narratives and disposition codes were
frequently incomplete, providing insufficient information for an officer to base action
upon. No other location-specific data elements were mentioned by more than four groups,
including address searches, hazard flags, mapping or routing information, and
information about the current occupant or owner of the given address.
The various groups identified nearly three dozen distinct information sources and
resources as available in the office, but not available in the field. Three groups indicated
no significant gaps between the types of information available to them both in the office
and in the field. El Mirage and Youngtown indicated that although they could get the
same information whether in the office or in the field, they were required to go through
their dispatchers for field information needs because they did not have MDCs. The most
frequent gap reported between the types of information available from the office and the
types available from the field involved NCIC/ACIC databases that were not available
from the field (five groups). Three groups reported not having access to ACJIS and
complete reports with full narratives.
When asked whether they would like information that they did not currently have
available in the field, participants were able to identify nearly 50 items. The majority fell
within the categories of person data and operational information. These were evenly
distributed between the two categories, and accounted for 80% of the items mentioned.
The remaining 20% fell into the combined categories of place and property. One officer
noted that “the system is good, it’s easy to use, but we can’t get anybody else’s info…and
that’s not enough.”
Forty percent of the focus groups requested information or MDC access to information
that would enhance their pool of data about individuals, whether suspects, victims,
witnesses, or contacts. The data element requested most often was a photograph attached
to personal data, either a driver’s license photo or booking photo. Even those agencies

14
currently able to retrieve photos asked that the service be expanded to include photos
from other agencies. Currently, some agencies can view booking photos for individuals
arrested and booked by their own agency, but the officers found this insufficient. They
wanted their systems to include MVD photos and photos from other agencies; eleven
groups requested photos from at least one and preferably both sources. One officer asked
for “booking photos, driver’s license, anything with a face.” Other person data requested
by five or more groups included criminal histories, driver’s license histories, officer
safety hazards, prior contact with other agencies, and direct access to PACE from MDCs.
Feedback was solicited from agencies regarding performance of duties and desired
improvements to the hardware and software of their current systems. In this category,
both El Mirage and Youngtown (agencies without MDCs) requested to have MDCs in all
patrol vehicles. Seven groups requested the most commonly desired operational
enhancement: MDCs with e-mail and/or instant messaging capability. Officers wanted to
communicate among themselves and across shifts while in the field, and to have briefings
electronically disseminated and available during the shift.
Officers also wanted MDCs to give them access to hot sheets of persons flagged for
Attempt to Locate (ATLs), recently stolen vehicles, and areas of recently increasing
criminal activity (e.g., burglaries, auto thefts). They wanted access to complete reports
with full narratives and to the Internet. One officer from El Mirage explained:
…we need MDTs, where we can get prior contacts with other agencies with
names, addresses, photos, physical descriptions, vitals, stolen vehicle and property
searches, access to full reports and narratives, driver’s history, GPS with mapping
and routing info, with touch-screens, a full-sized illuminated keypad, oh, and
officer safety alerts, whether it’s medical, or violent, or a drug house.
Information Sharing and Analysis
One of the two most commonly requested items related to property or location data was
mapping and routing information, provided by a GPS unit, to guide officers to unfamiliar
addresses when responding to calls for service. An officer in one focus group was explicit
about wanting “a mapping system with routing info, like a GPS, and topo or aerial
photos, lot plots, and street maps.” The other item most commonly requested was the
ability to do comprehensive license plate and registration checks directly from MDCs.
Five groups requested direct access to NCIC/ACIC from their vehicles, and three groups
asked for the ability to search firearm serial numbers.
Ten focus groups representing eight of the nine agencies rated the process of information
sharing among officers within their own agencies as “poor,” with eight groups from six
agencies citing a lack of routine and reliable information sharing between precincts and
shifts. Asked about the information that was shared, officers most frequently reported that
it pertained to addresses to be aware of and other officer safety issues. Eight groups from
six agencies indicated that briefing packets for a given shift, either hardcopy or e-mail,
were the most common means of sharing information with patrols.

15

Asked what information was wanted from other officers and investigators within their
own agencies, the majority (ten groups from seven agencies) asked for Attempt to Locate
(ATL) suspect information. Six groups from four agencies wanted to be aware of areas or
addresses either to watch or avoid, and five groups from four agencies wanted
information about ongoing investigations and what a patrol officer’s response should be
if encountering a person or location related to the investigation. An illustration of this
need was provided by an officer who explained that “being unaware if detectives are
working a house could blow the investigation, or put us in danger, not knowing what we
could be walking into.”
Nine groups representing six agencies reported very limited (poor) communication and
information sharing on the part of other agencies. Often, such communication occurred
during rare and coincidental face-to-face contacts between two officers; this was reported
by seven groups from five agencies. The most commonly shared information across
jurisdictions, reported by seven groups from six agencies, was Attempt to Locate (ATL)
alerts for persons, stolen vehicles, or vehicles suspected in a crime. Some groups
described, as an example of typical cross-jurisdictional information sharing, a scenario in
which sergeants from two different agencies would park together somewhere, each
listening to the other’s radio traffic and then relaying it over their own radios.
ATL alerts for persons or vehicles was the information most wanted from other
jurisdictions, reported by six groups representing six agencies. Four groups from four
agencies wanted crime trend data from neighboring communities, or better, from across
the metropolitan area. Other information desired by at least three groups included the
following: (a) ongoing investigations, (b) criminal histories, (c) officer safety issues or
hazards, (d) prior police contacts, (e) compatible radio frequencies, (f) e-mail or instant
messaging in the field, (g) MVD or booking photos, and (h) more detailed person data,
including known family and associates linked to a person; scars, marks, and tattoos; and
last known addresses.
Not all agencies had full-time crime analysts, but most patrol officers were aware of the
kinds of resources and services that an analyst could provide. Asked what information
they would want from crime analysts, 10 groups representing eight agencies answered
that they wanted predictive maps. Although their preferences varied between predictions
based on zones and predictions based on timeframes, the groups were in agreement on
the desirability of geographically based guidance for proactive policing efforts. Three
additional mapping deliverables were requested by nine groups: (a) beat-level crime trend
data, requested by six agencies, (b) hot spots, or areas with recently high crime rates,
requested by six agencies, and (c) crime trends by location or area of the city and by
crime type (e.g., construction site burglaries, auto thefts, home invasions), requested by
seven agencies. About products and services offered by crime analysts, officers
commented that crime trend maps were “good to structure patrol time,” for letting
officers know “what’s going on in my area,” and for showing trends in “preventable
crimes.”

16
Homeland Security
Eight groups from five agencies reported having received some training in how to
respond during an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), whether
radiological, biological, chemical, or other. Nine groups representing six agencies
reported receiving training in the Incident Command System (ICS). The five agencies
that reported receiving WMD training were among the six agencies that reported
receiving ICS training, illustrating that the two most commonly reported trainings were
being offered by the same agencies. Glendale and Peoria reported receiving mobile field
force or riot control training. Also of note, five groups representing four agencies
reported that the frequency and quality of their major incidence response training had
been poor or inadequate. Two groups from separate agencies rated the mobile field force
training negatively, with one commenting that “we trained with Scottsdale, Tempe, and
Gilbert - nobody from the West Valley, nobody who would actually be close enough to
help.” Another commented, “It’s a joke. It’s like marching band practice.”
When asked what kind of information would be most useful or desirable when
responding to a major incident, 11 groups from eight agencies said that the most
important information for patrol officers to have is the specific hazard or threat level
involved. Eight groups from seven agencies wanted routing information for incoming
emergency responders or for evacuation routes. Other frequent requests were for
perimeter information (seven groups from six agencies) and for more interagency training
(nine groups from six agencies).
Phoenix and Chandler Patrol Focus Group Summary
Focus groups were held with the Chandler and Phoenix police departments for
comparative purposes. Based upon the outcome of the focus groups, the Chandler Police
Department had more needs in common with the West Valley law enforcement agencies
than did the Phoenix Police Department. Chandler aligned more closely with the West
Valley agencies regarding the need for specific data elements such as ATLs, file stop
information, and other agency crime trends. For the most part, the Phoenix Police
Department reported having better access to internal information and across jurisdictions;
therefore, it did not have the same needs as the West Valley agencies. The Phoenix
agency did share the interest of Chandler and the West Valley agencies in having crime
trend data across jurisdictions, photos, and officer safety information. Overall, responses
from the Chandler and Phoenix police departments were consistent with typical responses
from the West Valley agencies, even though some differences were noted.
Major Findings: Patrol
•
•

Agencies without MDCs (El Mirage, Wickenburg, and Youngtown) need this
equipment.
Consistencies in reporting occurred across agencies, regardless of agency size.

17
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Agencies across the board expressed a strong need to be able to retrieve photos
from the MVD, whether booking photos or photos from other criminal justice
agencies.
Better access is needed to information within agencies directly from MDCs, rather
than through dispatch or across agencies.
Greater deficiencies in technology appeared in smaller jurisdictions.
Many groups and agencies implicitly or explicitly identified a need for training in
the capabilities and use of their respective systems and processes.
Better access to ACJIS information is needed.
Better access to PACE information is needed.
Increased information from crime analysts is needed, including:
o predictive maps,
o crime trend information for agency and surrounding jurisdictions, and
o hot spot analysis.
Better ability to share geographic or address-level information is needed.
Although not within the scope of this study, the need for interagency radio
communication is an issue for West Valley law enforcement agencies.

18

Section IV: Investigator Findings
Overview of Information Systems
Evaluators began sessions with investigators by inquiring what information technology
(IT) hardware and software was available to them, how comfortable they were using
these tools, and their general perceptions of the technologies’ performance. All groups of
investigators reported having access to a desktop computer at their stations. Five groups
from five agencies reported having a field radio, a cell phone, and Internet access in the
office. Five groups from five agencies reported having difficulty getting access to
databases or extracting data from their systems. Only three groups from two agencies
reported being completely comfortable with their systems. One of those groups stated
that its system was “very easy to use…but it’s limited to locally inputted data only.”
Another group reporting difficulties said that “it left a lot to be desired.”
The information that investigators reported as being available through their systems was
primarily person data, but it included data elements tied to property or location. Of
approximately 45 different data elements identified by the investigators, more than 71%
were person data; 15% was place data, and 15% was property data. The investigators’
emphasis on person data is a strong indication of the type of information they routinely
want and need. More than 30 types of person-related information were cited by
investigators, including information gathered from a variety of sources. The list of
information resources investigators currently use in the office includes the following:
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the AZTEC court record system, the
Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN), Arizona Child Protective Services
(CPS), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Arizona Department of
Corrections (ADC), and the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NCIB).
Six groups representing six agencies said that they had access to comprehensive criminal
history records and internal arrest records. Six groups from five agencies reported also
having access to Field Interview (FI) cards gathered within their own agencies. Seven or
more groups from six or more agencies reported that for persons entered into their
systems through a prior contact or arrest by their agency, they had access to names and
aliases; physical descriptions (height, weight, hair color, eye color); scars, marks, and
tattoos; race/ethnicity; date of birth; social security number; and address and contact
information.
Nine groups from eight agencies said they could use a serial number or vehicle
identification number (VIN) to retrieve information that had been entered into their
agency’s system regarding stolen property. Seven agencies reported being able to search
for stolen property information entered in their systems using property descriptions. Six
groups from five agencies said they had the ability to check the status of property that had
been logged into their systems, whether as evidence, stolen, recovered, or some other
status. Investigators said that although they could search for a specific piece of property,
usually by serial number, property entries were not typically cross-referenced; they could

19
not retrieve an inventory of all property entries attached to a single report number without
reviewing the original report narrative.
The most commonly identified place-related data were from Call For Service (CFS)
histories, reported by eight groups from seven agencies. CFS data includes the nature of
the calls, time of occurrence, who responded, action taken, and whether or not a report
was generated. Seven groups from seven agencies said that they could retrieve
information for a given address about different individuals who had been contacted there.
Only three groups from three agencies mentioned having flags for addresses that would
alert officers to specific hazards or potential officer safety issues.
Investigators overwhelmingly wanted access to the same data in the field that were
available in the office. Nine groups from eight agencies requested mobile data computers
or terminals (MDC/MDT) or laptops for use in the field, preferably with full access to
their agencies’ record management systems (RMS). Nine groups from seven agencies
wanted MVD or booking photos linked to name searches from Maricopa County or other
local jurisdictions. Six groups from six agencies asked for direct MDC access to warrant
checks for all local, county, and statewide agencies. Four other desirable items were
identified by at least four groups from four agencies: (a) field access to NCIC/ACIC
records, (b) access to PACE from MDC, (c) officer safety alerts, and (d) electronic access
to FI cards. One detective described their dilemma succinctly: “We don’t have laptops or
MDTs, so we have no database access in the field.” An investigator from a different
jurisdiction wanted “access to full narratives” and “access to MCSO bookings, with
photos, facility info, everything.”
Information Sharing and Analysis
Five groups from five agencies said that they shared “almost everything” with other
officers and detectives within their own agency. Eight groups from seven agencies
reported sharing Attempt To Locate (ATL) suspect information, and six groups from five
agencies said that they shared ATL information about persons for whom the investigator
had probable cause for an arrest. Five of the investigator groups from five agencies said
they also shared officer safety or hazard information routinely.
Field Interview (FI) card information was the most commonly requested item among the
investigator focus groups, mentioned by six groups from six different agencies. Five
groups from five agencies placed a high priority on information specific to suspects and
witnesses and their associates. Detectives in three agencies wanted more detailed reports
from their patrol officers. The value that investigators placed on these three elements
further illustrated the importance attributed to person data. One detective, describing the
use of FI cards, said they were “the best intel, but they’re very delayed.” This statement
expressed not only the value the detective placed on FI card information, but the
importance of having the most recent and relevant data. The impact of the chain of
information exchange between patrol officers and investigators on investigations was
supported by another detective who explained that “patrol often has a lot of intelligence

20
info about people and activities,” implying the importance to investigators of getting that
information.
The most common means of sharing information across jurisdictions by investigators was
reported as some form of monthly meeting of regional investigators. Nine groups from
eight agencies identified a routine investigators’ meeting as the typical means by which
they share information, with the most frequently mentioned being the West Valley
Investigators Association monthly meeting. These meetings typically include information
about a series of linked cases, known details about an unknown suspect or investigative
lead, recent trends and updates, and any other information a detective may want to share
regarding ongoing cases.
Investigators placed a high priority on person data from other jurisdictions, especially
data from FI cards that reflect all prior contact with any agency in the county or state.
They also would like detailed information about suspects in open cases, such as name and
vitals, last known address, vehicles registered to the person, and known associates and
their contact information. A detective from one agency stated simply that he wanted
“everything from everyone.” An investigator from another agency asked for “person data
from any and all agencies.” Both of these statements exemplify the desire of investigators
to have improved access to person data from other jurisdictions. Seven groups
representing six agencies wanted information about ongoing investigations in other
jurisdictions that might affect their own or that have parallel interests. Additionally, five
groups from five agencies wanted crime trend data from other jurisdictions, particularly
from those who share a border.
With the exception of a single group, investigator focus groups identified predictive
trends as the most desirable crime analyses for their work. Predictive maps and trends
identifying probabilities of when and/or where the next in a series or type of crime might
occur were most favored. Seven agencies also asked for general crime trend data. Six
wanted crime-specific hot spot data and four requested general mapping or geographic
analysis. One group asked for predictions about specific crime types with probabilities
for different days, times, and locations, making the forecasting “as narrow as possible.”
Another wanted better forecasting and prediction maps, and added, referring to municipal
boundaries, that “border trend data would be helpful.” Two groups without a full-time
crime analyst asked for one. One detective, asked what he wanted from a crime analyst,
exclaimed, “Anything!”
All but one agency reported having at least one unit-based database that stored a variety
of information that was not part of the agency’s standard system. Examples of the unitbased databases included: (a) repeat offenders, (b) street crimes, (c) drug/narcotics
investigations, (d) sex offenders, (e) robberies, (f) gangs, (g) pawn records, (h) traffic
services, (i) entertainment district enforcement squad, (j) case management files, and (k)
victim advocates. The only unit-based database that investigators said would not likely be
made available to anyone outside the given unit was the one for victim’s advocacy. All
others could be made available at least in part, if not entirely. Most agencies would be
willing to share their unit-based databases, but at least one said that they preferred to

21
share information with investigators based on specific requests and that they would not
want to have “proactive distribution” or on-demand open access to other agencies.
Homeland Security Training and Information
Investigators received training more frequently than patrol groups, with six or more
groups and agencies receiving training in Hazmat recognition and response; the proper
application and use of personal protection equipment (PPE), or protective suits, eyewear,
gas masks, and the like; and Incident Command System (ICS) training. ICS training
occurred locally and in Anniston, Virginia. Law enforcement officers were provided
training on policies and procedures to govern major emergency events of a radiological,
biological, chemical, or other catastrophic event. ICS training focused on command and
control procedures, roles and responsibilities of first responders and support personnel,
and staging, routing, and perimeter control techniques. The groups indicated some
dissatisfaction with training. For example they commented that their WMD training was
too brief (a single 8-hour class), and that the school shooting scenario training was 4
years ago and they had received no follow-up training. Participants also indicated that
they needed “more hands-on training” and “mutual aid training.” Generally, the groups
felt a need for greater cooperative training among West Valley agencies, with higher
standards of competency and proficiency and more frequent repetition.
Investigators were asked to provide the most important information needed when
responding to a major incident. The information cited as most important by the majority
of agencies was the location of the incident command and the staging areas for various
responders. Closely behind, with nine groups from eight agencies agreeing, is the specific
nature of the problem: Is it a shooter? Are there hostages? Is it a chemical spill? Was
there an explosion? They also need to know the type of hazards present, the threat level
to responders and the public, and any other type of information available about the nature
and extent of the incident. Also of note, seven agencies identified interagency compatible
radio contact as critical, and six groups from five agencies wanted to know their roles and
responsibilities at the scene.
Phoenix and Chandler Focus Group Summary
Focus groups of investigators were conducted in Chandler and Phoenix as comparison
groups for the West Valley agencies. Overall, detectives in Phoenix and Chandler
expressed resources and needs in common with their West Valley counterparts. For
issues related to information systems, Chandler reported the same IT resources that were
most frequently cited by West Valley detectives, including a computer in the office with
the agency’s RMS and Internet access, and only having radios and/or cell phones in the
field. Phoenix agreed on eleven of the thirteen most frequently identified data elements
available through the given agency’s system, including various person data elements
(names, aliases, physical descriptions, demographics, addresses); internal arrest records;
comprehensive criminal histories; stolen property entries; and CFS histories. Neither
Chandler nor Phoenix reported any difficulties accessing or using information from their
respective systems.

22

For responses related to information sharing and analysis, Phoenix also expressed a
desire that was strongly aligned with that of agencies from the West Valley for
information available in the field. Phoenix and Chandler both shared and wanted
information from within their own respective agencies and from other jurisdictions,
compatible with the most frequently identified elements among West Valley agencies.
Regarding information from crime analysts, Chandler detectives expressed a desire for
more specific crime trend data, but Phoenix largely expressed complete satisfaction with
the products and services currently available from their crime analysts, an opinion that
only one West Valley group shared. Both Chandler and Phoenix reported using unitbased databases and expressed a willingness to share some of that information with other
law enforcement agencies.
Phoenix and Chandler detectives reported having received both Hazmat and PPE training,
but Phoenix detectives also reported having received ICS, National Incident Management
System (NIMS), WMD, and Mobile Field Force training, as well. Both Chandler and
Phoenix agreed with the majority of West Valley agencies that interagency radio
compatibility would be critical for a major incident response, and Phoenix also agreed
with the majority of West Valley agencies in identifying the importance of knowing the
nature and level of the threat, and information regarding the locations of command and
control, and of various staging areas.
For those items that would be most important to any data sharing initiative, Phoenix
investigators identified three of the top four items identified by West Valley agencies:
shared RMS data, prior law enforcement contact data, and photographs. Chandler did not
identify any of the common West Valley data elements, but did place an emphasis on
more detailed person data. Overall, investigators in the Phoenix focus group seemed more
in line than Chandler detectives with the perceptions and concerns of the West Valley
groups.
Major Findings: Investigators
•
•

•
•
•

Most investigators had no field access to departmental information resources,
other than through radio dispatch, unlike patrol’s access to MDC/Ts.
Investigators make significantly greater use of person data, primarily related to:
o Names, aliases, descriptors, demographics, and identifiers;
o Known associates, last known and previous addresses, and contact
numbers; and
o Prior contact with other law enforcement agencies.
Focus groups reported their use of property information was primarily to search
for and identify stolen property and vehicles.
Call For Service histories and the people contacted at a given address were the
most common use of place data by investigators.
All investigators had access to computers and a variety of database, Internet, and
software resources in the office, but these were not routinely available in the field.

23
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Attempt to Locate alerts are the most common type of information shared by
detectives within an agency.
Detectives want more frequent and timely use of Field Interview card information
from patrol officers within their agency.
Information derived from Field Interview cards generated in other agencies is
important to investigators.
Investigators primarily use meetings (typically attended monthly) as a means of
sharing information with members of other agencies about ongoing cases, suspect
details, and modus operandi patterns.
Access to crime trend data from neighboring jurisdictions was also requested.
Prediction trend maps were identified as the most useful and/or desirable product
from crime analysts.
Most agencies have at least one unit-based database used by investigators and are
willing to share them with other law enforcement agencies.
The majority of investigators received some form of training in major incident
response strategies and procedures.
Investigators identified the most important information to have during a major
incident as:
o Staging areas
o Command and control location
o Nature and level of threat
o Specific role and responsibility at scene
The list of most-wanted for investigators included:
o Access to internal and interagency RMS data in the field
o Person data and prior police contact from other jurisdictions
o Cross-jurisdictional radio compatibility
o Photos – MVD/Booking – available electronically in the field

24

Section V: Crime Analyst Findings
Information Infrastructure
Crime analysts were asked about the kinds of data that they had access to for analytic
purposes. Our interviews indicated that most of the crime analysts were limited to data
obtained through their agencies’ CAD/RMS systems. The only exception was the
Glendale Police Department. The Glendale analyst had eight sources of data available for
analysis: CAD/RMS, arrest, traffic, person, gang, probation, and data related to unit-level
activities, persons, and places that were involved with drug activity.
We asked about the data collection software that the crime analysts used with their CAD
and RMS systems. Crime analysts from Surprise, Avondale, and Tolleson indicated that
their agencies relied on software products from Spillman Corporation. The Peoria Police
Department relied on a software package from HTE Corporation, and the Goodyear
Police Department uses New World System, a product similar to Spillman’s. The
Glendale Police Department was the only agency that developed its own software for
CAD/RMS. The Glendale system, developed by the city’s IT section in 1985, is called
CHIPS (Computer Handled Incident Program System). City information technology (IT)
departments support the CAD/RMS systems for all of the interviewed agencies, with the
exceptions of the Goodyear Police Department, where CAD/RMS is managed by the city
telecommunications department, and Surprise, where the police department manages the
CAD/RMS and the city IT and telecommunications department provides network
support.
All of the crime analysts were asked about the analytic software they used on the job.
Four of the six analysts stated that they used Microsoft products such as Access and
Excel. Analysts from three agencies stated that they used ArcGIS for crime mapping, and
three analysts stated that they used ATAC (Automated Tactical Analysis of Crime) to
examine crime trends by day of week, time of day, and offense type. Two crime analysts
stated that Spillman provided a number of prefabricated queries to produce canned
reports, and one crime analyst explained that he also uses software products such as
Curve Expert, Crime Stat, and I2. One analyst used RIGEL for geographic profiling.
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Capacity
We asked the crime analysts whether their cities had a geographic information system
(GIS) section or department and if so, whether they had access to it. All of the analysts
stated that their cities had a GIS section or department, with the exception of Tolleson.
Likewise, all of the crime analysts except Goodyear’s stated that they had access to their
GIS section or department. In Goodyear, the analyst explained that because of recent,
rapid growth and development, police requests for crime mapping and other GIS-related
matters were not a high priority for the GIS department, and thus, they still had limited
access. Surprise Police Department’s analyst explained that their city’s GIS department
was always helpful in providing crime maps to the police. The analyst at the Glendale
Police Department said that their unit actually had more capacity for crime mapping than

25
the city’s GIS section did; he attributed this to the availability of data and their
experience and training in conducting crime analysis and mapping. Perhaps the most
interesting GIS infrastructure was found in the city of Avondale. Avondale’s crime
analyst explained that the city had an informal GIS committee comprised of
representatives from fire, police, utilities, and engineering. That committee meets
regularly to share ideas, data, and shape files pertaining to schools, crime, roads, floor
plans of apartment complexes, and other critical infrastructures.
With one exception, all of the crime analysts stated that they used or had access to ESRI
products. Although two of the agencies still used ArcGIS v. 3.2, all agencies expected to
have access to v. 9.0 in the near future. Of the six analysts interviewed, only one
(Tolleson Police Department) did not have access to any ESRI product, but that one was
able to conduct crime mapping through Spillman, which includes queries for rapid
production of crime maps and other geographic forms of analysis.
Perceived Reliability, Validity, and Timeliness of Data
We asked the analysts about the reliability and validity of their data. Although all of the
crime analysts believed that their data had been generally reliable and valid in recent
years, they were able to identify data elements that were weaker relative to the rest of
their data. Modus operandi (MO)were the most commonly cited examples. Specifically,
analysts stated that officers and detectives rarely took time to complete MO information.
Often this information was either missing from the records or officers had not included
specific data elements. For example, officers might fail to include information pertaining
to the method of entry into the home, in the case of a burglary, or language used, in the
case of a robbery. Analysts explained that many officers do not like to enter data and MO
data is easy to omit from reports. Three analysts explained that physical descriptions of
suspects are not detailed in reports and officers frequently failed to include information
on the suspect’s weight, height, physical identifiers, and age. Two analysts stated that a
major problem with their data was related to geo-coding. They maintained that officers
often did not include the address of the crime or failed to confirm the location of the
crime when that field was automatically populated as part of the data-capturing process.
Four analysts explained that problems with data occurred because their officers did not
correct erroneous dispatch data. For example, if a citizen called the police about a
burglary, when in fact it was a theft, the officer who investigated the original call might
fail to contact the dispatcher to change the offense code entered into the CAD/RMS
system. The analysts also said that in some instances, when property was recovered,
officers would not update the report in the CAD/RMS system. Two crime analysts stated
that their agencies’ property data were not reliable. This was particularly problematic in
Glendale where the majority of property data was kept in physical files and was missing
from the department’s electronic information system. One analyst believed that his
agency had poor quality control on electronic records and that there were problems with
the how data fields were automatically populated. One analyst said that because of this,
time and date data were often unreliable.

26
We asked crime analysts about their perceptions of the most neglected information on
reports. Four of the six analysts stated that MO data were the most neglected. Many
pointed out that in the case of burglaries, information such as mode of entry is often
missing (e.g., cut lock, “crash and dash”). At least one analyst explained that in as many
as 95% of reports, MO data are missing. Three of the analysts stated that physical
description data were the most neglected. They stated that officers often failed to include
such information as physical marks, scars, tattoos, hair length, and general appearance on
their reports. Two crime analysts stated that specific information regarding stolen
property was not regularly entered into their department’s information systems, and one
analyst expressed having little confidence in his department’s address data.
We asked the crime analysts in each agency about the timeliness of their data. Most of
the analysts indicated that their data were fairly timely, and referred to policies that
required reports to be entered into their information systems within a reasonable period.
From our interviews, we found a clear relationship between agency size and the period of
time taken to enter data: The larger the agency, the longer it took to enter data. For
example, in Goodyear, Tolleson, and Avondale, reports were required to be entered
electronically by the end of each shift. If there were extenuating circumstances, officers
could request a few more days to complete this task. In Surprise and Peoria, it could take
up to 7 days for data to be entered into the information system and to become available
for departmental use. In Glendale, the largest police department in the West Valley, data
is less timely. Many reports might not be available in the department’s information
system for as long as 20 days. Due to such delays, the Glendale Police Department has
instituted a prioritization system. Those arrested and booked in the city’s jail facility are
entered first, followed by crimes against persons, and then by property crime reports.
Information Sharing Infrastructure
We asked crime analysts about the software applications they used for data sharing and
terrorism prevention. Four of the crime analysts stated that they relied on Microsoft Excel
to share information within and between agencies. Three agencies reported using
Microsoft Access. One agency reported using ArcGIS for space-based information;
another relied upon ATAC (Automated Tactical Analysis of Crime) to share data
pertaining to crime; still another used PDF files to share information. We found that four
agencies (Avondale, Surprise, Buckeye, and Tolleson) used Spillman products and that
they would soon have the capacity to share their CAD/RMS data through a central node
housed at the Department of Public Safety.
Likewise, we asked crime analysts about their perceptions of the most applicable or
useful software for sharing information across jurisdictions. Three of the six crime
analysts believed that COPLINK was the most useful because it already was in use by
Phoenix and Tucson, two of the major police agencies in the state. Two analysts agreed
that Spillman had a strong product for sharing information, but one stated that this
preference was based on the fact that their agency already was using it. The other stated
that COPLINK would be just as effective; he was “not that happy” with Spillman because
it did not permit in-depth, aggregate analysis of crime problems. One crime analyst stated

27
that he was not sure which system would be best, and another believed that Microsoft
Access would be best for data sharing.
Information Sharing
We asked analysts about the information they shared with other jurisdictions. Four of the
six analysts stated that they did share information with crime analysts and detectives
outside their agency. The Surprise Police Department’s representative stated that they did
not share much information yet, but would in the near future. Tolleson’s representative
stated that they shared information only with Buckeye Police Department, with whom
they had a data-sharing arrangement. The other four crime analysts (Avondale, Peoria,
Glendale, and Goodyear) said that they most often shared information pertaining to
patterns of crime (e.g., MO data) to determine the extent to which crime series might be
taking place across the valley within their jurisdiction. Two agencies reported that they
shared crime report information and information related to stolen property; one shared
sex offender data, one shared information on border crime patterns with adjacent police
agencies, and one shared information on population trends and uniform crime statistics.
We asked crime analysts about the types of data and information that they would like to
obtain from other jurisdictions. All six of the crime analysts stated that person data were
most needed: a person’s last known address, criminal history, potential for violence, and
a photograph. Four agencies identified a need for MO data to spot crime series events,
and two analysts stated that they needed information that could be obtained through the
RMS systems of other agencies. One analyst also expressed a need for crime trend data,
and another wanted information on vehicles.
Crime analysts were asked about the types of data they most often used from their
information systems. Four of the six analysts stated that they frequently used place-based
data to examine hot spots. Analysts explained that these data were used by patrol officers
and operation level managers for the purpose of directing patrol activities and for
allocating resources. Two of the analysts stated that they used data from police reports to
examine offense patterns within the city. Additionally, two analysts stated that they used
Calls for Service data for presentations at city council meetings. One analyst used event
data to look for series crimes, and another used person data to help officers obtain mug
shots and to identify persons on probation or who had outstanding warrants for arrest.
We also asked crime analysts about the data that they provided to their officers and
detectives. We found that analysts shared different types of data with each group. Four of
the analysts shared information with patrol for the purpose of helping them guide their
directed patrol activities. Specifically, they provided them with information on crime
trends by time, day of week, and location. Three of the analysts shared “look-out-for”
information with patrol officers. This included information on wanted persons and
vehicles that patrol officers should be on the watch for. Surprise Police Department’s
crime analyst shared information on traffic trends and person data related to outstanding
warrants and those on probation. Goodyear’s crime analyst provided that agency’s patrol

28
officers with information about crime series taking place in their jurisdiction and in
surrounding areas.
Crime analysts also shared different types of data with their investigators. For example,
in Avondale they shared information about where crime was occurring in the city, and in
Glendale they provided information on persons who were suspected or wanted for
particular crimes. In Peoria and Tolleson, crime analysts stated, they worked with
detectives to put “pieces of the puzzle together” using any and all data available, to
provide detectives with information that might help solve a crime or locate a suspect or
witness.
We asked the crime analysts what information they would like from their own agency’s
officers and detectives. Three analysts wanted more MO information. Specifically, they
were interested in data on emerging crime patterns for the purpose of identifying series
crimes that might be preventable. Some analysts were specific in the types of MO
information that they wanted, and they wanted officers and detectives to report not only
what they found, but also what they did not find. Two analysts commented that they
wanted more of the information obtainable through Field Interview (FI) cards such as
suspect names, physical descriptions, known associates, vehicles, and last known
addresses. One crime analyst stated that he simply wanted officers to fill out the existing
forms properly and to include all information requested by the department.
Homeland Security
We asked the crime analysts to describe the software applications or analytic methods
that they would find most useful for terrorism prevention. Most were uncomfortable
answering this question due to lack of familiarity with data issues and needs pertaining to
homeland security. Two analysts stated that the question was not applicable in their
positions within the police agency. The remaining analysts did not respond by naming
specific software programs, but stated that person data would be useful for terrorism
prevention. They explained that data on traffic stops and field interviews and other
general intelligence helped them assess high-risk, violent persons who might have the
capacity to engage in activities that would threaten the community. These analysts
explained that it would be helpful to know about such high-risk individuals’
identification, vehicles, places of residence, and access to weapons and explosives.
One of the crime analysts believed that it would be helpful for officers to have access to
Crime Capture. This is a program provided through the Department of Public Safety that
allows agencies access, using a dummy terminal, to booking photos and driver’s license
data. At this time, the crime analyst stated, this information is not available to officers in
the field, but it is desperately needed. One other crime analyst believed that I2 would be
helpful for agencies sharing social network data across jurisdictions. He cited as an
example being able to use field interview data or data derived from the soon-to-beunveiled Gang-net program to better identify and assess threats from criminal
organizations.

29
Phoenix and Chandler Focus Group Summary
Interviews with crime analysts in both Phoenix and Chandler suggested that West Valley
police agencies had much more in common with Chandler than with Phoenix with respect
to the crime analysts’ functions. Interview data obtained from the Chandler crime analyst
suggested few differences between Chandler and the model West Valley police agency.
On the other hand, the Phoenix crime analyst indicated that her unit had substantially
more resources than West Valley agencies or Chandler with respect to personnel,
equipment, software, and data available for analysis. Phoenix also reported having greater
ability to share information than any other agency studied, due to its many formal datasharing arrangements such as COPLINK, PACE, VICAP, NIBRS, and Crystal.
Interview data suggested that both Phoenix and Chandler had data that were at least as
valid and reliable as that of the West Valley agencies, but we found that it takes
substantially longer for information to become available in Phoenix than at any other
agency interviewed for this project. The comparison agencies’ analysts cited the same
concerns as the West Valley analysts with respect to needing additional modus operandi
(MO) data to help identify crime series. Both Phoenix and Chandler crime analysts stated
that they would like to be able to share person data with other agencies across the Valley,
particularly for those persons previously involved in the criminal justice system. Phoenix
also reported a need for information related to calls for service, field interviews, citations,
and persons and places involved in incidents.
Major Findings: Crime Analysts
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Six of the ten agencies had a crime analyst.
Most crime analysts had access only to data obtained through their CAD/RMS
systems.
Crime analysts most often used Microsoft Access and Excel for analytic purposes.
All analysts but one had access to their city’s GIS department.
All analysts but one used or had access to ESRI products.
Crime analysts generally believed that their CAD/RMS data were reliable and
valid.
The most commonly cited problem data were related to modus operandi (MO);
the next most commonly cited problem was officers failing to correct erroneous
dispatch data.
A clear relationship existed between the size of an agency and the period of time
within which data were entered into the department's information systems, with
smaller departments being faster than larger agencies.
West Valley crime analysts shared information ad hoc.
All crime analysts stated that person data were the most needed, followed by MO
and address-level data.

30

Section VI: Records Management and Communication Supervisors
Information Infrastructure
An underlying premise of the West Valley Information Sharing Enterprise (WISE) is that
the data-sharing framework must be able to use data provided by each city’s current
Records Management System (RMS) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems. We
found that each agency involved uses a computer-based RMS; eight of the ten agencies
have a CAD system. However, as stated in the Scope of Work, agencies have acquired
different proprietary systems or have developed them in-house. Table 4 lists the types of
systems currently in use by each of the study agencies.
Table 4: Information Infrastructures for West Valley Agencies
Agency

CAD

RMS

Operating System

AVONDALE

Spillman1

Spillman1

Unix

BUCKEYE

Spillman1

Spillman1

Unix

EL MIRAGE

CISCO2 CAD

CISCO2 CAPS

Windows

GLENDALE

CHIPS3 (In-House)

CHIPS3 (In-House)

Oracle

GOODYEAR

NWS4, Aegis CAD

NWS4, Aegis RMS

Windows

PEORIA

Sungard H.T.E.

Sungard H.T.E.

CR Series AS 400

SURPRISE

Spillman1

Spillman1

AIX

TOLLESON

Spillman1

Spillman1

Unix7

WICKENBURG

None5

LEADS

DOS

YOUNGTOWN

None6

Xpediter

Windows

1 Spillman offers a multi-platform application that runs on Microsoft Windows® HP UX®, AIX®, and Sun Solaris™
operating systems.
2 CISCO – Creative Information Systems Company.
3 CHIPS – Computer Handled incident Reporting System.
4 NWS – New World Systems.
5 Wickenburg relies on hand-written tallies.
6 Youngtown relies on El Mirage for call dispatch.
7 Tolleson relies on Buckeye’s server.

Records management representatives from Surprise, Avondale, and Tolleson indicated
that their agencies relied on software products from Spillman Corporation for managing
their CAD/RMS systems. The Peoria Police Department relies on an HTE software
package from SunGard Corporation. Goodyear Police Department uses a New World
System software, a Windows-based product that they said was similar to Spillman’s.

31
Finally, El Mirage relies on software developed by Creative Information Systems
(CISCO) for their integrated CAD/RMS, another Windows-based product.
The Glendale Police Department is the only agency that developed its own software to
manage CAD and RMS. Its RMS is called CHIPS (Computer Handled Incident Program
System); the CAD system is simply referred to as “CAD.” Both were developed by the
city’s IT section in 1985.
CAD/RMS systems for all of the interviewed agencies were supported by city
information technology (IT) departments, with the exceptions of the Goodyear Police
Department, where CAD/RMS is managed by the city telecommunications department,
and Surprise, where the police department manages CAD/RMS and the city’s IT and
telecommunications department provides network support.
The four agencies that relied on the Spillman software gave it mixed reviews. Smaller
agencies appreciated its ease-of-use and customer support. All agencies were looking
forward to being able to share and query the databases of other Spillman-based agencies
to obtain information about people, vehicles, property, warrants, and incidents, but some
concerns were expressed about the limits of the canned reports and the scalability of the
software to meet the anticipated rapid population growth. However, each agency had
recently acquired the software and none was planning to change.
Likewise, Goodyear had acquired the New World Systems software 2 years ago and is in
the process of bringing it fully online. El Mirage stated that they were planning to
upgrade their CISCO system during the next fiscal year to include a GUI interface on
laptops in the field. Both Goodyear and El Mirage managers stated that a key feature of
their systems was the integration of the statewide CJIS system with the software interface
delivered in the cars. Goodyear has this capacity currently, and El Mirage is working
toward it.
Glendale IT staff stated that within the next 5 years, they would be exploring options for
a new CAD and RMS system since support for the Oracle product was ending. Peoria IT
staff stated that although they anticipated a change from their HTE system, this would not
occur for some time. Peoria interviewees said that the AS400’s reliability was a key
reason for keeping the HTE system for the next few years, while the city absorbs other
extensive IT changes.
Youngtown and Wickenburg both expressed the desire to upgrade RMS systems, but
noted that financial constraints and lack of IT support were preventing them from
exploring options at present. In summary, as anticipated, any data-sharing effort would
rely on these existing data infrastructures to share the “strands of similar data.”
Data Integrity
As the Scope of Work states, vast amounts of data are collected by law enforcement
agencies. Police gather data on people, places, and vehicles, among other things, in just

32
about every contact they make within the community. The question is: How timely,
complete, and comprehensive are these data -- how good are they? To answer this
question, we asked records management supervisors and communications supervisors a
series of questions about who enters data, and their timeliness and accuracy.
We learned that data collection, timeliness, and integrity vary considerably across the
West Valley agencies. Table 5 provides an overview of how incident reports are
processed. We learned that in three jurisdictions, officers complete their reports using
laptops or MDTs in their cars, while officers in three other jurisdictions complete their
reports using computers located at their stations or substations. In five of the agencies,
officers may hand-write reports, after which records or administrative staff will enter the
information into databases. In one agency, Glendale, officers may dictate their reports for
system entry by records staff.
Table 5: Data and Report Entry by Department1
Agency

Where Incident Report
Entered by Officers

Report Entry

Entry Backlog

AVONDALE

Laptop in Car

Officer

None

BUCKEYE

At Station;
Handwritten

Officer;
Civilian in Records Division

Up to a week

EL MIRAGE

At Station

Officer

Up to a week

GLENDALE

Handwritten;
Dictated

Civilian in Records Division

Up to 3 weeks

GOODYEAR

Laptop in Car

Officer

None

PEORIA

30-50% Handwritten;
50-80% Laptop in Car

Civilian in Records Division

Up to 2 months

SURPRISE

Laptop in Car

Officer

None

TOLLESON

Handwritten;
Typed Narratives

Administrative Civilian

None

WICKENBURG

Handwritten

Administrative Civilian

None

YOUNGTOWN

At Station

Administrative Civilian

None

1 Tabular data represent primary methods for data entry reported by an agency.

Most indicated that data entry was fairly timely, and they made references to policies that
required reports to be entered into their department’s information systems within a brief
period. As with the crime analysts, the records managers’ results showed a clear
relationship between agency size and the length of time it took to enter data into the
information systems.
We explored how compatible, comprehensive, and accurate the data were when entered.
Most agencies felt that data collected through their CAD and RMS systems ranged from

33
fairly accurate to quite accurate. All of the communication staff were confident about the
accuracy of their CAD data because certain fields were automatically population with
system data on times, phone numbers, and addresses from the Maricopa 911 geo-coded
data files. Most felt their agencies’ officers were aware of the importance of calling in the
information during incidents to provide accurate response-time data.
We found that their confidence in RMS data was somewhat related to who entered the
data and how many different people were involved. In three of the smaller agencies, a
single person was responsible for most data entry, reducing the likelihood of
interpretation errors or miscoding. These agencies expressed the highest levels of
confidence in their data. One of the agencies made it a policy that officers would not
enter data. Staff stated, “The minute that they [officers] start trying to enter data, then
their functionality becomes that of a data entry person and not a sworn police officer that
should be out in the community, visible and patrolling.” Agencies with officers
responsible for data entry reported that they relied on edit checks built into the reporting
systems along with supervisory oversight to ensure accurate data; however, these
agencies also engaged in systematic data cleaning efforts, especially for older data.
Records staff indicated that entering data from forms was not difficult for them. Problems
with data entry when officers used the Spillman system were attributed to lack of training
and/or of comprehensive system edit checks. The systems, although flexible, allowed
officers to incorrectly enter key data, for example, actual incident location. This failure,
noted by records staff in two departments, complicated the extraction and aggregation of
data. One agency reported significant problems with its data, stating that it was engaged
in a major data cleaning and retraining effort. The smaller communities noted system
difficulties with their RMSs. In Youngtown, if more than two individuals attempted
simultaneously to access the RMS, the system would lock up and crash. In Wickenburg,
the system often crashed, even though only one person used it.
All agencies reported that they maintained written data entry policies and procedures to
guide reporting. In most cases, the policies were recorded as sections within the standard
operating procedures. Interviewees most often indicated that their policy manuals were
lengthy, filling multiple notebooks or stored electronically on CDs. In some cases,
interviewees indicated that their policies were general in nature; others said their records
policies were quite detailed, to the extent of specifying all capital letters for report fields,
how apartments are coded, and how address fields were to be written. Records and
communication staff indicated that policies and procedures were regularly updated and
updates were often distributed by e-mail.
With respect to forms, the interviewees said the booking or arrest form is standardized for
the entire county. However, each agency has its own incident reporting form. As a result,
sharing incident and field interview data is complicated; the forms lack any kind of
standardization. One interviewee stated that “the state of Arizona is coordinating some
initiative to standardize forms across the entire state, but it is not clear that the initiative is
succeeding, as every agency is somewhat wedded to their own forms.”

34

Sharing Information with the Other Departments
Records and communication staff indicated that they shared information with other
departments as requests were received. When a request was received from another law
enforcement agency, the records clerk would verify identity by requesting a badge or ORI
number, and checking the e-mail address or fax number from the requesting person.
When the identity of the requestor was confirmed, the clerk would either mail or fax the
report or prepare it for pickup by the requesting officer. No West Valley agency reported
sharing information electronically; they did not have e-mail encryption available.
(Glendale reported having access to the PACE system to obtain information from
Phoenix. Peoria is currently in the process of joining COPLINK to obtain access to
Phoenix data.)
Sharing Information with the Public
Records divisions respond to citizen and business requests for information. We asked
each department about the types of information requested by and provided to the public.
To gain a better understanding of the potential for efficiency gains from an integrated
system, we inquired about the methods used to receive and address public requests. We
found that most West Valley departments continued to receive requests for information
through in-person visits, phone contacts, and the mail.
Records staff in every department perceived an increase in requests for information from
the public, as would be expected given the rapid population increases in many of their
communities. Interviewees reported that requests were typically insurance-related, such
as accident reports and theft reports. In addition, a resident sometimes will ask for
information about neighborhood crime or a problem neighbor. One community reported
that its department actively participates in community meetings and receives requests
about specific community crime reports.
Records staff also provide information for media representatives from newspapers,
television, and radio stations. Finally, records staff field requests for reports and 911
transcripts from defense attorneys and prosecutors. Glendale reported that it receives as
many as 600 requests for 911 tapes per year; Peoria noted a slight increase in the number
of requests for 911 tapes over the past few months.
We asked whether the agencies used Web sites to inform the public and to receive
information. Most of the agencies reported having at least basic Web sites. Avondale and
Glendale were in the process of planning or enhancing their sites to include more
interactive features. We visited their Web sites, and table 6 describes their features.

35

Table 6: Web Sites of the West Valley Police Agencies
Agency

Types of
Information

Format of Crime Information

AVONDALE

Static Pages Descriptions

Monthly Crime Reports in PDF

Web site:
BUCKEYE
Web site:
EL MIRAGE
Web site:
GLENDALE
Web site:
GOODYEAR
Web site:
PEORIA
Web site:
SURPRISE
Web site:
TOLLESON
Web site:
WICKENBURG
Web site:

Online
Reporting
No1

www.avondale.org/index.asp?NID=78
Static Pages Descriptions

None

No

www.buckeyeaz.gov/police/index.htm
Static Pages Descriptions

Periodic Crime statistics, information about police
forms and report requests.

No

www.cityofelmiragepolice.org (*temporarily not available)
Interactive Pages Police Forms, Reports
and Hotlines

Interactive Crime Grid Map that creates table
"Crimes" in selected grid area; PDF Performance
Reports; UCR Reports listed but not available

Yes2

www.ci.glendale.az.us/police/
Static Pages Descriptions

None

No

www.goodyearaz.gov/indexasp?ND=59
Static Pages - Crime
Analysis Section

Static Tables for Part 1 through 2005; Interactive
Calls for service Beat Map 2005 data; Up-to-date
Burglary Report (PDF)

No

www.peoriaaz.com/index1.htm
Static Pages Descriptions

None

No

www.surpriseaz.com/index.asp?NIJ=22
Static Pages Descriptions

UCR Reports, Quarterly 2004

No

www.tollesonaz.org/index.asp?NID=15
Static Pages Descriptions

Table 1995-2003

No1

www.ci.wickenburg.az.us/index.asp?NID=73

YOUNGTOWN

None

Web site:

None

None

1 Printable report request form in PDF format.
2 Online forms also available for reporting incidents, tips, commendations, and complaints.

No

36
The Glendale Police Department’s Web site was the most advanced, with an interactive
crime grid map. When a grid was selected, the site generated a table of crimes that had
occurred within the specified period in the selected area. The site also had online
reporting forms for citizens to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

File an online crime report for theft, vandalism, criminal damage, and/or lost
property;
Request traffic enforcement;
Report Glendale Arena traffic complaints;
Provide narcotics tips;
File a bias or hate crime report;
Commend police personnel; and
File a citizen’s complaint.

The site provided downloadable PDF files for citizens to make public records requests
and to apply to the police citizen academy. Avondale and Wickenburg also provided
downloadable forms on their Web sites for requesting public records.
During our interviews, we learned that West Valley agencies viewed Web sites as a
valuable resource for interacting with the community. Many of them expressed interest in
using the Internet to communicate more information to the community. Three records and
communication staff expressed interest in allowing the public to request and report
information using their Web sites. However, no department said that improving its Web
site would be a priority in the next 5 years. Only two agencies mentioned developing a
Web-based data warehouse as a viable option to support sharing of West Valley data. In
fact, one agency expressed serious reservations about posting or sharing data across the
Web, citing security and citizen-privacy concerns.

37

Section VII: Homeland Security Officials
We interviewed command staff who had responsibility for homeland security issues
within their jurisdictions. In four of five agencies, a supervisor or commander was in
charge of homeland security issues, among other responsibilities, within his or her
agency. In one agency, Glendale, a commander served as Director of Homeland Security
and was the agency’s liaison with ACTIC and other agencies.
We asked these homeland security officials to provide their views on data and
information sharing. All indicated that they had shared data at one time or another with
appropriate state and federal agencies (ACTIC and JTTF) when they were asked,
particularly information regarding critical infrastructures. But they also acknowledged
that no existing system allows data exchanges to and from their agencies to ACTIC or
JTTF. One commander indicated that he received e-mail and bulletins from ACTIC, but
that was the extent of their information sharing.
In the West Valley, these officials thought that their jurisdictions were less likely than
Phoenix to be targets of terrorism, although they acknowledged that there were potential
targets in their cities. For example, a nuclear power plant, air force base, and sporting
arenas all are potential sites for terrorist activity. For the most part, however, they
believed that they were not at the core of danger. According to one commander,
…where I see [my agency] and the rest of the West Valley agencies are, if
something’s going to happen, my guess is it will probably happen in Phoenix.
Now, peripherally, it will shut down, and we will have to assist even Phoenix if
there was some massive event. We would have things like gas shortages, lines,
food availability. It would affect all of us in that manner, so none of us will say,
“Well, that’s in Phoenix, and we’re not going to be affected.” Because I believe
that it will.
The problem, they said, was that information regarding these types of threats is not
shared and “that information is secured and hasn’t been shared, and it needs to be placed
somewhere where people can get access to that in law enforcement.”
In Glendale, a new stadium, currently under construction for the Arizona Cardinals, will
be the site of the 2008Super Bowl. As a result, there is more concern for terrorism than
before. The commander in Glendale said,
I would suspect that we would want some way of sharing, allowing those users
(ACTIC and JTTF) to access our data for the analysis and predicting issues. I
think that’s the goal, is to somehow design a system for the people that need the
information, but exclude the people that really don’t need it, that they don’t get it.
That’s the trick. From the homeland security perspective, in prevention and
protection portions of homeland security, I would imagine that our agency is
going to have an intelligence bureau and they will have a special operations
center. Those folks will probably receive their data at the new emergency

38
operations center, so I think my perspective is more of where the data goes as
opposed to what types of data it is and those kinds of things.
One commander indicated that he and others obtain and share information at a quarterly
West Valley tactical commanders meeting.
Commanders mentioned that training has occurred within and among jurisdictions,
although not on a regular basis. One commander said that a WMD exercise was recently
conducted; they take these seriously.
Homeland Security in Phoenix
The commander in charge of homeland security in the Phoenix Police Department
indicated that 30 personnel were assigned to the Homeland Defense Bureau that includes
state and local personnel. The Phoenix personnel included supervisors, detectives, and
analysts. Within the Homeland Defense Bureau are two groups: state and local, and the
Joint Terrorism Task Force. Each group demands top secret or secret clearance levels.
The commander indicated that files and information are governed by the Code of Federal
Regulations 28 (CFR28) that limits sharing of confidential information. He asked, “We
have a problem with when we gather intelligence and we have the joint terrorism task
force guys on the top-secret side getting stuff, how do you take it from there and turn it
into a criminal case on the other side?”
Sharing information is limited because of security clearances and CFR 28. The
commander noted, “We are working through some of those issues… we’ve had a couple
of successful cases we’ve done lately.”
He also indicated that:
…this center has every database in the world up there, and a lot of stuff I don’t
even know about that is up there, but it’s still picking up a phone that works best.
We had to invent a program called the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program that
involves fire fighters and police officers in jurisdictions all around the valley and
the state that can tie directly into the intel center information center. So, that
means they can call up there and get anything they want if they have the proper
clearance.
Major Findings: Homeland Security
•
•

No system currently exists that allows for data exchanges between West Valley
police agencies and the Arizona Homeland Security Bureau.
Information on homeland security issues has been shared by commanders with the
state, but sparingly.

39
•
•
•

West Valley commanders acknowledge that they are on the periphery of
terrorism; they anticipate that Phoenix would be more likely than their
jurisdictions to be a target.
Training has been provided to officers on WMD events, but not on a continuing
basis.
Phoenix has more manpower dedicated to homeland security than the 10 West
Valley departments combined.

40

Section VIII: Command Personnel Findings
Perceptions of Data Quality
Most of the chiefs believed that their CAD/RMS data were valid and reliable. They
explained that their systems were stable and that most of the data were “good.” We asked
about their perceptions of problems associated with their CAD/RMS data. Four of the
chiefs explained that there were inconsistencies with the coding of offense data. Many of
them noted, for example, that a citizen might call the police about a burglary, when in
fact, after an officer investigates the incident, he or she determines that it was actually a
theft. The chiefs reported that in these cases, officers often do not call to correct the error
with dispatch, and so the offense codes remain incorrect in the CAD/RMS system. Two
of the chiefs stated that problems with their CAD/RMS systems were restricted to address
data. They explained that although some officers do not collect information
systematically, others do not collect the data at all. For instance, some might record
address-level data by documenting intersections, while others use full addresses, and still
others might use only business names. They explained that the lack of consistency of
address-level data makes it difficult to analyze such information accurately.
The chief in El Mirage indicated that his agency’s CAD/RMS system was antiquated. He
stated that it was primarily used for report writing and report generation, and that it was
unreliable for any other use. Youngtown reported that it did not have its own CAD/RMS
system; the agency out-sources this responsibility to El Mirage. The Youngtown chief
reported that that agency receives regular downloads of CAD/RMS data from El Mirage;
they use this information for compiling statistics to make presentations to city officials
and to make personnel-allocation decisions. Buckeye’s chief reported that his CAD/RMS
system was underdeveloped and that the agency is working with a vendor to train
personnel to use the system, so that they can better use this information in the future.
Commanders in the West Valley agencies shared the sentiments of their police chiefs
about data quality. Most believed that their data were valid and reliable. With respect to
data systems, the supervisor in Wickenburg indicated that they did not have CAD or
RMS; instead, they rely on handwritten cards for dispatching calls for service, and a
civilian enters reports into an antiquated database.
Information Use and Availability
We asked all of the police chiefs about the kinds of information and data that they used
for decision-making. The most common response was CAD/RMS data, followed closely
by data obtained directly from crime reports or logs. This information was used by the
chiefs for several operational and administrative purposes. The most common purposes
were to notify their commanders about crime problems needing their attention and to
make decisions about personnel allocations to geographic areas with high levels of crime.
Chiefs in Goodyear and Tolleson also indicated that they used traffic data for this
purpose.

41
However, interviews with the chiefs indicated that they primarily used departmental data
to make administrative decisions rather than for decisions directly related to operations.
Almost all of the chiefs stated that they used CAD/RMS data to justify resources and to
guide requests for additional personnel and equipment. Two chiefs stated that they used
CAD data for tracking and evaluating officer activity and productivity; two others
mentioned that they used complaint and internal affairs data for personnel decisions.
Likewise, two of the chiefs stated that they spent the majority of their time on personnel
issues, so they relied heavily on “all data” pertaining to the evaluation of personnel.
Buckeye’s chief stated that due to a lack of data infrastructure, that agency was required
to rely heavily on person-to-person or person-to-group conversations to make operational
and administrative decisions. 7
We asked the chiefs about the types of information that they most often used from their
information systems. All of the West Valley chiefs stated that they primarily relied on
event data obtained through crime reports or their CAD/RMS systems. For example,
almost all of the chiefs stated that such data were used for the purpose of designing placebased intervention strategies, such as increasing patrols in known hot spots. They
explained that they also used this information to identify series patterns for crimes such
as burglaries, robberies, and auto thefts. If a pattern was identified, the information was
then used to direct special units or patrols to address the problem.
Commanders use departmental data for allocating personnel and targeting areas of
criminal behavior. In Avondale, for example, commanders indicated that they used maps
and calls for service data to target hot spots and to construct the new beat system.
Two of the chiefs stated that they also relied heavily on census data for allocating
resources. For example, one chief explained that analysis of census data showed that
some areas of the city were heavily populated with Spanish speakers; he re-allocated his
Spanish-speaking officers to these areas, increasing the effectiveness of police services.
Two other chiefs stated that they relied heavily on accident data to determine where
traffic operations should be deployed.
Of special interest was the finding that half of the chiefs reported that their agencies did
not have the infrastructure or capacity to map crime within their jurisdictions. These
agencies tended to be smaller and did not have the financial resources to staff or equip
this function. However, three of the chiefs reported that their agencies were actively
involved in crime mapping, and one was in the process of implementing crime mapping
within the next few months. All three of these agencies used crime mapping for tactical
and operational purposes. For example, these chiefs stated that crime mapping was
routinely conducted to identify location-specific crime trends. If a trend or hot spot was
observed, they used this information to make managers aware of the problem and to
7

During interviews with the chiefs, it became clear that they relied on several sources of information for
making decisions. All of the chiefs understood that the purpose of this interview was to assess their data
needs with respect to crime and related problems. Thus, although many of the chiefs did not make mention
of the vast array of information that they use for decision-making, the omission of such discussion does not
indicate that they do not use other information.

42
ensure that appropriate resources were being deployed. One of the chiefs used crime
maps for organizational decisions, as well. This chief used crime mapping to determine
beat assignments and make budget presentations to the city council. He also reported that
his agency provided crime maps to citizens to assist them with personal decisions and
with crime prevention efforts by block watch programs.
Information Needs
We asked West Valley chiefs about the types of information they needed from other
jurisdictions. Five of the chiefs explained that their agencies needed information from
other jurisdictions about people who had had prior contact with the criminal justice
system. They were specifically interested in data pertaining to arrest history and field
interviews, and in individual’s potential for violence, previous addresses, and vehicles. A
few chiefs stated that their agencies also needed information pertaining to known
associates of offenders. These data, they explained, could be obtained through Field
Interview cards and access to jail visitation rosters. Many of the chiefs noted that one of
the reasons person data are so important is that individuals who are contacted by the
police in their jurisdiction are quite often not residents of their city. Thus, field level
officers are often working without much information that might help with the tactical
decisions they must make in the field.
Six of the chiefs also stated that they needed modus operandi (MO) information from
other agencies. They said that many crime series take place across the valley; criminal
investigators tend to work these crimes independently, without the accumulated
knowledge of their colleagues across the metropolitan area. An example was a series of
safe burglaries occurring throughout the Valley. Only recently did investigators across
departments recognized the regional trend and begin collaborating on investigating these
cases. Chiefs also voiced a variety of data needs from other jurisdiction, including
information pertaining to gangs, vehicles, property, and census data.
Commanders agreed with the chiefs that they needed information on arrest histories and
crime series. The Buckeye commander said, “It would be nice just to get on the computer
without calling around and just… and it just pops up – yeah, we had contact with him for
this or whatever. I just think that the ease and the availability of information on different
people will be just great.”
Homeland Security Information Sharing
We asked West Valley chiefs about the extent to which they currently share information
related to homeland security and about their agencies’ homeland security information
needs. Our interviews suggested that sharing information related to homeland security
was restricted to agency participation in the Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information
Center (ACTIC). Four chiefs stated that their agencies participated in ACTIC, either
directly or indirectly, for the specific purpose of sharing information about threats related
to homeland security. Two of the chiefs (Glendale, Peoria) indicated that they had
allocated permanent personnel to ACTIC; two stated that their agencies did not have their

43
own personnel assigned to ACTIC, but they relied on a representative from another
agency. For example, Youngtown relied on an ACTIC representative from the Peoria
Police Department and El Mirage relied on a representative from the Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Office to retrieve and provide this information the agency. Three chiefs gave
specific examples of the types of information that they share with ACTIC. Two stated
that they had contacted ACTIC about stolen police uniforms and badges, providing the
information to their ACTIC representatives, who in turn provided it to ACTIC. Another
chief explained that some of his officers had observed two individuals photographing
airplanes at the local airport with sophisticated equipment. The officers obtained
identifying information on the persons and forwarded it to ACTIC.
All of the chiefs agreed that their agencies needed information pertaining to homeland
security threats. Four chiefs stated that they needed information pertaining to persons and
groups that have potential to engage in crime or terrorism within their local jurisdictions,
giving as examples gangs, gang members, immigrants, and potential terrorists. These
chiefs were clear that although most of the information forwarded by federal agencies
was interesting, they did not want or need generic information about potential threats, but
rather needed specific information on persons of interest or potential locations that might
be threatened within their communities. Two chiefs pointed out that critical
infrastructures were located either within their jurisdictions or nearby. These chiefs stated
that the proximity to critical infrastructures causes them to need information about crime
in the areas surrounding that infrastructure and intelligence on threats to it. Three of the
chiefs also stated a need for general information pertaining to trends, potential threats,
and critical infrastructures within their jurisdictions.
Perceived Challenges to Regional Data Sharing
Near the conclusion of the interview, we asked the chiefs about obstacles they saw in
regional data sharing. Five of the chiefs believed that the cost of implementing an
information-sharing system could be a deterrent to some agencies. They noted that many
of the agencies in the West Valley are small and do not have adequate resources
(personnel and money) to invest in such a major undertaking. Other chiefs pointed out
that some West Valley police agencies have already committed to costly information
systems, so they might not want to spend additional monies on yet another one.
Five chiefs believed that there might be administrative problems with the development of
a regional data-sharing initiative. These chiefs stated that many issues will need to be
discussed before such an initiative could begin, and that friction between the agencies
could stall such a project. For example, they cited a need for dialogue about issues
connected with data management, data security, data ownership, data quality control,
system maintenance, training requirements, and memoranda of understanding, any of
which, if not handled delicately, could derail the project. About one third of the chiefs
mentioned that for the initiative to succeed, agencies would need to move forward while
recognizing the delicacy of relationships, understanding that trust and strong relationships
would be central to the project’s success. A few of the chiefs also mentioned that some

44
information technology personnel, as well as some police managers, are territorial with
respect to their data and may be reluctant to share information.
Three commanders indicated that turf battles among some agencies might hinder the
ability to share information, but they also said that the smaller departments recognize the
need to share because they lack resources to deal independently with information-related
problems. One commander mentioned that some people “think their information is top
secret and they are not willing to share.” The same commander also said that “the large
agencies were the ‘worst’ in terms of providing information…that it’s really, really,
really difficult.”
A commander in Glendale said that one of the barriers to data sharing is that lack of
standardized terminology. He mentioned that definitions vary across departments for
different data elements. He said that “it’s hard to move the data if we don’t have a
common name for something.”
We asked the chiefs where within their own agencies they might have problems with the
implementation of a data-sharing initiative. Without exception, chiefs indicated that this
would not be an issue, and that as far as they were concerned, there would be no
problems with the implementation of the West Valley data-sharing initiative. Almost all
of the responses were similar to the following: “Absolutely not. We would welcome it.
We want to be able to query other agencies reports. Our patrol guys need it the most. It is
good for officer safety and crime fighting.” Another chief similarly stated, “None. My
department is ready and waiting, and we want to move forward.” All of the chiefs
expressed the desire to participate in the initiative and stated that they would work to
resolve problems as they arose. They all emphasized that it is imperative that the data
initiative move forward and that they would strongly support it in any way that they
could.
Major Findings: Command Personnel
•
•
•
•
•

Most of the chiefs and commanders believe that their CAD/RMS data is valid and
reliable. However, four of the chiefs explained that there were inconsistencies
with the coding of offense data.
The most common type of data the chiefs and commanders rely on to make
decisions is CAD/RMS data, followed closely by data obtained directly from
crime reports or logs.
Interviews with the chiefs indicated that they use departmental data and
information primarily for the purpose of making administrative decisions rather
than for making decisions related to operations.
Half of the chiefs indicated that their agencies did not have the infrastructure or
capacity to map crime within their jurisdictions.
Chiefs stated that they most needed modus operandi (MO) information from other
agencies, followed closely by information on people who had had prior contact
with the criminal justice system.

45
•
•
•
•
•

Commanders need arrest histories and information on crime series in the West
Valley.
Half of the chiefs believe that the cost of implementing an information-sharing
system could be a deterrent.
Half believe that there might be administrative or management problems with the
development of a regional data-sharing initiative that could cause problems with
project implementation.
Some commanders believe that turf battles could hinder data sharing.
All of the chiefs stated that it is imperative that the data initiative move forward
and that they would strongly support it in any way that they could.

46

Section IX: Web Sites
We reviewed 47 Arizona agency Web sites that were identified on the Arizona
Department of Public Safety’s Web site (www.azdps.gov/information/default.asp), 69
Web site applications that were listed as potential solutions in the needs assessment
Scope of Work, and 27 information-sharing projects profiled on the Web site for Search,
Inc. (www.search.org/programs/info/resources.asp).
Of the 47 Arizona agency sites (listed in Appendix B: Reviewed Web Sites – Arizona):
•
•
•
•

74% were primarily static information or brochure-like Web sites.
51% provided data on crime statistics, although several had data that was at least
a year old.
15% provided crime maps, four of which were interactive and dynamic.
21% provided access to an online form of some type. Some of these were
downloadable PDF forms to complete and submit by mail or in person; others
could be completed online and submitted electronically.

Two sites were notable and should be considered for the WISE effort. One provides data
for multiple locations in a dynamic (data-driven) manner. The Tempe Web site provided
a link to another site, www.azcentral.com, where users can search for crimes reported in
the Phoenix area by city and zip code. This media-based site provides pinmaps for
Chandler, Gilbert, Glendale, Mesa, Peoria, Phoenix, and Tempe. Users can limit the
search to a time period: the prior month, 3 months, 6 months, or year. The pins on the
maps identify incidents as violent, property, or “other” crimes, and indicate the block of
the incident. Users can also list the data shown on the map.
A second site, the Chandler Police Department Web site, allows the public to obtain
police records online. In our interview with the Chandler records staff, we learned that
Chandler has outsourced this service to a private company. The company provides
redaction of information services and a way for members of the public to receive copies
of their police reports online, freeing police personnel time.
A review of the other 69 Web site applications (see Appendix B: Reviewed Web Sites –
National) yielded that:
•
•
•
•

23% of the Web sites have interactive, dynamic geographic information
applications.
9% have data on calls for service.
57% have data on reported crimes.
10% have data on persons of interest.

The Web sites most relevant to this effort were those that supported interagency sharing.
The Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS at www.arjis.org) is “a
complex criminal justice enterprise network utilized by 50 local, state and federal
agencies in the San Diego region.” According to information on the site, it includes a

47
secure intranet that “contains data on the region’s crime cases, arrests, citations, field
interviews, traffic accidents, fraudulent documents, photographs, gang information and
stolen property.” It provides a “single point of entry to query all regional justice data” and
is used for tactical analysis, investigations, statistical research, and crime analysis. From a
public view, it allows for the dynamic generation of maps and lists about crime problems
for 18 cities and San Diego County, as well as for numerous neighborhoods, police beats,
council districts, and other geographic areas. The East Valley Compass project at
www.citizencompass.org/compass/, involving 10 California East Valley cities, is similar
that of ARJIS.
From the Search, Inc. section on local profiles, we learned that many communities are
engaged in strategic planning to develop interagency criminal justice systems. However,
many of these efforts are focused on sharing information across the system among
police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections, rather than among police agencies. Of
particular interest to the West Valley effort is the Maricopa County Integrated Criminal
Justice Information System (ICJIS). Its purpose is to facilitate the integration of
information systems among the criminal justice agencies of Maricopa County. It is led by
a coalition of five primary criminal justice agencies within Maricopa County: the
Sheriff's Office, the prosecutor (County Attorney), indigent representation agencies
(Public Defender, Legal Defender, Office of Legal Advocate, and Office of Contract
Counsel), the Clerk of the Court, and the court system (Superior Court, Adult Probation,
Juvenile Probation, Justice Courts, and Pretrial Services). A bi-annual strategic business
plan was approved by participants in April 2005.
Other ongoing efforts similar to the West Valley project were the Texas Urban Counties
Common Integrated Justice System and the Shield plan. The Texas effort involves 13
urban counties and is focused on cost reduction and standardized work products. As of
2003, they were in the process of selecting a vendor to build the system. The Shield
project involved three metropolitan areas: New York City, the National Capitol Area (the
District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia), and Pennsylvania. It sought to
demonstrate real-time sharing of public safety, law enforcement, and justice information
across jurisdictions to help protect our nation against terrorist attacks and to enhance law
enforcement nationwide. As of September 2003, this effort was seeking to link the
partners’ existing local data-sharing networks into a multi-jurisdictional network across a
secure Internet connection.
In summary, our review of Web sites found that the criminal justice field is just
beginning to embrace Web-based technologies. Few models for creating a crossjurisdictional data warehouse exist. The West Valley partners are poised to be one of the
first groups to create a model for effectively sharing information.

48

Section X: Conclusions
This needs assessment has four major objectives:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Define the current technological environment within the West Valley.
Define how technology is used or consumed within the West Valley.
Identify current and future data-sharing needs of police agencies.
Determine whether there are any obstacles to regional information sharing within
the West Valley.

To accomplish these objectives, we conducted extensive interviews with nearly 240
members of the 10 West Valley, Phoenix, and Chandler police departments. We also
examined population forecasts, socio-demographic information, and crime data
associated with each of these agencies. We reviewed the Web sites of 47 Arizona police
agencies, 65 Web-based information-sharing projects from across the country, and 27
other state and local information-sharing projects identified by Search, Inc. From this
information we learned the following.
Existing Technological Infrastructure
• Technological resources are severely limited in some agencies, but in others,
potential for growth mirrors future population increases.
• Technology (hardware and software) for information sharing varies in
sophistication within the West Valley. Wickenburg, for example, has no CAD,
RMS or MDCs in patrol cars. At the other end of the spectrum is Glendale which
has CAD, RMS, MDCs, GIS, an interactive Web site, and a crime analyst.
• Some West Valley agencies are or will be able to share information through their
current systems. For example, El Mirage currently supports Youngtown through
its CAD system. Four agencies, Avondale, Buckeye, Surprise, and Tolleson, are
on the cusp of sharing information because all use the Spillman system. Glendale
is able to obtain information from Phoenix through PACE, and Peoria will soon
be able to share information with Phoenix through COPLINK.
• Eight of the 10 West Valley agencies have recently acquired or updated their
CAD/RMS systems. Many are still in the process of converting data and bringing
the systems to full operational capacity. Glendale plans to upgrade its CAD/RMS
over the next 5 years.
• No police department in the West Valley has an existing system readily capable
of collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and distributing information and knowledge
in an efficient and user-friendly manner to all of the involved agencies.
Identified Technology Needs
• Patrol officers in El Mirage, Youngtown, and presumably Wickenburg expressed
a need for MDCs in their cars.
• Investigators expressed a need for MDCs in their vehicles throughout the West
Valley.
• Youngtown and Wickenburg sought basic technology (e.g., CAD, RMS) for their
agencies.

49
•

Half of the chiefs and commanders sought mapping capabilities for their agencies.

Identified Data Needs
• Patrol officers and investigators want direct access to data about persons,
including an individual’s prior contact with police, criminal history, Field
Interview cards, photograph, aliases, associates, addresses, and outstanding
warrants.
• Patrol officers want access to Attempt to Locate suspect and vehicle information,
and knowledge about ongoing investigations.
• Investigators want information derived from Field Interview cards, access to
crime trend data from neighboring jurisdictions, and access to internal and
interagency RMS data in the field.
• Patrol officers and investigators both sought additional information from crime
analysts including mapping, crime trends, hot spots, and predictive information.
• Chiefs and commanders supported their officers’ requests for modus operandi
information and person data.
• Crime analysts indicated that person data, modus operandi information, and
address-level data were most needed.
Obstacles to Regional Information Sharing
• MO data was found to be unreliable and not valid in most of the study agencies.
• At least half of the agencies do not have the capacity to engage in place-based
(address-level) analysis.
• The cost of implementing an information-sharing system could be a deterrent for
some agencies to participate fully in WISE.
• Administrative and management problems with the development of a regional
data-sharing initiative could cause difficulties with project implementation.
• Issues of data management, data security, data ownership, quality control, system
maintenance, standardization of terminology, and training requirements need to
be discussed or they could derail the sharing of information.
• Turf battles among all levels of personnel could hinder data sharing.
• Some West Valley police agencies have already committed to costly information
systems, so they might not want to spend additional monies on yet another
information system.
Other Important Findings
• The population of the 10 West Valley jurisdictions will increase by at least 31%
from 2005 (625,440) to 2010 (817,300). If prognosticators are correct, then
Buckeye will triple in size and Goodyear and Surprise will see increases close to
50%.
•

All of the police chiefs in the West Valley feel that it is imperative that the data
initiative move forward and would strongly support it in any way that they could.

50

Section XI: Recommendations
The findings and conclusions of this study illustrate the diversity of the West Valley
police departments with respect to technology use, data needs, size, and growth. Some
agencies need more technology than others, but many of them do not have the resources
to obtain it. Some agencies are confronting phenomenal growth within the next few
years. How will they keep pace with a growing population and a growing department,
and anticipate the information needs of their officers while working with nine other
agencies? How does WISE balance the needs of the smaller agencies with those of the
larger ones? How does the group determine the direction of the data-sharing effort? In
addition to these issues, obstacles to regional information sharing must be short-circuited
before they emerge to overwhelm the project. What are the best methods for doing this?
The good news is that police chiefs in the West Valley are behind the initiative and are
willing to provide support for its furtherance.
Recommendations
At the conclusion of this needs assessment, based on our findings, we recommend the
following steps:
1. Create a governance structure to assure the success of the project. This should
include representation and leadership from the West Valley Chiefs of Police. We
recommend that the committee serve as a subcommittee for the Far West Valley
Chiefs Association to provide oversight and guidance for the WISE effort.
2. The subcommittee from the West Valley Chiefs Association should select a
project manager for the WISE initiative. It is recommended that this person be
independent of West Valley police agencies so that he or she can offer
independent and unbiased advice and direction. The project manager should be
responsible for guiding the strategic planning process, identifying money to
implement the WISE project, serving as liaison between the West Valley Chiefs
of Police and the WISE subcommittee, and for implementing the project.
3. Create a team or subcommittee from within WISE to initiate a strategic planning
process that will lead to the implementation of a West Valley-wide system and
intelligence-led policing efforts. This team would develop a strategic plan, based
upon the needs assessment, to bring to the WISE group for feedback and
approval. As noted previously, the strategic plan should have as a primary focus
the sharing of person-level data.
4. A written statement about the West Valley effort thus far to create an informationsharing initiative should be distributed to the public through local newspapers and
television stations. This not only will foster legitimacy for the West Valley
agencies and their chiefs, but it will convey information to other Maricopa County
law enforcement agencies about the growing organizational capacity and strength
of the West Valley.

51
5. Create an external advisory board. The board should be comprised of individuals
who have played a primary role in the creation of data-sharing projects within
their jurisdictions. This group will be able to provide WISE with valuable
experiential advice on how to proceed and how to address obstacles.
Recommended Next Steps
• Hire a project manager who is independent of West Valley police agencies.
• Develop a preliminary strategic plan for implementing the WISE project.
o Assign individuals from the WISE committee to a subcommittee for
accomplishing this task.
• Determine the timeline for the above two action steps.

52

References
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission. (2005). Arizona Crime Trends: A System Review.
Phoenix: Arizona Criminal Justice Commission.
Chau, M., Atabakhsh, H., Zeng, D., & Chen H. (2001, May 21-23). Building an
Infrastructure for Law Enforcement Information Sharing and Collaboration: Design
Issues and Challenges. Paper presented at the National Conference on Digital
Government, Los Angeles.
Cresswell, A. et al. (2005). Sharing Justice Information: A Capability Assessment
Toolkit. Washington DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance.
Harris, K. (2006). Strategic Planning: 10 Critical Success Factors and Sure-Fire Ways to
Fail! Presented at the Symposium on Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing,
Washington DC.
Ioimo, R. (2000). Applying the Theory of Task-Technology Fit in Assessing Police Use of
Field Computing. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Nova University.
MAG. (2006). A Resource for Policy Makers in the Maricopa Region (Maricopa
Association of Governments, January 2006 Regional Report) Phoenix, Arizona.
Peterson, M. (2005). Intelligence-Led Policing: the New Intelligence Architecture.
Washington DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance.
Romesburg, W. (2005). Law Enforcement Tech Guide for Small and Rural Police
Agencies. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
Zaworski, M. (2005). Assessing an Automated Information Sharing Technology in the
Post 9-11 Era. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Florida International University.

53

Appendix A
Interview Instruments

Patrol Instrument
1. What IT equipment do you currently have available?
2. Do you feel comfortable getting information from your system?
3. What specific information (i.e., people, places, property) can you obtain from
your system?
4. What information or resources do you have available in the office that are not
available in the field?
5. Is there information that you would like, but do not currently have available in the
field?
6. What information do you share with other officers and detectives within your own
agency?
7. What information do you want from other officers and detectives within your own
agency?
8. What information do you share with other jurisdictions?
9. What information do you want from other jurisdictions?
10. What information do you want from your crime analysts?
11. Have you received any training on responding to major incidents, for example, a
natural or man-made disaster? If “yes,” how much and what kind of training?
12. What information do you think would be important for you to respond to a major
incident, for example, a natural or man-made disaster?
13. If you had to select just one piece of information or data, or a resource that you do
not currently have available, what would you want?

54

Investigator Instrument
1. What IT equipment do you have available?
2. Do you feel comfortable getting information from your system?
3. What specific information (i.e., people, places, property, autos, mug shots) can
you obtain from your system?
4. Is there information (i.e., people, places, property, autos, mug shots) that you
would like, but do not currently have available to you in the field?
5. What information do you share with other officers and detectives in your agency?
6. What information do you want from other officers and detectives in your agency?
7. What information do you share with other jurisdictions?
8. What information do you want from other jurisdiction?
9. What information do you want from your crime analysts?
10. Do you have any unit-based databases? (What is in them, specifically?)
11. Are you willing to share these databases with other personnel in or out of your
agency?
12. Have you received any training on responding to major incidents, for example, a
natural or man-made disaster? If “yes,” how much and what kind of training?
13. What information do you think would be important in order for you to respond to
a major incident, for example, a natural or man-made disaster?
14. If you had to select just one piece of information or data, or a resource that you do
not currently have available to you, what would you want?

55
Crime Analyst Instrument
1. What kind of data do you use for analysis?
2. What software applications do you currently use for data sharing and/or terrorism
prevention?
3. What software applications or analytical methods would be most useful for
terrorism prevention?
4. Does the city have a GIS department and do you have access to it?
5. Do you use GIS? What software? Which version?
6. What data collection software do you use (CAD, RMS, others)?
7. How reliable, valid, and timely do you think your data are?
8. What piece of information is most neglected on reports?
9. What analytic software do you use (Access, GIS, Excel, other)?
10. What information (i.e., people, places, property, autos, mug shots) do you most
often use from your systems?
11. Is there information (i.e., people, places, property, autos) that you would like but
do not currently have available in the field?
12. What is the most applicable or useful software for sharing information across
jurisdictions?
13. What information do you share with other jurisdictions?
14. What information do you want from other jurisdiction?
15. What information do you share with other officers and detectives?
16. What information do you want from other officers and detectives, and what would
that be?
17. Who supports your CAD and RMS system?

56
CAD/RMS System Administrator Instrument
1. Who do you report to?
2. Describe your system or network and its capabilities?
3. How do you support your police agency?
4. What kind of support would you be able to provide to the West Valley datasharing initiative?
5. How reliable, valid, and timely do you think your data are?
6. Policies and procedures to data entry and changes, query?
7. What security requirements do you have for sharing information within and
across departments?
8. What big initiatives do you have going in the next 5 years?

57
Records and Communications Instrument
1. Show me the forms you guys enter.
2. How difficult is it for you to enter your data? What problems do you have?
3. What kind of backlog do you have?
4. How reliable, valid, and timely do you think your data is?
5. Where are your quality control checks?
6. Who do you routinely share data with?
7. Show me your policies and procedures for data entry.
8. What does the public ask for most often? How hard is it to provide to them?
9. What information do you regularly provide to the public?
10. Do you charge a fee for records to the public?
11. What is your view of allowing access to info on a Web-based system?
12. Do you think that you would save any time by providing this information on a
Web-based system?
13. What information do you regularly provide to officers or other officials?

58
Chiefs, Senior Executive, and Homeland Security Personnel Instrument
1. What reporting mechanisms do you currently use for data sharing and/or
homeland security?
2. What is your agency’s crime mapping capability and how do you use it?
3. How reliable, valid, and timely do you think your CAD/RMS data is?
4. What kind of information/data do you use for decision-making?
5. What information do you need for homeland security?
6. Are there any data that you are sharing with regard to homeland security
regionally, county-wide, or state-wide?
7. Where is the data that you are sharing coming from?
8. What information do you need from other jurisdictions?
9. What information (i.e., people, places, property, autos, mug shots) do you most
often use from your systems?
10. Is there any other information that you would like, but do not currently have
available to you?
11. What obstacles do you see in regional data sharing?
12. Where within your agency do your think you might have problems with the
implementation of a data-sharing initiative?

Appendix B
Reviewed Web Sites - National

Jurisdiction

Mesa

Scottsdale

South Tucson

Tempe

Berkeley

Corona

Daly City

St

Web Address

Description Of Site Contents

Notable
Sites

Calls for
service

Reported
Crimes

AZ

http://www.ci.mesa.
az.us/police/crime_
analysis/maps/mes
a_city_map_district
s.asp

Interactive of department districts. Map
is linked to beat stats from Oct-Dec '05
and residential burglary and stolen
vehicle locations, all in PDF format.

AZ

http://eservices.sco
ttsdaleaz.gov/cosm
ap/crimes/default.a
sp

Interactive pinmap w/ location, type,
and date of crime. Up-to-date within the
last 6 months.

AZ

http://www.southtuc
sonpolice.com/GISi
ntro.html

Out-of-date maps containing location of
Part 1 offenses.

√

AZ

http://www.tempe.g
ov/cau/crime_analy
sis_maps.htm

Interactive map of department beats.
Also contains limited (totals only) up-todate crime data.

√

CA

http://www.ci.berkel
ey.ca.us/police/crim
estats/crimestatma
p.html

Interactive Pin District map linked to
limited (totals) out of date Part 1
offenses data.

√

CA

http://www.discover
corona.com/depts/p
d/crimestats.cfm

Semi-interactive with "Zone" (district)
map and limited (totals) crime data in
the form of a bar graph.

√

CA

http://www.ci.dalycity.ca.us/resident/f
rame.htm

Interactive pin district map linked to
crime data containing address, call
type, and date/time. Jan '02-Apr '05.

√

Persons

√

√

√

59

Jurisdiction

St

Web Address

Description Of Site Contents

CA

http://www.fontan
a.org/police/crime
_mapping.htm

Interactive Pin "COMPASS" map with
locations of calls for service, "crime
event," and "enforcement activity."

CA

http://www.fremo
ntpolice.org/meg
an/megan.html

No maps. Only basic crime stat totals
for '00-'05.

Fresno

CA

http://www.fresno
.gov/fpd/
(UPDATED URL)

PDFs with crime statistics and maps
containing locations of various crime
types. 2005 data.

Huntington
Beach

CA

http://www.hbpd.
org/indexg2.htm

No maps. Only basic Part 1 crime
totals for '01-'05.

CA

http://gismap.co.l
a.ca.us/sols/defa
ult.htm

Interactive pinmap with sex offender
releasee info including address and
offense info. Also contains offender
location in relation to schools.

√

CA

http://www.oaklan
dnet.com/cw/Disc
laimer.jsp
(UPDATED URL)

Interactive "CRIMESTAT" map with
locations of crimes.

√

CA

http://www.ci.onta
rio.ca.us/index.cf
m/2981

No maps. Only Part 1 crime and
traffic accident totals from '01-'03.

Oxnard

CA

http://www.oxnar
dpd.org/CrimeCa
mera/crimemap.h
tm

Interactive Pinbeat map linked to
crime data.

√

Redding

CA

http://rpdmaps.ci.
redding.ca.us/

Same site as Los Angeles County.

√

Fontana

Fremont

Los Angeles
County

Oakland

Ontario

Notable
Sites

Calls for
service

Reported
Crimes

√

√

√

Persons

√

√

√

√

√

60

Jurisdiction

Riverside
County

Sacramento

Salinas
San Diego
County
San Diego
County

Santa Rosa

Visalia

Boulder

St

Web Address

Description Of Site Contents

CA

http://216.57.210.
151/riverside/jsp/i
ndex.jsp

Same site as Los Angeles County.

CA

http://gis.cityofsa
cramento.org/We
b site/sacpd/

Interactive pinmap with a query builder.

CA

http://crimemap.ci
.salinas.ca.us/

Not up-to-date re: stats. Latest available
are 2004 Part 1, Part 2, Misc, and
"burglary summary." Site says there is
an Interactive Pincrime map, but the
server is always busy.

CA

http://www.arjis.o
rg/mapping/help/
disclaimer.html

Interactive Pinmap with locations of
crimes and linked data on crime time
and block address.

CA

http://www.arjis.o
rg/SDCRPinMap
Entry.html

CA

Notable
Sites

Calls for
service

Reported
Crimes

Persons

√

√

Same site as Los Angeles County.

√

√

http://ci.santarosa.ca.us/pd/29
0pc/index.html

Linked to Megan's Law Web site (same
as others). No other crime stats
anywhere.

√

√

CA

http://www.vpd.ci.
visalia.ca.us/

Interactive pinmap with crime incident
location linked to offense info and date.
Up-to-date. Site also has Part 1 crime
stats for '03-'05 and "tracking trends for
COPPS" stats.

√

√

CO

http://www.ci.boul
der.co.us/police/c
rime/crime_map_
flash.htm

Interactive pinmap with current week’s
crime incident locations. Also has map
of districts.

√

√

√

61

Jurisdiction

Colorado
Springs

Golden

Longmont

Washington

Fort
Lauderdale
Port St.
Lucie

Atlanta

St

Web Address

Description Of Site Contents

CO

http://www.springsgo
v.com/Page.asp?Nav
ID=348

PDF maps of burglaries (motor vehicle),
burglaries, MV theft, robberies, and
vandalism locations, by week since
beginning of '06. Also has .asp map of
meth lab seizures to date for '03-'05.

CO

http://ci.golden.co.us/
dept/police/crimemap
/crimemaps.htm

No crime stats or crime maps. City Web
site has GIS link, but no crime maps
available.

CO

http://www.ci.longmo
nt.co.us/police/crimeu
pdate/map.htm

Semi-interactive pinsite with assault,
burglary, car break-ins, motor vehicle
thefts, mischief/vandalism, and sexual
assault incident locations. Also has Part
1 crime stat totals for '01-'05.

√

DC

http://mpdc.dc.gov/inf
o/districts/districts.sht
m

Citywide up-to-date monthly crime stats
and static maps of district and defined
district "hot spot areas

√

FL

http://ci.ftlaud.fl.us/pol
ice/mapflpd.html

Graphic map of districts. Citywide
Violent and Non-Violent Crime stats '00'05, Part 1 crime data, arrests, and
service calls; all up-to-date.

FL

http://www.cityofpsl.c
om/PSLCops/index.ht
m

Interactive map of districts and zones.
Site also contains basic crime stats by
district.

http://www.atlantapd.
org/index.asp?nav=cr
imemaps

Interactive pinmap with basic crime
incident locations and Interactive
Pindistrict map linked to commander
and contact info. Also has UCR report
for '02-'05.

GA

Notable
Sites

Calls for
service

Reported
Crimes

Persons

√

√

√

√

√

√

62

Jurisdiction

Web Address

Description Of Site Contents

IL

http://12.17.79.6/

Interactive pinmap with crime incident
location linked to crime classification. Upto-date. Also has an Interactive pin "safe
passage program map" for safe routes to
schools.

IL

http://samnet.isp.
state.il.us/statepo
lice/images/sami
ntro.htm

Detailed up-to-date sexual offender
database with offender locations and
offense info. UCR data from 1997-2004.
No maps.

IN

http://www.evans
villepolice.com/cri
me_analysis.htm

Interactive pinmap of crime incident
locations linked to crime description and
date/time of incident. Up-to-date.

√

IN

http://arcimsnt1.in
dygov.org/prod/in
cident/

Interactive pinmap of crime incident
locations linked to description, incident
address, date/time, and case #. Also has
Interactive Pin"crime view community"
map that seems to have similar data, but
in relation to schools, etc. and is better
quality.

√

KS

http://65.70.140.1
07/Web
site/lencrime/inde
x.html#

Interactive pinmap of crime incident
locations linked to date of incident. Up-todate.

Wichita

KS

http://www.wichit
apolice.com/Ther
matic_Maps/stats
.htm

Semi-interactive map of "reporting areas"
linked to crime stat totals. Also has JPG
thematic maps of various crimes.

Lexington

KY

http://crimewatch.
lfucg.com/

Interactive pinmap with locations of
crimes but no linked data.

Chicago

Illinois State
Police

Evansville

Indianapolis

Lenexa

St

Notable
Sites

Calls for
service

Reported
Crimes

Persons

√

√

√

√

√

63

Jurisdiction

St

Web Address

Description Of Site Contents

LA

http://www.jpso.c
om/mo_ims/jpso_
web/zipcode_star
t.htm

Interactive pinmap with locations of
crime incidents linked to address,
time/date. Shows surrounding
schools and parks.

LA

http://www.neworleans.la.us/cno
web/nopd/maps/b
asecrimemap.ht
ml

Not currently available.

MA

http://www.ci.cam
bridge.ma.us/~C
PD/reports/2003/f
irst%20quarter%
20report/index.ht
ml

Semi-interactive department map
linked to PDF '04 reports containing
maps and other year-end info.

MA

http://www.danve
rspolice.com/anal
ysis.htm

Contains links to other crime
analysis pages such as the Crime
Mapping Research Center at NIJ.

MD

http://141.157.54.
34/bpdmaps/

Interactive pinmap with locations of
crime incidents linked to address,
time/date, and crime description.
Shows surrounding schools, police
stations, and parks.

Detroit

MI

http://www.ci.detr
oit.mi.us/police/p
olice/compstat.ht
m

UCR data from '90-'04 plus some
charts/graphs of stats.

Lansing

MI

http://www.lansin
gpolice.com/

Interactive pinmap with crime
incident locations.

Jefferson
Parish

New Orleans

Cambridge

Danvers

Baltimore

Notable
Sites

√

Calls for
service

Reported
Crimes

Persons

√

√

64

Jurisdiction

St. Louis
CharlotteMecklenburg

Lincoln

Albuquerque

Hobbs

Cincinnati

Columbus
Oklahoma
City

St

Notable
Sites

Calls for
service

Reported
Crimes

Web Address

Description Of Site Contents

MO

http://64.218.68.50/
stlouis/newslmpd/vi
ewer.htm

Interactive pinmap with locations of
crime incidents linked to address,
time/date, and crime description.

NC

http://baffle.pfeiffer.
edu/

Interactive pinmap with crime incident
locations. Shows surrounding schools,
police stations, and hospitals.

NE

http://ims.ci.lincoln.
ne.us/CVCommunit
y/

"Crime View Community" map,
interactive, with locations of crime
incidents linked to time/date and crime
description.

NM

http://www.cabq.go
v/police/statistics/in
dex.html (Updated
URL)

Neighborhood and beat crime stats
only. No maps.

√

NM

http://www.hobbspd
.com/crimestats.ht
m (Updated URL)

Graphic maps of auto burglary,
commercial burglary, residential
burglary, and traffic accidents. Also has
current crime stats including types of
force used.

√

OH

http://www.cincinna
ti-oh.gov/pages/282-/

PDF report contains hot spot maps. Site
contains elaborate up-to-date Part 1 & 2
offense stats.

OH

http://www.columbu
spolice.org/precinct
stats/

No crime stats.

OK

http://www3.kwtv.c
om/television/

Interactive pinmap with crime incident
locations linked to address info. Uses
ESRI map objects.

Persons

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

65

Jurisdiction

Tulsa

Beaverton
Police

Portland

Pennsylvania
State Police

Memphis

Nashville

Austin

St

Notable
Sites

Calls for
service

Reported
Crimes

Web Address

Description Of Site Contents

OK

http://www.tulsapoli
ce.org/mapcentral.
html

Interactive pinmaps with locations of
crime incidents linked to address,
time/date, and crime description.
Separate maps for current crime, '04 &
'05 crime, meth lab locations, traffic
collisions, and sex offenders.

OR

http://www.ci.beave
rton.or.us/departme
nts/police/crime/#m
aps

PDF crime maps by district with incident
locations. Also has PDF version of crime
stats by district.

√

OR

http://www.cgis.ci.p
ortland.or.us/maps/
police/

Density maps of total crime summary for
year and semi-interactive pinmaps with
incident locations.

√

PA

http://ucrreport.psp.
state.pa.us/UCR/R
eporting/GIS/GisMa
in.asp

Density maps of total crime summary for
year and semi-interactive pinmaps with
incident locations.

TN

https://crimemappe
r.memphispolice.or
g/crimemapper/ind
ex.cfm

Density maps containing total offenses,
total offense per 10,000 pop, total
offense/law enforcement officers, and law
enforcement staff per 10,000.

TN

http://www.police.n
ashville.org/stats/m
aps/sectors.htm

Interactive, up-to-date crime pinmap and
UCR stats

TX

http://www.ci.austin
.tx.us/police/crimein
formation

Interactive map linked to crime counts.
Does not have incident locations mapped.

√

Persons

√

√

66

Jurisdiction

Notable
Sites

Calls for
service

Reported
Crimes

Web Address

Description Of Site Contents

TX

http://www.ci.dallas.tx
.us/dpd/stat_decision.
htm

Interactive beat map linked to
beat's crime data.

√

TX

http://maps.sanantoni
o.gov/Web
site/sapducr/viewer.a
sp

SAPD Uniform Crime Report Web
site - interactive pinmap with
crime incident locations linked to
incident info.

√

UT

http://www.slsheriff.or
g/html/stats/communi
ty_stats.html

Graphic map with quarterly or
monthly crime stats and incident
locations.

VA

http://www.co.stafford
.va.us/sheriff/map.ht
m

No crime stats or map

WA

http://www.co.pierce.
wa.us/pc/abtus/ouror
g/sheriff/default.htm

Interactive pinmap of incident
locations with links to stats w/in a
certain radius of the area.

WA

http://gis.co.snohomis
h.wa.us/maps/rso/ind
ex.htm

Interactive pinmap with sex
offender releasee locations linked
to detailed offender info.

Spokane

WA

http://www.spokanep
olice.org/weeklymap.
htm

Interactive pinmap with incident
locations linked to a crime
summary.

Philadelphia
PD

PA

www.cml.upenn.edu/
crimebase

Interactive density maps linked to
crime summary data for '98-'04

Dallas

San Antonio
Salt Lake
County
Stafford
County
Pierce
County
Snohomish
County

St

Persons

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√

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67

Reviewed Web Sites - Arizona

Jurisdiction

Web Address

Apache County
Sheriff's Office
(Saint Johns)

www.apacheone.com

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Apache
Junction PD

www.ajcity.net/police/public_safety.
htm

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Avondale PD

www.ci.avondale.az.us/index.asp?
NID=7 8

Monthly crime
stats in PDFs

√

Bullhead City
PD

www.bullheadcity.com/police/index.
asp

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Carefree Town
Marshal's
Office

www.carefree.org/index.asp?Type=
B_L ST&SEC={5FDB2E4B-6EB444A9-8926CE16F1303FF3}

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

www.ci.casagrande.az.us/cgpd/cgp
d.php

Static page - no
crime statistics,
Online Complaint
and Crime Report
Forms for
property crime
under $250

√

Casa Grande
PD

Description Of Site Contents

Notable
Site

Brochure
Type Site

Crime
Statistics

Crime
Maps

Interactive
Crime Map

Online
Reporting

√

√

68

Jurisdiction

Chandler PD

Clarkdale PD
Cochise County
Sheriff's Office
(Bisbee)
Coconino
County Sheriff's
Office
(Flagstaff)

Web Address

Description Of Site
Contents

Notable
Site

www.chandlerpd.com

Order Online
Reports; Several
Online Forms;
Corona Solution
Interactive Map and
reports on calls for
service in prior week
& previous 12
months - Powered
by CADMine; Alarms
data for year

√

www.clarkdale.az.us/policedept.htm
l

Static Page - Bike
Registration Form
and House Watch
Form (PDFs)

√

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

http://209.180.126.252/Sheriff/Defa
ult.ht m

Brochure
Type Site

http://co.coconino.az.us/sheriff.aspx

Web site down

Cottonwood PD

www.cottonwoodpd.org/frames.htm

Static Page - Crime
Stats last updated in
2002

√

Douglas PD

www.douglasaz.gov/PoliceDepartm
ent/P oliceDepartment.htm

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Crime
Statistics

Crime
Maps

√

√

Interactive
Crime Map

√

Online
Reporting

√
√

√

69

Jurisdiction

Web Address

Description Of Site
Contents

Eagar PD

www.eagar.com/public_safetypolice.htm

Static page with
police blotter -- list of
arrests similar to
newspaper

Fountain Hills
Marshal's
Department

www.fh.az.gov/PublicSafety/default.
asp

Link to Maricopa
County Sheriffs

www.ci.gilbert.az.us/police/default.c
fm

Static pages Graphic maps with
crime stats

Gilbert PD

Notable
Site

Brochure
Type Site

Crime
Statistics

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

Glendale PD

www.ci.glendale.az.us/police

Interactive grid map
-- pulls crime stats
by month and grid
area. No GIS
mapping. UCR
missing; PDF Crime
Clock, Forms, 2003
Performance Report;
File an online crime
report on accidents,

Goodyear PD

http://www.ci.goodyear.az.us/index.
asp? NID=14

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

La Paz County
Sheriff's Office
(Parker)

www.co.la-paz.az.us/sheriff.htm

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Maricopa
County Sheriff's
Office
(Phoenix)

www.mcso.org/

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Crime
Maps

Interactive
Crime Map

Online
Reporting

√

√

70

Jurisdiction

Web Address

Description Of Site
Contents

Mesa PD

www.cityofmesa.org/police/default.
asp

Large Web site online reporting
forms; grid maps
with updated PDFs
of maps with crimes
by beat (quarterly Dec 2005); PDFs of
density maps

Metropolitan
Area Narcotics
Trafficking
Interdiction
Squads
(MANTIS)
(Tucson/Pima)

www.ci.tucson.az.us/mantis/

Static page with links
to departments and
description of drugs

Mohave County
Sheriff's Office
(Kingman)

www.co.mohave.az.us/1moweb/de
pts_fies/sheriff_files/about_sheriff.h
tm

Static page - no
crime statistics

Northern
Arizona
University PD
(Flagstaff)

www.nau.edu/~naupd/

PDF of 2005 Crime
Report; Online
Crime Report Form;
Daily Crime Log

Oro Valley PD

www.ovpd.org/

Static Table of
Incidents and
Offenses through
July 05; Static Table
of Police Activity, i.e.
calls for service, etc.
through Feb 06

Notable
Site

Brochure
Type Site

Crime
Statistics

Crime
Maps

√

√

Interactive
Crime Map

Online
Reporting

√

√

√
√

√

√

√
√

71

Jurisdiction

Web Address

Description Of Site
Contents

Notable
Site

Brochure
Type Site

Paradise Valley
PD

www.ci.paradisevalley.az.us/police/

Static Table Crime
Stats per month Feb 06; Static Excel
Crime Graphs

√

Payson PD

http://www.ci.payson.az.us/Depart
ments/ police/pd-home.htm

Static page - 2004
Annual Report in
PDF

√

Peoria PD

http://www.peoriaaz.com/index1.ht
m

Static Table of Part 1
Crimes 2005;
Burglaries by week
(Mar 15-21' 06),
PDF; Calls for
service on
interactive map -- list
of calls (2005)

Phoenix PD

www.ci.phoenix.az.us/POLICE/inde
x.htm l

Crime stats
interactive - 2002;
PDF UCR 2005;
PDF Jan 2006 UCR
Report; PDFs of
Hotspot Maps, Sept
'05

Pima
Community
College DPS
(Tucson)

www.pima.edu/dps/

2004 Annual Report
- PDF; Monthly Log PDF -Jan 06

Pima County
Sheriff's Office
(Tucson)

www.pimasheriff.org/

Static Tables of UCR
Crimes by month
Feb 06

Pinal County
Sheriff's Office
(Florence)

http://co.pinal.az.us/sheriff/

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

√
√

Crime
Statistics

Crime
Maps

Interactive
Crime Map

Online
Reporting

√
√
√

√

√

√

√

√
√

√

72

Jurisdiction

Web Address

Description Of Site
Contents

Prescott PD

http://www.cityofprescott.net/servic
es/pol ce/

Prescott Valley
PD

Notable
Site

Brochure
Type Site

Crime
Statistics

Static Table of UCR
Crimes through 2005

√

√

http://www.pvaz.net/Services/police
/inde x.htm

Static Table of UCR
Crimes for Aug'
2005

√

√

Saint Johns PD

www.stjohnsaz.com/public_safety.h
tm

Static Table/ Graph
of 2004 UCR Crime
Data

√

√

Scottsdale PD

www.ci.scottsdale.az.us/police/

Interactive GIS
Mapping Application
using AutoDesk
Mapping From city
Web site; Static
Table UCR 2004;
Static Table of Auto
Thefts by Zip &
Burglaries 2005

Sedona PD

http://www.sedonaaz.gov/egov/dep
artme nt.aspx?dID=357

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Show Low PD

http://www.ci.showlow.az.us/depart
ments/police/index.htm

Static page - no
crime statistics; Few
online forms - No
report of crime

√

Sierra Vista PD

www.ci.sierravista.az.us/Police/inde
x.htm

2004 Annual Report
on Crime Statistics
(PDF)

√

√

South Tucson
PD

www.tucson.com/stpd

2004 Part One GIS
Crime Maps - Static
images by quarter

√

√

√

Crime
Maps

Interactive
Crime Map

Online
Reporting

√

√

73

Jurisdiction

Web Address

Description Of Site
Contents

Notable
Site

Brochure
Type Site

Crime
Statistics

Crime
Maps

Springerville
PD

www.springerville.com/public_safet
ypolice.htm

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Surprise PD

http://www.surpriseaz.com/index.as
p?N D=22

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Tempe PD

www.tempe.gov/police/

Online forms for
some criminal
activity; Alarms &
Payment Form;
Crime Prevention
Forms; Traffic
Complaints;
Extensive Crime
Analysis Site Updated PDFs; Link
to
www.azcentral.com
crime mapping; Calls
for service by beat interactive and upto-date

Tucson PD

http://www.ci.tucson.az.us/police/in
dex.p hp

Interactive Crime
Statistics; 2004
Density Maps of
Crime PDF;
Comprehensive site
- difficulty pulling
data by
neighborhoods:
Online Crime
Reporting

Interactive
Crime Map

Online
Reporting

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

74

Jurisdiction

Web Address

Description Of Site
Contents

Notable
Site

Brochure
Type Site

University of
Arizona PD
(Tucson)

www.uapd.arizona.edu/

Static Crime Stats
Table (2003); Daily
Activity Log (Mar
2006); 2005 Annual
Report (PDF)

√

Yavapai County
Sheriff's Office
(Prescott)

www.yumacountysheriff.org/index.h
tml

Static pages - no
crime statistics;
County site has
interactive GIS, but
no crime

√

Yuma PD

http://www.ci.yuma.az.us/coypd/

Static page - no
crime statistics

√

Yuma County
SO (Yuma)

http://www.yumacountysheriff.org/

2004 Annual Report
(PDF); Online Forms
for Accidents; Report
Request, etc.

Crime
Statistics

Crime
Maps

Interactive
Crime Map

Online
Reporting

√

√

√

75